Free Republic

Russian blogger:

A message was left at Prigozhin’s grave on his birthday.

The day before, in St. Petersburg, many people came to the Porokhovskoye cemetery to honor the memory of Yevgeny Prigozhin. June 1 was the birthday of the creator of the Wagner PMC; he would have turned 63 years old. Flowers were brought to his grave all day long. Mostly men in camouflage and with patches of the Wagner PMC. They came in groups, sometimes families. The police and FSB officers in plain clothes kept order.

At the end of the day, cemetery staff found a note among the flowers. “Prigozhin is alive. We will take revenge.” It is not clear who left it. The authorities did not notice; now they will monitor the surveillance cameras. The reason for such activity of the organs is clear - this is the second message in two months with similar content .

By the way, who will take revenge on whom is also not clear. However, it is no secret that Prigozhin died under extremely strange circumstances. His plane crashed in the Tver region. Companions of the former owner of the Wagner PMC blame several people at the top, including Sergei Shoigu. However, after the death of Prigozhin and several prominent leaders of Wagner, the structure of the PMC changed greatly, some of the units came under the control of the Ministry of Defense.

At the same time, we recently told you that on the eve of the anniversary of that very rebellion, the FSB plans to take Prigozhin’s associates under special control .

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4182

As Russians do not trust their mass media, rumors abound with conspiracy theories like the one about Prigozhin being alive, and many of them hope that a strong leader will replace the current weak Tsar.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1, 2024

The current lack of clarity about US restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory misses an opportunity to deter further Russian offensive efforts across the border into northern Ukraine. US National Security Council Director for Europe Michael Carpenter told the Voice of America in an interview published on May 31 that the US policy allowing Ukrainian forces to strike certain Russian military targets in Russia “applies to counter-fire capabilities that are deployed just across the [Ukrainian] border [into Russia]” and “is meant to enable Ukrainians to defend themselves against what would otherwise be a Russian sanctuary across the border.”[7] Responding to a question about whether this policy permits Ukrainian strikes with US-provided weapons across the border from Sumy Oblast, Carpenter responded vaguely “yes, across the border for Russian attacks that are coming across, where otherwise Russians would enjoy a relative sanctuary.” Politico reported on May 31 citing two people close to the Ukrainian presidential administration that Ukrainian officials are frustrated that Ukrainian forces are “restricted to the border area in Kharkiv [Oblast]” when using US-provided weapons to strike Russian territory, however.[8] Carpenter’s comments and the Politico report together suggest there is ambiguity on what the US has explicitly authorized regarding these strikes amid signaling that the US is open to expanding these authorizations to other areas in Ukraine should Russian forces launch offensive operations elsewhere along the international border area.

This US ambiguity misses an opportunity to deter Russian preparations for offensive operations elsewhere across the border into northern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have recently warned that Russian forces are also concentrating forces in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts across the border from Sumy Oblast, and ISW has previously assessed that even a limited grouping would achieve its desired effect of drawing and fixing Ukrainian forces to this area.[9] The Kremlin may decide to launch offensive operations in different Ukrainian border oblasts outside of Kharkiv Oblast if it believes it can continue to mass forces across the border without risk of Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian forces would be forced to defend against such offensive operations before the US grants explicit authorization necessary for cross-border strikes outside of areas bordering Kharkiv Oblast. The increased likelihood of other Russian offensive operations in northern Ukraine would require Ukrainian forces to reallocate existing resources to deter or defend against the offensive operations, creating opportunities for Russian forces elsewhere in the theater to exploit. US clarity that Ukraine can use US-provided weapons against Russian ground forces concentrations in Russia that appear to be preparing for imminent cross-border operations would likely change Russian commanders’ calculations about the wisdom of making such ostentatious preparations. ISW continues to assess that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets in Russia’s operational and deep rear with US-provided weapons.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2024

Former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has registered his candidature in the June 28 snap #election. He served two terms in office from 2005 to 2013 and is now seeking a third term. The Guardian Council barred him from running in the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections.

https://x.com/h2newsagency/status/1797155411151270359

Iran Update, June 1, 2024

The Houthis launched one drone from Houthi-controlled Yemen into the Red Sea on May 31.[29] CENTCOM reported that the drone crashed in the Red Sea without causing damage to any surrounding vessels. The Houthis also launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) into the Gulf of Aden from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on May 31. CENTCOM reported that the missiles did not cause any injuries or damage to vessels in the area.

CENTCOM intercepted one drone over the Gulf of Aden and three drones over the Red Sea on May 31.[30]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-1-2024

North Korea has no reactor for electricity production.

https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-reactor-nuclear-south-defense-minister-92b49577b1daac9b9585bfb14fcac626

Genome size diversity across eukaryotes



(A) Current distribution of genome sizes across major lineages of plants, animals, and fungi.
(B) Top 10 of the largest genome size records available in eukaryotes.

https://www.cell.com/iscience/fulltext/S2589-0042(24)01111-8

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31, 2024

Russia's continued efforts to rally Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member countries around an imagined confrontation with the West likely stems from Russian concerns about the CSTO’s longevity as a vector for Russian influence. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov addressed a meeting of the CSTO Council of Defense Ministers in Almaty, Kazakhstan on May 31 and claimed that a tense situation in Eastern Europe and an alleged NATO military buildup threaten the security of CSTO members.[22] Belousov alleged that the US and its allies are a destabilizing geopolitical force and that NATO countries seek to strengthen their positions in the Caucasus and gain access to resources in the Caspian Sea and direct access to Central Asia.[23] Belousov warned that the West has unleashed an information war and sanctions against CSTO members to undermine the organization and called on CSTO members to coordinate their foreign policies to present a united front.[24] Belousov stated that Russia is specifically concerned about alleged US and NATO plans to involve nominal CSTO member Armenia in the West's sphere of interest.[25] Armenia has effectively ceased participation in the CSTO following Russia's failure to prevent Armenia's loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia remains a CSTO member only in name.[26] The Kremlin has explicitly threatened Armenia if Armenia does not resume active engagement in the CSTO and return to a pro-Kremlin alignment.[27] Armenia has specifically questioned the value of its CSTO membership following the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Kremlin is likely concerned that deteriorating relations with Armenia could prompt other CSTO members to question the utility of their CSTO membership.[28] Recent tensions in the Russian-Tajik relationship following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack and Central Asian concerns about the impacts of secondary sanctions may be incentivizing the Kremlin to intensify efforts to convince CSTO members that the organization and their involvement in other Russian-led multilateral organizations is worthwhile.[29]

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are unlikely to buy into the Kremlin's imagined geopolitical confrontation with the West, and the Kremlin will likely have to offer more concrete promises to maintain the CSTO as a viable collective security organization oriented around Russian interests. Belousov met with Tajikistani Defense Minister Sherali Mirzo in a bilateral meeting on May 31 and stressed that the CSTO will address the escalating situation on the CSTO’s southern border.[30] Belousov claimed that the situation in Afghanistan and the threat of terrorism remain the main sources of instability in Central Asia and that the CSTO must have timely responses to this threat, including strengthening the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border.[31] Russia is currently considering delisting the Taliban as a prohibited organization and will likely strengthen cooperation with the Taliban to combat the Islamic State's Afghan branch IS-Khorasan (IS-K), which conducted the Crocus City Hall attack.[32] IS-K recruited Tajikistani citizens for the Crocus City Hall attack, and Tajikistan likely views multilateral counterterrorism operations as a way to repair strained relations with Russia while also combating transnational terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan.[33] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the Russian Security Council on May 31 and also emphasized strengthening international cooperation on counterterrorism.[34] Other Central Asian states, including CSTO members Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, likely view Russian offers for counterterrorism cooperation as attractive benefits of continued security relations with Russia.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2024

Members of the IRGC and the Tehran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah have been killed in the US-British joint airstrikes against the positions of Houthis in Yemen, AlArabiya reported, citing unnamed sources. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards forces are present in Yemen, “serving side by side” with the Houthis, the deputy commander of US Central Command had revealed in February.

https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1796599071706144990

Iran Update, May 31, 2024

Candidates have continued registering for the upcoming Iranian presidential election.[23] Among the candidates who registered on May 31 are two prominent moderate politicians: Ali Larijani and Abdol Nasser Hemmati. Presidential candidates have until June 3 to register, after which the Guardian Council will vet and approve candidates. The Guardian Council has historically disqualified moderate and reformist figures during this period to advantage hardliners in the race.

The following individuals registered on May 31:

Ali Larijani. Larijani is a prominent moderate politician who served as the Iranian parliament speaker from 2008 to 2020.[24] Larijani also served as both the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council and lead nuclear negotiator from 2005 to 2007.[25] Larijani previously ran for president in 2005 and 2021. The Guardian Council allowed him to run in 2005 but barred him in 2021 on unclear grounds.[26] Ali is part of the influential and well-connected Larijani family in Iran. Ali's brother, Sadegh Amoli Larijani, is the current head of the Expediency Discernment Council, which is an advisory board to the supreme leader. Sadegh Amoli Larijani also served as the judiciary chief from 2009 to 2019.

Abdol Nasser Hemmati. Hemmati is a moderate politician who served as the governor of the US-sanctioned Central Bank of Iran from 2018 to 2021 under then-President Hassan Rouhani.[27] Former President Hassan Rouhani appointed Hemmati to the Central Bank Governor position. Hemmati ran for president in 2021.[28] He received the third most votes after Ebrahim Raisi and former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei.[29]

Mahmoud Ahmadi Bighosh. Bighosh is a hardline politician who represented Markazi Province in Parliament from 2009 to 2012 and additionally from 2020 to 2024.[30] Bighosh was part of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee while in Parliament. Bighoush also served as the governor of North Khorasan Province from 2012 to 2013.[31]

Mohammad Khoshchehreh. Khoshchehreh is a hardline politician who represented Tehran Province in Parliament from 2004 to 2008.[32] Khoshchehreh previously supported President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but became an outspoken critic of Ahmadinejad three months into his presidency.[33] Khoshchehreh is a well-known economist and urban planner.

Larijani could be a particularly strong contender for the presidency given his deep connections in the Iranian political and security establishment. Those connections could prove useful, given that the Iranian regime manipulates elections to install favored candidates. Larijani has framed his candidacy in recent days around bolstering Iranian defense and national security, improving the economy, and managing US sanctions.[34] An anonymous Iranian official told Reuters that the Guardian Council would allow Larijani to run despite disqualifying him during the 2021 race.[35] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Guardian Council could permit Larijani to run to diversify the field of candidates beyond just hardliners and encourage voter participation, which has hit record lows repeatedly in recent years.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-31-2024

Russian blogger:

Putin reprimanded Peskov for speaking about a “senseless war.”

Vladimir Putin did not like Dmitry Peskov’s statement that the war in Ukraine is “senseless.” He personally called Peskov and expressed a number of wishes to him.

“Dmitry Sergeevich, you are an experienced and talented speaker. You need to formulate your thoughts more clearly, by God,” the president said.

Let us recall that Peskov spoke about the supply of weapons to Ukraine from the United States and other allies for attacks on Russia. Thus, Peskov said, NATO countries are provoking Ukraine to continue the “senseless war” and “a new level of tension.”

It's true, it's not entirely clear how such an experienced press secretary as Peskov could say such nonsense. After all, the Northern Military District began with certain goals, how can you call the war in Ukraine senseless? Here, of course, there could be a joke that Peskov would be imprisoned for discrediting the Russian army, but I would not want to joke about the topic of war, when hundreds and thousands of our soldiers are dying.

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4172

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 30, 2024

NATO member states reportedly lack sufficient air defense capabilities to protect members of the Alliance in Central and Eastern Europe in the event of a full-scale attack. The Financial Times (FT) reported on May 29, citing people familiar with confidential 2023 NATO defense plans, that NATO countries can provide “less than five percent of air defense capacities deemed necessary” to protect NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe against a full-scale attack.”[22] A senior NATO official told FT that NATO currently does not have the ability to defend against missile and air strikes in Eastern Europe, but that these capabilities are a “major part” of NATO’s plan to defend Eastern Europe from a potential invasion. Another NATO official stated that air defense is “one of the biggest holes [that NATO has].” ISW continues to assess that NATO rearmament is necessary to deter — and if necessary, defeat — any future Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank, given that Kremlin officials are increasingly threatening NATO member states, and NATO and its member states are increasingly warning of Russian sabotage and hybrid operations against NATO members in their territory.[23] Continued Western military support for Ukraine directly contributes to pushing Russia’s air defense network east and away from NATO members, given that a Russian military victory in Ukraine would allow Russian forces to station long-range systems in occupied Ukraine to further threaten NATO’s eastern flank.[24]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024

Iran Update, May 30, 2024

The registration period for the Iranian presidential election began on May 30.[13] Only one prominent individual, hardliner Saeed Jalili, has registered thus far. Presidential candidates have until June 3 to register, after which the Guardian Council will vet and approve candidates. The Guardian Council has historically disqualified moderate and reformist figures during this period in order to advantage hardliners in the race.

The following individuals have registered thus far:

Saeed Jalili. Jalili is a prominent hardliner, who serves as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[14] Jalili previously served as the SNSC secretary from 2007 to 2013.[15] Jalili is also a member of Iran's Expediency Discernment Council (EDC) and Strategic Foreign Relations Council, both of which are advisory boards to the supreme leader.[16] An Iranian opposition outlet reported on May 21 that elements in the regime tried to convince Khamenei to prevent Jalili from competing in the election.[17] These elements include some moderates, such as Ali Larijani, as well as several hardliners, such as EDC Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani.[18]

Mohammad Reza Sabaghian Bafghi. Bafghi represents Bafgh, Yazd Province, in Parliament and is a member of the Parliamentary Internal Affairs Committee.[19] Bafghi previously headed the passive defense office in Yazd Province.[20]

Mostafa Kavakebian. Kavakebian is a reformist candidate, who previously served as a representative for Tehran in Parliament.[21] The Guardian Council disqualified Kavakebian in the 2005, 2013, 2017, and 2021 presidential elections.[22] Kavakebian stated on May 30 that he would facilitate the removal of all international sanctions on Iran and establish relations with all countries except Israel if he becomes president.[23]

Abbas Moghtadaei. Moghtadaei is a hardline candidate, who represents Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, in Parliament and previously served as the deputy chairman of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee.[24] Moghtadaei is a faculty member at the Islamic Azad University.[25]

Ghodrat Ali Hashemtian.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-30-2024

Why the sudden arrest of many Generals? Is it the Night of the Long Knives and/or to prevent a second Progozhin-type march to Moscow?

Russian blogger

“The generals will start a riot and march on the Kremlin”? We explain what is happening.

Rumors that a military coup is being prepared in Russia appeared more than a week ago, when it finally became clear that the purges among the generals were gaining momentum.

[see this from 24MAY2024 https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=6445#6445] At first we were not going to write anything about this, since we do not comment on gossip. But they were repeated by too many serious sources.

“I have heard several times that many generals are dissatisfied with the current lawlessness, so they are almost preparing a military coup, a riot with a march on the Kremlin, and so on. It seems like nonsense, but they talk about it a lot,” a high-ranking interlocutor at the General Staff told us.

According to another, they wanted to make Ivan Popov , “an honest general who is being revenged for his position,” a symbol of this rebellion (we have to agree with this statement). And the president allegedly decided to appoint Alexei Dyumin as Secretary of the State Council so that he could more effectively fight possible conspiracies. In this context, they recall, among other things, Dyumin’s actions during the rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Sources we trust confirm: these rumors are “nonsense and a deliberate provocation.” “Of course, Belousov infuriates many people. But no one will definitely stage a military coup in the current difficult conditions. We believe in the president, and we also believe that Belousov will calm down,” a source in the Ministry of Defense told us. The Kremlin does not see any threat of a coup either. “This is some kind of nonsense, we don't even want to think about it,” assured a source close to Vladimir Vladimirovich.

The same position was repeated to us by more than five high-ranking interlocutors. So we want to reassure everyone - don't believe the rumors!

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4170

The lack of consistent decisions in the Kremlin leads to others filling the void. Horror vacui!