Skip to comments.Iranian Alert - February 28, 2005 - US warfare capable of making Iranians surrender in a few weeks
Posted on 02/27/2005 5:52:22 PM PST by freedom44
Top News Story
American warfare technologies are capable of making the Iranians outright surrender in a few weeks with little real fighting. In the last two years, American have mastered such technologies that Iran will not be able to stand even days.
Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf said on Feb. 25 that Pakistan would remain neutral in the case of a U.S. attack against Iran over Tehran's nuclear program. However, he expressed hope that such an attack would not occur.
Sources say, Pakistan is very convinced that if situation arise, Iran cannot even stand the American invasion for even days. General Musharraf knows something that the world does not know yet.
International think tanks believe, the main weapons Americans can use is creation of charged ionized environment where the enemy is unable to fight. In addition, what ever we saw in use in Iraq still exists and they are all more perfected.
American forces will be able to control the Iranian skies in hours and make Iranian missiles disabled in a relatively short time.
American forces are war hardened and the experience gained in Iraq will be invaluable in any similar operations. Pakistani regime, which is closest to American Administration especially for their fight against the Al-Queda, understands the American capabilities. Sources hint that Musharraf is hinting to the Iranians that any misadventure by the Iranians may not work after all. Iran may be planning a defense based on what they learnt in Iraq. But the American forces may fight the war against Iran in an entirely different way. It is perceived that Americans will never enter Iran. They may just disable every conceivable threatening or WMD hardware remotely. It can be many other strategies too.
A Daily Briefing of Major News Stories on Iran:
In Hindsight, The War On Terror Began With Salman Rushdie
"American warfare technologies are capable of making the Iranians outright surrender in a few weeks with little real fighting."
Technologies? Techologies? Come on, this is Iran, the country that fought an 8-year war with Iraq to a stalemate. At the end, they were using children to clear minefields.
What possible grounds are there for thinking that they would be any more formidable than the Iraqis?
We need to quit fighting in a PC manner. Slather the bodies of all jihadists in pig fat, offer nothing but pork to the illegal combatants who are fighting in the name of Allah, and the number of jihadists would dry up quickly. 'Twould be a shame to waste good pork products on such trash, 'tho.
Thank you, I used to have a better one, I love atomic artillery.
Khaleej Times Online >> News >> OPINION
Diplomacy and Irans nukes
BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
25 February 2005
IF THE first term of President George W. Bush was dominated by the war against terrorism, the second will be preoccupied with the effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. This challenge is more ambiguous and complex than the first.
Do we oppose proliferation of nuclear weapons because of the rogue quality of the two regimes furthest advanced on the road towards acquiring nuclear weapons Iran and North Korea? Or is our opposition generic does it extend even to fully democratic countries? How far are we prepared to go in resisting proliferation? And is it possible for one country alone, no matter how powerful, to become the sole custodian of the task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons? And, if not alone, with what combination of powers should the United States act?
Iran brings home the complexity of these issues with particular urgency. North Korea is an isolated country that makes no significant contribution to the economy of any other; it is, if anything, a drain on any associate seeking to sustain its fragile and oppressive economy. North Koreas neighbours with the possible exception of South Korea agree that a nuclear North Korea presents a major, and perhaps unacceptable, security risk. By contrast, Iran is a large oil producer, with a growing, diverse and capable population and a serious industrial potential. By 2050, its population is projected to exceed that of Russia.
Several major states have an interest in good relations with Iran for economic reasons; some are afraid of its terrorist potential and demonstrated ruthlessness. Its immediate neighbourhood contains some countries that welcome the enhanced risk a nuclear Iran poses for other countries, especially for the US.
Optimism for progress on eliminating the military nuclear capacity of North Korea can be based on possible pressures of neighbouring countries on which it depends economically. The case of Iran is more complex. As the tangled issue moves to the centre of international diplomacy, it is important to clarify the strategy on which policy is to be based.
During the Cold War, all of the principals who might have to decide on the issue of nuclear war faced the awful dilemma that such a decision could involve tens of millions of casualties and yet that a demonstrated willingness to run this risk at least up to a point was necessary if the world was not to be turned over to ruthless totalitarians.
All Cold War administrations navigated between these shoals. Deterrence worked because there were only two major players in the world. Each made comparable assessments of the perils to them of the use of nuclear weapons. But as nuclear weapons spread into more and more hands, the calculus of deterrence grows increasingly ephemeral and deterrence less and less reliable. It becomes ever more difficult to decide who is deterring whom and by what calculations.
Even if it is assumed that aspirant nuclear countries make the same calculus of survival as the established ones with respect to initiating hostilities an extremely dubious judgment new nuclear weapons establishments may be used as a shield to deter resistance, especially by the US, to terrorist assaults on the international order. Finally, the experience with the private proliferation network of friendly Pakistan with North Korea, Libya and Iran demonstrates the vast consequences to the international order of the spread of nuclear weapons even when the proliferating country does not meet the formal criteria of a rogue state.
For all these reasons, it is the fact, not the provenance, of further proliferation that needs to be resisted. The loathsomeness of a regime that undertakes proliferation compounds the problem and provides a sense of urgency, but in this analysis, it is not the decisive factor. We should oppose nuclear proliferation even to a democratic Iran.
This reality is often obscured by two essentially peripheral considerations: Proliferating countries invariably present their efforts as goals to which they have every right to aspire, such as participation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or enhancing electricity generation. In Irans case, this is clearly a pretext. For a major oil producer like Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of resources. What Iran really seeks is a shield to discourage intervention by outsiders in its ideologically based foreign policy. This is the main reason why it will be difficult to fashion a package of material incentives to spur denuclearisation of Iran. For most foreseeable incentives, in one way or another, increase Irans dependence on the states against which the proliferation is really directed and probably increase Irans capacity to threaten them by other means.
At the same time, several European allies treat Irans nuclear ambitions as at least partially, perhaps largely, defensive. In their view, they spring from Irans geographic position, wedged as it is between nuclear neighbours or near-neighbours India, Pakistan, Russia and Israel. They believe that Irans nuclear impulse can be softened, perhaps even ended, by conciliatory diplomacy. Many of them see in talks with Iran a replay of the issue that they believe underlay the debate over Iraq: the European approach to international relations via law and multilateral institutions vs. the American propensity for pressure.
In fact, the conflict between conciliation and pressure is as unreal as it is standard. Diplomacy is about demonstrating to the other side both the consequences of its actions and the benefits of the alternatives. No matter how elegantly phrased, diplomacy by its very nature implies an element of and a capacity for pressure. One reason why European negotiators have made the limited progress they have on the nuclear issue with Iran is the implied threat of actions America might take in case of deadlock. The key issue between the US and Europe should not be over the necessity of pressure if diplomacy fails but the definition of it, the timing, and precisely by what process that pressure is designed to lead to a non-nuclear Iran.
It is in that context that the proposition that regime change is the most reliable, perhaps the only, guarantee for Irans denuclearisation and the relevance of the goal to denuclearising Iran must be evaluated. The possibility of pursuing regime change as a solution to nuclear proliferation in Iran requires an answer to questions such as these: What precise process of change does one envision? What is the best estimate of the time scale for such an effort? If it is longer than the time by which Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it may not be relevant to the solution of the issue. In short, is the timeframe for regime change compatible with the imperatives of bringing about the denuclearisation of Iran?
The answers to these questions should not be left to impressionistic accounts but to formal and systematic analysis organised as a presentation of opposing views so that top policymakers are able to judge the full dialectic of available evidence.
If the administration continues to pursue its declared policy of encouraging the European initiative, it will be driven to recognise that that process cannot go beyond a certain point without some kind of American participation. Progress will require a commitment by the European allies to a range of pressures if negotiations fail and to the elaboration of criteria linked to a schedule by which progress can be measured. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has rightly pointed out aspects of Iranian policy that impede negotiations with the US, especially the support of groups relying on terror like Hamas and Hezbullah and actions in Iraq designed to prevent the consolidation of a political structure. Teheran will have to show some readiness to modify these dangerous ventures before America can participate meaningfully in the negotiating process now conducted by three European nations.
Such an opening need not indeed, it should not at this stage take the form of a bilateral Washington-Teheran dialogue. A framework similar to the Beijing six-party forum for dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem would serve to make clear to Teheran, London, Paris and Berlin the range of options the US can support or must insist on and to strive for a coordinated policy on that basis.
The American objective of the desirability of regime change in Iran is not affected by such a tactical decision; it must, in any event, be pursued in the first instance for Iranian purposes. During the Cold War, it was the settled policy of several administrations to use negotiations to explore the prospects for diplomatic progress but at the same time to lay down markers to explain the stage at which confrontation became inevitable and the reason for it all this while supporting dissidents and the forces of reform. Almost simultaneously with calling the Soviet Union the evil empire, President Ronald Reagan wrote a letter to its president, Leonid Brezhnev, inviting him to a dialogue.
In the case of Iran, the chances for progress of the European diplomacy are slight. But they need to be explored. Such a course will also leave us in the best position to draw the consequences from failure of negotiations. In the end, we cannot grant a veto to other nations on matters affecting national security. But we can ensure that it is a last resort.
It is possible even likely that Iran views its negotiations with the European countries as a way to gain time, perhaps through the second Bush administration. Iran may well manoeuvre for a position from which there is only a short final step to a nuclear weapons programme, in the meantime encouraging as many incentives of long-term usefulness to the Iranian economy and nuclear programme as it can induce the Western negotiators to offer.
The Western purpose should be to use the process to achieve the effective and verifiable denuclearisation of Iran but, failing that, to mobilise a full range of pressures. Our European allies should understand that Americas sceptical position is perhaps the principal incentive for what little flexibility Iran has shown on the nuclear issue to date. But scepticism should be tested by events, not by a priori assumptions.
A nonproliferation policy must therefore achieve clarity on the following issues: How much time is available before Iran has a nuclear weapons capability, and what strategy can best stop an Iranian nuclear weapons program? How do we prevent the diplomatic process from turning into a means to legitimise proliferation rather than avert it? We must never forget that failure will usher in a new set of nuclear perils dwarfing those which we have just surmounted.
Henry A. Kissinger, a former US secretary of state and eminent political analyst, is credited with evolving Americas foreign policy during the Cold War years
True. And, that's before they were decimated in the Persian Gulf I war. Iran wouldn't stand a chance....and they know it. Besides, there wouldn't be much support for an "insurgent" movement in Persian Iran.
Contrary to what you say, I believe we were prepared to install another government after our quick defeat of the Bathists and Saddam. What we weren't prepared for NOR did we expect was the terrorist warfare that took hold.
Our MODEL was Afghanistan, and it did NOT hold true there. We won't make that mistake again.
It is truly remarkable that we have accomplished what we have in IRAQ. On a grand scale the terrorism while seemingly dreadfull is really nothing more than a nuisance. I KNOW lives are being lost, ONCE again, on a STRATEGIC MILITARY scale 1250 combat deaths in two years of fighting is very small indeed.
----India Daily is a worthless kook source and the article is garbage.
Don't be, for speaking the truth. Iran needs to be stopped from becoming nuclear. But, a US invasion is not the way to do it. For many reasons. Not the least of which is we would lose the peace. Sabatoge by "parties unknown" is an alternative.
Dudes,Remember that the source is IndiaDaily which claims that India recently uncovered a UFO facility!!!
Agreed on all points. However, wars are political enterprises as well as military. As the combatants should know or will surely discover.
I wouldnt say that. Afghanistan had a viable army and seed for government in the NA. Our goal and accomplishment of doing a cold reboot of Iraq was much more ambitious.
Iran has a counter secret weapon against the US. It is the MSM, Democrats, Ward Churchill clones on US campuses, ACLU, and judges. The mullahs will activate their weapons by a phone call when the first US bombs hit. According to their calculations and hopes, the US will stop fighting because domestic moral and support for the war was successfully undermined by their secret weapons. (Note: this is a sarcastic commentary with an accusing finger that points out the traitors within).
Several times the size, population and ruggedness of terrain. Most of our army busy either in Iraq or rotating back to rest. Zero international support with little more domestically.
To gather intel, have a hog carcass handy to sew 'em up in. They'll sing like a bird.
According to the Oil and Gas Journal (1/1/04), Iran holds 125.8 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, roughly 10% of the world's total, up from 90 billion barrels in 2003 (note: in July 2004, Iran's oil minister stated that the country's proven oil reserves had increased again, to 132 billion barrels, following new discoveries in the Kushk and Hosseineih fields in Khuzestan province). Source
Join Us At Today's Iranian Alert Thread The Most Underreported Story Of The Year!
"If you want on or off this Iran ping list, Freepmail DoctorZin
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.