Posted on 06/21/2011 2:43:40 AM PDT by Jacquerie
Danger from States to National Government. Small v. Large States. Two Branch Legislature. Third Resolution. Popular Election of First Branch. Length of Terms.
In Convention
Mr. Jonathan Dayton from N. Jersey took his seat. [FN1]
[FN3] Docr. JOHNSON. On a comparison of the two plans which had been proposed from Virginia & N. Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity which characterized the latter was its being calculated to preserve the individuality of the States. The plan from Va. did not profess to destroy this individuality altogether, but was charged with such a tendency. One Gentleman alone (Col. Hamilton) in his animadversions on the plan of N. Jersey, boldly and decisively contended for an abolition of the State Govts. Mr. Wilson & the gentlemen from Virga. who also were adversaries of the plan of N. Jersey held a different language. They wished to leave the States in possession of a considerable, tho' a subordinate jurisdiction. They had not yet however shewn how this cd. consist with, or be secured agst. the general sovereignty & jurisdiction, which they proposed to give to the national Government. If this could be shewn in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons of the N. Jersey propositions, that the individuality of the States would not be endangered, many of their objections would no doubt be removed. If this could not be shewn their objections would have their full force. He wished it therefore to be well considered whether in case the States, as was proposed, shd. retain some portion of sovereignty at least, this portion could be preserved, without allowing them to participate effectually in the Genl. Govt., without giving them each a distinct and equal vote for the purpose of defending themselves in the general Councils.
Mr. WILSON'S respect for Docr. Johnson, added to the importance of the subject led him to attempt, unprepared as he was, to solve the difficulty which had been started. It was asked how the Genl. Govt. and individuality of the particular States could be reconciled to each other; and how the latter could be secured agst the former? Might it not, on the other side be asked how the former was to be secured agst. the latter? It was generally admitted that a jealousy & rivalship would be felt between the Genl. & particular Govts. As the plan now stood, tho' indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch of the Genl. Govt. (the Senate or second branch) was to be appointed by the State Legislatures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this participation in the Genl. Govt. would have an opportunity of defending their rights.
Ought not a reciprocal opportunity to be given to the Genl. Govt. of defending itself by having an appointment of some one constituent branch of the State Govts. If a security be necessary on one side, it wd. seem reasonable to demand it on the other. But taking the matter in a more general view, he saw no danger to the States from the Genl. Govt. In case a combination should be made by the large ones it wd. produce a general alarm among the rest; and the project wd. be frustrated. But there was no temptation to such a project. The States having in general a similar interest, in case of any proposition [FN4] in the National Legislature to encroach on the State Legislatures, he conceived a general alarm wd. take place in the National Legislature itself, that it would communicate itself to the State Legislatures, and wd. finally spread among the people at large. The Genl. Govt. will be as ready to preserve the rights of the States as the latter are to preserve the rights of individuals; all the members of the former, having a common interest, as representatives of all the people of the latter, to leave the State Govts. in possession of what the people wish them to retain. He could not discover, therefore any danger whatever on the side from which it had been [FN5] apprehended. On the contrary, he conceived that in spite of every precaution the general Govt. would be in perpetual danger of encroachments from the State Govts. Mr. MADISON was of the opinion [FN6] that there was 1. less danger of encroachment from the Genl. Govt. than from the State Govts. 2. [FN7] that the mischief from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former, than if made by the latter. 1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the greater tendency in such systems to anarchy than to tyranny; to a disobedience of the members than to [FN8] usurpations of the federal head. Our own experience had fully illustrated this tendency. -But it will be said that the proposed change in the principles & form of the Union will vary the tendency; that the Genl. Govt. will have real & greater powers, and will be derived in one branch at least from the people, not from the Govts. of the States. To give full force to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to the Genl. Legislature, and the States reduced to corporations dependent on the Genl. Legislature; Why shd. it follow that the Genl. Govt. wd. take from the States any branch of their power as far as its operation was beneficial, and its continuance desireable to the people?
In some of the States, particularly in Connecticut, all the Townships are incorporated, and have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the Representatives of the people of the Townships in the Legislature of the State ever endeavored to despoil the Townships of any part of their local authority? As far as this local authority is convenient to the people they are attached to it; and their representatives chosen by & amenable to them naturally respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any other right or interest. The relation of a General Govt. to State Govts. is parallel. 2. Guards were more necessary agst. encroachments of the State Govts. on the Genl. Govt. than of the latter on the former. The great objection made agst. an abolition of the State Govts. was that the Genl. Govt. could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local jurisdictions.
The objection as stated lay not agst. the probable abuse of the general power, but agst. the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of objects. As far as as its operation would be practicable it could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable, the conveniency [FN9] of the Genl. Govt. itself would concur with that of the people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments. Were it practicable for the Genl. Govt. to extend its care to every requisite object without the cooperation of the State Govts. the people would not be less free as members of one great Republic than as members of thirteen small ones. A Citizen of Delaware was not more free than a Citizen of Virginia: nor would either be more free than a Citizen of America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the Genl. Government to absorb the State Govts. no fatal [FN10] consequence could result. Taking the reverse of [FN11] the supposition, that a tendency should be left in the State Govts. towards an independence on the General Govt. and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out. The imagination of them, must have suggested to the States the experiment we are now making to prevent the calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those present to undertake the arduous task.
On the question for resolving "that the Legislature ought to consist of two Branches"
Mass. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. Jersey no Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [FN12]
The third resolution of the Report [FN13] taken into consideration.
Genl. PINKNEY moved "that the 1st. branch, instead of being elected by the people, shd. be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each State should direct." He urged 1. [FN14] that this liberty would give more satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accomodate the mode to the conveniency [FN15] & opinions of the people. 2. [FN14] that it would avoid the undue influence of large Counties which would prevail if the elections were to be made in districts as must be the mode intended by the Report of the Committee. 3. [FN14] that otherwise disputed elections must be referred to the General Legislature which would be attended with intolerable expence and trouble to the distant parts of the republic.
Mr. L. MARTIN seconded the Motion.
Col. HAMILTON considered the motion as intended manifestly to transfer the election from the people to the State Legislatures, which would essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence which could not be too watchfully guarded agst. All too must admit the possibility, in case the Genl. Govt. shd. maintain itself, that the State Govts. might gradually dwindle into nothing. The system therefore shd. not be engrafted on what might possibly fail.
Mr. MASON urged the necessity of retaining the election by the people. Whatever inconveniency [FN16] may attend the democratic principle, it must actuate one part of the Govt. It is the only security for the rights of the people.
Mr. SHERMAN, would like an election by the Legislatures best, but is content with [FN17] plan as it stands.
Mr. RUTLIDGE could not admit the solidity of the distinction between a mediate & immediate election by the people. It was the same thing to act by oneself, and to act by another. An election by the Legislature would be more refined than an election immediately by the people: and would be more likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community. If this Convention had been chosen by the people in districts it is not to be supposed that such proper characters would have been preferred. The Delegates to Congs. he thought had also been fitter men than would have been appointed by the people at large.
Mr. WILSON considered the election of the 1st. branch by the people not only as the corner Stone, but as the foundation of the fabric: and that the difference between a mediate & immediate election was immense. The difference was particularly worthy of notice in this respect: that the Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people; but have an official sentiment opposed to that of the Genl. Govt. and perhaps to that of the people themselves.
Mr. KING enlarged on the same distinction. He supposed the Legislatures wd. constantly choose men subservient to their own views as contrasted to the general interest; and that they might even devise modes of election that wd. be subversive of the end in view. He remarked several instances in which the views of a State might be at variance with those of the Genl. Govt.: and mentioned particularly a competition between the National & State debts, for the most certain & productive funds.
Genl. PINKNEY was for making the State Govts. a part of the General System. If they were to be abolished, or lose their agency, S. Carolina & other States would have but a small share of the benefits of Govt.
On the question for Genl. Pinkney motion to substitute election of [FN18] 1st. branch in such mode as the Legislatures should appoint, in stead of its being elected by the people." Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay Geo. no. [FN19]
General PINKNEY then moved that the 1st. branch be elected by the people in such mode as the Legislatures should direct; but waved it on its being hinted that such a provision might be more properly tried in the detail of the plan.
On the question for ye. election of the 1st. branch by the people."
Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay Geo. ay. [FN20]
[FN18] Election of the 1st. branch "for the term of three years," [FN21] considered
Mr. RANDOLPH moved to strike out, "three years" and insert "two years"-he was sensible that annual elections were a source of great mischiefs in the States, yet it was the want of such checks agst. the popular intemperence as were now proposed, that rendered them so mischievous. He would have preferred annual to biennial, but for the extent of the U. S. and the inconveniency [FN22] which would result from them to the representatives of the extreme parts of the Empire. The people were attached to frequency of elections. All the Constitutions of the States except that of S. Carolina, had established annual elections.
Mr. DICKENSON. The idea of annual elections was borrowed from the antient usage of England, a country much less extensive than ours. He supposed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred triennial: and in order to prevent the inconveniency [FN22] of an entire change of the whole number at the same moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election of one third.
Mr. ELSEWORTH was opposed to three years, supposing that even one year was preferable to two years. The people were fond of frequent elections and might be safely indulged in one branch of the Legislature. He moved for 1 year.
Mr. STRONG seconded & supported the motion.
Mr. WILSON being for making the 1st. branch an effectual representation of the people at large, preferred an annual election of it. This frequency was most familiar & pleasing to the people. It would be not [FN23] more inconvenient to them, than triennial elections, as the people in all the States have annual meetings with which the election of the National representatives might be made to co-incide. He did not conceive that it would be necessary for the Natl. Legisl: to sit constantly; perhaps not half-perhaps not one fourth of the year.
Mr. MADISON was persuaded that annual elections would be extremely inconvenient and apprehensive that biennial would be too much so: he did not mean inconvenient to the electors; but to the representatives. They would have to travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the Union; and would probably not be allowed even a reimbursement of their expences. Besides, none of those who wished to be re-elected would remain at the seat of Governmt.; confiding that their absence would not affect them. The members of Congs. had done this with few instances of disappointment. But as the choice was here to be made by the people themselves who would be much less complaisant to individuals, and much more susceptible of impressions from the presence of a Rival candidate, it must be supposed that the members from the most distant States would travel backwards & forwards at least as often as the elections should be repeated. Much was to be said also on the time requisite for new members who would always form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge of the affairs of the States in general without which their trust could not be usefully discharged.
Mr. SHERMAN preferred annual elections, but would be content with biennial. He thought the Representatives ought to return home and mix with the people. By remaining at the seat of Govt. they would acquire the habits of the place which might differ from those of their Constituents.
Col. MASON observed that the States being differently situated such a rule ought to be formed as would put them as nearly as possible on a level. If elections were annual the middle States would have a great advantage over the extreme ones. He wished them to be biennial; and the rather as in that case they would coincide with the periodical elections of S. Carolina as well of the other States.
Col. HAMILTON urged the necessity of 3 years. There ought to be neither too much nor too little dependence, on the popular sentiments. The checks in the other branches of Governt. would be but feeble, and would need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven. The British House of Commons were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit of ye. Constitution had not ceased. Frequency of elections tended to make the people listless to them; and to facilitate the success of little cabals. This evil was complained of in all the States. In Virga. it had been lately found necessary to force the attendance & voting of the people by severe regulations.
On the question for striking out "three years"
Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. divd. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [FN24]
The motion for "two years" was then inserted nem. con.
Adjd.
FN1 From June 21 to July 18 inclusive not copied by Mr. Eppes.
FN2 This footnote is omitted in the transcript. It refers to a copy of Madison's journal made by John W. Eppes, Jefferson's son-in-law, for Jefferson's use some time between 1799 and 1810. "The Writings of James Madison, Hunt, Editor, Vol. VI (1906), 329, n; Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. V (1905), 294-296.
FN3 The transcript here inserts the following: "The second Resolution in the Report from the Committee of the Whole, being under consideration."
FN4 The transcript uses the word "proposition" in the plural.
FN5 The word "was" is substituted in the transcript for "had been."
FN6 The phrase "in the first place" is here inserted in the transcript and the figure "1" is omitted.
FN7 The figure "2" is changed to "and in the second place" in the transcript.
FN8 The word "to" is omitted in the transcript.
FN9 The word "conveniency" is changed to "convenience" in the transcript.
FN10 The transcript italicizes the word "fatal."
FN11 The word "as" is substituted in the transcript for "of"
FN12 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-7; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no-3; Maryland, divided."
FN13 The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.
FN14 The figures "1," "2" and "3" are changed to "first," "secondly" and "thirdly" in the transcript.
FN15 The word "conveniency" is changed to "convenience" in the transcript.
FN16 The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the transcript.
FN17 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
FN18 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
FN19 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, South Carolina, aye-4; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no-6; Maryland, divided."
FN20 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye- 9; New Jersey, no-1; Maryland, divided."
FN21 The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.
FN22 The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the transcript.
FN23 The words "be not" are transposed to read "not be" in the transcript.
FN24 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-7; New York, Delaware, Maryland, no-3; New Jersey, divided."
In Convention.
Dr. William Samuel Johnson (CN) summarized the approach to state sovereignty between the two plans. If the individuality of the member states could be shown to be safe, it would go a long way to removing the objections of the small states.
James Wilson (PA) foresaw no danger to the small states. The danger, if any, would be from the states encroaching on the national government. There would be, as stated by others, an inherent jealousy between the state legislatures and Congress. But wouldn’t the nature of the Senate serve to protect inherent state interests? Shouldn’t the general government have a method of protecting itself from the states via appointment of one branch of the state governments? If large states formed a combination, the rest would be able to frustrate them. And why would they combine in the first place, since they have similar interests? The general government would be as interested in protecting the rights of the states as the states were to protect individual rights. No, if there was any danger at all, it came from the states. (Robert Yates said Mr. Wilson proposed to “designate the powers of each,” so that no danger could be apprehended from either.)
James Madison (VA) largely concurred with Mr. Wilson. History showed anarchy to be the endpoint of confederacies. Their immediate experience under the Articles did not contradict.
Mr. Madison next revealed how individual virtue was essential to the proposed system. He could not visualize power grabs by the general government. He could not foresee legislation that was not beneficial to the people.
He drew an analogy between general/state government and state government/townships in CN. Besides, it would be impractical for the general government to extend itself into every nook and cranny of life in such an extended country. States were, if for nothing else, needed for lesser objects. He saw no danger to the people from the General Government absorption of the State Governments.
The second resolution, to create a two branch Congress, passed 7-3-1. (NY, NJ, DE being the no votes, MD divided.)
The third resolution, popular election in the first house, was next.
#3 “Resolved that the members of the first branch of the national Legislature ought to be elected by the People of the several States for the term of Three years. to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service to be paid out of the National- Treasury. to be ineligible to any Office established by a particular State or under the authority of the United-States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch) during the term of service, and under the national government for the space of one year after it's expiration.”
General Pinckney (SC) proposed leaving the method of election up to the state legislatures. Luther Marin seconded.
Alexander Hamilton (NY) roughly called out the proposed change as a subterfuge to do away with popular election and increase state influence.
George Mason (VA) said one branch must represent the people; the single house representing them would be their only defense.
Roger Sherman (CN) preferred election by the state legislatures, but would accept popular election.
John Rutlidge (SC) could make no distinction between the two methods other than the nature of the people sent to Congress. If given the chance, imagine the rough, unrefined men the people would have sent to the convention.
James Wilson (PA) described popular election as “the foundation of the fabric.” Legislatures often have purposes different from the people who elect them.
Rufus King (MA) alluded to possible corruption in the appointments by the legislatures.
General Pinckney’s motion to have state legislatures determine the method of electing members to the first house was defeated 6-4.
Popular election of members to the first house passed 9-1.
Three year terms for members of the first house was then considered.
Governor Edmund Randolph (VA) thought one year terms as practiced in all states except SC would be best, were it not for the expense and difficulty of travel. Therefore, he moved to create two year terms.
John Dickinson (DE), for much the same reasons, preferred three year terms with annual rotation of one third of the membership.
Judge Oliver Ellsworth (CN) found the people to be fond of annual elections.
Caleb Strong (MA) supported and seconded the three year motion.
James Wilson (PA) thought effective representation required annual elections. There would be no extra burden because national reps could be elected coincidentally with state representatives. He envisioned the national legislature would be in session for a fraction of the year and thus implied travel to and from distant parts of the country would not be much of a problem.
James Madison (VA), a member of Congress during the war, and likewise a member of the VA House of Delegates afterward, opposed annual elections as extremely inconvenient to the representatives. Members who desired reelection would frequently travel back to home districts with difficulty and expense. There was a learning curve involved in legislative affairs that would not be well served by short terms.
Roger Sherman (CN) preferred annual, but would support biennial elections. Members should regularly mix with the people and not adopt the habits of the capital.
George Mason (VA) wished all states to be on an equal footing and therefore supported biannual elections, which would reduce the advantage of members serving in nearby Mid-Atlantic States. Biennial elections would also coincide with state elections in SC.
Alexander Hamilton (NY) urged three year terms, as neither too conducive toward, nor restrictive of, popular sentiments. Annual elections would render the citizens lethargic and subject to motivated cabals. It was a common complaint among the states. There were laws in VA to ensure voting attendance.
Three year terms were struck, 7-3
Two year terms passed unanimously.
(Imagine one year Congressional terms. The only reason we don’t have them was the difficulty of 18th Century travel. Would they detrimentally affect the stability of the House and therefore Congress? Would one year terms reduce the tendency toward career politicians? Recent votes would certainly be fresher in the minds of voters)
Adjourned.
Constitutional Convention Ping!
Thanks!
Do you remember what day were the debates on the qualifications for the president?
Or have we not gotten there yet?
Nope, we haven’t gotten there yet. IIRC, a lot of time was spent on the method of his election, but next to no time on the “natural born” aspect.
The “natural born” part is of course one consideration, as was age.
I just wondered if they ever thought any other experience like military experience (since he would be commander in chief) or executive experience (since he would be chief executive) that might be needed to qualify.
I guess we’ll read about it when they get to it!
The reason for the convening of the Delegates.
“Mr. Madison next revealed how individual virtue was essential to the proposed system. He could not visualize power grabs by the general government. He could not foresee legislation that was not beneficial to the people. ”
One out of three. Mr. Madison reveals his weaknesses.
“He (Mr. Madison) drew an analogy between general/state government and state government/townships in CN. Besides, it would be impractical for the general government to extend itself into every nook and cranny of life in such an extended country. States were, if for nothing else, needed for lesser objects. He saw no danger to the people from the General Government absorption of the State Governments.”
Mr. Madison here scores a little better (and provides us with the reason why he is not admired by the likes of a Chuck U Schumer or a Bawney Fwank). Both are afflicted with the avarice and ambition that will indeed, if unchecked, result in the absorption of the states by the federal government.
“George Mason (VA) said one branch must represent the people; the single house representing them would be their only defense.”
Precisely so.
“John Rutlidge (SC) could make no distinction between the two methods other than the nature of the people sent to Congress. If given the chance, imagine the rough, unrefined men the people would have sent to the convention.
Imagine the refined, corrupt creatures who now haunt the halls of Congress.
“Rufus King (MA) alluded to possible corruption in the appointments by the legislatures.”
Corruption lurks in every device of government. What to do?
“Roger Sherman (CN) . . . Members should regularly mix with the people and not adopt the habits of the capital.
Prophetic. Sherman was one of the brightest bulbs in the hall.
“Would one year terms reduce the tendency toward career politicians?”
Possibly. But I am reminded of a cautionary tale by Machiavelli: If a prince should become capricious, willful, indifferent, unjust, decadent, careless, profligate, lazy, and neglectful, he might well lose his throne (his sovereignty), and perhaps his head in the bargain. In a republic such as ours, should the people similarly become capricious, willful, indifferent, unjust, decadent, careless, profligate, lazy, and neglectful, might they not, like the prince, lose at least their sovereignty?
I think we stand at the threshold.
Precisely. As long as the people predominantly send the likes of Sheila Jackson Lee, Cynthia McKinney, Alcee Hastings, Schumer, . . . there is no hope a Constitutional Reawakening, as evidenced in the Tea Party movement, will make a significant difference.
As for Roger Sherman, he was unquestionably among the brightest bulbs.
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