Skip to comments.New Jersey Obama Ballot Challenge Appealed to Appellate Division: Oral Argument Scheduled
Posted on 05/15/2012 6:45:26 AM PDT by Seizethecarp
On Friday, May 11, 2012, I filed with the New Jersey Appellate Division on behalf of Nicholas E. Purpura and Theodore T. Moran their appeal of the New Jersey Secretary of States final decision to permit presidential candidate Barack Obama on the New Jersey primary ballot.
On Monday, the Court issued an order providing that the Court, sua sponte, accelerates the appeal. Finally, the Court scheduled telephonic oral argument for Wednesday, May 30, 2012, at 1:00 p.m.
In our appeal, we will be arguing that:
1. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and Secretary of State (SOS) erred in finding that Obama, because he does not have to consent to his nominating petition, does not have any legal obligation to provide any evidence to the New Jersey Secretary of State proving who he is, where he was born, and that he is constitutionally eligibility to occupy the Office of President in order to be placed on the New Jersey primary election ballot.
2. The ALJ and SOS erred in finding that a natural born Citizen includes any child who is born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, regardless of the citizenship status of the parents.
3. The ALJ and SOS erred in finding that Obama was born in Hawaii, for there is no evidence in the record supporting such a finding.
4. The ALJ and SOS erred in finding that Obama was born in Hawaii and therefore as a matter of law he is an Article II natural born Citizen.
(Excerpt) Read more at obamareleaseyourrecords.blogspot.com ...
The court may have accelerated the hearing because of timing to get ballots printed, were the SOS decision be reversed anywhere along the line. The normal briefing process of 30 days here, 30 days there, etc. could cause enormous problems for November.
I found Paine’s statement confusing.
I always just assumed the King/Queen of England was English. And his statement essentially is ‘In England, the Monarch is sometimes a foreigner, always a half foreigner and always married to a foreigner’.
The King is sometimes a foreigner but even in times when he is not a foreigner, he is still a half foreigner and even if he marries an English woman, he still marries a foreigner. It reads like some kind of riddle.
BTW, Paine’s says that in England foreigners cannot be members of Parliment. John Jay said he thought that the same should be true for the United States.
In a letter to Timothy Pickering,
It is said that the Naturalization Act is to be revised and amended. Permit me to suggest an idea which I have for many years deemed important. We doubtless may grant to a foreigner just such a portion of our rights and privileges as we may think proper. In my opinion it would be wise to declare explicitly that the right and privilege of being elected or appointed to or of holding and exercising any office or place of trust or power under the United States or under any of them shall not hereafter be granted to any foreigner but that the president of the United States with the consent of the Senate be nevertheless at liberty to appoint a foreigner to a military office.
I am dear sir
Your most obedient servant
And both New York and Massacusetts sent requests to Congress to amend the Constitution so only natural born citizens could be Senators or Representatives.
I think you give Paine too much credit. I believe he was just a rebel rouser. He immigrated here in 1773 because he failed to make a living in England. He fell out of favor here, went to England finding disfavor. Then off to France to stir things up; got thrown into prison there then he writes “Age of Reason” attacking the principles of Christianity - the bedrock of beliefs in this country. He gets out of prison and sails off to America again only to be scorned by the populace. That scorn continued into the 20th century when Teddy Roosevelt called him a “filthy little atheist.”
As a writer he was clear in his writing as were the framers of the Constitution. If they meant natural born citizens of citizen parents, why the heck didn’t they say it in those exact words? Why would you have to clarify the meaning pages or even chapters later? If I wrote out a formula on how to make something, left off a vital part, then in the next chapter said, “oh, by the way, this is what I meant by....” Get my point?
I see a PERIOD after this statement accredited to Paine, “He cannot be elected under thirty-five years of age; and he must be a native of the country.”
I also see the word “he” so shouldn’t we start a campaign against women running for president also?
Other than a handful of people everyone understands “foreigner” as someone not born here. Senators and congressmen can be of foreign birth once they become citizens here. The distinction clearly written down is that the president cannot be foreign (born outside the country) making him a natural born citizen at birth. Over 95% of the country understand the rules that way, the judicial system rule that way, and congress has legislated that way.
By just applying a little common sense one has to realize that they cannot normally PROVE that their parents are citizens of this country. I know I never received a copy of my mother or father’s birth certificate. Hence the 14th amendment wherein it matters NOT who your parents are, if you are born here you are a NBC.
John Adams said, "Without the pen of the author of Common Sense, the sword of Washington would have been raised in vain."
Without Paine, Jefferson would never have written the Declaration of Independence.
He fell out of favor here...
Alexander Hamilton also had his difficulties, and was killed for it. Jefferson died broke. Washington married his wealth, just like John Kerry. Even Benedict Arnold is still the Hero of Saratoga. You can impugn the character of anyone, but their deeds still stand on their own.
I see a PERIOD after this statement accredited to Paine, He cannot be elected under thirty-five years of age; and he must be a native of the country. I also see the word he so shouldnt we start a campaign against women running for president also?
I'll let your debate over articles, prepositions, punctuation, and pronouns, stand against my debate of the substance and significance of Paine's plain-meaning words.
William the Conqueror was born in Normandy, France (1027), and of Viking lineage. He was Duke of Normandy in 1035, and King of England by 1066.
There were others as well.
William II of England born in Normandy, France (1060)
Henry II, Richard II and Edward IV were also born in France.
William III was born in the Netherlands and George I and II were born in Germany.
There were others, who were born in Scotland and Wales...both are different countries that are part of the "United Kingdom" today but at their respective times were independent (on/off) from the country of England.
This is a great illustration of how "foreigners" can become King (Queen) of England/UK.
That's correct. This is what needs to be understood by those of us in the 21st century. nomenclature familiar to the founders.
The royal dictionary, french and English, and English and french
Author: A. Boyer
Publisher: T. Osborne, 1764
Original from Ghent University
Same author, different Publisher and 4 years later (same definition):
The royal dictionary English and French and French and English: extracted from the writings of the best authors in both languages
Author: Abel Boyer
Publisher: printed by John Mary Bruyset, 1768
Original from the Complutense University of Madrid
Digitized: Jul 27, 2009
Length: 716 pages
Subjects: Foreign Language Study / French
The new royal and universal English dictionary ...: To which is prefixed, a grammar of the English language, Volume 2
Author: J. Johnson
Publisher: Millard, 1763
Original from Columbia University
Digitized: Sep 16, 2009
A dictionary of the English language. Abstracted from the folio ed., by the author. To which is prefixed, an English grammar. To this ed. are added, a history of the English language
Author: Samuel Johnson
Original from: Oxford University
Digitized: Aug 10, 2006
The new spelling dictionary
Author: John Entick
Original from: University of Lausanne
Digitized: Feb 27, 2008
Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language (1755) "the most widely used dictionary at the ratification's time"
This is the "nomenclature" known to the founders and framers. It also explains why there were some English translations of Vattel's legal treatise that used the word "native" instead of "natural born". The words meant the same thing in the 1700's. That is the nomenclature that they were familiar with.
"Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says "The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens."in THE VENUS, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 289 (1814).
It's why we see Chief Justice Waite state
"At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar [edit: this nomenclature they were familiar with is directly mirrored to the definition found in Law of Nations...which the framers read and referenced during the Constitutional Convention], it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens,"
“William the Conqueror was born in Normandy, France (1027), and of Viking lineage. He was Duke of Normandy in 1035, and King of England by 1066.”
Thomas Paine referred to him as “the son of a prostitute, and the plunderer of the English nation”.
William the Conqueror was also known as "William the Bastard."
Oh, and many English Kings where known to "plunder."
Point remains, William I was a "foreigner" who took the English crown.
“IMO, for this appeal to work, they need to hammer home that the Wong Kim Ark decision affirmed and upheld the NBC definition in Minor; and that the Ankeny appeals decision also affirmed that Minor is the ONLY Supreme Court decision that provided a legal precedent for defining NBC.”
Sorry, but you acting like an idiot doesn't change the facts.
Except, of course, that NO ONE agrees with your supposed ‘facts’.
Links for WKA & Ankeny here for anyone who wants to know what they REALLY say:
“Based upon the language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 and the guidance provided by Wong Kim Ark, we conclude that persons born within the borders of the United States are natural born Citizens for Article II, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship of their parents. “
In Minor, written only six years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Court observed that:
The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.
Ankeny admitted they had no legal precedent and no real guidance for the 'conclusion' from Wong Kim Ark:
We note the fact that the Court in Wong Kim Ark did not actually pronounce the plaintiff a natural born Citizen using the Constitution‟s Article II ...
How did they get guidance when they admit there's no legal precedent.
“The only legal precedent both cases could formally cite for defining natural-born citizenship is from Minor v. Happersett.”
You aren’t good at reading, are you...
“II. The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to English nationality was birth within the allegiance, also called “ligealty,” “obedience,” “faith,” or “power” of the King. The principle embraced all persons born within the King’s allegiance and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual — as expressed in the maxim protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem — and were not restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance, but were predicable of aliens in amity so long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born in England, of such aliens were therefore natural-born subjects. But the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation of part of the King’s dominions, were not natural-born subjects because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the jurisdiction, of the King.
This fundamental principle, with these qualifications or [p656] explanations of it, was clearly, though quaintly, stated in the leading case, known as Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati, decided in 1608, after a hearing in the Exchequer Chamber before the Lord Chancellor and all the Judges of England, and reported by Lord Coke and by Lord Ellesmere. Calvin’s Case, 7 Rep. 1, 4b-6a, 18a, 18b; Ellesmere on Postnati, 62-64; S.C., 2 Howell’s State Trials, 559, 607, 613-617, 639, 640, 659, 679.
The English authorities ever since are to the like effect. Co.Lit. 8a, 128b, Lord Hale, in Hargrave’s Law Tracts, 210, an in 1 Hale P.C. 61, 62; 1 Bl.Com. 366, 369, 370, 374; 4 Bl.Com. 74, 92; Lord Kenyon, in Doe v. Jones, 4 T.R. 300, 308; Cockburn on Nationality, 7; Dicey Conflict of Laws, p. 173-177, 741.
In Udny v. Udny, (1869) L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 441, the point decided was one of inheritance, depending upon the question whether the domicil of the father was in England or in Scotland, he being in either alternative a British subject. Lord Chancellor Hatherley said: “The question of naturalization and of allegiance is distinct from that of domicil.” P. 452. Lord Westbury, in the passage relied on by the counsel for the United States, began by saying:
The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions: one, by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political status; another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status.
And then, while maintaining that the civil status is universally governed by the single principle of domicil, domicilium, the criterion established by international law for the purpose of determining civil status, and the basis on which
the personal rights of the party, that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy or intestacy, [p657] must depend,
he yet distinctly recognized that a man’s political status, his country, patria, and his “nationality, that is, natural allegiance,” “may depend on different laws in different countries.” Pp. 457, 460. He evidently used the word “citizen” not as equivalent to “subject,” but rather to “inhabitant,” and had no thought of impeaching the established rule that all persons born under British dominion are natural-born subjects.
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in the same year, reviewing the whole matter, said:
By the common law of England, every person born within the dominions of the Crown, no matter whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, whether the parents were settled or merely temporarily sojourning, in the country, was an English subject, save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of England. No effect appears to have been given to descent as a source of nationality.
Cockburn on Nationality, 7.
Mr. Dicey, in his careful and thoughtful Digest of the Law of England with reference to the Conflict of Laws, published in 1896, states the following propositions, his principal rules being printed below in italics:
“British subject” means any person who owes permanent allegiance to the Crown. “Permanent” allegiance is used to distinguish the allegiance of a British subject from the allegiance of an alien who, because he is within the British dominions, owes “temporary” allegiance to the Crown. “Natural-born British subject” means a British subject who has become a British subject at the moment of his birth.” “Subject to the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, any person who (whatever the nationality of his parents) is born within the British dominions is a natural-born British subject. This rule contains the leading principle of English law on the subject of British nationality.
The exceptions afterwards mentioned by Mr. Dicey are only these two:
1. Any person who (his father being an alien enemy) is born in a part of the British dominions, which at the time of such [p658] person’s birth is in hostile occupation, is an alien.
2. Any person whose father (being an alien) is at the time of such person’s birth an ambassador or other diplomatic agent accredited to the Crown by the Sovereign of a foreign State is (though born within the British dominions) an alien.
And he adds:
The exceptional and unimportant instances in which birth within the British dominions does not of itself confer British nationality are due to the fact that, though at common law nationality or allegiance in substance depended on the place of a person’s birth, it in theory, at least, depended not upon the locality of a man’s birth, but upon his being born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the King of England, and it might occasionally happen that a person was born within the dominions without being born within the allegiance, or, in other words, under the protection and control of, the Crown.
Dicey Conflict of Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.
It thus clearly appears that, by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the Crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction of the English Sovereign, and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
III. The same rule was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.
In the early case of The Charming Betsy, (1804) it appears to have been assumed by this court that all persons born in the United States were citizens of the United States, Chief Justice Marshall saying:
Whether a person born within the United States, or becoming a citizen according to the established laws of the country, can divest himself absolutely of [p659] that character otherwise than in such manner as may be prescribed by law is a question which it is not necessary at present to decide.
2 Cranch 64, 119.
In Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor (1833), 3 Pet. 99, in which the plaintiff was born in the city of New York about the time of the Declaration of Independence, the justices of this court (while differing in opinion upon other points) all agreed that the law of England as to citizenship by birth was the law of the English Colonies in America. Mr. Justice Thompson, speaking for the majority of the court, said:
It is universally admitted, both in the English courts and in those of our own country, that all persons born within the Colonies of North America, whilst subject to the Crown of Great Britain, are natural-born British subjects.
3 Pet. 120. Mr. Justice Johnson said: “He was entitled to inherit as a citizen born of the State of New York.” 3 Pet. 136. Mr. Justice Story stated the reasons upon this point more at large, referring to Calvin’s Case, Blackstone’s Commentaries, and Doe v. Jones, above cited, and saying:
Allegiance is nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign under whose protection he is, and allegiance by birth is that which arises from being born within the dominions and under the protection of a particular sovereign. Two things usually concur to create citizenship: first, birth locally within the dominions of the sovereign, and secondly, birth within the protection and obedience, or, in other words, within the allegiance of the sovereign. That is, the party must be born within a place where the sovereign is at the time in full possession and exercise of his power, and the party must also, at his birth, derive protection from, and consequently owe obedience or allegiance to, the sovereign, as such, de facto. There are some exceptions which are founded upon peculiar reasons, and which, indeed, illustrate and confirm the general doctrine. Thus, a person who is born on the ocean is a subject of the prince to whom his parents then owe allegiance; for he is still deemed under the protection of his sovereign, and born in a place where he has dominion in common with all other sovereigns. So the children of an ambassador are held to be [p660] subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protection and in the dominions of a foreign prince.
3 Pet. 155. “The children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens.” 3 Pet. 156.
Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth.
3 Pet. 164.
In Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, decided (as appears by the records of this court) on the same day as the last case, it was held that a woman born in South Carolina before the Declaration of Independence, married to an English officer in Charleston during its occupation by the British forces in the Revolutionary War, and accompanying her husband on his return to England, and there remaining until her death, was a British subject within the meaning of the Treaty of Peace of 1783, so that her title to land in South Carolina, by descent cast before that treaty, was protected thereby. It was of such a case that Mr. Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
The incapacities of femes covert, provided by the common law, apply to their civil rights, and are for their protection and interest. But they do not reach their political rights, nor prevent their acquiring or losing a national character. Those political rights do not stand upon the mere doctrines of municipal law, applicable to ordinary transactions, but stand upon the more general principles of the law of nations.
3 Pet. 248. This last sentence was relied on by the counsel for the United States as showing that the question whether a person is a citizen of a particular country is to be determined not by the law of that country, but by the principles of international law. But Mr. Justice Story certainly did not mean to suggest that, independently of treaty, there was any principle of international law which could defeat the operation of the established rule of citizenship by birth within the United States; for he referred (p. 245) to the contemporaneous opinions in Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, [p661] above cited, in which this rule had been distinctly recognized, and in which he had said (p. 162) that “each government had a right to decide for itself who should be admitted or deemed citizens,” and, in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, published in 1834, he said that, in respect to residence in different countries or sovereignties, “there are certain principles which have been generally recognized by tribunals administering public law” [adding, in later editions “or the law of nations”] “as of unquestionable authority,” and stated, as the first of those principles, “Persons who are born in a country are generally deemed citizens and subjects of that country.” Story, Conflict of Laws, § 48.
The English statute of 11 & 12 Will. III (1700). c. 6, entitled
An act to enable His Majesty’s natural-born subjects to inherit the estate of their ancestors, either lineal or collateral, notwithstanding their father or mother were aliens,
enacted that “all and every person or persons, being the King’s natural-born subject or subjects, within any of the King’s realms or dominions,” might and should thereafter lawfully inherit and make their titles by descent to any lands
from any of their ancestors, lineal or collateral, although the father and mother, or father or mother, or other ancestor, of such person or persons, by, from, through or under whom
title should be made or derived, had been or should be “born out of the King’s allegiance, and out of is Majesty’s realms and dominions,” as fully and effectually, as if such parents or ancestors “had been naturalized or natural-born subject or subjects within the King’s dominions.” 7 Statutes of the Realm, 90. It may be observed that, throughout that statute, persons born within the realm, although children of alien parents, were called “natural-born subjects.” As that statute included persons born “within any of the King’s realms or dominions,” it, of course, extended to the Colonies, and, not having been repealed in Maryland, was in force there. In McCreery v. Somerville, (1824) 9 Wheat. 354, which concerned the title to land in the State of Maryland, it was assumed that children born in that State of an alien who was still living, and who had not been naturalized, were “native-born citizens of the [p662] United States,” and, without such assumption, the case would not have presented the question decided by the court, which, as stated by Mr. Justice Story in delivering the opinion, was
whether the statute applies to the case of a living alien ancestor, so as to create a title by heirship where none would exist by the common law if the ancestor were a natural-born subject.
9 Wheat. 356.
Again, in Levy v. McCartee (1832), 6 Pet. 102, 112, 113, 115, which concerned a descent cast since the American Revolution, in the State of New York, where the statute of 11 & 12 Will. III had been repealed, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Story, held that the case must rest for its decision exclusively upon the principles of the common law, and treated it as unquestionable that, by that law, a child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, quoting the statement of Lord Coke in Co.Lit. 8a, that,
if an alien cometh into England and hath issue two sons, these two sons are indigenae, subjects born, because they are born within the realm,
and saying that such a child “was a native-born subject, according to the principles of the common law stated by this court in McCreery v. Somervlle, 9 Wheat. 354.”
In Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) 19 How. 393, Mr. Justice Curtis said:
The first section of the second article of the Constitution uses the language, “a natural-born citizen.” It thus assumes that citizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the Constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which referred citizenship to the place of birth.
19 How. 576. And, to this extent, no different opinion was expressed or intimated by any of the other judges.
In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said:
All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion [p663] that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution.
1 Abbott (U.S.) 28, 40, 41.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, speaking by Mr. Justice (afterwards Chief Justice) Sewall, early held that the determination of the question whether a man was a citizen or an alien was “to be governed altogether by the principles of the common law,” and that it was established, with few exceptions,
that a man born within the jurisdiction of the common law is a citizen of the country wherein he is born. By this circumstance of his birth, he is subjected to the duty of allegiance which is claimed and enforced by the sovereign of his native land, and becomes reciprocally entitled to the protection of that sovereign, and to the other rights and advantages which are included in the term “citizenship.”
Garder v. Ward (1805), 2 Mass. 244, note. And again:
The doctrine of the common law is that every man born within its jurisdiction is a subject of the sovereign of the country where he is born, and allegiance is not personal to the sovereign in the extent that has been contended for; it is due to him in his political capacity of sovereign of the territory where the person owing the allegiance as born.
Kilham v. Ward (1806), 2 Mass. 236, 265. It may here be observed that, in a recent English case, Lord Coleridge expressed the opinion of the Queen’s Bench Division that the statutes of 4 Geo. II, (1731) c. 1, and 13 Geo. III (1773), c. 21, (hereinafter referred to) “clearly recognize that to the King in his politic, and not in his personal, capacity is the allegiance of his subjects due.” Isaacson v. Durant, 17 Q.B.D. 54, 65.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, speaking by Mr; Justice Gaston, said:
Before our Revolution, all free persons born within the dominions of the King of Great Britain, whatever their color or complexion, were native-born British subjects; those born out of his allegiance were aliens. . . . Upon the Revolution, no other change took place in the law of North Carolina than was consequent upon the transition from a colony dependent on an European King to a free and sovereign [p664] State; . . . British subjects in North Carolina became North Carolina freemen; . . . and all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the State. . . . The term “citizen,” as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term “subject” in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people, and he who before as a “subject of the king” is now “a citizen of the State.”
State v. Manuel (1838), 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 24-26.
That all children born within the dominion of the United States of foreign parents holding no diplomatic office became citizens at the time of their birth does not appear to have been contested or doubted until more than fifty years after the adoption of the Constitution, when the matter was elaborately argued in the Court of Chancery of New York and decided upon full consideration by Vice Chancellor Sandford in favor of their citizenship. Lynch v. Clark, (1844) 1 Sandf.Ch. 583.
The same doctrine was repeatedly affirmed in the executive departments, as, for instance, by Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, in 1854, 2 Whart.Int.Dig. (2d ed.) p. 394; by Attorney General Black in 1859, 9 Opinions, 373, and by Attorney General Bates in 1862, 10 Opinions, 328, 382, 394, 396.
Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, speaking of the “general division of the inhabitants of every country under the comprehensive title of aliens and natives,” says:
Natives are all persons born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States. This is the rule of the common law, without any regard or reference to the political condition or allegiance of their parents, with the exception of the children of ambassadors, who are in theory born within the allegiance of the foreign power they represent. . . . To create allegiance by birth, the party must be born not only within the territory, but within the ligeance of the government. If a portion of the country be taken and held by conquest in war, the conqueror acquires the rights of the conquered as to its dominion and government, and children born in the armies of a State, while [p665] abroad and occupying a foreign country, are deemed to be born in the allegiance of the sovereign to whom the army belongs. It is equally the doctrine of the English common law that, during such hostile occupation of a territory, and the parents be adhering to the enemy as subjects de facto, their children, born under such a temporary dominion, are not born under the ligeance of the conquered.
2 Kent Com. (6th ed.) 39, 42. And he elsewhere says:
And if, at common law, all human beings born within the ligeance of the King, and under the King’s obedience, were natural-born subjects, and not aliens, I do not perceive why this doctrine does not apply to these United States, in all cases in which there is no express constitutional or statute declaration to the contrary. . . . Subject and citizen are, in a degree, convertible terms as applied to natives, and though the term citizen seems to be appropriate to republican freemen, yet we are, equally with the inhabitants of all other countries, subjects, for we are equally bound by allegiance and subjection to the government and law of the land.”
That decision is quoted at length in Ankeny.
Not to the length that you've quoted the dicta and everything they quoted is completley undermined when they admit there is NO LEGAL PRECEDENT. Wrap your head around that. The case they cited did NOT declare Wong Kim Ark to be a natural-born citizen. The ONLY legal precedent is from Minor. Ankeny argues that Minor didn't consider children born to noncitizen parents, but this is an outright lie.
You don’t know what a legal precedence is.
n. Latin for “remark,” a comment by a judge in a decision or ruling which is not required to reach the decision, but may state a related legal principle as the judge understands it. While it may be cited in legal argument, it does not have the full force of a precedent (previous court decisions or interpretations) since the comment was not part of the legal basis for judgment.”
The argument made in WKA is central to the decision, and thus is not just ‘dicta’ - unlike the passing comment made in Minor, which birthers like to quote. It is a matter on which they heard testimony from both sides, and was critical in reaching their conclusion. That makes it part of the decision.
The argument made in WKA is NOT about natural-born citizenship. The only time they referred to it was when they brought Article II and how it was defined by the Minor court. WKA’s central argument was about a different term “citizenship by birth” ... which is why they did not pronounce WKA to be a natural-born citizen ... which Ankeny admits ... which means there’s no legal precedence for the DICTUM in Ankeny. The ONLY legal precedent Ankeny cited was from Minor. That’s it. Game. Set. Match.
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