Posted on 12/04/2015 7:28:33 AM PST by Jim W N
More.
You should read Madison in Federalist #46 for the expectation of states being the dominant power:
I don't think is the case anymore. Federal handouts have made people more beholden to the federal government. In fact, liberals are at war with state governments. Take Gay Marriage as an example. They pit one state against another, taking an advantageous result in one state to the federal level to force it upon the rest.
Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective States. Into the administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow.
People have become more partial to the federal government, but not because of better administration. They're being bought by taxpayer monies approved by a Congress that no longer feels beholden to their respective states. The states have much to fear, because of federal encroachment of federal power.
If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due; but even in that case the State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered.
The 17th amendment has upended this assumption. The roles have been reversed.
It has been already proved that the members of the federal will be more dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State governments, than of the federal government. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these causes, the State governments must clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States.
And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their affections and consultations?
Because of the 17th amendment and the need for raising campaign funds, Senators are now more interested in the "collective welfare of their particular" party, not their state, because it is the party that drives much of their campaign financing. All of the liberal agenda in Washington was driven by party and national special interest, not state issues. States are pawns, a means to a national agenda end.
Were it admitted, however, that the Federal government may feel an equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty.
We saw this play out in Arizona over their immigration policy. Holder sued Arizona to prevent them from enforcing state immigration laws that the federal laws already permitted them to do. We saw it again in Nevada with the BLM trying to shut down private cattle grazing. They were successful in California closing down a 100 year old oyster farm on the Point Reyes National Seashore.
Now we see the call for nationalizing local policing.
On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter.
We saw this play out with the federal government shutdown and retaliation of closing national parks in all the states. The militarization of civil police are becoming much more intimidating to the average citizen of a state who is considering civil unrest.
Recently, Mitch McConnell's "embarrassments created by legislative devices," such as those regarding Senate votes regarding treaty powers and confirmation votes, have angered many. The actions of John Boehner's retaliations are not far behind.
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole.
This is exactly what the Article V movement is trying to accomplish. Rally the states around the idea of taking back control of the federal government through exercising their Article V power to propose the amendments of change that Congress is unwilling to.
But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal government to such an extremity. In the contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed against the other. The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; but it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter.
We would have to see if this plays out. Would the whole of the people align with the states in support of an Article V convention, or would they align with the Congress and the President to maintain the status quo? There's the rub.
The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of time, elect an uninterupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism.
This reads like a Nostradamus prophecy. It is exactly what has happened over the last decade, most recently accelerated.
Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence... Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms.
Here is a gem for the 2nd Amendment people. It is clear from this passage that the 2nd amendment was specifically intended to prevent a tyrannical government from forming, for fear of an armed populace.
And it is not certain, that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it.
The argument here is that the people will rise up in arms against a federal government that encroaches beyonds its limited, enumerated powers. And knowing that, it would be madness for the federal government to even try to engage with force, knowing that death and destruction that would naturally follow. Given the stockpiling of hollow-point bullets, and military anti-mine personnel carriers now being distributed across the United States, I think that our government is actually planning to do something just like this.
Madison calls it "insulting" to suggest that the American people sit back and let federal representatives solve their problems ("the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors... by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it.")
What I see is a discussion of brinksmanship and inevitable civil war instigated by a federal government that refuses to back down to states that push back on encroachment.
On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them.
I see signs that our current federal government is planning for exactly such a crisis, and is actively trying to incite it.
Madison calls the powers "reserved to the individual states... indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union," including the power to call for a proposing Convention. The proponents of an Article V convention is an attempt to avoid a direct head-to-head conflict with the federal government by side-stepping them and taking a parallel path to making Constitutional change.
-PJ
The Leftist courts have done just than since the early 20th Century, overturning without explanation or constitutionally-based reasoning early precedent, for example the unexplained overthrow of the Slaughterhouse Cases.
Also, the Constitution nowhere gives the Court such sweeping powers as has been assigned in practice. The Court was created for INDIVIDUAL CASES and CONTROVERSIES, not to make national legislation from the bench. The rule of stare decisis for the Court is that an earlier case, IF FOUND TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL, is mandatory authority for subsequent cases with the same facts and questions of law.
The Supreme Law of the Land continues to be the Constitution, not the precedent of unconstitutional Court decisions.
One more.
"To provide for amendments to be ratified by three fourths of the States under two exceptions only. ''That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other. The exception in favor of the equality of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably insisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality. The other exception must have been admitted on the same considerations which produced the privilege defended by it.
The intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate, independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article of the plan, the Congres will be obliged “on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States [which at present amount to nine], to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof.” The words of this article are peremptory. The Congress “shall call a convention.” Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.[snip]
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original formation, very different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on one question, may become the minority on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any other point no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.
Hamilton writes that the pre-17th amendment Senate and the Article V power to call for proposing Conventions were meant to put states on equal footing with the federal government.
Hamilton writes that the threat of states calling an Article V convention is intended as a check on a federal government that ignores their interests.
Hamilton writes that Article V gives no discretion to Congress, other than that they are obligated to call the Convention.
Hamilton recognizes that factions of states may agree on one topic and disagree on another; that these factions are fluid and malleable. Hamilton relies on the experience of the Convention delegates to sort it out.
Hamilton writes that each proposed amendment must stand on its own merits, and be ratified by 3/4ths of the states, and that a wholesale replacement of the Constitution is therefore impossible.
Hamilton writes that states might try to offer amendments of "local interests," but that amendments addressing general liberty and security are more likely to get three-fourths of the states to ratify.
It is clear from the context of Federalist #43 and #85 that the convention is for the states to control the federal government, not for the federal government to coopt the convention to hurt the states.
-PJ
Our current situation was best summarized -
From long ago -
If it has its defects, it is said, they can be best amended when they are experienced. But remember, when the people once part with power, they can seldom or never resume it again but by force. Many instances can be produced in which the people have voluntarily increased the powers of their rulers; but few, if any, in which rulers have willingly abridged their authority. This is a sufficient reason to induce you to be careful, in the first instance, how you deposit the powers of government.
How far the clause in the 8th section of the 1st article may operate to do away all idea of confederated states, and to effect an entire consolidation of the whole into one general government, it is impossible to say. The powers given by this article are very general and comprehensive, and it may receive a construction to justify the passing almost any law. A power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution, all powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, is a power very comprehensive and definite [indefinite?], and may, for ought I know, be exercised in a such manner as entirely to abolish the state legislatures. Suppose the legislature of a state should pass a law to raise money to support their government and pay the state debt, may the Congress repeal this law, because it may prevent the collection of a tax which they may think proper and necessary to lay, to provide for the general welfare of the United States? For all laws made, in pursuance of this constitution, are the supreme lay of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of the different states to the contrary notwithstanding. By such a law, the government of a particular state might be overturned at one stroke, and thereby be deprived of every means of its support.
It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the constitution would warrant a law of this kind; or unnecessarily to alarm the fears of the people, by suggesting, that the federal legislature would be more likely to pass the limits assigned them by the constitution, than that of an individual state, further than they are less responsible to the people. But what is meant is, that the legislature of the United States are vested with the great and uncontroulable powers, of laying and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies, organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and other general powers. And are by this clause invested with the power of making all laws, proper and necessary, for carrying all these into execution; and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country to one single government. And if they may do it, it is pretty certain they will; for it will be found that the power retained by individual states, small as it is, will be a clog upon the wheels of the government of the United States; the latter therefore will be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way. Besides, it is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over every thing that stands in their way. This disposition, which is implanted in human nature, will operate in the federal legislature to lessen and ultimately to subvert the state authority, and having such advantages, will most certainly succeed, if the federal government succeeds at all. It must be very evident then, that what this constitution wants of being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union into one complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive powers, to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily acquire in its exercise and operation.
Let us now proceed to enquire, as I at first proposed, whether it be best the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, or not? It is here taken for granted, that all agree in this, that whatever government we adopt, it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed as to secure the liberty of the citizens of America, and such an one as to admit of a full, fair, and equal representation of the people. The question then will be, whether a government thus constituted, and founded on such principles, is practicable, and can be exercised over the whole United States, reduced into one state?
Anti-federalist: Brutus #1
Charter of negative liberties - Obama
Looks like a good one. Maybe someone has already done all this stuff on how the average Joe can learn the Constitution.
But as you say, everyone should read it. It’s not enough to just publish such a book. There must be a way to get into everyone’s hands or enough hands to make a difference. Somehow I see local Tea Parties helping out with something like this. Someone with a lot of money so that we can literally go door-to-door and give these to folks.
Thanks PJ. Good stuff. Time for states to assert their sovereignty NOW and if they’re too chicken then let the citizenry become familiar with their Constitution and FORCE such sovereignty and such nullification of unconstitutional federal acts.
Let the battle begin!!!
For example: the Commerce Clause. We started with a fairly narrow interpretation of this clause as limiting federal power into state affairs, until perhaps Swift v. United States (1905), which started the precedent of local action influencing commerce therefore being part of commerce, which was twisted ultimately to the travesty of Wickard v. Filburn (1942) within a single generation.
Well, the Supremacy Clause certainly puts the Constitution in highest legal authority and over Court decisions.
Remember, if it is not a specified power in the Constitution it is not a legitimate federal judicial, legislative, or executive power. The Court is bound by the Constitution and must base its decisions based on the Constitution. If it does not, then its act, just like an unconstitutional act of Congress or the President, is invalid and should be rejected and/or nullified by the states.
WELL SAID THANK YOU!
I understand, and agree 100% that what you stated is the way things SHOULD be; this was clearly the intention of the founding fathers from their own words. Unfortunately, in practice, there is no mechanism for ensuring that this happens and as long as we continue to accept the doctrine of stare decisis, there is no way for things to change.
We are now a barely literate, barely numerate, population who cannot function beyond the primal urges
Welcome to California!
Well said, I agree, were screwed.
Who says we have to continue to accept the doctrine of the Left? Hence my post. It’s time for a change and time to stop worrying about what the Left does. The issue isn’t the Left. The issue is the Right and what it will do to trigger a rebirth of freedom, “to the point of bayonet if necessary”, to borrow an old Reagan line.
We must be ready to fight for our God-given freedom. If we are unwilling to fight and die for the freedom others have given their lives for, then we’ve lost already.
The Left and opposition to freedom will never stop. The only question is, will we maintain an ardent vigilance and determination to regain our freedom. If so I believe we have a good chance of winning. If not, we lose by default. I’d rather fight for freedom and lose or die trying, than live in surrender to the slavery of tyranny.
Fighting is about I’m good for really, but when it comes for that the time for debate, or even talking is long past. I was thinking more in terms of what can be done through the political process.
It’s a fight.
First, the fight is in the debate in the forum of ideas which we pretty much consistently win.
Next, the fight is in influencing resistance and nullification of unconstitutional federal acts.
It doesn’t have to come to blows, but if it does, so be it. Obama and the Left are quite ready for that. We better be also.
Again, if we’re not ready to go all the way in the good fight of faith and freedom, we’ve already lost because our opposition will stop at nothing. But if we’re ready, willing, and able to go all the way, we have a good chance of winning. Win or lose the fight is worth it.
In a fight for principles, absolutely! If you won't fight for what you believe in, you're not really living anyway.
Yes, I’m talking about the faithful fight for freedom. A life that dies in that fight is better than one that lives in surrender to tyranny.
Someday soon, my guess is it’s several decades from now, the whole world under this coming Man of Perdition, will be faced with that very choice: submit to and literal worship of tyranny or die. (Those of us who are believers in Jesus Christ will have already been taken up outta here when that happens - but the idea is still the same.)
<> It (Article V) guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults.<>
Our nation is in its horrid condition precisely because we have refused the Framer's gift: the Article V state amendment convention process. We have collectively chosen to perpetuate the faults of the living, de-facto constitution.
If time remains, there is little of it.
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