Will more foreign troops bring peace to Afghanistan?

Reuters ^ | July 25th, 2008 | Myra MacDonald

[DBCJR]

With both ...Obama and John McCain calling for more troops to be sent to Afghanistan, there have been a slew of articles arguing this will at best not work and, at worst, fuel the insurgency...Zbigniew Brzezinski,...prominent supporter of Barack Obama, ...risks repeating the defeat suffered by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan."... Our strategy is getting in deeper and deeper.”

...Canada’s Globe and Mail, ... ”We knew by 1985 that we could not win,” it quotes veteran Ruslan Aushev as saying. It then took Moscow four more years to extricate hundreds of thousands of troops... Gulf News, Patrick Seale says that trying to force through a military solution on Afghanistan would be a grave mistake which would only radicalise the Muslim world further, while Juan Cole writes in salon.com that Obama could be jumping from the frying pan into the fire by shifting the focus away from Iraq to Afghanistan.

... the Belfer Center which argues that the solution lies in restoring the autonomy and authority of the Pashtun tribes in both southern Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan. “Rather than seeking to extend the reach of the central government, which simply foments insurgency,” it says, ”the US should be doing everything in their means to empower the tribal elders and restore balance to a tribal/cultural system that has been disintegrating since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.”

At the other end is a suggestion by U.S. counterinsurgency expert John Nagl that Afghanistan institute a draft to call up Afghans to fight the insurgency. ”It was good enough for the United States up until 1973,” said Nagl, an author and former U.S. Army battalion commander ... “How can it not be good enough for the fifth poorest country in the world which is afflicted by a difficult insurgency?”

[MinorityRepublican]

No it won’t bring more peace. But it will kill more terrorists to create conditions possible for peace.

[Gaffer]

Start nuking some of the mountain valleys and isolated areas - that will help

[scory]

There hasn’t been peace in Afghanistanfor many centuries - if ever. The country has been under the thumb of Persians, Macedonians, Arabs, Mongols, Turks and the British and none of them pacified the place. Believe me, if the Mongols couldn’t get the job done our PC driven “leaders” won’t even get to first base.

[Prophet in the wilderness]

" Will more foreign troops bring peace to Afghanistan? "

20,000 lbs of ( M.O.A.B. ) diplomacy would.

[Billthedrill]

There's actually quite a bit more involved than merely raising troop levels, as there was with the Surge in Iraq. I do note that Reuters is breaking out all the old defeatist wheezes they used before the intervention with the possible exception of the Brutal Afghan Winter. Had they been correct when first they had invoked them the Taliban would still be in power. The former weren't, and the latter aren't.

The key to Afghanistan is simple - as long as the Taliban and al-Qaeda enjoy sanctuary over the border in Waziristan there will be war. When the tribes get fed up with it and evict them, there will be no more war. That's what it will take.

[MadMax, the Grinning Reaper]

I have posted a reply to this article and the one poster/commentor, at the blog site underlined in the FR story.

You are welcome to view it.

We need to reply to articles and columns in other countries for two reasons. The first is to answer issues raised in the original story, and to counter misinformation often posted in the “comments section”.

It gives us an international voice - i.e. doing the job our government doesn’t do very well.

Also, it shows people that we are not a bunch of yahoos who don’t care about what is going on in the world. Perhaps we can reach new people with our views and unseen/unheard information.

It is a “win-win” situation for use to use the international blogger internet to defend our country.

[DBCJR]

Most agreed! Good job,

[Retain Mike]

More troops work if they are used effectively.

Afghanistan is at risk, because people like General Petraeus and his philosophy are scarce commodities. NATO, Pentagon and intelligence bureaucrats, many masquerading in military uniforms, have consistently ignored and depreciated counterinsurgency warfare. Successful career development worldwide requires resumes applying advanced technologies for conventional warfare in Europe and on blue water seas to third world small wars. Counterinsurgency warfare receives scant attention for being low tech, labor intensive and unspectacular.

When General Petraeus commanded the 101st Airborne in Iraq in April 2003 he said, “Now the hard part begins”. However, he had only two stars and did not co-author Army’s counterinsurgency field manual until 2006. The Marine Corps, not Army, has unpopular distinction for embracing the culture of counterinsurgency warfare. As Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Peter Pace had the watch for internal political battles allowing General Petraeus prominence. Seldom would such a gifted, experienced soldier obtain significance needed within ossified intelligence and defense bureaucracies to implement proven counterinsurgency tactics.

Application of counterinsurgency tactics would increase momentum among local religious, tribal and political leaders to reject the Taliban and accept national government. The objective would be to help them make pragmatic, consistent decisions recognizing utility of aligning with Kabul. Afghan and NATO combined units would clear Taliban from marginal regions, remain militarily present, and allow reconstruction teams entry. Locals would assume authority as behavior confirmed commitment to national goals. In rebellious regions attacks would disrupt Taliban units planning offensives, until regular presence expanded from adjacent pacific areas.

[DBCJR]

You sound like you have some strategic military experience yourself.

[Retain Mike]

I was fortunate enough to avoid most of the stuff that could get you shot doing that type of work. My introduction was in 1971 when our LST took some Marines from Da Nang to Okinawa. This Marine warrant officer spent a lot of time on the bridge when I had the watch and gave a dissertation on combined action platoons and the 1940 Small Wars Manual.

He did not have anything good to say about McNamara and Westmorland who prevented the Marine Corps from implementing counterinsurgency tactics in the area on his previous tours. We did not have the same problem in 1971 down in IV Corp when TF116 and VN counterparts destroyed the last active VC main force unit located south of the Mekong Delta. I have been hooked on this cul-de-sac of warfare ever since. Two good sites to look at are:
Small Wars Journal: http://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php

The Long War Journal: http://www.longwarjournal.org/

[DBCJR]

Thanks. I have been concerned for some time that our nation has lost what it takes to win a war. While Europe lost it a century ago, small terrorist nations have figured out that we do not have the resolve to win:

1) to do what it takes, or

2) hang in there until victory,

for anything more complex than Grenada - and Jimmy Carter woulod have botched that.

I can remember 9/11 as clear as a bell. I had a son in
college, so I called him. “this was a systematic attack,” I told him, “More will follow. We are at war. You will probably be drafted. I wish that I could go in your place.” That is not the way things unfolded. To my surprise, and against the analysis of all the pundits of that day, we never had another assault on American soil. For that I am very grateful to President George Bush
and our American troops. While mistakes have been made, there has been an overwhelimng success in what matters most. Yet our people, lead by the MSM, show great disdain, chorused by the world. We have a presidential candidate now apologizing to GERMANY (of all nations!!!) for US aggression!!!!!!!

[Non-Sequitur]

At the other end is a suggestion by U.S. counterinsurgency expert John Nagl that Afghanistan institute a draft to call up Afghans to fight the insurgency. ”It was good enough for the United States up until 1973,” said Nagl, an author and former U.S. Army battalion commander ... “How can it not be good enough for the fifth poorest country in the world which is afflicted by a difficult insurgency?”

Ask South Vietnam that question.

[Retain Mike]

I have in a saved Word file about 7,000 words worth of letters to the editor I keep sending out. I often find it amazing how often I need to counter the same lies and false rhetoric. Thinking of your comment and debate around Obama’s trip here is a letter I’ll update to send out this coming week.

Regarding a timetable for leaving Iraq, the United States has a well-deserved reputation for abandoning allies, ignoring the suffering of others, and failing to respond to significant attacks. During the Cold War a few examples were crises in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Guatemala, Cuba, and Lebanon. More recently our apathetic boredom impacted Somalia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Sudan. The Muslims of the Salafi/Wahhabi heresy take great encouragement from our failure to defend the sovereignty of our Iranian embassy, and our subsequent lethargic responses to 15 major terrorist attacks under four presidents. They are well acquainted with our affection for debating elegant foreign policy models until we find meanings for necessity, proportional response, multi-lateralism, and exit strategy, which shelter us from meaningful confrontation with an empty, self-congratulatory righteousness, and which sponsor accurate perceptions by those relying on us of turning a blind eye, agonizing over their losses from afar, or cutting and running.

We cannot use the words timeline, deadline, or exit strategy when those are code words for the type of actions defined above, and for identifying us as a dysfunctional ally. The plan for withdrawal must be keyed to a pragmatic evaluation of events. All statements must emphasize that when Iraqi and U.S. governments agree certain conditions exist, the disengagement proceeds to the next step. Only in this way can the Salafi/Wahhabi jihadists understand we intend to persevere in this generational conflict against them.

[DBCJR]

All of this making the US and its culture incapable of sustaining a resolve toward a victory. We live in a time when prisoners of war are conveyed the rights of citizens under the Bill of Rights, where every instance of collateral damage is considered a capital crime (wonder what these people would do about Dresden?). Our rules of engagement prevent the advantage of any surprise or even first strike. No other power would bow to world opinion as we do. We, as a country, have “Prom Queen Syndrome” , an adolescent mentality that is predicated on an intense fear that we won’t be popular enough.

[Retain Mike]

I love the “Prom Queen Syndrome” phrase. I am tempted to steal that for one of my letters.

[DBCJR]

Be my guest!