BRITISH SEEK PARACHUTE INVADERS REPORTED SENT AS SUICIDE SQUADS (8/15/40)

Microfiche-New York Times archives, Monterey Public Library | 8/15/40 | W.F. Leysmith, James MacDonald, Maj. Alexander P. de Seversky, Frank L. Kluckhohn, Camille Cianfarra

[Homer_J_Simpson]

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[Homer_J_Simpson]

You have to remember that, with the death of Walter Wever . . .

Walter who?

"There can be little doubt that the ideas of Douhet had considerable impact on Luftwaffe philosophy, although perhaps not as much as Galland claimed. Douhet wrote his Command of the Air in 1921, and it was translated into German during the 1920s; it did not appear in English, however, until the Second World War was underway. The impact might have been greater but for an accident. The first Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, General Walther Wever, was a Douhetist of the first order despite his long career as a soldier and his late conversion to the flying business. Wever, the intellecutal leader of the 'big bomber men' of the Luftwaffe, developed two prototypes of what he called the 'Ural Bomber'; but they might just as well have been named 'battleplanes.' Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe, however, disaster struck Wever on June 3, 1936, during a visit to Dresden; suffering a case of 'gethomeitus' because of a late departure for Berlin, he neglected the walkaround preflight inspection of his brand new Heinkel 70 and left the aileron lock in place. He crashed on take-off. The prospects for a German strategic bombing force died with him."

Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor, The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean

[CougarGA7]

Douhet wrote his Command of the Air in 1921, and it was translated into German during the 1920s; it did not appear in English, however, until the Second World War was underway.

Interesting. So it may be more accurate to call these commentators who follow these air doctrines that we percieve as Douhetian as Mitchellian instead. "Winged Defense" was published in 1925 and is very similar in perspective as Douhet. The only exception is Douhet's assertion that civilian centers are primary targets for air forces since they will break the will of the enemy. Mitchell's work is more centered on the destruction on the enemies military capacity.

[PzLdr]

Wever, like Kesselring and other senior Luftwaffe officers [exceptions being Goering, Loerzer, Milch and Udet] was a transferee [abductee] from the Army. Wever, Kesselring and Jeschonneck had all been artillerymen, as was the Army Chief of Staff, Halder, and I believe, the Commander of the Army, Brauchitsch.

[PzLdr]

Wever, like Kesselring and other senior Luftwaffe officers [exceptions being Goering, Loerzer, Milch and Udet] was a transferee [abductee] from the Army. Wever, Kesselring and Jeschonneck had all been artillerymen, as was the Army Chief of Staff, Halder, and I believe, the Commander of the Army, Brauchitsch.

[BroJoeK]

"Raising enlistees to $467.17 a month, in today’s money."

That depends on how you look at it.

Check out this site for relative worth calculations.

If you only consider the consumer price index, then your number is about right.

But if you compare $30 per month in 1940 with today's unskilled wages and production worker compensation, then it's equivalent to around $1,000 per month -- and that's with no expenses for room & board. ;-)

But the number I like best is the relative share of GDP comparison -- in this case $30 per month in 1940 would be over $4,000 per month today!

What that means is simply that a soldier earning $30 then was in the same relative position on the economic totem pole as someone making over $4,000 today.

And 1940 was still peace time, so the risks of death or injury were as yet pretty small...