Even if Hitler had wisely ordered the Me 262 into production in 1943, the plane was still in many ways no match for the fastest Allied fighters like the P-51B/C/D/K, Hawker Tempest V and Supermarine Spitfire Mk. XIV, because of the Me 262’s slow acceleration and limited maneuverability. The Allies would have figured out how to draw the Me 262 into a dogfight where the Allied fighters had the advantage.
I recall reading recently a history of the AAF in WW-II “Winged Victory” of the Allies strategy for dealing with the jets.
As the ME-262 and AR-234 required long concrete runways once a jet was sighted the call went out on the radio “JETS”. Available units would then start patrolling those airfields. The flight time of the early jets was rather short and once the jets were in the pattern they were easy pickings for any Allied fighters.
This strategy played upon the early jets weakness in the slow acceleration of the engines of the times.
Regards
alfa6 ;>}
However, from what I've read Arnold and the others in high command still believed they could destroy the German aircraft industry from the air. The full degree of the ineffectiveness of strategic bombing would not be known until after the war.
Also, American effectiveness was much better than the Brits because we bombed in daylight and had the Norden sight. Frankly, I dont think the Brits cared if they hit anything or not - they wanted to destroy the major German cities.
Finally, consider the effect of the air campaign on Germany's military effectiveness. A huge percentage of German industry and a big chunk of her armed forces are now devoted to producing aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons and manning the defenses. That is production and manpower that is not in Russia or in France preparing for us.