Today, Clark insists he never went around the chain of command. He argues that his job as NATO commander was a "two-hatted" position, partly a U.S. military role and partly a diplomatic post, leading the 19-nation coalition. He contends the latter role required him to assist the secretary of state and other White House officials. At best, Clark is being disingenuous here. As the NATO commander, his political guidance comes from the North Atlantic Council. There is a U.S. "Permanent Representative" of Ambassador rank on that organization who represents the official United States position and is the "chain of command" back to the U.S. Secretary of State. And coordinating & maintaining political consensus among the NATO members is the responsibility of the NATO Secretary General, not the SACEUR.
Further, Clark had no business providing his advice to the President and Secretary of State independent of the SecDef & CJCS. And arguably for Kosovo, it was his bad advice on including NATO access to Serbia into the Rambouillet Accord that was a deal-breaker. He also advised Madame Secretary that Slobo would fold when threatened with bombing and that was wrong. And then when he finally got back into his own bailiwick--planning for war--he screwed that up too with a wimpy little couple day operation and no planned sequel.
So he was not only self-serving and conniving, he was incompetent.
At best, Clark is being disingenuous here. As the NATO commander, his political guidance comes from the North Atlantic Council. There is a U.S. "Permanent Representative" of Ambassador rank on that organization who represents the official United States position and is the "chain of command" back to the U.S. Secretary of State. And coordinating & maintaining political consensus among the NATO members is the responsibility of the NATO Secretary General, not the SACEUR. Further, Clark had no business providing his advice to the President and Secretary of State independent of the SecDef & CJCS. And arguably for Kosovo, it was his bad advice on including NATO access to Serbia into the Rambouillet Accord that was a deal-breaker. He also advised Madame Secretary that Slobo would fold when threatened with bombing and that was wrong. And then when he finally got back into his own bailiwick--planning for war--he screwed that up too with a wimpy little couple day operation and no planned sequel.
So he was not only self-serving and conniving, he was incompetent
You're on the right track. Now keep going, and connect the dots. And don't forget three very important dots.
