Missouri Supreme Court Upholds Constitutionality of Concealed Carry Law

Bang!

Great news from Missouri.

Heard that too. But there was something else associated with it about 4 counties where it couldn't be enforced in. Couldn't make out what they were talking about..

Any more info????

ping

Apparently it is the unfunded mandate portion of the law that was challenged by the four counties, and it can't be enforced there. Sounds like rural areas are a go, while urban areas can't be forced to issue. Once they find out they can make money on it, they will eventually give in.

But there was something else associated with it about 4 counties where it couldn't be enforced in.

Probably the four counties where the referendum on the issue failed a couple of years ago: St. Louis City (which is also a County), St. Louis County, and whichever counties encompass Kansas City.

Basically, all the blacks voted against it because the St. Louis/Kansas City socialist newspapers manufactured large quantities of fear-mongering FUD just before the election.

Ok, just got another KMBZ update on that. Apparently it is ruled constitutional with the exception that it could not be enforced in four MO counties (didn't catch the list). These particular counties would have to decide (vote) to have this or not. This opens the door for other counties to vote out the concealed/carry law.

Sounds to me like the MO Supremes have only succeeded in totally screwing up what the legislature passed. Totally!!!

Great news!!! Congrats to all!!

I do hope you are correct.

Opinion
Supreme Court of Missouri

Case Style: Alvin Brooks, et al., Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. State of Missouri and Attorney General Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, James Murphy, Defendant, Bull's Eye, L.L.C., et al., Appellants/Cross-Respondents.

Case Number: SC85674

Handdown Date: 02/26/2004

Appeal From: Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Hon. Steven R. Ohmer

Counsel for Appellant: Paul C. Wilson, Alana M. Barragan-Scott, William J. Bryan, Peter von Gontard and Russell L. Makepeace

Counsel for Respondent: Burton W. Newman and Richard C. Miller

Opinion Summary:

In September 2003, a supermajority of the general assembly overrode a gubernatorial veto to pass House Bills 349, 129, 1236 and 328, commonly referred to as the concealed-carry act. A key component of the act is to allow citizens to obtain a permit to carry concealed firearms if they meet certain enumerated qualifications. The act also requires sheriffs to fingerprint and conduct criminal background checks on all applicants and otherwise determine whether they meet the statutory qualifications. The act then requires sheriffs to issue permits accordingly and, under certain circumstances, to suspend or revoke permits. Before the act took effect, a group of taxpayers sued the state and the attorney general, seeking a permanent injunction to stop the act's enforcement and a declaratory judgment that the act was unconstitutional. The next day, the taxpayers amended their petition, adding the St. Louis city sheriff as a defendant. The following day, firearms training business Bull's Eye, L.L.C., and its principals were allowed to intervene in the case. In November, the trial court issued a final declaratory judgment in the taxpayers' favor, holding the act violates article I, section 23 of the state constitution, and permanently enjoining enforcement of the entire act. The trial court specifically rejected the taxpayers' other claims, including their claim that the act violated article X, sections 16 and 21 of the Missouri constitution (provisions of the Hancock amendment). The state, attorney general and Bull's Eye appeal, and the taxpayers cross-appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED. INJUNCTION DISSOLVED IN PART.
Court en banc holds: (1) The trial court erred in declaring the concealed-carry act unconstitutional under article I, section 23. This section states: "That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons." The words of the last clause are plain and unambiguous. Read in proper grammatical context, and giving the words their common usage, this clause does not prohibit wearing concealed weapons. Rather, it prohibits a person from invoking the constitutional right to keep and bear arms as a justification for wearing concealed weapons. The general assembly, therefore, retains its plenary power to enact legislation regarding the use and regulation of concealed weapons.
(2) As part of the Hancock amendment, article X, section 16 prohibits the state from "requiring any new or expanded activities by counties or other political subdivisions without full state financing," and article X, section 21 is to the same effect. The taxpayers claim that the concealed-carry act does not provide "full state financing" to fund the activities and costs imposed on sheriffs and county governments necessary for the issuance of the concealed-carry permits. The failure to provide funding, taxpayers explain, constitutes an unfunded mandate in violation of article X, sections 16 and 21. Although the act directs sheriffs to impose a fee not to exceed $100 for issuance of the permits, ostensibly to fund the new activities and costs, under section 50.535.2, RSMo, this fee only can be used for "training and equipment." To the extent the implementation costs exceed those for training and equipment, taxpayers contend that the legislative mandate still will be at least partially unfunded. Because no claim is made, this Court does not address the validity of the fee to satisfy the requirement for "full state financing" of the state-mandated duties. Instead, the challenge is only to the inadequacy of the fee to fund the mandate.
(3) Because the state is imposing the permit fee on a statewide basis, the taxpayers have standing to challenge the act statewide.
(4) Under the Hancock amendment, a case is not ripe (sufficiently developed to allow a court to determine the facts, to resolve a presently existing conflict and to grant specific and conclusive relief) without specific proof of new or increased duties and increased expenses. These elements cannot be established by common sense or speculation and conjecture. Here, specific evidence as to the added duties and added expenses the concealed-carry act will impose was provided only with regard to four counties -- Camden, Cape Girardeau, Greene and Jackson. Accordingly, the Hancock challenge is ripe as to those four counties.
(5) Section 571.094.10 of the concealed-carry act requires sheriffs to pay the permit fee into the sheriff's revolving fund, which, under section 50.535.2, RSMo, only can be used by law enforcement agencies to buy equipment and to provide training. The evidence shows that Jackson County will incur approximately $150,000 annually in increased personnel costs to fingerprint and conduct background checks on applicants and to process permit applications. The evidence also shows that Camden, Cape Girardeau, Greene and Jackson counties will incur an increased cost of $38 per applicant for the highway patrol to conduct fingerprint analyses. These costs constitute an unfunded mandate in violation of the Hancock amendment. The state is enjoined from enforcing the act in these four counties, but only to the extent it constitutes an unfunded mandate imposed on these counties.
(6) The parties do not raise, nor does this Court address, the question of whether a county's governing body can elect to fund the increased costs voluntarily from other county revenue sources that are not dedicated for some other mandated use.
(7) To the extent the permit fee charged in any county exceeds the amount of estimated actual costs of training and equipment necessary to process the permit applications, that excess cannot be characterized as a permissible " ;user" fee. Instead, it would violate article X, section 22 of the Hancock amendment, which prohibits counties from levying any tax, license or fee without the approval of a majority of the county's qualified voters.
(8) Section 50.535.3 allows sheriffs of first-class counties to defer at least some of their increased activities and costs under the act by designating one or more chiefs of police of any town, city or municipality within the county to accept and process the permit applications and then reimburse them for their costs from the proceeds of the permit fee.
(9) The court's judgment dismissing the Hancock claims as applied to the remaining Missouri counties is affirmed, and the court's injunction prohibiting enforcement of the act in those counties is dissolved. In the absence of specific proof of increased costs in these counties, disposition of the Hancock issue as to these counties is premature. Even though the challenge to the statewide mandate may be brought in a single suit, ripeness remains to be determined on a county-by-county basis.
(10) Certain provisions of the concealed-carry act do not implicate the Hancock amendment, are not affected by any unfunded mandate under Hancock and, therefore, are not subject to injunctive relief. These include the reenacted section 571.030, which provides, for instance, that any person 21 years or older lawfully may transport a concealable firearm in the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle, and subsections 20 and 21 of section 571.094, which prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons in locations such as churches, courthouses and schools, with exceptions, and sets out civil penalties for failing to leave those locations on request.
(11) The taxpayers' claim that the concealed-carry act is unconstitutionally vague is denied. They offer only hypotheticals that, in the future, might arise as disputes but, at this time, are merely conjecture.
(12) The taxpayers' claim that the concealed-carry act usurps the will of the people as expressed by the defeat of Proposition B in 1999 also is denied. No court in this state ever has held that voter defeat of a measure precludes subsequent legislative action on that same issue, and to do so now would call into question the entire concept of representative democracy.
(13) The case is remanded for disposition of the injunction bond under section 526.200, RSMo, and assessment of costs as defined under article X, section 23.

Dissenting opinion by Chief Justice White: (1) The author agrees that Camden, Cape Girardeau, Greene and Jackson counties are not required to comply with the concealed-carry act. The author disagrees, however, that the act's unfunded mandate does not apply statewide or that the issue is not ripe as to the remaining counties. The author would hold that no Missouri county is required to comply with the act as a result of the unfunded mandate for which the state, and only the state, is required to finance fully.
(2) The author notes that article X, section 16 prohibits the state from requiring any new or expanded activities by counties and other political subdivisions "without full state financing, or from shifting the tax burden to counties and other political subdivisions." The author further notes that article X, section 21 prohibits the general assembly from requiring counties or other political subdivisions from performing a new activity or service or an increased activity or service "unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the county or other political subdivision for any increased costs."
(3) The author writes that the principal opinion mischaracterizes Brooks's argument, which is not just challenging the adequacy of the application fee but which also repetitively alleges that the state, in violation of the Hancock amendment, has failed to fully fund the act's mandate from any source of state revenue. The author states that the Court could decide this clearly presented issue today because Brooks makes clear that there is a facial violation of the Hancock amendment by arguing there is no state funding anywhere in the act to finance the state mandate, yet the principal opinion declines to address this issue. The author notes that a speedy and authoritative decision would avoid the intolerable confusion created by the principal opinion's holding, which partially implements an unconstitutional law.
(4) The author further notes that it does not matter whether the application fee will pay for the counties' additional expenses because this money is not state revenue and, therefore, is totally irrelevant to the Hancock analysis. The author notes that any money not provided directly from state revenue by a state appropriation that is diverted and expended by a county to implement the concealed-carry act is money taken directly from county taxpayers, each of whom has standing for injunctive relief.
(5) The author observes that, after today's holding, once an application for a concealed firearms license is filed by a single individual in each of the remaining "unenjoined" counties, a single taxpayer in that same county need only seek a declaratory judgment that the concealed-carry act violates the Hancock amendment and demonstrate any additional cost to the county resulting from the act to succeed in enjoining the act's enforcement. The author notes that the principal opinion dictates this result by laying out the law of the case -- that any evidence of increased costs imposed by the act demonstrates an unfunded mandate.
(6) The author points out contradictions in the principal opinion's analysis when it states that this matter can be resolved in a single additional suit while at the same time asserting that nothing less than particularized evidence is required from each county for each individual claim to become ripe - only then will the Court agree to recognize the obvious Hancock violation on a county by county basis. The author further notes that the principal opinion's decision to unnecessarily delay application of Hancock to all of Missouri's counties ultimately will result with inflicting the unnecessary cost of future litigation on each of the counties or political subdivisions involved in the declaratory judgment actions that will follow this opinion. The author notes that the Hancock amendment will allow the taxpayer bringing suit to recover costs and fees once the act is enjoined in the remaining counties and political subdivisions not enjoined by today's holding.
(7) The author would hold that, because he would find the act to be unconstitutional under the Hancock Amendment, it is inappropriate and unnecessary to construe the act with regard to article I, section 23.

Source: http://www.osca.state.mo.us/Courts/PubOpinions.nsf/0f87ea4ac0ad4c0186256405005d3b8e/837fe5ba41d66deb86256e46004fc352?OpenDocument

Missouri Supreme Court desicion handed down today!

http://www.osca.state.mo.us/Courts/PubOpinions.nsf/0f87ea4ac0ad4c0186256405005d3b8e?OpenView

LTC News Update 2/26/04 MOSC Decision

FOR WIDEST POSSIBLE DISTRIBUTION

At 11 am today the Missouri Supreme Court handed down their Opinion on
the
LTC Lawsuit Appeal. The MOSC found in our favor, that the law was
constitutional on the Article 1 Section 23 issue that Judge Ohmer said
was
clearly unconstitutional at the trial court level. We Appealed to the
MOSC
on those (Article 1, Sect 23) grounds. The Opposition then Cross
Appealed
(and was late with their filing) on all the issues that *they* had lost
on
in the trial court. The MOSC did find against us on the Hancock issue
and
said the funding prescribed by HB349 had a Hancock problem.

(Interestingly, Judge Ohmer, who ruled against us on Article 1 Section
23,
and found *no* Hancock violation, turned out to be *wrong* [overruled]
by
the MOSC on both issues.)

See for full details:

http://www.osca.state.mo.us/Courts/PubOpinions.nsf/0f87ea4ac0ad4c0186256405005d3b8e?OpenView

The legislation to correct the Hancock funding problem is already
drafted
and expected to be filed by close of business today with the Missouri
Legislature. Full analysis of the Opinion will follow by separate LTC
News
Update later today and will be posted on the web site at:

http://www.learntocarry.com

Tim Oliver
LTC-LDF

Key parts:

3) Because the state is imposing the permit fee on a statewide basis, the taxpayers have standing to challenge the act statewide.
(4) Under the Hancock amendment, a case is not ripe (sufficiently developed to allow a court to determine the facts, to resolve a presently existing conflict and to grant specific and conclusive relief) without specific proof of new or increased duties and increased expenses. These elements cannot be established by common sense or speculation and conjecture. Here, specific evidence as to the added duties and added expenses the concealed-carry act will impose was provided only with regard to four counties -- Camden, Cape Girardeau, Greene and Jackson. Accordingly, the Hancock challenge is ripe as to those four counties.

Post 11 is just the summary part of the opinion. Thanks for the link to the entire decision.

ping

Interesting stuff: Sounds like the legislature clearly screwed up in not providing funding for the various activities (background checks, fingerprinting, etc.) required under the act, but the law prohibits local governments from enacting new fees to pay these expenses without voter approval.

OOOORRRRAAAHHHH!!!! OOO FREAKING RAH!!!!!!!!!!!

Semper Fi

Finally

Excellent. The Court made the critical ruling that Concealed Carry was not prohibited by Article I, Section 23 (which is exactly the issue which the dissenting judge had wanted the Court to avoid). The "bad" part of the ruling is just an argument over funding, which can easily be resolved by having the state government foot the bill for this unfunded mandate. Once that's done, CCW's will be legal throughout all Missouri counties.

It sounds like a great decision.

Donkey Kickin'! Most here in Springfield are happy. I imagine the governor is mad...Ha ha!