Iranian Alert -- June 27, 2004 [EST]-- IRAN LIVE THREAD -- "Americans for Regime Change in Iran"

Join Us At Today's Iranian Alert Thread – The Most Underreported Story Of The Year!

"If you want on or off this Iran ping list, Freepmail DoctorZin”

1 posted on 06/26/2004 11:05:44 PM PDT by DoctorZIn

To: Pan_Yans Wife; fat city; freedom44; Tamsey; Grampa Dave; PhiKapMom; McGavin999; Hinoki Cypress; ...

Join Us At Today's Iranian Alert Thread – The Most Underreported Story Of The Year!

"If you want on or off this Iran ping list, Freepmail DoctorZin”

2 posted on 06/26/2004 11:09:03 PM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

Iran 'Covered Up Nuclear Spill'

June 27, 2004
Telegraph UK
Con Coughlin

Western intelligence officials are examining reports that Iran's Revolutionary Guards attempted to cover up a nuclear accident that occurred during the delivery of a secret shipment of weapons-grade uranium from North Korea.

The accident allegedly caused Teheran's new £260 million international airport to be sealed off by Revolutionary Guard commanders within hours of its official opening on May 9.

The first scheduled commercial landing at the airport - an Iran Air civilian flight from Dubai - was intercepted by two Iranian air force jets and diverted to Isfahan, 155 miles away, even though it was low on fuel. At the same time, trucks were placed across the runway to prevent other aircraft from landing.

The airliner's interception, which was ordered by the Revolutionary Guards, prompted an official complaint from Iran's Civil Aviation Organisation (CAO). "No regulation in the world permits threatening a passenger plane," it said in a statement.

Seven weeks later, the showpiece airport named after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Iranian revolution, is still closed. All commercial flights are required to use the capital's ageing Mehrabad complex.

At the time of the incident, Revolutionary Guard commanders claimed that Khomeini airport had been closed because of "security problems".

Iranian aviation officials, however, believe that Teheran wanted to cover up evidence of the previously unreported nuclear accident in 2002, linked to Iran's secret programme to build an atom bomb. Although the airport, 30 miles south of Teheran, was not ready to take commercial traffic until this spring, military flights have landed there for at least two years.

In December 2002, according to officials with access to the airport, a North Korean cargo jet delivering a consignment of nuclear technology, including some weapons-grade uranium, was being unloaded at night under military supervision. During the delivery, a container slipped and cracked on the Tarmac. All personnel in the vicinity were taken from the site and given thorough medical examinations.

Crews from the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) wearing protective suits were brought in to clean up the spillage. The scientists worked at the site for several days, staying indoors during daylight and working only in darkness.

They later determined that the site had been completely decontaminated, and Revolutionary Guards allowed airport construction to resume, confident that they had concealed the incident from the outside world.

Their attitude changed, however, after inspectors working for the United Nations-backed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uncovered evidence in June 2003 that Iran had secretly enriched uranium to weapons grade at the Kalaye electric centrifuge plant, on the outskirts of Teheran. Iran had previously denied having the necessary technology.

The Kalaye revelations embarrassed Revolutionary Guards' commanders, who are responsible for protecting Iran's secret nuclear facilities. The findings prompted the IAEA to intensify pressure on Teheran for a full disclosure on the extent of Iran's nuclear programme, which Iranian officials continue to insist is being developed for purely peaceful purposes.

Iranian aviation officials, who cannot be named for their own security, believe that the Revolutionary Guards ordered the closure of Khomeini International Airport in case the IAEA inspectors detected deposits of enriched uranium. The airport will remain closed until Russian nuclear experts can examine the site of the spill and make sure that no traces of the illegal shipment remain.

A senior Western intelligence official said: "We are aware of the concerns being expressed by Iranian aviation experts and are trying to investigate them. The problem is that the Revolutionary Guards will not allow access to the airport to any foreign nationals, including UN inspectors."

Earlier this month the IAEA rebuked Iran over its failure to give a full account of its atomic programme as suspicions mounted that Iran is continuing with its efforts to build nuclear weapons.

Last week, American intelligence officials provided satellite evidence that they claimed showed a nuclear site at Lavizan Shiyan in Teheran. They said that it had been razed to remove evidence of research work that had been conducted there.

The airport closure reflects Iran's obsession with national security, which last week led to Revolutionary Guards seizing eight British servicemen patrolling the disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iraq and Iran. The men were released after they were cleared of any wrongdoing.

http://portal.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/06/27/wiran27.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/06/27/ixnewstop.html

3 posted on 06/26/2004 11:12:51 PM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

This just in from a student inside of Iran...

"Doc,

I was at university yesterday and I heard about some organized rallies and demonstrations which will be held on 9th of July this year. I really hope it happens and helps weaken the regime quick."

4 posted on 06/26/2004 11:28:56 PM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

I understand that the Christian gospel is enjoying renewed credibility in Iran, now that those who screamed for an Islamic mullahocracy got what they asked for.

5 posted on 06/27/2004 12:38:59 AM PDT by TomSmedley ((technical writer looking for work!))

To: DoctorZIn; McGavin999; freedom44; nuconvert; sionnsar; AdmSmith; dixiechick2000; onyx; Pro-Bush; ...

Iran vows to resume building uranium centrifuges Tuesday

Sunday,June27,2004
WHNT19

Tehran, Iran-AP -- Iran's Foreign Ministry says the country will resume building centrifuges for its nuclear program on Tuesday despite international objections, but will continue to hold off enriching uranium.

The announcement came days after the U-N nuclear watchdog approved a European-drafted resolution that rebuked Iran for past cover-ups in its nuclear program.

A Foreign Ministry spokesman says Iran has informed the International Atomic Energy Agency of its decision, as well as the governments of Britain, Germany and France.

However, he said Tehran will remain committed to suspension of actual uranium enrichment _ injecting gas into centrifuges.

http://www.whnt19.com/Global/story.asp?S=1971364

6 posted on 06/27/2004 2:41:20 AM PDT by F14 Pilot (John ''Fedayeen" sKerry - the Mullahs' regime candidate)

ping to the Iranian daily thread

7 posted on 06/27/2004 5:06:37 AM PDT by Pan_Yans Wife (" It is not true that life is one damn thing after another-it's one damn thing over and over." ESV)

...I understand that the Christian gospel is enjoying renewed credibility in Iran, now that those who screamed for an Islamic mullahocracy got what they asked for....

You might fing this interesting...

http://www.christianpost.com/dbase.php?cat=ministries&id=751

8 posted on 06/27/2004 10:03:40 AM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

Iraq: The U.S. and Iran Keep Talking

June 25, 2004
Stratfor
Strategic Forecasting, Inc

Summary

Iraqi Vice President Ibrahim Jaafari has echoed Prime Minister Iyadh Allawi in saying that the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) would impose martial law in some areas after assuming power. His remarks follow the declaration of a truce June 24 by radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army in Baghdad -- which also said it was ready to help protect important sites from attacks by insurgents. The two statements indicate that Washington and the Shia are still working together. They also underscore the tough -- and ongoing -- process of negotiations between Iran and the United States amid the tensions over Tehran's nuclear program.

Analysis

Ibrahim Jaafari, Iraq's Shiite Islamist interim vice president, said June 25 that although imposing martial law in certain areas of the country was undesirable, it was necessary because of the security situation in the country. He was reiterating what interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyadh Allawi said earlier in the week. On June 24, radical Shiite leader Muqtada al Sadr's Mehdi Army in Baghdad announced a truce and offered to assist the incoming Iraqi regime in securing important sites from insurgent attacks.

The offer from al-Sadr to help the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) maintain security -- and Jaafari's remarks supporting for the IIG's decision to enforce martial law in areas hit by the insurgency -- show that the United States the Shia are still cooperating despite the recent deterioration of relations between them. This also means that U.S.-Iranian back-channel negotiations continue in spite of an international atmosphere that is increasingly tense owing to U.S. opposition to Iran's nuclear program, and the recent showdown between Tehran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The United States and Iran understand that they are at loggerheads on the nuclear issue; they also understand that Iraq forces them to cooperate. Stratfor has detailed the complexity of the secret U.S.-Iranian dealings on Iraq.

Iran could create problems in Iraq. It could have Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his Hawza, Jaafari's Hizb al-Dawah ([Islamic] Call Party -- or HD) and al-Sadr's Mehdi Army all rising up against the U.S. forces. Instead, there is increased movement by the three Shiite forces to a position of accommodation. The Shia in Iraq and Iran understand that if they are to achieve their goal of a Shiite-dominated Iraqi republic by 2006, they will need to work with the United States.

The United States also needs cooperation -- albeit tacit -- from the Shiite community in order to follow through on its plans for Iraq. This requires Iranian support, which is why there has been a great deal of rhetoric emanating from Washington threatening to drag Tehran before the U.N. Security Council over the nuclear issue -- but no real action. If Washington could take action it would, but dealings over Iraq have prevented the Bush administration from moving ahead with the issue to a certain extent.

Mutual need will push both sides into continued dealings over Iraq, while the usual rhetoric of mutual condemnation continues from both capitals. The disconnect between words and deeds is an indicator not only of the extremely complex dealings between Washington and Tehran, but also that the covert system is very much alive and working.

http://www.stratfor.com/free-scripts/comsite2.pl?page=BZpreview&src_id=0224&major=43044&trans_id=GEN20040625-501

9 posted on 06/27/2004 10:04:46 AM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

Iran's Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction

June 24, 2004
U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia

Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0128

Iran’s Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Testimony by
Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and
International Security

John R. Bolton

to the
House International Relations Committee
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia
24 June 2004

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for the opportunity to testify today before this Subcommittee to discuss Iran’s weapons of mass destruction ("WMD") programs and what the Bush Administration is doing to stop them.

I will cover all of Iran’s WMD programs and will provide detailed comments on Iran’s extensive covert nuclear weapons program. All of Iran’s WMD efforts -- chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles -- pose grave threats to international security. Iran’s pursuit of these deadly weapons, despite its adherence to treaties that ban them marks it as a rogue state, and it will remain so until it completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantles its WMD-related programs.

Chemical Weapons

We believe Iran has a covert program to develop and stockpile chemical weapons. The US Intelligence Community reported in its recent unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, also known as the "721 Report," that Iran continues to seek production technology, training, and expertise that could further its efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. A forthcoming edition of the 721 report is expected to state that "Iran may have already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and nerve agents -- and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them -- which it previously had manufactured."

Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention ("CWC"). The CWC’s central obligation is simple: no stockpiling, no development, no production, and no use of chemical weapons. The overwhelming majority of States Parties abide by this obligation. Iran is not, and we have made this abundantly clear to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Although Iran has declared a portion of its CW program to the OPCW. It is time for Iran to declare the remainder and make arrangements for its dismantlement and for the destruction of its chemical weapons.

Biological Weapons

The US Intelligence Community stated in its recent 721 Report that, "Tehran probably maintains an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran's biological warfare (BW) program also could have benefited from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them." Because BW programs are easily concealed, I cannot say that the United States can prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that Iran has an offensive BW program. The intelligence I have seen suggests that this is the case, and, as a policy matter therefore, I believe we have to act on that assumption. The risks to international peace and security from such programs are too great to wait for irrefutable proof of illicit activity: responsible members of the international community should act to head off such threats and demand transparency and accountability from suspected violators while these threats are still emerging. It would be folly indeed to wait for the threat fully to mature before trying to stop it.

Iran is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention ("BWC") and the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Like the CWC, the central obligation of the BWC is simple: no possession, no development no production and, together with the 1925 Protocol, no use of biological weapons. The overwhelming majority of States Parties abide by these obligations. We believe Iran is not abiding by its BWC obligations, however, and we have made this abundantly clear to the parties of this treaty. It is time for Iran to declare its biological weapons program and make arrangements for its dismantlement.

Ballistic Missiles

Iran continues its extensive efforts to develop the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Thanks to assistance from entities -- including government-owned entities -- in North Korea, Russia, and China, Iran is developing a variety of liquid-propellant and solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) -- including the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud C), and Tondar-69 (CSS-8) -- as well as a new solid-propellant SRBM, the Fateh-110. The 1,300-km range Shahab-3 missile is a direct threat to Israel, Turkey, U.S. forces in the region, and U.S. friends and allies.

In addition, we believe Iran has programs to develop longer-range missiles that will be able to strike additional targets throughout the region or that will allow Iran to launch missiles against Israel from locations further within Iranian territory. Finally, Iran is likely to develop IRBMs or ICBMs capable of delivering payloads to Western Europe or the Unites States. I want to emphasize this point: Iran is acquiring the means to produce ever more sophisticated and longer-range missiles. If they are successful in this endeavor, our attempts to slow the missile trade will have little effect on Iran’s already-developing indigenous missile capability.

North Korea is one of the main suppliers of ballistic missiles, missile equipment, and production technology to Iran. North Korea provided Iran with the technology to produce the SCUD B (300 km range) and SCUD C (500 km range) missiles. In addition, the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile is based on the North Korean No Dong missile.

Foreign assistance has been key to the development of Iran’s ballistic missile programs. Such assistance during the first half of 2003 included equipment, technology, and expertise and has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Although Iran is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a multilateral arrangement aimed at stemming the proliferation of ballistic missiles or the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), Iran has engaged in substantial trade in missile technology with countries that ought to know better.

The U.S. Response to BW, CW, and Missile Technology Transfers to Iran

Since the Bush Administration took office, we have imposed trade sanctions involving WMD-related transfers to Iran more than 50 times. The Iran Nonproliferation Act (INPA) of 2000 has been our most valuable tool in enabling the Bush Administration to punish proliferators for their illegal transfers of WMD and missile technology. Despite these efforts, some companies, which we brand as serial proliferators, continue to sell materials that could advance Iran’s WMD and missile programs. These serial proliferators include the Chinese companies NORINCO, CPMIEC, Zibo Chemical and others, and from North Korea, the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation. But we don't just go after these serial proliferators, we go where the evidence leads us. In the last INPA report, we sanctioned the usual suspects from Russia, China and North Korea. But we also sanctioned companies from Taiwan, Macedonia and Belarus. We want any proliferators, whether a conglomerate like NORINCO or a small missile parts company from Macedonia, to understand that the U.S. will impose economic burdens and brand them as proliferators. It is a message we believe is getting through.

In our efforts to halt such dangerous and destabilizing trade and punish companies and individuals for the proliferation of missile technology to Iran, the United States has imposed Executive Order and Missile Sanctions Law sanctions five times on four different entities for missile-related technology transfers to Iran since 2001. In addition, we have held numerous diplomatic discussions with various supplier nations, both MTCR members and non-MTCR members, in an effort to persuade them to investigate and stop Iranian efforts to procure missile-relevant items in their countries.

Nuclear Weapons

The United States strongly believes that Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons, and has been warning publicly about Tehran’s weapons ambitions for over a decade.

We know Iran is developing uranium mines, a uranium conversion facility ("UCF"), a massive uranium enrichment facility designed to house tens of thousands of centrifuges, numerous centrifuge productions workshops, a heavy water production plant, and a laser enrichment facility. We know that Iran has violated its NPT and IAEA commitments by covertly enriching uranium, by covertly producing and separating plutonium, by secretly converting yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride ("UF6"), and by secretly producing uranium metal and by failing to declare any of these activities to the IAEA. Iran secretly procured P-1 centrifuge components from the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network, as well as P-2 components, developed the means to manufacture centrifuge components domestically (including in military workshops), and -- contrary to its commitments to the IAEA and to three European governments -- continues to produce components today. Iran has announced plans to "hot test" its UCF at Esfahan, which will produce UF6, in clear violation of its promises to suspend all enrichment-related activity. Moreover, Iran continues with plans to build additional unnecessary nuclear capabilities, such as a heavy-water reactor -- a facility ideally suited to produce large quantities of plutonium usable in a nuclear weapon, which also explains Iran’s secret experiments with reprocessing plutonium behind the back of the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"). The designs for that facility underscore the weapons intent, as do Iran’s experiments to produce polonium-210, a weapons initiator.

The costly infrastructure to perform all of these activities goes well beyond any conceivable peaceful nuclear program. No comparable oil-rich nation has ever engaged, or would be engaged, in this set of activities -- or would pursue them for nearly two decades behind a continuing cloud of secrecy and lies to IAEA inspectors and the international community -- unless it was dead set on building nuclear weapons.

Let me describe for you what the IAEA Board of Governors has said about Iran in the last year:

June 2003

The June 19, 2003 statement by the Board of Governors "shared the concern expressed by the Director General in his report at the number of Iran’s past failures to report material, facilities and activities as required by its safeguards obligations," and went on to say "the Board urged Iran promptly to rectify all safeguards problems identified in the report and resolve questions that remain open."

The June 2003 Board statement also encouraged Iran not to introduce nuclear material into centrifuges, and to cooperate fully with the Agency, including permitting the IAEA to take samples at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop involved with enrichment activities.

September 2003

On September 12, 2003, the Board passed a resolution expressing concern that "information and access were at times slow in coming and incremental, that some of the information was in contrast to that previously provided by Iran, and that there remained a number of important outstanding issues that require urgent resolution." The Board noted with concern that:

the Agency environmental sampling at Natanz revealed the presence of two types of highly enriched uranium;

IAEA inspectors found considerable modifications had been made to the premises at the Kalaye Electric Company prior to inspections that may impact on the accuracy of environmental sampling;

some of Iran’s statements of the IAEA had undergone significant and material changes, and that the number of outstanding issues had increased since the last report;

despite the Board’s June 2003 statement encouraging Iran not to introduce nuclear material into its pilot centrifuge enrichment cascade at Natanz, Iran introduced such material.

The September 2003 Board resolution also expressed "grave concern that, more than one year after initial IAEA inquiries to Iran about undeclared activities, Iran has still not enabled the IAEA to provide the assurances required by Member States that all nuclear material in Iran is declared and submitted to Agency safeguards and that there are no undeclared nuclear activities in Iran," and called on Iran to

"provide accelerated cooperation and full transparency to allow the Agency to provide at an early date the assurances required by Member States."

"ensure that there are no further failures to report material, facilities and activities that Iran is obligated to report pursuant to its safeguards agreement."

"suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities, including the further introduction of nuclear material into Natanz, and, as a confidence-building measure, any reprocessing activities."

Finally, the Board decided that "it is essential and urgent in order to ensure IAEA verification of non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran remedy all failures identified by the Agency and cooperate fully with the Agency to ensure verification of compliance with Iran’s safeguards agreement by taking all necessary actions by the end of October 2003, including:

Providing a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the enrichment program;

Granting unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, for the Agency to whatever locations the Agency deems necessary;

Resolving questions regarding the conclusion of Agency experts that process testing on gas centrifuges must have been conducted;

Providing complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments;

Providing such other information and explanations, and taking such other steps as are deemed necessary by the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues involving nuclear materials and nuclear activities.

November 2003

On November 26, 2003, the Board passed a resolution noting "with deep concern that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to reporting of nuclear material, and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored." Other provisions of the November 2003 resolution…

...noted "with gravest concern, that Iran enriched uranium and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities, in the absence of IAEA safeguards" and "with equal concern, that there has been in the past a pattern of concealment resulting in breaches of safeguard obligations and that the new information disclosed by Iran and reported by the Director General includes much more that is contradictory to information previously provided by Iran."

..."strongly deplores Iran’s past failures and breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of its Safeguards Agreement, as reported by the Director General; and urges Iran to adhere strictly to its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement in both letter and spirit."

...called on Iran "to undertake and complete the taking of all necessary corrective measures on an urgent basis, to sustain full cooperation with the Agency in implementing Iran’s commitment to full disclosure and unrestricted access, and thus to provide the transparency and openness that are indispensable for the Agency to complete the considerable work necessary to provide and maintain the assurances required by Member States," and decided "that, should any further serious failures come to light, the Board of Governors would meet immediately to consider, in the light of the circumstances and of advice from the Director General, all options at its disposal, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement."

March 2004

On March 13, 2004, the Board passed a resolution that stated "serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran’s past and present nuclear program considered essential by the Board’s November 2003 resolution, in that the Agency has since uncovered a number of omissions -- e.g., a more advanced centrifuge design than previously declared, including associated research, manufacturing and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for the construction of hot cells at the Arak heavy water research reactor -- which require further investigation, not least as they may point to nuclear activities not so far acknowledged by Iran." The March 2004 resolution also…

...noted "with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent, and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments."

...noted with concern that "Iran’s and Libya’s conversion and centrifuge programs share several common elements, including technology largely obtained from the same foreign sources."

..."deplored that Iran, as detailed in the report of the Director General, omitted any reference, in its letter of 21 October 2003, which was to have provided the "full scope of Iranian nuclear activities" and a "complete centrifuge R&D chronology," to its possession of P-2 centrifuge design drawings and to associated research, manufacturing, and mechanical testing activities -- which the Director General describes as "a matter of serious concern, particularly in view of the importance and sensitivity of those activities."

...called on Iran "to be pro-active in taking all necessary steps on an urgent basis to resolve all outstanding issues, including the issue of LEU and HEU contamination at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and Natanz; the issue of the nature and scope of Iran’s laser isotope enrichment research; and the issue of the experiments on the production of polonium-210."

June 2004

Last week, on June 18, 2004, the Board resolution passed a resolution that "deplores … the fact that, overall, as indicated by the Director General’s written and oral reports, Iran’s cooperation has not been as full, timely, and proactive as it should have been, and, in particular, that Iran postponed until mid-April visits originally scheduled for mid-March -- including visits of Agency centrifuge experts to a number of locations involved in Iran’s P-2 centrifuge enrichment program -- resulting in some cases in a delay in the taking of environmental samples and their analysis."

The Board also recalled Iran’s decision to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and to permit the Agency to verify that suspension, and noted with concern that:

"as detailed in the Director General’s report, this verification was delayed in some cases, and that the suspension is not yet comprehensive because of the continued production of centrifuge equipment;"

"Iran’s decision to proceed with the generation of UF6 is at variance with the Agency’s previous understanding as to the scope of Iran’s decision regarding suspension;"

"Iran has withheld 10 assembled centrifuge rotors for research activities."

The June 2004 resolution also…

...noted "with concern that after almost two years from when Iran’s undeclared program came to the Agency’s knowledge a number of questions remain outstanding, and in particular two questions that are key to understanding the extent and nature of Iran’s enrichment program: the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran and the extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the P-2 advanced centrifuge design."

...noted "with serious concern that important information about the P-2 centrifuge program has often been forthcoming only after repeated requests, and in some cases has been incomplete and continues to lack the necessary clarity and also that the information provided to date relating to contamination issues has not been adequate to resolve this complex matter."

...noted "with concern that the Agency’s investigations have revealed further serious omissions in the statements made by Iran, including in the October declaration, in particular concerning the importation of P-2 components form abroad and concerning laser enrichment tests, which have produced samples enriched up to 15%, and also that Agency experts have raised questions and doubts regarding the explanations provided by Iran concerning those programs."

...called on Iran "to take all steps necessary on an urgent basis to help resolve all outstanding issues, especially HEU and LEU contamination…and the scope of Iran’s P-2 centrifuge program."

...called on Iran immediately to correct all remaining shortcomings, to refrain from production of UF6, and to reconsider the decision to start construction of a heavy water reactor.

The United States believes the time to report this issue to the Security Council is long overdue. We are working closely with our friends and allies to urge an IAEA Board of Governors resolution that declares Iran in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations and reports that noncompliance to the UN Security Council. It is not a question of "if", but of "when" the IAEA Board will report that noncompliance. We believe it must happen soon, or risk eroding an important part of the IAEA safeguards system, and risk sending a signal to would-be proliferators that there are not serious consequences for pursuing secret nuclear weapons programs.

The United States and all of its G-8 partners were united in expressing their concern about Iran at the Sea Island Summit, stating that "[we are] deeply concerned that Iran's suspension of enrichment-related activity is not yet comprehensive. We deplore Iran's delays, deficiencies in cooperation, and inadequate disclosures, as detailed in IAEA Director General reports. We therefore urge Iran promptly and fully to comply with its commitments and all IAEA Board requirements, including ratification and full implementation of the Additional Protocol, leading to resolution of all outstanding issues related to its nuclear program."

Alarm about Iran’s nuclear weapons effort has grown at the IAEA over the last year. Since June 2003, the IAEA Director General has issued five damaging reports on Iran’s failure to adhere to the IAEA safeguards rules it is required to obey pursuant to Article III of the NPT. Every subsequent report contains language confirming that previous Iranian statements made to the IAEA were false or incomplete. The IAEA has repeatedly deplored Iran’s deception and lack of cooperation with its inspectors. In response, Iran has defiantly rejected calls by the IAEA and its members to come clean on its nuclear program.

Iran has pursued two separate methods for uranium enrichment. It has established a number of workshops for the manufacture and testing of centrifuges (many of which are owned by military industrial organizations), a pilot enrichment facility designed for 1,000 centrifuges, and a large buried facility intended to house up to 50,000 centrifuges. In parallel, Iran has pursued another program to enrich uranium with lasers. Both of these programs were not declared to IAEA inspectors who had visited Iran for years until an Iranian opposition group disclosed their existence.

Iran has developed a program that would allow for the production of plutonium, an alternate path to nuclear weapons. Iran is building a large heavy water production plant, also covertly until disclosed by an Iranian opposition group. Its purpose is to supply heavy water for a research reactor that Iran plans to begin constructing this year. The technical characteristics of the heavy water moderated research reactor Iran plans to build are optimal for the production of weapons-grade plutonium.

Another potential source of plutonium for weapons is the Bushehr light-water power reactor, which is currently under construction. That reactor is under IAEA safeguards and Iran and Russia are discussing an agreement to return all spent fuel to Russia. However, if Iran should withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty and renounce this agreement with Russia, according to Paul Leventhal of the Nuclear Control Institute, the Bushehr reactor would produce a quarter ton of plutonium per year which Leventhal says is enough for at least 30 nuclear bombs.

The safeguards violations uncovered by the IAEA include:

Iran’s failure to report the production of plutonium by covertly introducing uranium targets into the safeguarded Tehran Research Reactor and subsequently reprocessing the irradiated targets to separate the plutonium;

the failure to report the import and use of uranium hexafluoride for testing centrifuges and production of enriched uranium; and

the failure to report the use of uranium metal for laser enrichment experiments including production of enriched uranium, which, as we have recently learned, was enriched to up to 15%, well beyond the level needed for reactor fuel.

Iran has a long history of denying the IAEA full access to its nuclear program. The most recent example occurred in March 2004, when Iran denied IAEA inspectors access to several suspicious facilities for a month, long enough to ensure that the report being prepared for the June 2004 Board of Governors meeting would be unable to include data from inspections of these locations.

Another unmistakable indicator of Iran’s intentions is the pattern of repeatedly lying to and providing false and incomplete reports to the IAEA. For example, Iran first denied it had enriched any uranium. Then it said it had not enriched uranium more than 1.2 percent. Later, when evidence of uranium enriched to 36 percent was found, it attributed this to contamination from imported centrifuge parts.

Iran also denied the existence of a laser enrichment program, but backtracked and confessed the truth when confronted with irrefutable technical evidence from IAEA inspections. However, it claimed that the equipment was only able to enrich uranium up to 3% or slightly beyond. The June 2004 Director General’s report states Iran had achieved levels of enrichment of up to 15% in some samples. Iran’s dubious explanation for producing polonium-210, a short-lived, highly radioactive element used as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons, was that it was intended for use in nuclear batteries that could be used in satellites and deep space programs. Obviously, the IAEA does not accept that as a credible explanation for Iran’s experiments.

Perhaps the most blatant instance of Iranian deception concerned concealment and misleading statements on its effort to acquire and build centrifuges, including the more advanced P-2s. Iran’s pattern of lies and shifting stories about its P-1 centrifuge work has been well documented by the IAEA and discussed in the press over the last year. After an initial claim of having no centrifuge program, Iran has moved through a dizzying variety of shifting stories, each modified upon the discovery of contradictory information. It had done no centrifuge work; then it admitted working on some centrifuges, then a lot of centrifuges. It denied foreign procurement, then it admitted procuring foreign designs, and then admitted procuring foreign components. It denied doing any centrifuge testing, but then admitted centrifuge testing with UF6.

And all that was just with respect to P-1 centrifuges. In February 2004, the Director General reported to the IAEA Board of Governors that it had discovered evidence of the advanced P-2 design centrifuges that was omitted from Iran’s October 2003 declaration to the IAEA. This declaration was supposed to provide the "full scope of Iranian nuclear activities" and a "complete centrifuge R&D chronology" -- but it obviously did not. As described earlier, in response to this discovery, the Board of Governors passed a resolution in March 2004 that deplored Iran’s concealment of the P-2 information.

Incredibly, this was not the final word on this story. A June 1, 2004 report by the IAEA Director General detailed how the last set of statements Iran made about its P-2 centrifuges were also incomplete and false. The IAEA explained that Iran’s P-2 centrifuge effort was much more extensive than it had claimed in February, and that Iran had acquired and attempted to acquire substantial quantities of material for P-2 centrifuges from abroad despite earlier official denials of such procurement. (Iran even had the effrontery to circulate an official document at the IAEA Board meeting last February denying any foreign P-2 procurement. As noted, this was false. The June report also made it clear that the IAEA did not believe Iran’s assertion that it started acquiring P-2 technology in 1995 but did not begin to assemble them until 2001 or test them until 2002. Iran also attempted to influence the June 2004 report on this matter by not providing the IAEA with key information on it until 30 May 2004, which was too late to be included in the report

Iran’s attempt to redirect attention from the P-2 issue at the IAEA Board of Governors last week by flagging a minor revision made to the Director General’s June 1 report as a significant error. This ploy backfired, since it drew the IAEA Board’s attention back to the major unresolved inconsistencies in Iran’s declarations, and to the fact that Iran’s official position continued to be a denial of having imported P-2 centrifuge parts until the IAEA confronted it with proof to the contrary.

Other cover stories put forward by Iran for the development of a nuclear fuel cycle and for individual facilities are simply not credible. For example, Iran is making an enormous investment in facilities to mine, process, and enrich uranium, and says it needs to make its own reactor fuel because it cannot count on foreign supplies. But for at least the next decade Iran will have at most a single nuclear power reactor. In addition, Iran does not have enough indigenous uranium resources to fuel even one reactor over its lifetime -- though it has quite enough to make several nuclear bombs. We are being asked to believe that Iran is building uranium enrichment capacity to make fuel for reactors that do not exist from uranium Iran does not have.

Iran would have us believe it is building a massive uranium enrichment facility without having tested centrifuge machines, and building a heavy water production plant with no evident legitimate use for the product. The more credible explanation is that Iran is building the infrastructure to produce highly enriched uranium in centrifuges and plutonium in a heavy water moderated reactor.

Finally, there is Iran’s claim that Iran is building massive and expensive nuclear fuel cycle facilities to meet future electricity needs, while preserving oil and gas for export. All of this strains credulity. Iran’s uranium reserves are miniscule, accounting for less than one percent of its vast oil reserves and even larger gas reserves. Iran’s gas reserves are the second largest in the world, and the industry estimates that Iran flares enough gas annually to generate electricity equivalent to the output of four Bushehr reactors.

Several weeks before the November 2003 meeting of the IAEA Board, the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany went to Tehran. The result was a public statement committing Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA and to suspend uranium enrichment activities, something the IAEA Board had called for in its June 2003 resolution. The same parties reached a further elaboration of this commitment in Brussels in February, prior to the March 2004 Board of Governors meeting.

We are concerned that Iran’s nuclear weapons program continues secretly and in parallel with this engagement between Iran and the Europeans. Indeed, we believe that Iran is continuing to pursue a strategic decision to acquire nuclear weapons. The revelations in the Director General’s reports of February and June of 2004 that the production of centrifuge components continues in Iran and IAEA discovery of repeated Iranian deception over P-2 centrifuges despite Iran’s pledge last fall to suspend its enrichment activities and provide a full accounting of its nuclear program, raise serious doubts about Iran’s commitments to the Europeans.

Repeated public statements by senior Iranian officials that the suspension of enrichment activities is only temporary and their enrichment program will resume once the issues with the IAEA are resolved raise further questions whether the undertakings between Iran and the Europeans are having the desired effect of turning Iran away from its nuclear weapons effort. Here is a sample of the statements made by Iranian officials about the uranium enrichment suspension through March 2004:

In October 2003, Hasan Rowhani, the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council stated that although Iran’s enrichment suspension was to go into effect immediately, he said it could last for one day or one year.

Rowhani was later more explicit that the suspension of enrichment is temporary, stating on November 29, 2003, that "a permanent suspension has never been an issue and will never be." On March 7, 2004, he said that "there is nothing permanent … when to resume is in the hands of our system."

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said on November 2 that Iran would not "give up" enrichment "at any price."

Statements by Iranian officials last week on the enrichment suspension have been even more forceful.

Rowani reacted angrily to last week’s Board of Governors resolution on Iran, saying that "Iran will reconsider its decision about suspension and will do some uranium activity in the coming days."

Foreign Ministry spokesman Mr Hamid Reza Assefi said on June 20th that "Iran feels itself no longer obliged to its commitments with the European Union trio and will revise its policies on nuclear activities and announce the new decisions within the coming days."

Iranian President Mohamed Khatami declared that Iran was no longer bound by any "moral commitment" to continue suspending uranium enrichment, and could reject the IAEA decision.

The Iranian nuclear weapons program, compounded by the Iranian effort to develop long-range missiles, is one of the most serious nonproliferation challenges -- and challenges to the credibility of the NPT regime -- we face today. It is clear that Iran draws from many of the same networks (including the A.Q. Khan organization) that supplied Libya with nuclear technology, components, and materials, including nuclear weapons designs. Ending Iran’s program is a priority objective of the United States and the international community.

The Bush Administration’s Response to Iran’s Nuclear Weapon’s Program

Despite all Iran has done, it is not too late to halt and reverse Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The United States is using all available diplomatic tools to this end. We have focused special attention on Russia, the supplier of the Bushehr reactor. Following sustained high-level exchanges, initiated by President Bush, we believe that Russia now shares our concern about Iran’s nuclear activities, joins us in supporting the IAEA’s ongoing inspections, and backed language in the Sea Island Summit declaration deploring Iran’s failure to cooperate with the IAEA.

Additionally, Russia recently joined the core group of nations participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI"), a robust new tool for counter-proliferation launched one year ago by President Bush. PSI is designed to stop the spread of WMDs, their delivery systems, and related materials to non-state actors and proliferant states such as Iran. The overwhelmingly positive response and enhanced awareness that PSI has fostered globally about real, practical steps that can be taken to defeat proliferators is a testament to the importance that countries attach to confronting the challenge of proliferation and developing innovative tools to combat it. More than sixty nations attended the First Anniversary PSI Meeting held a few weeks ago in Krakow, Poland, demonstrating the global support for the PSI and the recognition that the proliferation of WMD is one of the gravest threats we face today.

The PSI interdiction of the ship, BBC CHINA, en route to Libya with equipment for its nuclear weapons program was an important element in the Libyan decision to dismantle its WMD programs. We continue to work with other nations under PSI to interdict suspect WMD shipments to states of proliferation concern such as Iran.

This Administration is determined to reinvigorate compliance assessments of countries, such as Iran, that seek WMD. For example, successive administrations have stated that Iran was in violation of their obligations under the NPT. But the U.S. was not specific about the manner of violation or the consequences of these violations. After a vigorous analysis, this Administration stated at a Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference meeting last April that Iran was in violation of Article II of the Treaty because it was seeking or receiving assistance in the manufacture of a nuclear weapon.

In a speech President Bush delivered at the National Defense University on February 11, 2004, President Bush addressed weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation regime that allowed Iran and other states with covert nuclear programs to subvert their NPT obligations. Among other measures designed to prevent the spread of WMD, the President proposed:

Limiting enrichment and reprocessing plants to those states that already have full-scale functioning plants. Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines would be strengthened to prevent the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to other countries.

Creation of a Special Committee of the IAEA, made up of states in good standing, to "focus intensively on safeguards and ensure that nations comply with their international obligations." This new committee would help deter, detect and prevent nuclear proliferation.

Universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, and making the Additional Protocol a condition of nuclear supply.

Bar countries under IAEA investigation from holding seats on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new IAEA Special Committee.

The United States received strong support for these proposals at the Sea Island Summit. We also raised them at the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting last month and the IAEA Board of Governors meeting last week. While we made some headway at the NSG and IAEA, there are still some states we need to convince and we will continue to work with to win the necessary international support for the President’s proposals.

Conclusion

What we ask for is not much -- only what is necessary to protect our security and to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and other WMD. All that Iran must do is to abide by the treaties it has signed banning weapons of mass destruction and stop its program to develop ballistic missiles. We cannot let Iran, a leading sponsor of international terrorism, acquire the most destructive weapons and the means to deliver them to Europe, most of central Asia and the Middle East, or beyond.

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/bol062404.htm

10 posted on 06/27/2004 10:08:18 AM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

Rep. Ros-Lehtinen Remarks on Iran's Nuclear Ambitions

June 24, 2004
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations

Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0128

Opening Remarks by Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia for Hearing: "Iranian Proliferation: Implications for Terrorists, their State-Sponsors, and U.S. Countermeasures"
Thursday, June 24, 2004, 3:00 p.m.

Iran’s unconventional weapons program and its fondness for using terrorism as statecraft, have made this pariah state a litmus test of President George Bush's war against terror. A nuclear Iran combined, with its deep-rooted terrorist infrastructure, is an Iran that must be stopped.

Unfortunately, the Iranian regime received another pass from the IAEA Board last week, as the resolution adopted had no references to the UN Security Council or any further action to hold Iran accountable.

For at least two decades, the Iranian regime has been pursuing a covert nuclear program. It has undertaken a number of efforts for the manufacture and testing of centrifuge components, including at facilities owned by military industrial organizations.

Concurrently, Iran is pursuing another approach to uranium enrichment that uses lasers, a complex technology rarely used by even the most advanced countries, because it is not cost efficient.

Iran has expressed interest in the purchase of up to six additional nuclear power plants and is pursuing a heavy water research reactor that would be well suited for plutonium production. This represents yet another path to nuclear weapons, which endangers not only the region, but also the world.

According to the IAEA report of November of last year, the Iranian regime admitted that it had failed to report a large number of activities involving nuclear material. This same report noted that Iran's deceptions have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear cycle.

Further, the IAEA could not disprove that Iran's nuclear program was not for weapons development.

Within this context, Iranian news sources were filled with statements referring to Iran’s right to possess nuclear weapons within the current international context.

One, in particular, referenced: "the natural and obvious right of the Iranian nation, and no power, whether of government or international assemblies, has the right to…cause any restriction or limitation on the exercise of this right in the field of nuclear activities by Iran."

Move forward to February and March of this year.

The resolution adopted by the Board enumerated more recent Iranian breaches, including failing to disclose work on advanced P-2 centrifuges for uranium enrichment and work on Polonium 210, an element that could be used in nuclear explosions.

Come June 1st. The IAEA reports a series of unresolved issues that strike at the core of Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

The response from the Iranian Foreign Minister and the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council was that Iran has to be recognized by the international community as a member of the nuclear club; that "This is an irreversible path."

The Central Intelligence Agency has warned that even intrusive IAEA inspections may not prevent Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons because Tehran could be using legitimate fuel production to cover up its weapons program.

It is imperative that the international community join forces to deny Iran any and all avenues toward achieving nuclear status, including punitive measures to bring to a screeching halt Iran’s progress on this path.

To reiterate, if last week’s meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors is any indication, the prospects for success look grim.

The Board’s failure to report the Iran case to the UN Security Council sends a dangerous message to other pariah states and potential proliferators.

Further, given the role that certain European countries have played in undermining the authority of the IAEA, cutting side deals with the Iranians and succumbing to Iranian intimidation, what options does the U.S. have?

What efforts can be undertaken to delay, deter and prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear capability?

Undersecretary of State John Bolton will address these and other critical issues.

Nevertheless, the urgency of the Iran threat is not limited exclusively to its nuclear intentions. As a Senior DOD official underscored during a briefing in September 2002, Iran "is the full ticket."

They have medium and long-range missile programs. They also have a chemical and biological weapons program.

Most importantly, Iran remains the most active state-sponsor of terrorism in the world.

As Dr. Paul Leventhal, one of the witnesses in our second panel, recently articulated, when you have a nation that actively supports terrorism and seeks nuclear weapons, you cannot rule out the possibility that it could and would collaborate with terrorists to carry out nuclear terrorism.

Therefore, this hearing seeks to address, not just the Iran nuclear threat, in itself, but the implications for unconventional terrorism and proliferation among states in the region.

On the first issue, it seeks to answer such questions as:

Would a nuclear Iran enhance the capacity of the terrorist network?

If Iran develops a nuclear capability, will it cede its other non-conventional weapons to the terrorist network?

Further, what is the likelihood of terrorist use of nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological weapons?

While there is no specific evidence or analyses asserting Iran’s willingness to become a routine purveyor of unconventional weapons to non-state actors, there is the example of the Karine-A.

Iran shipped 50 tons of heavy weaponry to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, which is headquartered in Damascus, with bases in Syrian-occupied Lebanon. The arsenal contained 107 rockets, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles, and anti-tank missiles.

With respect to cooperation between Iran and other terrorist nations, former CIA Director Tenet noted in his February 2004 threat assessment briefing to Congress: "Iran appears to be willing to supply missile-related technology to countries of concern and publicly advertises its artillery rockets and related technologies, including guidance instruments and missile propellants."

Certainly, the interest exists on the part of terrorist groups to secure chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons capabilities.

It has been reported for some time that al-Qaeda has been seeking these weapons.

The trial of bin Laden and other al-Qaeda operatives for the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, shed new light on this. Prosecution witnesses detailed their efforts to assist bin Laden in an attempt to acquire uranium, presumably for the development of nuclear weapons.

On June 13th of last year, news sources reported that authorities in Thailand intercepted a man trying to sell radioactive material that could have been used to make "dirty bombs."

One may assume that these efforts are limited to al-Qaeda but, as some terrorism experts have affirmed, there is increasing evidence that al-Qaeda is now cooperating with Hezbollah, which enjoys backing from Iran and Syria.

Hezbollah is not only based in Syrian-occupied Lebanon, but also, according to public reports, in the "triborder" region of South America where Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina meet, and has operational capabilities in Canada.

Thus, when we talk about the far-reaching implications of Iran’s nuclear efforts, we should not and must not discuss it in a vacuum.

It is difficult to assess how aggressively Iran would exploit its nuclear capability and how it would behave, but one thing is clear: an Iran with nuclear weapons could significantly alter the regional dynamics and lead to further proliferation in the region—both from other state-sponsors of terrorism, such as Syria, or from U.S. allies which may feel threatened.

Michael Eisenstadt, who will also testify as part of the second panel, will address some of these issues.

Iranian nuclear capabilities would change perceptions of the military balance in the region, and could pose serious challenges to the U.S. in terms of deterrence and defense.

To answer questions about how this will alter the U.S. defense posture and military strategy in the region, DOD has provided us with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Peter Flory.

Ultimately, at the crux of any solution to Iran’s nuclear program and to the implications it bears for proliferation in the region, is the need to deny and deprive terrorists—whether state or non-state actors—the access to the technology, the parts, and the materials, to develop an unconventional weapons arsenal.

A positive first step was taken on April 28th of this year, when the UN Security Council adopted a U.S. resolution that underscored the threat of terrorist entities acquiring, developing, dealing in, or using these deadly weapons and their means of delivery.

Among other determinations, it committed all States to undertake and enforce measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery.

However, as President Bush noted in his speech earlier this year at the National Defense University, "There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action."

The jury is still out on the resolve and commitment of some of our allies.

We must not allow our allies to deceive themselves about Iran’s nuclear intentions and the broad-based support that the weapons program enjoys throughout the government, particularly among the "reformist" clergy.

Since Khatami’s public announcement on February 9, 2003, that Iran was developing its own means to produce nuclear fuel, senior Iranian officials have made it abundantly clear that the nuclear program, in their eyes, makes the Islamic Republic more secure, reinforcing the regime from real or perceived existential threats to their existence.

We look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how to address these critical threats to U.S. national security and priorities.

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/ros062404.htm

11 posted on 06/27/2004 10:10:43 AM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

White House Condemns Iran's Nuclear Plans

June 27, 2004
Reuters
Reuters.com

ISTANBUL -- The United States Sunday condemned Iran for persisting with what Washington regards as an atomic bomb-making program. "Iran needs to come clean and fully cooperate with its international obligations," White House spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters traveling with President Bush to a NATO summit in Istanbul.

"Iran's continued failure to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency and continued failure to stop all enrichment-related reprocessing activities only reinforce the concern we have expressed," McClellan said.

Iran said Sunday it would resist international pressure to reverse its decision to produce parts for centrifuges that enrich uranium, reneging on a pledge to suspend all enrichment activities.

Its decision was a retaliation against an IAEA resolution last week that "deplored" Iran's failure to cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors.

But Iran also pledged in the letter to continue to allow IAEA inspectors access to nuclear sites for short-notice, intrusive inspections under the IAEA's so-called Additional Protocol, which Tehran signed last year but has yet to ratify.

If enriched to a low level, uranium can be used as fuel for electricity-generating reactors such as the one Iran is building on its south coast. But if enriched further, to weapons-grade, it can be deployed in warheads.

Washington has pushed its Western allies to take a tougher line on Iran but Britain, Germany and France have resisted, preferring to try to persuade Tehran that it is in its interests to come clean on nuclear activities.

The U.S. official said Iran's defiance would help persuade other countries to consider referring the issue to the United Nations, which could impose economic sanctions.

"We have expressed concern within the IAEA about the need to consider sending this matter to the Security Council of the United Nations and I think this latest move may only serve to convince others of the need to seriously consider that step," McClellan said.

The United States, the European Union and the IAEA condemned Iran Saturday for resuming centrifuge part production and urged Iran to rethink its decision.

Iran insists its ambitions are entirely peaceful and has said it has no immediate plans to pump uranium hexafluoride gas into spinning centrifuges to start the enrichment process.

http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=politicsNews&storyID=5522729

12 posted on 06/27/2004 10:11:31 AM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

Iran Won't Buckle to Pressure on Centrifuges

June 27, 2004
Reuters
Reuters.com

TEHRAN -- Iran will resist international pressure and hold to its decision on making centrifuges, which Washington says are key to an atomic bomb program, Tehran's chief nuclear negotiator said Sunday.

The United States, the European Union and the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) condemned Iran on Saturday for deciding to produce parts for centrifuges that enrich uranium and urged Iran to rethink its decision.

"They may react bitterly or heighten pressure on us, but that is not important," the Secretary-General of Iran's Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rohani told parliament, in comments broadcast live on state radio.

If enriched to a low level uranium can be used as fuel for electricity-generating reactors such as the one Iran is building on its south coast. But if enriched further, to weapons-grade, it can be deployed in warheads.

Iran sent a letter to the IAEA telling the agency that Tehran "intends to resume, under IAEA supervision, manufacturing of centrifuge components and the assembly and testing of centrifuges as of 29 June."

Iran insists its ambitions are entirely peaceful and has said it has no immediate plans to pump uranium hexafluoride gas into spinning centrifuges to start the enrichment process.

Iran's decision was a retaliation against an IAEA resolution last week that "deplored" Iran's failure to cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors.

Iran has blamed Britain, Germany and France for failing to close its nuclear dossier at the IAEA board in June but Rohani said Iran would resume talks with those countries next week.

A joint U.S.-EU statement, issued after talks between President Bush and European leaders in Ireland, stopped short of threatening new action to punish Iran for reneging on a pledge to suspend all enrichment activities.

Iran pledged in its letter to continue to allow IAEA inspectors access to nuclear sites for snap inspections under the IAEA's so-called Additional Protocol.

Rohani said the country would not withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and would implement the Additional Protocol the conservative parliament is wavering on ratifying.

"Today, the system has decided to remain committed to the NPT and allow the IAEA'S inspections to continue," Rohani said.

http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=5522545

13 posted on 06/27/2004 10:12:14 AM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

Reza Pahlavi's speech at Crans Montana Forum

June 26, 2004
rezapahlavi.org
CransMontana Forum

Risks of Doing Business with the Islamic Republic

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you very much for having me before such a distinguished gathering of business and political leaders, concerned with the well-being of all people in a rapidly integrating world. I would like to focus my remarks about my homeland on the political and economic risks of dealing with the Islamic Republic. But first an assessment of the current situation in Iran:

For seven years, the so-called reformist movement made believe that free and fair elections were the issue in Iran. They ignored the fact that elections are not important where the elected cannot legislate: where they can only propose laws to theologians who embody sovereignty in a theocracy.

Six months ago the ruling theologians disqualified prominent reformers from running for Parliament and brought the curtain down on all pretence to democracy. Noting their desperate economic condition, they now want to follow the Chinese economic model, because it is the only one that can work without democracy, or so they think! Of course it is ironic that theocrats could only find godless communism as the example to emulate, but the real problems of copying China lie elsewhere:

Decades of social regimentation and strict hierarchy in government provided the Chinese with tools that Iran’s revolutionaries do not have. China’s artificially low exchange rate contrasts against Iran’s, which is propped up by oil income and inflates the cost of domestic production. Social liberalization that normally attends economic take-off is not abhorrent to communist leaders, but it does undermine theocracy.

Even these general considerations do not explain the unique and fundamental problems of the Islamic Republic with growth in the age of globalization. To understand these, let us pretend for the moment that we are advising the Islamic Republic on a Direct Foreign Investment project to expand factory capacity, to create employment and produce something saleable in the world – an issue that China deals with every day.

The law firm representing such a foreign investor, and its advisors, will be required to answer questions on (1) Clarity and stability of laws, (2) Standards of enforcement, and (3) Reliability of applicable economic data, particularly the costs of doing business in Iran.

To satisfy the first requirement, we will have to tell the Islamic Republic it must get rid of conflicting sources of legislation. As I mentioned before, the Islamic Parliament cannot make laws, but only propose them to an unelected Guardian Council that must approve them before they become law. If there is a conflict, it goes to a third authority called the Expediency Council. For years, questions as vital as powers of the President and his cabinet have been stalemated between these bodies, which represents interests of different cliques.

To meet the second requirement, we must ask the Islamic Republic to replace religious courts with secular ones. Where a religious judge has the rank of Ayatollah, he can render judgment based on his own “fatwa”, or decree, which is often at variance with the judgment rendered by another court. No court of appeals, no higher authority can change the fatwa of an Ayatollah. For you see, in traditional Shiism, the authority of an Ayatollah is binding on those who choose that particular Ayatollah as a source of emulation. Someone else may choose to follow another Ayatollah with a different opinion on the same subject matter. The system works very well in the personal domains of faith and moral guidance. It wreaks havoc when you bring it into government. How can a business enter contracts when its rights could be judged by one standard, and its obligations by another unpredictable measure?

The third requirement requires transparency. This is the Islamic Republic’s worst nightmare. No foreign army scares the Islamic Republic more than KPMG or PWC 1. For you see, close to 70% of Iran’s non-oil Gross Domestic Production is controlled by so-called revolutionary “foundations”. Much like crime syndicates of yesteryears, these economic behemoths operate above fiscal laws and under a blanket of secrecy.

The “foundations” grease the friction points between powerful cabals, they subsidize incomes of officers of the regime’s armed repressive apparatus, but above all they distort the national economy beyond any hope of repair. Their more flagrant privileges have ranged from access to foreign exchange at grossly advantageous rates to purchasing factory production at controlled prices, which are often a small fraction of market prices.

In the absence of normal audit requirements, no one knows exactly where the “foundations” benefits accrue, but we know one thing: There will never be transparency, as long as the foundations feed Iran’s handful of billionaires and the armed thugs protecting their regime.

Now you see the dimensions of our problem advising the Islamic Republic on the requirements of a healthy economy in today’s interconnected world: They have change their founding philosophy of law and sovereignty, they have to secularize the judiciary and lose their leaders’ source of income and base of power.

If they accept these changes today, they will be out of power tomorrow! And we have only touched on legal and economic issues. Political risks are even greater:

For years the Islamic Republic has earned the number one spot on the US State Department’s list of state sponsors of terror. It has, in fact, been convicted in courts of Germany, France and the US. It is also the closest to becoming a nuclear state. Combine the two and you will see the world’s worst fear, wrapped up in one regime.

A short while after his administration imposed trade sanctions on Iran, I had a chance meeting with President Clinton. “We tried everything else, and it didn’t work,” he was reported as saying in that meeting, where I even sensed a muted apology. Remember that this was years before the war on terror defined struggle of this age, and years before Iran acquired advanced centrifuges for producing weapon’s grade uranium, and the polonium used to make the trigger for the atom bomb!

Today, unlike their divided stance on Iraq, you may safely conclude that Europe and the US will stand united against the Islamic Republic on terrorism and its nuclear policy. Unlike Iraq, the preferred option is not military, but political and economic pressures – which will not permit Iran to connect to the global economy – even if the philosophy and structure of power in the Islamic Republic allowed it.

Let me conclude with two messages, one to the free world’s business community, and the other to their governments.

First, before dealing with the clerical regime in Iran impose clear conditions: I ask you not to contribute to the terrorism and the oppression of the Iranian people by helping the “foundations” that pay for that terrorism and that oppression which enrich a few. I ask you not to enter into contracts subject to laws made by divination and interpreted by various theocrats. And even where you do enter agreements, I ask you to insist on standards of transparency currently absent in Iran.

Second, my message to Western governments is to demonstrate their unity against the Islamic Republic’s policies in a less mistakable and much more pointed manner. Diluted signals are likely to lead to the nuclearization of the world’s foremost terrorist state. I fear that, at some point, a limited military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities may become inevitable, giving the regime an excuse to fan a nationalist reaction. Considering the fact that Iranians, particularly the young generation, favor the West more than anywhere else in the Islamic world, the military option will be the most unfortunate. It will damage the popular base and natural anchor of an increasingly connected globe in the Islamic world, an outcome that serves no one’s interest but the Islamic Republic.

Bear in mind that regimes in trouble with their own people seek foreign enemies. Thanks to developments in Iran’s immediate neighborhood; the Islamic Republic has run out of immediate enemies. Terrorism and nuclearization are the most obvious routes for begetting offshore enemies. The Islamic Republic’s non-territorial definition of their realm as that of the faithful further justifies looking for external enemies. This is an intention that must not acquire capability, ergo the need for a united and clear stand of the free world NOW!

Ladies and Gentlemen, together with my compatriots, from the left to the right of the political spectrum, from republicans to monarchists, we are all engaged in the great effort to materialize the Iranian people’s inalienable right to a referendum for determining our future. The clear, united and decisive support of the free world for our human and political rights are all that Iranians need to rise up against this theocracy from the dark ages and rejoin the world as a responsible, free and prosperous nation.

My thanks – once again – for your support, and the opportunity to be with you today.

[1] The international accounting firm of Price Waterhouse Cooper

http://www.rezapahlavi.org/speeches/cmf62604.html

14 posted on 06/27/2004 10:13:43 AM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

NOT GOOD NEWS --- Pilot

Iran, Saudi Arabia Stress All-Out Cooperation

Persian Journal
Jun 27th, 2004

Iranian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Ali Asghar Khaji, bidding farewell at the end of his four-year tenure, met in Riyadh Saturday with Saudi Deputy Defense Minister Amir Khalid bin Sultan, IRNA reported.

The Iranian ambassador conveyed warm greetings from Iranian officials for the Saudi Defense Minister Sultan bin Abdul Aziz and expressed hope for his speedy recovery. Saudi Defense Minister had recently undergone surgery. He further said the two nations are in the midst of expansion of political, economic and security cooperation. The Saudi Deputy defense minister also expressed satisfaction on the two nations cordial ties and stressed on expansion of their political and economic capabilities. As a token of the two nations' improving relations is the agreements signed during the recently concluded Iran-Saudi Arabia Joint Economic Commission's 6th session. According to the MoU, the two sides have agreed to sign documents evidencing their joint intention to avoid double taxation, support of investment, customs, air, ground and marine transport, and tourism.

The two sides will also be signing documents on cooperation to establish an export guarantee fund and set up new cities in their order areas. The two sides also reached agreements for cooperation in their economic, commerce, investment, technical, health, agriculture, standards, culture, science, Hajj and pilgrimage, information, sports and youth, transport, communication and energy and trade delegation committees.

http://www.iranian.ws/iran_news/publish/article_2745.shtml

15 posted on 06/27/2004 10:22:06 AM PDT by F14 Pilot (John ''Fedayeen" sKerry - the Mullahs' regime candidate)

DPRK denies saying of joint nuclear test with Iran
(Xinhua)

Updated: 2004-06-27 13:43

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sunday denied Japanese saying of DPRK-Iran joint test of detonating devices for nuclear bombs and criticized the Japanese newspaper's practice of telling sheer lies to speak for the United States.

It was reported that Japanese ultra-right conservative forces Sankei Shimbun said in a newspaper of Japan that a six-member Iranian technical delegation comprising physicists and computer experts entered the DPRK in
May expecting to conduct a joint test of detonating devices for nuclear bombs with DPRK, involving the examination of neutron by using nuclear facilities in the DPRK for six months starting from July.

"There had been no deal in the field of nuclear technology between the DPRK and Iran and no delegation on such mission came here, either," said the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), adding that "it was nothing but a cynical ploy to put pressure upon the DPRK, taking advantage of the US moves to charge the DPRK with the nuclear proliferation."

The report said that some Japanese newspaper "hasn't dropped its bad habit of seeking its own interests by sowing seeds of dissension among other countries and nations."

"The Japanese society and media need to be cautious about this practice of telling sheer lies to speak for the US. though it professes to be an influential paper in Japan," said the KCNA.

http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/27/content_343143.htm

16 posted on 06/27/2004 10:25:27 AM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

U.S. raises temperature in nuke row with Iran
27 Jun 2004 14:36:07 GMT

(Adds Rice quotes, Iranian foreign minister, byline)

By Adam Entous

ISTANBUL, June 27 (Reuters) - The United States on Sunday condemned Iran for persisting with what Washington says is an atomic bomb-making programme but Tehran vowed to resist such international pressure.

"Iran needs to come clean and fully cooperate with its international obligations," White House spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters travelling with U.S. President George W. Bush to a NATO summit in Istanbul.

"Iran's continued failure to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency and continued failure to stop all enrichment-related reprocessing activities only reinforce the concern we have expressed," McClellan said.

Iran said on Sunday it would resist pressure to reverse its decision to produce parts for centrifuges that enrich uranium, reneging on a pledge to suspend all enrichment activities.

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said that "making centrifuges is different from enriching uranium."

"It is Iran's natural right to resume assembling and making centrifuges," he said. Iran insists its ambitions are peaceful.

Iran's decision was a retaliation against a resolution last week from the IAEA, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, that "deplored" Iran's failure to cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors.

But Iran also pledged to continue to allow IAEA inspectors access to nuclear sites for short-notice inspections under the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which Tehran signed last year but has yet to ratify.

If enriched to a low level, uranium can be used as fuel for electricity-generating reactors such as the one Iran is building on its south coast. But if enriched further, to weapons-grade, it can be deployed in warheads.

TOUGH U.S. LINE

Washington has pushed its Western allies to take a tougher line on Iran but Britain, Germany and France have resisted, preferring to try to persuade Tehran that it is in its interests to come clean on nuclear activities.

"We have been, the United States, the most aggressive and the most certain about our view that the Iranians are trying to ...acquire military uses for nuclear power, maybe even nuclear weapons," U.S. national security adviser Condoleezza Rice told U.S. television on Sunday.

"It's a very tough situation but we believe that this is one that still has a diplomatic solution within sight," she added.

McClellan said Iran's defiance would help persuade other countries to consider referring the issue to the U.N. Security Council, which could impose economic sanctions.

"I think this latest move may only serve to convince others of the need to seriously consider that step," he said.

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L27649348.htm

17 posted on 06/27/2004 11:16:37 AM PDT by freedom44

Iranian dissident Aghajari goes back to court after death sentence quashed

TEHRAN, June 26 (AFP) - Prominent Iranian dissident Hasham Aghajari might be released from prison on bail while he awaits the latest review of his death sentence for apostacy, recently quashed by the Supreme Court, the tribunal's
chief justice said Saturday.

Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammadi Guilani, quoted by the student news agency ISNA, said "if he pays the bail, he could be freed."

He was referring for the first time to the possibility of bail, a yearafter Aghajari's defence team asked for conditional release from prison.

Guilani also hinted that Aghajari would be cleared, saying that if the sentence were quashed again, it would be because the facts "were not of such a nature as to warrant such a verdict."

Pressed by journalists to say whether that meant in his eyes that Aghajari was not an apostate, he replied "yes," the official news agency IRNA said.

A history professor at Tehran University, Aghajari was convicted by a judge in the western city of Hamedan in November 2002 after he called for a reformation in Iran's state Shiite Muslim religion.

After the verdict sparked widespread protests, supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei intervened and the case was sent back to the same court in Hamedan, which stubbornly refused to back down on its ruling that Aghajari deserved to die.

The death sentence was again quashed by the Supreme Court, which this time around has sent the case to a Tehran penal court -- taken as a sign that the death penalty will not be imposed for a third time.

According to Iranian criminal law, any death sentence has to be given Supreme Court scrutiny even if, like Aghajari, the defendant refuses to appeal.

Khamenei was also quoted by a top judiciary official last month as saying Aghajari's words "cannot be characterised as apostasy and are not liable to the death penalty".

Aghajari was also sentenced to eight years in jail. The term was later commuted to four years before being scrapped on April 14, but he is still being held in Tehran's Evin prison.

http://www.iranmania.com/news/270604c.asp

18 posted on 06/27/2004 11:17:28 AM PDT by freedom44

Manouchehr Mohammadi being dragged away follwoing an undated protest in Tehran

19 posted on 06/27/2004 11:19:56 AM PDT by freedom44

Report on the Islamic Republic's Terrorism abroad:

Since the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran, terrorist attempts have targeted exiled Iranians as well as citizens of other countries, condemned as heretics, around the world. These attacks were ordered by the Islamic government of Iran.

1. In July 1980, Shapour Bakhtiar escapes an assassination attempt in Paris, France. A French policeman and a neighbor are killed and one policeman is seriously injured.
2. In July 1980, Ali Tabatabai is killed in Washington D.C., United States.
3. In 1981, Shahriar Shafigh is killed in Paris, France.
4. In January 1982, Shahrokh Missaghi is killed in Manila, Philippines.
5. In April 1982, a young German student is killed during the attack of the residence of Iranian students in Mainzer, Germany, by the pro-Iranian Hezbollah.
6. In June 1982, Shahram Mirani is fatally wounded in India.
7. In August 1982, Ahmad Zol-Anvar is fatally wounded in Karachi, Pakistan.
8. In September 1982, Abdolamir Rahdar is killed in India.
9. In 1982, Colonel Ahmad Hamed is killed in Istanbul, Turkey.
10. In February 1983, Esfandiar Rahimi is killed in Manila, Philippines.
11. In February 1984, Gholam-Ali Oveissi and his brother, Gholam-Hossein, are killed in Paris, France.
12. In August 1985, Behrouz Shahverdilou is killed in Istanbul, Turkey.
13. In December 1985, Hadi Aziz-Moradi is killed in Istanbul, Turkey.
14. In August 1986, Bijan Fazeli is killed in London, Great Britain.
15. In December 1986, Vali Mohammad Van is killed in Pakistan.
16. In January 1987, Ali-Akbar Mohammadi is killed in Hamburg, Germany.
17. In May 1987, Hamid Reza Chitgar disappears in Vienna, Austria and is found assassinated in July.
18. In July 1987, Faramarz-Aghaï and Ali-Reza Pourshafizadeh are killed and twenty-three persons
are wounded in residences of Iranian refugees Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.
19. In July 1987, Amir-Hossein Amir-Parviz is seriously wounded by the explosion of a bomb placed in his car
in London, England.
20. In July 1987, Mohammad-Hassan Mansouri is shot dead in his house Istanbul, Turkey.
21. In August 1987, Ahmad Moradi-Talebi is killed in Geneva, Switzerland.
22. In October 1987, Mohammad-Ali Tavakoli-Nabavi and his youngest son, Noureddin, are killed in Wembley, Great Britain.
23. In October 1987, Abol-Hassan Modjtahed-Zadeh is kidnapped in Istanbul, Turkey.
24. In December 1988, an Iranian refugee is assassinated in front of the headquarters of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees in Karachi, Pakistan.
25. In June 1989, Ataollah Bay Ahmadi is killed in the Emirate of Dubai.
26. In July 1989, Abdol-Rahman Ghassemlou and Abdollah Ghaderi and Fazel Rassoul are killed in Vienna, Austria.
27. In August 1989, Gholam Keshavarz is killed in Cyprus.
28. In September 1989, Sadigh Kamangar is assassinated in the north of Iraq.
29. In September 1989, Hossein Keshavarz, victim of a terrorist attempt, is paralyzed for life.
30. In February 1990, Hadj Baloutch-Khan is killed by a terrorist commando in Pakistan.
31. In Mars 1990, Hossein Mir-Abedini is wounded by an armed commando in the airport of Istanbul, Turkey.
32. In April 1990, Kazem Radjavi is killed in Coppet, Switzerland.
33. In July 1990, Ali Kashefpour is kidnapped and killed in Turkey.
34. In September 1990, Efat Ghazi is killed in Sweden by a bomb intended for her husband.
35. In October 1990, Cyrus Elahi is killed in Paris, France.
36. In April 1991, Abdol-Rahman Boroumand is killed in Paris, France.
37. In July 1991, Alberto Capriolo is wounded in Milan, Italy.
38. In July 1991, Hitoshi Igarashi is killed in Tokyo, Japan.
39. In July 1991, Ahad Agha is killed in Suleimanya, iraq.
40. In August 1991, Shapour Bakhtiar and Soroush Katibeh are killed in Suresnes, France.
41. In September 1991, Saïd Yazdan-Panah is fatally wounded in iraq.
42. In December 1991, Massoud Rajavi escapes a terrorist attempt in Baghdad, iraq.
43. In January 1992, Kamran Hedayati is wounded opening a letter bomb in Vastros, Sweden. He looses his sight and his hands.
44. In May 1992, Shapour Firouzi is killed in Iraq.
45. In July 1992, Kamran Mansour-Moghadam is killed in Suleymania, Iraq.
46. In August 1992, Fereydoun Farokhzad is killed in Bonn, Germany.
47. In September 1992, Sadegh Sharafkandi, Fatah Abdoli, Homayoun Ardalan and Nouri Dehkordi are killed in Berlin, Germany.
48. In January 1993, Ugur Mumcu is killed in Ankara, Turkey.
49. In February 1993, the fundamentalist terrorists in Turkey admit to have kidnapped and killed Ali-Akbar Ghorbani who had disappeared in June 1992 in Turkey.
50. In March 1993, Mohammad-Hossein Naghdi is killed in Rome, Italy.
51. In June 1993, Mohammad-Hassan Arbab is killed in Karachi, Pakistan
52. In October 1993, Turkish fundamentalists admit having tortured and killed for Iranian officials, Abbas Gholizadeh who was kidnapped in Istanbul, Turkey in December 1992.
53. In November 1993, William Nygaard is wounded in Oslo, Norway.
54. In January, 1994, Taha Kermanj is killed in Corum, Turkey.
55. In August 1994, Ghafour Hamzei'i is killed in Baghdad, iraq.
56. In February 1996, Zahra Rajabi and Ali Moradi were killed in Istanbul, Turkey.
57. In March 1996, Ali Mollazadeh was killed in Karachi, Pakistan.
58. In May 1996, Reza Mazlouman ( Kourosh Aryamanesh) was killed in Paris, France.

http://activistchat.com/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=2924

20 posted on 06/27/2004 11:21:18 AM PDT by DoctorZIn (Until they are Free, "We shall all be Iranians!")

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