Skip to comments.Vets refuse to forgive Kerry for antiwar acts
Posted on 09/07/2004 1:24:21 PM PDT by Calpernia
"If I got three Purple Hearts for three scratches, I'd be embarrassed," said Ted Sampley, who fought in Vietnam and publishes U.S. Veteran Dispatch. He remembers soldiers turning away awards for minor injuries.
Mr. Kerry has said none of his Purple Heart injuries, only one of which removed him from the field for two days, was critical.
After his third Purple Heart, Mr. Kerry requested and was granted permission to return to the United States to work behind a desk in New York. Even while still a Navy man, he began traveling to antiwar rallies with leading war protesters such as Adam Walinsky, a former speechwriter for Robert F. Kennedy.
Mr. Walinsky recalled that Mr. Kerry flew him around the state of New York for several Vietnam Moratorium protests in October 1969.
"He was a guy who had been in the war," he said. "We spent a lot of time talking about the campaign, the presidential campaign and the Vietnam War."
Mr. Kerry has said he did not take part in the protests, but was intrigued by Mr. Walinsky's views about the war. The two men stayed in contact and "became reasonably good friends," Mr. Walinsky said.
Others were shocked by the Naval officer's association with the antiwar movement.
"He gets this cushy job in his hometown, goes around protesting the war, then asks to get out six months early," Mr. Sampley said. "What regulations were busted when Kerry as a Naval officer and still on the payroll was flying around protesting the war? And who had to stand in and fight for John Kerry after he left six months early?"
(Excerpt) Read more at washtimes.com ...
Either get help,or just stop this now...you're not helping matters and trying to highjack this thread is doing you no good either.
Keep digging,some of the info you've already turned up is very good,very good indeed.Thanks for ddoing the scut work. :-)
Too bad you showed your true self, eh?
Now,we are at the end of this......your baiting and flames are a distraction to others and ruining an interesting thread.I'll answer you no more.
Man, you are 1K at least worse than Stewart. I can't believe it.
Read, or Sheesh, NO ONE HERE LIKES YOU. We know you.
Excellent! I love those.
Calpernia, pages 123-124 in Unfit For Command also speak of this. John O'Neill talked about Pacepa and his revelations about the KGB disinformation campaign, the Stockholm Coonference and the Communist funded World Peace Organization. Romech Chandra is also mentioned.
From the last paragraph of that section: "Whether Kerry knew it or not, his 1971 testimony to the Fulbright Committee was receiting the Communist Party line chapter and verse. Pacepa left no doubt as to his conclusion, 'As far as I'm concernec, the KGB gave birth to the antiwar movement in America'."
>>>Calpernia, pages 123-124 in Unfit For Command also speak of this.
I haven't seen this book in my area yet. When I get it, I'm going to see if I can make it an ebook format. I type FAST.
Maybe JimRob will put a sign in area on FR for freepers to access so no copyright violations occur.
>>>>This must be what Kerry was allegedly court martialed for, because he was still an officer in the Naval Reserves.
There was another Kerry thread where a freeper posted Carter's pardon. I have to go to a meeting this morning. When I'm back, I will see if I can find that post or pardon quote from Carter.
Come on guys, I don't want this thread pulled. I read a lot of stuff to get this posted :(
I will try to find info on that again. I know the time frame you are looking for.
And YES, I know the training camps you are referring to. We posted about that on the terror threads.
Unfortunately, the Net wasn't collecting data live back then. This will have to be information someone added.
And as Col Holmes is quoted saying in the beginning, a lot of the people that knew, aren't alive anymore.
>>>There are many who think that is where our missing POW's went, they were used to train the spies.
Even the McCarthy Files that are coming out has some POWs interviewed that speak of Soviet Propaganda tactics:
This clip below if from the Stalin Era; but I know there is more out there. http://www.nationalalliance.org/korea/korea04.htm
Will post more soon.
This letter was provided by the Russian side of the Joint Commission. We believe that large numbers of United Nations POWs, the overwhelming number of whom were soldiers of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), were already being secreted away in camps throughout the Soviet Union, as will be shown by the statements of Lieutenant General Khan San Kho and Zygmunt Nagorski.
Lieutenant General Kan San Kho. The essence of the Stalin - Chou en-lai meeting was corroborated by a senior retired Soviet officer, Kahn San Kho, who had been seconded to the North Korean People's Army, promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, and who eventually served as the deputy chief of the North Korean MVD. He stated in November 1992 that he assisted in the transfer of thousands of South Korean POWs into 300 to 400 camps in the Soviet Union, most in the taiga but some in Central Asia as well. LTG Kahn testimony shows the POW element of the GULAG was operating efficiently at this time in absorbing large numbers of UN POWs. Although LTG Kahn admitted only to knowledge of Korean prisoners, his interview strongly suggests the possibility that other UN POWs, including Americans, could also have been condemned to the camp system. F53
Colonel Gavril I. Korotkov. Another Soviet source is retired Soviet Army Colonel Gavril Ivanovich Korotkov, who served from July 1950 to mid-1954 as part of a general staff-based analytical group reporting to Marshal Rodion Malinovskiy, then commander-in- chief, Far East Military District, on developments in intelligence (tactical and technical) gained from the ongoing war in Korea. Specifically, Korotkov's political section was responsible for reporting on political information, the morale and psychological well-being of U.S. units engaged in Korea. This information was to be used in support of propaganda activities and possibly the refinement of operational/contingency plans. Colonel Korotkov provided the following information in an interview in August 1992:
Soviet military specialists had been given approval to interrogate U.S. POWs. There were two stages to this process:
Stage 1, Interrogations in North Korea. These were conducted at the front, immediately after POWs had been
52 "Minutes of the Meeting Between Comrade Stalin with Chou en-lai, 19 Sep 1952, translated in Draft TFR 37-11.
53 Amembassy Moscow Message, 271140Z, Subject: POW/MIA: Interview with General Kahn San Kho.
transferred into the hands of the North Korea-based Soviet forces. Initial contact focused on gaining operational and tactical intelligence, such as order-of-battle, etc.
State 2, Transfer to the Soviet Union. Korotkov was not aware of exactly who selected which American POWs for transfer to the Soviet Union for further interrogation, or which criteria were used in the selection process, but the most likely characteristics were experience, i.e., seniority - field grade officers and above. Two separate groups handled these military interrogations, the GRU-subordinated intelligence group which was interested in detailed tactical and technical intelligence, and the main political directorate-subordinated group, which was interested in political intelligence.
Korotkov had only limited knowledge of the procedures for the movement of Americans to and through the USSR. he did not know where the processing facilities or camps were located in North Korea. On several occasions he had visited the Soviet naval base at Pos'yet which served as a transit point for the movement of American POWs north to Khabarovsk. Although there was an airfield nearby, he believed that the bulk of the Americans were transported from Pos'yet to Khabarovsk by rail. But most likely at least some of the POWs were moved from North Korea or China by air.
Korotkov stated that the American POWs were kept under the control of the MGB. Generally, military interrogators had only a few hours with the Americans, although they sometimes had up to a few days, depending on the nature and perceived value of the information or source. While the POWs were at Khabarovsk, the MGB controlled them when they were not being interrogated. Once the process was completed, the POWs were returned to the control of the MGB. Therefore, Korotkov stated, he had no direct knowledge of the fate of these personnel. Although Korotkov did not know the exact number, he felt that the number of Americans processed through Khabarovsk was in the hundreds. Despite the fact that his political group had access to only a portion of the total number of POWs interrogated by the analytical group, he felt confident in this high estimate. Following the rout of the 24th Infantry Division in July and August 1950, there were "tens of American POWs" as Colonel Korotkov put it, but the number climbed quickly through the first months of the war. Furthermore, he indicated that operational directives said that Americans caught behind North Korean lines should be taken alive, not killed. A number of American pilots were taken alive. Moreover, Korotkov indicated that the Koreans were quite willing to allow the Soviets direct access and eventual control over U.S. POWs. By contrast, the Chinese, according to Colonel Korotkov, were very reluctant to release control over Americans who came into their hands.
Colonel Korotkov further stated that he had personally interrogated two American POWs, one of whom was a LTC Black. He could not remember the names of any other of the American POWS who had been processed through Khabarovsk. All reports on U.S. POW interrogations from Colonel Korotkov's analytical group were forwarded to the Headquarters, Far East Military District. The political group's reports were also sent directly to the Soviet Army's Main Political Administration, 7th Directorate, and the technical group's reports were sent through GRU (Military Intelligence) channels to Moscow. An effort was made to gain the cooperation of POWs and turn their allegiance. Those prisoners who demonstrated a willingness to cooperate were separated from the majority and given favorable treatment. However, as he remembers it, the number of Americans who cooperated was very small, in contrast with the Soviet experience with German POWs in World War II, of whom a higher percentage was willing to cooperate. An overall report was compiled which assessed the morale of U.S. servicemen in Korea. Colonel Korotkov stated that he had seen a copy of this report in the GRU archives at Podol'sk.F54
In his first interview, Colonel Korotkov stated that he had interviewed a U.S. officer, LTC Black. We believe that this may have been USAF LTC Vance Eugene Black who was reported by other POWs to have died of mistreatment and malnutrition in a North Korean POW camp.F55 Another retired Soviet officer, GRU Colonel Aleksandr Semyonovich Orlov, stated that he had arranged for an interview by a Pravda correspondent with LTC Vance Black.F56 In his subsequent interview with MG Loeffke, Colonel Korotkov denied having interrogated LTC Black, stating that he perhaps we had confused the name with a black POW. Task Force Russia interviewers, however, were adamant that he had been referring to
54 Amembassy Moscow Message, 241259Z Aug 92 Subject: POW/MIA Team Interview with Colonel Korotkov.
55 Lieutenant Colonel Vance Eugene Black, assinged to the headquarters of the l9th Air Force, was on a B-29 of the 98th Bomb Group that was shot down by enemy flak on 2 May 1951 over Pyongyang, North Korea. He died in captivity on or about 1 November l951. His death was witnessed by 1Lt Robert J. O'Shea, USMC. Lt. Col. Black died of mistreatment, and starvation at the infamous North Korean POW camp called "Pak's Palace".
56 Amembassy Moscow Message, 151645Z Oct 92, Subject: POW/MIA: POW/MIA Team Interview With Colonel (Ret) Orlov. See also Pravda Special Correspondent, "The Way of Interventionists," Pravda, 14 August 1951, p. 4 translated in TFR 31-1). Colonel Orlov stated that LTC Black was considered a suitable subject for interview because of his position as a staff officer.
the family name "Black" rather than to the black race. In this second interview, Colonel Korotkov remembered that the first officer he interviewed had been an Army first lieutenant, most likely from the 24th Infantry Division, but that he could remember nothing else. He had better recall about an Air Force pilot because he found much in common with him, such as color of hair (light), height (about 6'2"), rank (captain). He also said the pilot was about 28 to 30 years old. Colonel Korotkov also stated that while he was assigned to the project of interrogating Americans in the Far East during the Korean War, he also interrogated Japanese POWs, captured in World War II, and still held in Soviet custody. Here is an admission that foreign POWs were part of an overall system of exploitation.F57
Colonel Korotkov changed his statement in a subsequent interview with Major General Bernard Loeffke, former Director of Task Force Russia (now Joint Commission Support Branch - JCSB), in September 1992 after being contacted by a member of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. He then stated that the interrogations took place somewhere undefined, which he could not remember, in the Chinese-Korean-Soviet tri-border area. In MG Loeffke's words:
Since that encounter, the colonel changed his story as to the location where he interrogated U.S. POWs. Even after having been contacted by the KGB official, COL Korotkov agreed to answer questions on tape in front of Russian LTC Osipov, General Volkogonov's assistant. This interview took place on September 29. He said he and other Soviet officers in Soviet and at times Chinese uniforms had interrogated U.S. POWs over a 1-2 year period (1951-52) in an area near the borders of USSR, Korea and China. In this new version, Korotkov claims that he did not know, if that particular location was in Russia or not. The important point is that he would not say that it was not inside Russia. In all previous interviews he had specifically said that these interrogations took place in Khabarovsk. The colonel was obviously willing to oblige the security services by not saying that it took place in Khabarovsk; but he was not willing to say that it did not take place on Russian soil. The colonel's official statement on tape, and in front of a Russian officer assigned-to the-Joint POW/MIA Commission cannot easily be refuted. Korotkov is a respected military
57 Amembassy Moscow Message, 261132Z Oct 92, Subject: POW/MIA: Follow-Up Interview with Colonel Gavril Korotkov.
officer with prestigious academic credentials.F58
What Colonel Korotkov did not do was to deny that Soviet military personnel, including himself, were directly involved in the interrogation of a "large" number of American POWs during the Korean War. F59 In a subsequent videotaped interview recorded by Mr. Ted Landreth, an Australian journalist, Colonel Korotkov clearly stated that American POWs had been taken "through Khabarovsk" into the camp system. Their ultimate destination he did not know.
Later in discussions with Colonel Stuart Herrington, during the December 1992 Joint Commission meeting in Moscow he restated that the prisoners were escorted by a female Soviet Border Guards Officer in Soviet uniform. He also stated that he conducted his interrogations in Soviet uniform. During the Korean War, as the Russian side has explained, the Soviets attempted to establish deniability of involvement by a policy of dressing its military personnel, who served in Korea, in Chinese or North Korean uniforms. U.S. intelligence reporting during the Korean War as well as the testimony of a number of POWs who had contact with Soviet personnel tends to confirm this policy. There are also some examples of the Soviets' failure to adhere to this policy, usually involving hasty interrogations conducted shortly after capture. However, these examples are in the minority. Specifically, there are no known examples of Soviet officers wearing Soviet uniforms participating in formal interrogations with the exceptions of the cases of 1Lt Parks and Cpl Flores, cited in Part I. For Soviet personnel to have worn their uniforms during the interrogation of U.S. POWs argues at a minimum that the POWs were in the Soviet Union and that the Soviet authorities may have considered the issue of deniability to be irrelevant for men who were never going home.
Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso. Further evidence comes from contemporary U.S. intelligence sources. LTC Philip Corso, who served as Chief, Special Projects branch of the Intelligence Division, Far East Command, under Generals Douglas MacArthur, Matthew Ridgeway and Mark Clark during the Korean War. One of his primary duties was to keep track of enemy POW camps in North Korea, their location, the conditions at these camps, the estimated number of U.S. and other UN POWs held at each camp, and their treatment at the hands of the enemy. He has stated
58 Amembassy Moscow Message, 021430Z Oct 92, Subject: POW/MIA: Maj Gen Loeffke's Personal Assessment of Moscow POW/MIA Team's Operations.
59 Amembassy Moscow Message, 261132Z Oct 92, Subject: POW/MIA: Follow-Up Interview with Colonel Gavril Korotkov.
emphatically under oath before the U.S. Senate that U.S. POWs were taken to the Soviet Union. He stated that his information came from hundreds of intelligence reports from agents, defectors, North Korean and Chinese POWs, civilians, and repatriated U.S. POWs.F60 He also stated that at least two and possibly three trainloads of U.S. POWs were transferred from Chinese to Soviet custody at the rail transshipment point of Manchuoli on the Manchurian-Chita Oblast border of China and the Soviet Union. He estimated that each trainload could carry a maximum of 450 POWs. His information formed the basis of a major national policy decision by President Eisenhower in 1954. LTC Corso's professional determination of the situation was based on the concentrated application of the intelligence resources of the United States. F61
LTC Corso stated during a videotaped interview with Task Force Russia in January 1993:
I secured this information from I'd say, hundreds of prisoner of war reports, from Chinese and North Korea, who actually saw these prisoners being transported and later I talked to a few high level Soviet defectors who confirmed it - that this transfer was going on . . . . And that they were being taken to the Soviet Union. We estimated they were taken there for intelligence purposes. The operation, as far as we were concerned, was a GRU/NKVD operation in those days. And it was mostly to elicit information from them, possibly take over their identities or use them as agents, or . . . to assume their identities. And we had information along this line that this was being done . . . . Also, we had information that once the information was taken from them, and they were used, how the Soviets saw fit to use them, they were eliminated, and they would never come back. Which actually happened - they never came back. They were killed, which was Soviet policy, also.
The source of this information, as I said, was hundreds of prisoner reports, North Korean and Chinese prisoners that we took, defectors and other intelligence that I can't describe for certain reasons. And, as I say, photographs, because we
60 The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has conducted an intensive search for the hundreds of intelligence reports that Lieutenant Colonel Corso has cited. No reports of that magnitude have been found.
61 Statement of Lt. Col. Philip J. Corso, U.S. Army (ret.) Hearings of U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, Washington, D.C., November 10, 1992. Interview with Lt. Col. Corso by Task Force Russia, 11 November 1992.
photographed the camps, and so we saw movements, and the - people on the ground, civilians, also would come through. This was the intelligence process, put together very, very carefully, for a long period of time, matching all information and putting them together to show a pattern in the picture. F62
LTC Corso's single most dramatic source was North Korean Lieutenant General Pak San Yong. Pak was a Soviet colonel of Korean ethnicity who had been seconded to the North Korean People's Army and promoted to lieutenant general. He was also a member of the North Korean Communist Central Committee. Pak had been captured and disguised himself as a private but had been denounced by anti-Communist fellow prisoners. Under interrogation, he revealed that U.S. POWs had been sent to the Soviet Union and that they had been prioritized by specialty and that he had a list of those specialties. Pak had no information on the number of POWs sent to the Soviet Union.F63
In response to a question on how closely the defector information paralleled the information from POWs, LTC Corso responded:
Very close, in fact. What I was seeking from the defectors was the KGB/GRU operation. Not so much that prisoners were being taken to the Soviet Union, because we already knew that. But I wanted to learn more of the method of the operation of the GRU/KGB on how they used these prisoners, because that was the intelligence aspect of this. We knew that some were being used for espionage and maybe some for sabotage and we wanted to know what we could find out. So, mostly, my information on numbers and the transfer of prisoners was not taken from defectors. I didn't need that from defectors - we had that information, but operations within the Soviet Union, and the way they treated and what they did with these prisoners - that was where we were lacking in a lot of our information. And that I tried to get - and I got it - from defectors.F64
LTC Corso's concern that U.S. POWs were being recruited and trained for espionage missions was born out in June 1954 when the U.S. Army advised the Air Force that
62 Statement provided by LTC Corso to Task Force Russia, 23 February 1993, and video interview of LTC Corso conducted with Task Force Russia on the same date.
63 Annex B to Task Force Russia Biweekiy Report 13 November 1992, Subject: Interview with LTC (Retired) Philip Corso.
bump for amazing reference work by Calpernia - God Bless Ya - and for later use.
Thank you. But the recognition goes to the VETS who are finally telling their stories.
evidence had been uncovered which concerned the assignment of
Sabotage and Espionage missions to repatriated American prisoners of war during "Big and Little Switch," and that quite recently new cases of this type have been discovered. F65
The memorandum further stated that "Army intelligence could not rule out the possibility that POWs had accepted 'sleeper' missions. n The Army took this seriously enough to bar repatriated POWs from accepting overseas assignments for eighteen months after their return to the United States.F66
Lieutenant Colonel Delk Simpson. LTC Corso's determination and that of the Far East Command were corroborated in part by a more humble source in March 1954 when a former Soviet railway worker made an extensive statement to the U.S. Air Force Liaison Officer, LTC Delk Simpson, in Hong Kong. He also described his observation of the transfer of several trainloads of U.S. POWs from Chinese to Soviet custody at Manchuoli, his place of work, in 1951 and 1952. He first observed POWs in the railroad station the Spring of 1951. About three months later, he observed a second shipment and was impressed with the large number of blacks among the POWs. He was also able to identify OD outer clothing and the field jacket M1943, the very uniform item that the mass of U.S. POWs would be wearing. The railway worker further stated that he was told by a close Russian friend whose job was numbering railroad cars passing through Man-chu-li that numerous other POW trains passed through Man-chu-li. These shipments were reported often and when United Nations forces were on the offensive. F67
John Foster Dulles. Based on the Hong Kong report and other information that the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, sent a message to Ambassador Boylan in Moscow on 19 April 1954 stating, "This report corroborates previous indications UNC POWs might have been shipped to Siberia during Korean hostilities. n He then instructed Ambassador Boylan to approach the highest
65 Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Intelligence, Department of the Army (Secret) from Gilbert R. Levy, Chief, Counter Intelligence Division, Directorate of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, June 14, 1954.
66 Paul M. Cole, World War II. Korean War. and Early Cold War MIA-POW Issues (draft) (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, April 1993) p. 578.
67 Foreign Service Dispatch, Amcongen, Hong Kong, Desp. No. 1716, March 23, 1954.
available level Foreign Ministry official with an Aide-Memoire.68 On 5 May, the following message was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry:
The United States Government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody. The United States desires to receive urgently all information available to the Soviet Government concerning these American personnel and to arrange for their repatriation at the earliest possible time.F69
The Soviet Foreign Ministry responded with a dismissive note on 13 May 1954:
The assertions in the note of the United States Government that American prisoners of war, participants in military action in Korea, have been transferred to the Soviet Union and are at the present time maintained under Soviet guard are without any kind of basis and are clearly invented, as there are not and have not been any such persons in the Soviet Union.F70
Captain Mel Giles. Echoing the claims of both LTC Corso and LTC Simpson, was the information provided by CAPT Mel Gile, Far East Command Liaison Group, during the Korean War. In interviews in 1990, CAPT Giles maintained that one of his agents had found that 63 U.S. POWs were being shipped by truck and rail from Pyongyang, North Korea to Chita, in the Soviet Union in January 1952. Gile insisted that the report was considered so credible that the U.S. command cancelled air strikes on the railway that would be carrying the POWs.F71
CCRAK. An example of the reporting sources described by LTC Corso was an Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities
68 State Department Message from Secretary of State to U.S. Ambassador, Moscow, dated 19 April 1954.
69 Aide Memoire (No. 947) from U.S. Embassy Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, May 5, 1954.
70 Soviet Foreign Ministry Note, dated May 13, 1954.
71 "Chronology of Policy and Intelligence Matters Concerning Unaccounted for U.S. Military personnel at the end of the Korean Conflict and During the Cold War," Prepared by the Office of Senator Bob Smith, Vice-Chairman, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, November 10, 1992, p. 6.
Korea (CCRAK) memorandum of 24 February 1953 which reported:
The following information was received from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea Government. Report originated from the Nationalist Chinese Embassy --
According to reliable information, the Communist ChineseForce have transferred UN POWs to Russia in violation of the Geneva Conference. These POWs will be specially trained at Moscow for espionage work. POWs transferred to Moscow are grouped as follows: British 5, Americans 10, Canadians 3, and 50 more from various countries.
Russia has established a Higher Informant Training Team at Uran, Hodasong (phonetic) in Siberia in October 1952. 500 persons are receiving training, one third of them women. Japanese constitute the largest group and the others are Korean, Filipinos, Burmese, and American.
The date of this information is October - 22 December 1952. The U.S. Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea, comments in this memorandum:
This office has received sporadic reports of POWs being moved to the USSR since the very inception of the hostilities in Korea. These reports came in great volume through the earlier months of the war, and then tapered off to a standstill in early 1951, being revived by a report from January of this year (1953). It is definitely possible that such action is being taken as evidenced by past experience with Soviet authorities. All previous reports state POWs who are moved to the USSR are technical specialists who are employed in mines, factories, etc. This is the first report that are being used as espionage agents that is carried by this office.F72
Zygmunt Nagorskl. In addition to the Man-chu-li transit point, other routes for POW transfer to the Soviet Union have been identified. The journalist, Zygmunt Nagorski, obtained this information from two members of the MVD and an employee of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This other POW transit point was through the North Korean-Soviet border at Pos'yet between November 1951 and April 1952 when ice closed the Pacific coast and the Tatar Straits. These POWs were taken from Pos'yet through Chita by rail to Molotov (now Perm). The dates of this
72 Memorandum, Headquarters, Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea, 8242 Army Unit, CCRAK # M-101, 24 February 1953, Subject: CCF Military Conference concerning the Far East Situation.
operation coincide exactly with the dates for the transfer of POWs in the Hong Kong report, November 1951 to April 1952.F73
Another route was by sea when the ice receded. POWs, apparently mostly South Koreans from the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and other South Korean political prisoners, were transported by sea to Soviet Far Eastern ports such as Magadan and Okhotsk from which they were moved to the infamous Kolyma complexes around Yakutsk and to Vankarem on the Chukotsk Sea and to Ust Maisk on the Aldan River. These prisoners apparently were selected because of their anti-communist attitudes. The POWs sent to the Yakutsk ASSR were forced to build and staff coal mines, earth works, and dams and were under the supervision of the Ministry of Coal Production and the Ministry of Forests. The camps were under the command of an MVD officer named Sorotchuk. The POWs sent to the Chukotsk Peninsula, apparently to the number of at least 12,000, were used to build roads, electric power plants, and airfields. A civilian party functionary, probably a member of the MGB, was in charge of political education and indoctrination. He appeared to have been an ethnic Korean Soviet named Chinbo. There was a high mortality rate among all these prisoners.F74
From Pos'yet and possibly Man-chu-li about 300 U.S. and/or European POWs reportedly were transported by rail to Chita and from there to Molotov (now Perm) in February 1952 under heavy MVD guard. In the previous August and November of 1951, there had also been the movement of POWs from Chita. These latter POWs had been sent to Arkhangelsk Oblast to camps at Kotlas on the Northern Dvina and to Lalsk. In March of 1952, POWs passed through Khabarovsk and Chita to Molotov about every two weeks in small groups of up to 50 men. Chita appears to have been a concentration point for the POWs where they were incarcerated in the local MVD prisons, and when a sufficient number had been collected, then sent on to Molotov. The POWs may have been undergoing a selection process at this time. From December 1951 through the end of April 1952, trains of U.S. and European (probably British) POWs passed at intervals into the Komi-Permysk National District to Molotov, Gubakha, Kudymkar, and Chermoz. In April 1952, a number of U.S. officer POWs, referred to informally as the 'American General Staff', were kept under strict isolation in Molotov. In the town of Gubakha and in the industrial regions of Kudymkar and Chermoz, there were three isolated camps and one
73 Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report, 15 July 1952, Subject: Location of Certain Soviet Transit Camps for Prisoners of War from Korea. Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr., "Unreported G.I.'s in Siberia," Esquire, May 1953. 74 Ibid.
interrogation prison for U.S. POWs. At a camp called Gaysk about 200 POWs were kept and forced to work in workshops assembling rails and doing various technical jobs. These camps were completely isolated. Political education and indoctrination was carried out by the local Party organization headed by a functionary named Edovin, a delegate from the Obkom of the Komi- Perm National District. All these camps were under the command of an officer named Kalypin. Every few days several of the POWs were removed from the camps and not returned.F75
In 1990 Nagorski was quoted in the Los Angeles Times as stating that in the 1950s his foreign reporters had an extensive 'source network' of truck drivers and other working-class Soviets employed at or near prisons in Molotov, Khabarovsk, Chita, Omsk, Chermoz and elsewhere. Nagorski claimed his sources informed him that there were still up to 1,000 Americans POWs in Siberia from the Korean War when he last had contact with them in the late 1950s.F76
Other Foreign Sources. Over the years reports of American POWs in Soviet custody were provided by a number of foreign sources which are described below:
Turkish Traveler. On 5 February 1954 a reliable, friendly foreign intelligence service reported to an agency of the U.S. information they had received from a Turkish source traveling in Central Asia. The source, who had been interrogated in Turkey, states that while at Mukden, Manchuria, he "saw several coaches full of Europeans who were also taken to the USSR. They were not Russians. Source passed the coaches several times and head them talk in a language unknown to him." The source stated that one of the coaches was full of wounded Caucasians who were not speaking at all.F77
76 Senator Bob Smith citing the Los Anqeles Times, 8 July 1990
77 Charity Interrogation Report No. 619 referenced in declassified cables dtd 23 march 1954 and cited in "Chronology of Policy and Intelligence Matters Concerning Unaccounted for U.S. Military Personnel at the End of the Korean Conflict and During the Cold War," Prepared by he Office of Senator Bob Smith, Vice-Chairman, Select Committed on POW/MIA Affairs, November 10, 1992.
The Soviets transferred several hundred U.S. Korean War POWs to the USSR and did not repatriate them. This transfer was mainly politically motivated with the intent of holding them as political hostages, subjects for intelligence exploitation, and skilled labor within the camp system.
o There were at least two rail transshipment points for POWs:
o Through the Manchurian rail transshipment point of Man-chu-li into the Soviet Union.
o Through North Korea to the rail center at Pos'yet across the border in the Primorksiy Krai.
o Large numbers of UNC POWs were transported by sea to a number of Soviet ports on the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk for rail transportation into the interior of the Soviet Union. o Large numbers of South Korean POWs were also taken as part of this program and made up the bulk of the transfer population.
o A intense period of activity for the rail transportation of POWs was November 1951 through April 1952. Transportation by ship took place, for at least some of the prisoners, during the ice free months.
o From Khabarovsk POWs were sent by rail to another collection point in Chita and then to a number of camps in the Komi-Perm National District.
Evidence from Within the Soviet Union
Once the transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union was completed, the prisoners would have faced a long period of imprisonment. In that time, the opportunity increased for their whereabouts to become known to citizens of the USSR. Most of that knowledge appears logically to have come from other prisoners in the vast Soviet concentration camp system. Before 1992, occasional reports of contact with U.S. POWs in the Soviet camp system filtered out of the Soviet Union and were recorded by United States intelligence agencies. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of former Soviet citizens have come forward to report such contacts.
One of the difficulties in matching the names provided by these former Soviet citizens was the practice by Soviet prison authorities to often change the names of foreign prisoners and to forbid them to use their real names. This practice was confirmed by Lieutenant General (retired) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Yuriy Filippovich Yezerskiy.
Yezerskiy stated that tracking down specific foreigner prisoners in the former Soviet prison system would be very difficult because the names of foreigners were routinely changed, usually to other foreign rather than to Russian names. He suggested that the best source for the real names of prisoners would likely be other prisoners who knew them. He suspected that records of name changes may exist, most likely somewhere in Moscow.F78
In possible confirmation of Lieutenant General Yezerskiy's testimony, none of the persons named in the following sighting reports can be identified through U.S. casualty records of the Korean War.
Sightings in the Komi ASSR
Sighting No. 1. Lieutenant General Yezerskiy further stated that he had seen four to five Americans in Vorkuta, in the Komi ASSR, in 1954-1956 . These individuals were at the time all in their early to mid-twenties. He said he thought they were all from the
78 Amembassy Moscow Message, 2711132Z May 93, Subject: POW/MIA Team - Moscow: Weekly Activity Report 19/93, May 9 to 15, 1993.
World War II period but that they could have been from the Korean War.
Sighting No. 2. The Case of Captain Mooradian. One of the most precise reports was made by Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kazersky to Task Force Russia-Moscow team members on 27 October 1992. Mr. Kazersky had been decorated twice in the Great Patriotic War but thereafter had been sentenced to twenty years in the camps. He served at a camp called Zimka in the Komi ASSR and was released in the general amnesty after Stalin's death. He stated that while in the camp, he met U.S. Korean War POW from California. According to the TFR-M report:
Kazersky was aware that there were Americans at Zimka from camp rumor, and, in the Fall of 1952 or the Spring of 1953, he had a single encounter with an American pilot who had been shot down in North Korea and forced to land in Soviet territory near Vladivostok. The pilot said his plane had a crew of three and his radioman had been in Zimka as well, but had possibly been moved to another camp called "Yaser" after a brief period. The pilot did not know what had happened to the third crew member.
The pilot remained at Zimka for three to six months, and was then transferred to an unknown location. He was about thirty years old, five feet seven inches tall, slender, dark-haired and dark-complected, and in good health. He did not smoke and had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks. Kazersky believes he was of southern European origin, perhaps Italian or Greek. The pilot, whose nickname was "The American" (Amerikanets) lived in barracks number six, and worked in the consumer goods (Shirpotreb) section making frames for greenhouses. Kazersky had direct contact with the American only once and communication was difficult. the pilot had been in isolation for a year or more, and had learned very little Russian. Kazersky knew very little English. He could not recall the pilot's name (prisoners were almost always addressed by nickname, but is still firmly convinced that he was an American pilot.F79
At our request provided this information to Air Force Casualty Affairs which did a computer search of its MIAs using the military and biographical information stated by Mr. Kazersky. Air Force Casualty found a surprisingly close match in Capt Ara Mooradian, USAF, who was reported missing in action on 23 October 1951. Although not all information matched perfectly, there was agreement on the following points:
79 Amembassy Moscow Message, 301715Z Oct 92, Subject: POW/MIA: Interview with Nikolay Dmitriyevich Kazersky.
1. Mooradian's date of loss could-have placed him in a camp at the time stated by Kazersky.
2. He was from Fresno, California, the state Kazersky remembered.
3. Mooradian fit the physical description and was dark- haired and complected. He was of Armenian origin and could have been confused in Kazersky's memory for a southern European.
4. Six members of Mooradian's B-29 were listed as missing in action, two bodies were recovered, and five were repatriated. The man Kazersky met could have been referring to the survivors of his crew that were in the camp, one of whom was the radar -- not radio -- operator.
5. Although there was nothing in Capt Mooradian's file that indicated he had a facial scar, an examination of his photo in Air Force Manual 200-25 showed a faint round scar on his right cheek. This photo was enhanced by the National Photographic Interpretation Center whose analysts concluded that the mark was not a photographic anomaly but probably was indeed a scar.
The areas of disagreement with Kazersky's statement are:
1. Mooradian's aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea which was on the opposite side of the Korean Peninsula from Vladivostok.
2. He was the bombardier rather than the pilot of his B-29.
3. His aircraft had a crew of thirteen and not three.
4. Capt Mooradian was 6'1/2" tall instead of 5'8".
At a subsequent interview, Mr. Kazersky was shown a photo line-up of missing pilots and asked to identify the American he had met. He chose four photos as possibly being the one, one of which was that of Capt Mooradian.
Sighting No. 3. On 18 March 1993, TFR-M team members interviewed former prison guard Grigoriy Nikolayevich Minayev in St. Petersburg. Minayev claimed a guard from another battalion who worked at the maximum security prison in Mozindur (Mezhador), just south of Syktyvkar, Komi ASSR, told him in September 1983 of an American Korean War POW who was being kept there under maximum security (Osobiy Rezhim). In addition, Minayev said that his
80 Air Force Manual 200-25, Missinq in Action -- Korea, 16 January 1961, p. 95.
warrant officer training courses mentioned that foreign inmates- - were held in Syktyvkar during the fifties and sixties. While he was guard at the inter-oblast MVD/KGB hospital (ITK-12) in St. Petersburg, Minayev maintained that as recently as three years ago he saw foreign inmates brought there and secretly treated in a separate hospital wing in a ward for "imperialist intruders."F81
Sighting No. 4. On 26 March 1993, in response to the advertisement placed in the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Alekandra Yakovelevna Istogina called TFR-M to report that her husband, Leonid Sidko, had met an American POW in Minlag Camp, Inta, which is located south of Vorkuta in the Komi ASSR. She stated that Sidko had met and served with the American from 1953 to 1954, whose name he remembered as Alek Muller Zayolitz. According to Istogina, her husband had described him as approximately 30 years old, had dark hair, and spoke Russian well. She said her husband indicated that the American was transferred with several Germans to Moscow in 1954.F82
Sighting No. 5. On 6 April 1993, TFR-M team members received a letter at the U.S. Embassy in Talinn from Mr. Elmar Vesker. Mr. Vesker stated that after Stalin's death in March 1953, an American named Boris Holtzman, was taken to Schahto Kapitalnaya Camp 75/1 in Vorkuta. The American spoke some Estonian and fluent English and Russian. He was about 175-180 cm tall, stout, round-faced, curly-haired. Mr. Veskar stated that the American was sent to the Soviet Union from China and captured. He was first imprisoned in a special camp in Moscow after which he was taken to Vorkuta.F83
Sighting No. 6. On 15 April 1993, TFR-M team members in Talinn, Estonia, received a letter from Mrs. Lidia Hallemaa. Mrs. Hallemaa enclosed a photo, taken in 1955 in a prison camp in Vorkuta, where her brother Otto Adler had been imprisoned. Adler told his sister that three or four Americans were imprisoned in the same camp. Mr. Adler is now dead.
81 Amembassy Moscow Message, 281821Z Mar 93, Subject: POW/MIA: Interview With Former Prison Guard Grigoriy Minayev St. Petersburg.
82 Amembassy Moscow Message, 060913Z Apr 93, Subject: POW/MIA Team - Moscow: Weekly Activity Report 12/93, March 21 to 27, 1993.
83 Amembassy Talinn Message, 201028Z Apr 93, Subject: POW/MIA: Information from Residents of Estonia.
Sightings in Khabarovsk
Sighting No. 7. Japanese POWs. A Japanese POW from World War II repatriated from POW Camp No. 21 at Khabarovsk, stated that (1) he had heard from a camp guard that two Americans had been brought to Khabarovsk prison and were being investigated as spies; (2) he had heard from Soviet guards, prisoners, and laborers in April and May 1953 that 12 or 13 Americans, crew members of a military plane shot down by the Soviets were in a Khabarovsk prison; (3) he heard from prisoners in 1951 or early 1952 that an American fisherman, captured in the Gulf of Alaska, was brought to the Magadan region; and (4) he heard from a guard on a Soviet prisoner train at No. 2 station, Khabarovsk, in about June 1952 that there was a prison camp in the USSR for Americans only. Another Japanese reported that he had heard from the chief of the POW camp at Debin in October 1953 that an American Air Force officer was in a military hospital 500 miles north of Magadan (location unlocatable due to phonetic rendering). He reported that the officer had been sentenced to 25 years in prison in 1925 as a suspected spy.F84
Sighting No. 8. On 4 August 1992, Task Force Russia-Moscow team members interviewed Vladimir Yakovlevich Voronin, a prisoner in Semipalatinsk, who claimed to have met three Americans while serving an earlier sentence from 1951 to 1953 at the 5th Lagpunkt in Khabarovsk.
To the best of Voronin's recollection, the three Americans arrived at the camp in October 1952, and departed two months later. Voronin mainly observed the Americans at a distance, over a period of only a few weeks. The three Americans left the camp together with the Vlasov contingent (anti-communist Russians who had served under General Vlasov with the Germans in World War II) of about 20. A camp orderly, Volodya Khrustalev, told Voronin that the American had left with the "traitors". Khrustalev told Voronin that the Vlasov troopers were shot, but he did not know the fate of the Americans . . . . No one really knew who these Americans were, Voronin asserted. They were rumored to be U.S. military flyers, but none spoke Russian.F85
Voronin further related that he had contact with one American for an hour on a woodcutting detail. The American was notably thin, well over six feet (the tallest man in the camp), appeared to be
84 Information Report, 29 December 1953, Subject: American Prisoners-of-War Held in the USSR.
85 Amembassy Message, 050135Z Aug 92, Subject: Interview in Semipalatinsk with Individual Who Saw Americans in Khabarovsk.
about 30, had light hair and fair complexion. The other Americans appeared to be of darker complexion and were about 5'10" . All three Americans stood together at camp roll calls.F86
Sighting No. 9. On 22 March 1993 TFR-M received from the Central Russian Military Museum copies of a secret telegram and a top secret report from the files of the convoy troops which show the transfer in September 1953 of a Cecil August Stoner (NFI) from Khabarovsk to Moscow.F87
Sighting No. 10. On 7 April 1993, TFR-M received a letter from Artur Roopalu in Estonia. Mr. Roopalu stated that in 1951, he spent two days in a Vladivostok transit camp with two Americans. They had arrived there earlier and stayed after he left. These Americans did not have contact with other prisoners. One of them was abut 185 cm tall, well-built, dark, and the other was 180 cm tall. Mr. Roopalu heard in this camp that many Americans were taken from Khabarovsk to Magadan and from there to Kalama [Kolyma] or Puhtavanina.
Sightings in Irkutsk
Sighting No. 11. In August 1956 a recently returned Austrian prisoner of war, Mr. Albert Skala, reported to the U.S. Embassy in Vienna that he had known a U.S. Army officer, named Lieutenant Racek, with whom he had been imprisoned in the Soviet Union. Mr. Scala stated that the American was an officer of armored forces in Korea. Skala stated the he first met Racek in 1951 in Prison #2 in Irkutsk and that the two were cellmates there and subsequently in Lubyanka Prison in Moscow until the time of Skala's release in 1955.F88
Sighting No. 12. On 11 December 1992, a TFR-M team representative interviewed Romas Kausevicius near Vilnius, Lithuania. Mr. Kausevicius consistently repeated his story of meeting an American pilot named Robert in an Irkutsk KGB prison
86 Ibid .
87 Amembassy Moscow Message, 060913Z Apr 93, Subject: POW/MIA Team - Moscow: Weekly Activity Report 12/93, March 21 to 27, 1993.
88 Amembassy Vienna, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 169, August 21, 1956, Subject: American Citizen Detained in USSR.
cell in June 1950.F89
Sighting No. 13. From 6-12 December 1992, TFR-M team members traveled to Irkutsk and Khabarovsk to investigate the claim made by Mr. Romas Kaluskevicius that he had met an American POW in transit prison Camp #7 in Irkutsk in the late Summer of 1950. TFR-M confirmed that Mr. Kaluskevicius was, indeed, imprisoned in Irkutsk in that period, ending on 3 August 1950.F 90
Sighting in Taishet
Sighting No. 14. On 6 April 1993, TFR-M received a letter from Enn Kivilo in Estonia. Mr. Kivilo stated that he was imprisoned in prison camp L/P 011 (50 km from Bratsk in the direction of Taishet) in 1952 and served with an American POW named Jimmy Braiton or Baker. The American was about 180 cm tall, had dark eyes, played chess very well. F91
Sightings in Mordova
Sighting No. 15. On 2 August 1993, TFR-M team members interviewed Mr. Boris Uibo in Estonia. Mr. Uibo stated that in 1952 he served with an American Korean War POW in Camp #18, a close-hold camp for foreign prisoners, near Potma in Mordova (Mordvin ASSR). This American's name was Gary or Harry and, according to Uibo, definitely an American shot down in the Korean War. The American and Uibo worked together making wooden chess pieces. Uibo described Gary as no older than 25. Uibo stated that there was a concerted effort by the Soviets to hide the fact that they were holding foreign prisoners. Sometime late in 1953, Uibo was transferred to a hospital in Camp #9 and lost track of Gary. Uibo said that Soviet citizen prisoners were permitted to write two letters per year in Russian so they could easily be censored, but foreign prisoners, including Gary, were not permitted this privilege even though they could have gotten someone to translate their letters into Russian. He said no Soviet would take the risk of sending a letter on behalf of, or
89 Amembassy Moscow Message, 311510 Dec 92, Subject: POW/MIA Team - Moscow: Weekly Activity Report 22/92, December 6 to 26, 1992.
90 Amembassy Moscow Message, 311004 Dec 92, Subject: TFR-M Trip to Irkutsk and Khabarovsk.
91 Amembassy Talinn, 201028Z Apr 93, Subject: POW/MIA: Information from Residents of Estonia.
mentioning, a foreign prisoner.F92
Sighting No. 16. Sometime in the Winter of early 1954 after his release from Camp #9, Mr. Uibo was transferred to Camp #5 where he was assigned to work in the power station. It was at this camp that he met a black American pilot whom he described as 180 cm tall, slim, and athletic. He worked in a woodworking shop where furniture was made for the Kremlin. He believes that the American was still in the camp when he was released on 30 March 1955.F93
Sighting in Novosibirsk
Sighting No. 17. On 22 June 1993, a TFR-M team representative interviewed Mr. Bronius Skardzius near Utena, Lithuania. Mr. Skardzius told of his encounter with Americans at a Novosibirsk transit prison about June, 1952. He stated that there were two American pilots in the group of prisoners brought into his small room. The other prisoners were Germans. The Americans told him they had been shot down in Korea. They were dressed in khaki shirts and trousers with no belts or shoelaces (the authorities did not allow these to be kept). The first American told him that he was a captain in the Air Force.F94
Sighting in the Bashkir ASSR
Sighting No. 18. On 13 April 1993, TFR-M team members in Tallin, Estonia, received a letter from Felix Pullerits. Mr. Pullerits stated that from 1953 to 1955 he was imprisoned along with an American pilot named Lieberman, in a prison camp of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Building No. 18, near Salavati in the Ishinbai district of Bashkiria (Bashkir ASSR).F95
Sightings in Norllsk
Sighting No. 19. During the week of 19-26 April 1993, TFR-M team members interviewed Mr. Apollinaris Klivecka in Vilnius,
92 Amembassy Moscow Message, 161156 Aug 93, Subject: POW/MIA Interviews in Estonia.
94 Amembassy Vilnius Message, 191431Z Apr 93, Subject: Reports of Contacts with POW/MIAs.
95 Amembassy Tallinn Message, 201028Z Apr 93, Subject: Information from Residents of Estonia.
Lithuania. Mr. Klivecka stated that while imprisoned in the Kairakam (Death Field) he worked in the infirmary at the camp near Norilsk. In 1953 shortly after Stalin's death (March), he was ordered to inspect twenty prisoners who were waiting at the guard gate. He stated that two of them were so emaciated and exhausted that he recommended they be placed in the infirmary. One of them was a Japanese officer from the Kwangtung Army captured at the end of World War II. The other was an American pilot, named Robertson. The American spoke fluent Korean and also used a Korean name, Kim Sung Chung. He spent three months recuperating and regaining his strength. Since the infirmary was shorthanded, he was trained as a nurse's aid. Mr. Klivecka stated that Robertson and he lived in the same barracks until his release in January 1955. The American explained that he had been shot down over North Korea but had not been captured immediately. Since he spoke Korean, he turned himself in claiming that he was fleeing South Korea and that his mother was Korean, his father European. Korean officials sentenced him to a work camp where American POWs were imprisoned, especially pilots. When one of them recognized him, his Korean captors interrogated and tortured him. After he revealed his identity, he was turned over to the Soviets. Since he used two names, he was accused of espionage and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. After Stalin's death, all the prisoners received Red Cross packages except the American.F96
Sighting No. 20. The weeks of 3-14 May 1993, TFR-M received a letter from Mr. Valentinas Piekys, Vilnius, Lithuania who wrote that he had been a political prisoner in the Kapchikan Komsomolsky Camp near Norilsk. He stated that in 1949-1950 two Americans in military uniform were brought to the camp. They were in the camp for three months and then sent to some other place.F97
Sightings in Kemerovo
Sighting No. 21. During the week of 19-26 April 1993 in Vilnius, Lithuania, TFR-M team members received a letter from Mr. Povilas Markevicius. Mr. Markevicius wrote that in the Spring of 1952 he met two American prisoners while imprisoned in Kemerovo Oblast. The Americans said they had been sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. He described the one he had conversations with in poor Russian as about 170-173 cm, of swarthy completion, and with
96 Amembassy Vilnius Message, 261531Z Apr 93, Subject: Report of Contact with POW/MIAs.
97 Amembassy Vilnius Message, 170936Z May 93, Subject: POW/MIA Report of Contacts.
dark hair. The other American was taller and with auburn hair. The main topic of conversation was always escape. One rainy and windy night in the Spring the Americans actually did escape. Usually when escaped prisoners were caught, their dead bodies were put in the middle of the square to threaten others. However, he did not see any dead bodies after this incident.F98
Sightings ln Kazahkstan
Sighting No. 22. In April 1993, TFR-M team members in Vilnius, Lithuania, received a letter from Mr. Jokubas Bruzdeilinas who was imprisoned in a camp for political criminals at the Dzezhkazgan Mines, Karaganda Oblast, Kazakh SSR. Mr. Bruzdeilinas wrote that he served with an American pilot of the rank of major named Joseph shot down in either Korea or Vietnam. His date of birth was approximately 1920. This argues for an officer in the Korean War. Mr. Bruzdeilinas also wrote that the pilot was a Lithuanian American which was why he was put in a camp for Lithuanian prisoners. F99
Sighting No. 23. During the week of 3-14 May 1993, TFR-M received a letter from Mr. Jonas Zilaitis who wrote that he had served in the Kengyro Camp, Dzezkagan Oblast, in the Kazakh SSR. He claimed to have met a black American pilot there approximately at the time of a prisoner rebellion in May-June 1954.F100
Sighting in Archangelsk
Sighting No. 24. On 12 January 1993, a retired Ukrainian military veteran telephoned the U.S. Embassy in Kiev that he saw an American citizen in a prison camp in Russia's Archangelsk Oblast in 1969 or 1970. He did not meet the man personally but heard him speak English. The veteran identified himself only as "Viktor" said he had been assigned to the labor camp (Vypravno- Trudova Kolonia) in the Archangelsk provincial center of Yerstevo as a driver. Viktor characterized the American prisoner as robust and taller than average. Viktor was never told his name and heard no more about him. Viktor put his age at late 50s to
98 Amembassy Vilnius Message, 261531Z Apr 93, Subject: Report of Contacts With POW/MIAs.
99 Amembassy Vilnius Message, 1914312Z Apr 93, Subject: Reports of Contact With POW/MIA's.
100 Amembassy Vilnius Message, 170936Z May 93, Subject: POW/MIA Report of Contacts.
Patterns Among the Sightings
Out of twenty-two sightings, six are in the Komi ASSR. The Komi ASSR was home to the infamous Vorkuta concentration camp complex. We know that there were Americans in this particular area because five of the most well-known U.S. citizens imprisoned in the Soviet Union (John Noble, William Marchuk, Homer Cox, Leland Towers, and Wilford Cumish) all served their sentences in just this area. John Noble has stated that, although he did not see any American POWs in his camps at Vorkuta, he did hear rumors that they were in the complex. F102 The Komi ASSR also on a direct rail line from the Komi-Permskaya National District and the Perm Oblast, the areas Mr. Nagorksi identified as the end of the line for Americans POWs.F103 Apparently the end of the line was a little further north than Mr. Nagorski was able to detect.
Another four sightings were in prison camps in and around the city of Khabarovsk. Each of these sightings is described in terms of the transit of prisoners. Khabarovsk was a transit point for U.S. POWs as also described by Mr. Nagorski. This association was confirmed by Colonel Korotkov's statements that tens if not hundreds of POWs were interrogated there and his later statement that they transited Khabarovsk to unknown locations within the camp system. Three of the sightings were i Irkutsk, also a transit point in the movement of prisoners.
101 Amembassy Kiev Message, 141707Z Jan 93, Subject: Additional POW/MIA Information.
102 John Noble, Interview with Task Force Russia, 1992. Mr. Noble stated further that he did see former Soviet soldiers in the camps as prisoners, sentenced for having been captured in Korea by the Americans who repatriated them.
103 Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report, 15 July 1952, Subject: Location of Certain Soviet Transit Camps for Prisoners of War from Korea; Zygmunt Nagorski,Jr., "Unreported G.I.'s in Siberia," Esquire, May 1953.
The Soviet and Americans sources and documentation already discussed present a consistent and mutually reinforcing description of Soviet operations to transport U.S. Korean War POWs to the USSR. These sources, where they frequently overlap, agree in the following basic elements of this operation:
1. The Soviet Union transported U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union and never repatriated them. The transfer program had two elements:
o The first element was an in execution of an intelligence collection requirement and resulted in the transfer of a limited number of POWs with specialized skills, mostly F-86 pilots and other personnel for the purpose of technical exploitation.
o The second element was politically motivated and resulted in the transfer of several hundred POWs with the intent of holding them as political hostages, for intelligence exploitation, and for use as skilled labor within the camp system.
2. The transfer operation was conducted and carefully controlled by the MGB.
3. Khabarovsk was a center for POW control operations in the Soviet Far East. Interrogation operations were based there. It also served as a temporary internment site for POWs. The Komi-Permskaya National District, the Perm Oblast, and the Komi ASSR appear to be the locations where many of these POWs were kept.
4. Other prisoners, mostly F-86 pilots, were exploited to support the work of Soviet aircraft design bureaus.
After the death of Stalin in March 1953 and the subsequent execution of Beria, the possession of U.S. POWs as hostages may have been seen as a liability by the succeeding Soviet leadership. With the deepening of ideological animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union, acknowledgement of the taking of POWs to the Soviet Union, could only have further worsened that already deadly relationship. According to COL Corso, President Eisenhower did not press the POW issue to the
hilt because he feared that it could have precipitated general war. Eisenhower feared 8,000,000 American dead if war occurred at this time. From the other side of the dark glass, the new Soviet leadership might well have had the same fears and consigned the POWs in their hands to oblivion.
How Many Men are Truly Unaccounted for from the Korean War.
One of the more difficult problems we face in arriving at an estimate of how many Korean War POWs that may have been taken to the Soviet Union centers on a determination of how many men are truly missing in action from that conflict. Any POWs transferred to the Soviet Union would come from this group. Presented on the next three pages is one estimate of "truly unaccounted for", prepared by Dr. Paul M. Cole, RAND Corporation, in close consultation with the U.S. Army Central Investigation Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI)
Dr. Cole's calculations yield a total of 2,195 who are truly missing. By eliminating cases where the death was witnessed or documented, he has arrived at the total of 2,195 individuals whose fate is unknown. Unfortunately, this method does not yield a list of the 2,195 by name.
At this time, CILHI is reviewing each of its 8,140 casualty (BNR) files and entering the information into a new database. This project will be not completed in less than year. Upon completion, the database will be able to provide a by-name list of those who are "truly unaccounted for".
BNR Cases That Could Not Have Been Transported
to the USSR. F104
As of February 1993 the number of American BNR (Body Not Recovered) cases from the Korean War stood at 8,140. This figure is used as the baseline for the following derivation of how many BNR cases were confirmed as deaths by eye witnesses. The purpose of this exercise is to determine the number of U.S. BNR cases whose death was not witnessed or otherwise documented. Those whose deaths were witnessed or documented are not candidates for transport to the USSR.
The subset of BNR cases that could have been transported to the territory of the USSR may be estimated by subtracting from the 8,140 figure the sum individuals whose death was witnessed or otherwise documented. Among the BNR cases that could not have been transferred to the territory of the USSR are the following:
(1) BNRs whose death was witnessed by repatriated POWs and others and reported to UNC and U.S. officials.
(2) BNRs lost outside of Korea (Japan, for example) and after the Armistice. Korean War casualty data include a number of deaths that occurred beyond the geographic limits of the KWZ (Korean War Zone) and after the end of the Korean War. These cases were included in Korean War data at the time of the incidents under the Graves Registration Service concurrent death policy.
(3) BNRs located in UN cemeteries in North Korea.
(4) BNRs whose isoltaed burial locations were recorded by the GRS. These locations are usually specific to name and always include geographic location.
As shown in the following table, the deaths of at least 73 percent of all BNR cases were witnessed by repatriates or otherwise documented.
104 Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, World War II. Korean War. and Early Cold War POW/MIA Issues. Volume I: The Korean War (draft) (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, Aug 1993) pp. 163-164.
Table 2. BNR Cases Where Death was Witnessed
by Repatriates Or Otherwise Documented
Missing at action at sea: 293
Confirmed POW (BNR) deaths: 2,119
Total U.S. graves on North Korean Territory: 2,096
U.S. Burials linked to aircraft crash sites: 412
BNR cases occurring outside Korea: 53
BNR (died during death marches): 959
Post-war BNR cases grouped with war data: 13
Total confirmed or Documented BNR Deaths 5,945
[NOTE: I placed the above inside a table for easy reading--Webmaster]
l.This figure derives from CILHI data as of February 1993.
2.The total number of witnessed POW camp deaths is 2,730. The 2,119 number represents current POW (BNR) cases, thus 611 remains were recovered and identified since the 2,730 figure was derived.
3.UNC temporary cemeteries, 1,520; Total isolated burials, 576 (Army 217; Air Force 4; Branch and nationality unknown, 108; Memorial Division, QM data on unidentified American isolated burials, 247). This figure does not include POW camp graves since (a) These were the subject of Operation Glory repatriations and, (b) The total number of POW deaths (buried and unburied) is counted in category two.
4.Headquarters Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ) consolidated lists of air crashes into one master list that shows 322 crash sites and 412 casualties listed by KCOMZ as "number of remains n and "burial" number. There is no indication that these remains are any other than American personnel.
5.Figure derived from CILHI data. This includes BNR cases that occurred in Japan or between or between Japan and Korea, for example.
6.This number derives from evaluated reports of deaths on marches obtained following Operation Big Switch. The number of evaluated cases was reduced from 1,367 based on Little Switch debriefings or repatriates to 959 following evaluation of Big Switch repatriate reports.
7.Data from CILHI records.
Maximum of 2,195 BNR Cases. Of the 2,195 BNR Cases with no direct evidence of death (8,140 - 5,945 = 2,195), a large percentage were combat fatalities who were disintegrated by explosives or simply lost on the battlefield. Given the nature of the and duration of combat in Korea, the estimate of battlefield casualties that resulted in BNR cases F105 ranges as high as 3,070. There is no way to be precise about this figure, but it must be greater than zero in calculation.
105 Col. Harry Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts on File, 1987) p, 165. Summers estimates that the majority of MIA cases were due to combat conditions that did not permit the recovery of the body.
31 Missing USAF F-86 Pilots whose Loss
Indicates Possible Capture
Name Date of
1. Cpt William D. Crone 18 Jun 51
2. Cpt Robert H. Laier 19 Jun 51
3. lLT Laurence C. Layton 2 Sep 51
4. lLT Carl G. Barnett, Jr. 26 Sep 51
5. Cpt Charles W. Pratt 8 Nov 51
6. lLT Charles D. Hogue 13 Dec 51
7. lLT Lester F. Page 6 Jan 52
8. lLT Thiel M. Reeves 11 Jan 52
9. lLT Charles W. Rhinehart 29 Jan 52
10. lLT Thomas C. Lafferty 31 Jan 52
11. CPT Charles R. Spath 3 Feb 52
12. CPT Jack C. Langston 10 Mar 52
13. lLT James D. Carey 24 Mar 52
14. Maj George V. Wendling 13 Apr 52
15. CPT Albert G. Tenney 3 May 52
16. CPT John F. Lane 20 May 52
17. Maj Felix Asla, Jr. 1 Aug 52
18. Maj Deltis H. Fincher 22 Aug 52
19. Cpt Troy G. Cope 16 Sep 52
20. 2LT Jack H. Turberville 18 Nov 52
21. lLT Donald R. Reitsma 22 Dec 52
22. 2LT Bill J. Stauffer 26 Jan 53
23. lLT Paul J. Jacobson 12 Feb 53
24. lLT Richard M. Cowden 9 Mar 53
25. lLT Robert R. Neimann 12 Apr 53
26. Cpt Frank E. Miller, Jr. 27 May 53
27. lLT John E. Southerland 6 Jun 53
28. lLT Allan K. Rudolph 19 Jun 53
29. Cpt Charles E. Gunther 19 Jun 53
30. lLT Jimmy L. Escale 19 Jun 53
31. 2LT Gerald W. Knott 20 Jul 53
[NOTE: placed the above as I did for easy reading-WEBMASTER]
Source: USAF Casualty Affairs
Pilot: Captain William D. Crone, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 18 June 1951
Captain Crone was participating in a four ship combat mission in the Sinuiju area. Approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Sinuiju, the formation was attacked by eight enemy aircraft at 25,000 feet. Captain Crone was last seen in a 360 degree tight right turn. Circumstances of his loss could not be ascertained and an aerial search revealed no clues as to his fate.
2. Pilot: Captain Robert H. Laier, USAF
Date of Casualty: 19 June 1951
Captain Laier was participating in a four ship fighter sweep in the area of Sinuiju when he came under attack from enemy aircraft. When last seen, his aircraft was seriously damaged, trailing smoke, and in a steep dive at approximately 10,000 feet, 30 kilometers southeast of Sinuiju. An aerial search for his aircraft wreckage was unsuccessful. A subsequent, unofficial Chinese propaganda broadcast supports a belief that he survived the shootdown and was captured. Additional information: Captaln Laier had some engineering training at the university of Nebraska.
3. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Laurence C. Layton, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 2 September 1951
Minutes after arriving in the target area, the flight engaged in combat with a number of enemy fighters. During the action, Lieutenant Layton' 9 plane was hit. He radioed that he was going to try to reach the northwest coast of Korea and bail out. Another member of the flight accompanied Lt Layton and observed him parachute from the damaged F-86 near the mouth of the Chongchon-Gang River, roughly six miles off the coast. Subsequent information reveals that Lt Layton is believed to have been rescued by persons aboard a large power boat operated by the enemy.
4. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Carl G. Barnett, Jr., USAFR
Date of Casualty: 26 September 1951
Lieutenant Barnett was on patrol just north of the Sinanju River at 26,000 feet when his element engaged in aerial combat with
Four MIGS. Both F-86s of his element turned into a tight right turn. After about 160 degrees of the turn, the element leader still had visual contact with Lieutenant Barnett. One or two of the MIGs were firing at what was estimated as a 70 degree deflection angle and well out of range. Upon completion of the turn, the flight leader looked for Lieutenant Barnett but was unable to establish visual contact. When last seen, Lieutenant Barnett appeared to be in no trouble and in the opinion of the flight leader, if he was hit, it was an extremely lucky shot. An F-51 pilot in the area at the time reported seeing an F-86 trailing smoke at 8,000 feet and in a 30 degree dive. Other than the smoke the aircraft appeared to be under positive control. Subsequently, this F-86 crashed and when the F-51 pilot investigated, saw no signs of life near the wreckage.
5. Pilot: Captain Charles W. Pratt, USAF
Date of Casualty: 8 November 1951
Captain Pratt engaged a twelve ship enemy in the Pyongyang area. Seconds later, he radioed that his F-86 had been hit and that he was going to bail out. When last observed, his aircraft was at an altitude of 15,000 feet, heading toward the coast west of Pyonyang in a forty-five degree dive. A subsequent aerial search was unsuccessful. Additional information: Captain Pratt had engineerlng training and had attended the USAF Institute of Technology in Dayton, Ohio.
6. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Charles D. Hogue, USANG
Date of Casualty: 13 December 1951
Twenty miles northeast of Sinanju, a flight of enemy fighter aircraft was encountered and during the ensuing action, Lieutenant Hogue radioed that he believed he had been hit. During the remainder of the engagement, which continued for about four minutes, visual and radio contact was lost with Lieutenant Hogue' 9 F-86. However, a subsequent radio message received by tthe element leader indicated that the missing pilot was apparently south of Chinnampo and in no difficulty. The F-86 failed to return to base and all efforts to locate it and the fate of the pilot were unsuccessful.
7. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Lester F. Page, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 6 January 1952
After attacking a flight of four MIGs, Lieutenant Page radioed that he thought he had been hit during the encounter. His flight
leader inspect his aircraft from the rear and observed no visible damage. Lieutenant Page then turned south toward Chodo Island and when last seen by his flight leader was at approximately 30,000 feet. An extensive aerial search revealed no information as to the fate of Lieutenant Page or his F-86.
8. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Thiel M. Reeves, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 11 January 1952
Upon reaching Sinanju, the flight encountered and engaged eight enemy fighters in battle. During the ensuing action, Lieutenant Reeves radioed that his F-86 had been hit and that he might have to bail out. He headed toward the west coast of Korea at an altitude of 34,000 feet followed by his wingman who subsequently lost sight of him near the island of Chodo. An aerial search along the west coast of Korea was unsuccessful.
9. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Charles W. Rhinehart, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 29 January 1952
During a combat mission over North Korea, Lieutenant Rhinehart's F-86 experienced a flameout and all attempts to restart were unsuccessful. At an altitude of 4,000 feet, he was seen to successfully parachute from the plane and to land in water off the mainland amid an area of numerous sand and mudflats, some 25 miles south of Chongju, North Korea. A subsequent aerial search of the area failed to locate any trace of Lt Rhinehart. Additional information: Lieutenant Rhinehart had studied aeronautical engineering at Iowa State College, had gone through USAF All-Weather Interceptor Aircrew Training, and had gone through conversion training on the F-86-4 fighter, the newest variant of the F-86 at that time.
10. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Thomas C. Lafferty, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 31 January 1952
No circumstances of loss known.
11. Pilot: Captain Charles R. Spath, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 3 February 1952
Captain Spath was forced to bail out due to damage sustained by his aircraft. Last radio contact indicated he was at 16,000 feet
and was 40 miles from Wonsan. An intelligence report of 11 Jul 52 reveals that during the latter part of May 1952, unsuccessful attempts were made to rescue a downed F-86 pilot in the area 40 miles northwest of Wonsan who had been shot down on 2 September 1952. Rescue efforts were discontinued when it appeared that the pilot had been captured and that numerous, armed enemy personnel were in the area. This intelligence report was associated-to Captain Spath as he was the only F-86 pilot shot down in the Wonsan area during the first three days of February 1952. Additional Information: Captaln Spath was an honors graduate in Mathematlcs at Miami University of Ohlo.
12. Pilot: Captain Jack C. Lanqston, USAF
Date of Casualty: 10 March 1952
No circumstances of loss known.
13. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant James D. Carey, USAF
Date of Casualty: 24 March 1952
While in an encounter with three enemy MIGs over Lieutenant Carey was last seen inverted at 24,000 feet in a dive. All attempts to establish radio and visual contact were unsuccessful.
14. Pilot: Major George V. Wendling, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 24 March 1952
In the vicinity of the Sui Ho Reservoir, Major Wendling's flight engaged several enemy fighters in aerial combat. During the ensuing fight, Major Wendling radioed that his plane had been hit. The damaged plane went into a spin and when last seen was heading southeast toward the Yellow Sea. Minutes after his last radio message, the pilot of a friendly aircraft observed a huge splash in the waters of the Yellow Sea, followed by an oil slick, approximately 70 miles south of the target area. Whether this splash was caused by Major Wendling's plane could not be ascertained and a subsequent search of the reported crash area failed to reveal any trace of the missing officer or his F-86. A subsequent enemy propaganda broadcast from Peking, China on 25 April 1952 alleged that Major Wendling was killed when his plane was shot down near Ch'angtienhok'ou, Liaotung Province, China. NOTE: Major Wendling is a good candidate for having been taken to the former Soviet Union. The discrepancy between his last reported action, possible crash in the Yellow Sea, and the Chinese propaganda report on his death in a plane crash are too vast for plausiblity. In addition, Major Wendling's name
appears on the "List of 59" entitled "A List of United States Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through an Interrogation Point." Additionally, The Joint Commission Support Branch believes that further information on Major Wendling exists in the Russian archives as concluded in its "Preliminary Analysis of Korean War Interrogation Material" report dated June 1993.
15. Pilot: Captain Albert G. Tenney, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 3 May 1952
While making a high speed descent over North Korea, Captain Tenney's flight was attacked by enemy aircraft. During the engagement, Captain Tenney's aircraft was seen to dive away from an enemy MIG and execute evasive maneuvers at an extremely low altitude. He was informed of his low altitude and was instructed to pull up. Immediately thereafter, he leveled the wings of his F-86 which then struck the surface of the water in a low-angle high speed glide approximately 3 miles off shore near the mouth of the Yalu River. Enemy aircraft forced the leader to leave the area and prior to his departure, he did not see Captain Tenney abandon his F-86 or the aircraft sink beneath the water. Later in the day, search aircraft returned to the scene of the crash vicinity, but no trace of Captain Tenney or his aircraft were found. Captain Tenney's F-86 was not seen to disintegrate or sink and a the possibility exists that favorable conditions prevailed whereby Captain Tenney survived and was rescued by North Korean surface craft seen in the area. NOTE: Captain Tenney's name appears on the "List of 59" entitled "A List of United States Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through an Interrogation Point." Additionally, The Joint Commission Support Branch believes that further information on Captain Tenney exists in the Russian archives as concluded in its "Preliminary Analysis of Korean War Interrogation Material" report dated June 1993.
16. Pilot: Captain John F. Lane, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 20 May 1952
After completing a combat escort mission, Captain Lane and his leader left the target area and headed south at an altitude of 30,000 feet. Soon after departure. they were attacked by two enemy aircraft approximately 40 miles northeast of Sinuiju. Following the first burst of enemy fire, Captain Lane radioed that his aircraft had been hit. Shortly thereafter, the leader saw the F-86 spinning earthward but was unable to maintain
observation. Captain Lane was not heard from again and an intensive aerial search was unsuccessful.
17. Pilot: Major Felix Asla, USAF
Date of Casualty: 1 Aug 1952
Major Asla was engaged in aerial combat when he became separated from his wingman. He twice radioed for information as to whether visual contact could be established with his aircraft. The messages did not indicate that he was experiencing any difficulty at the time, although it appears that he failed to receive replies from the other pilot, who repeatedly advised that he did not have visual contact and was leaving the area. Subsequently, a report was received from a member of another flight in the area who witnessed an enemy fighter attack on Major Asla's F-86 and that his planes had lost the left wing. The aircraft was last seen spinning downward from an altitude of 23,000 feet at a point 15 miles southeast of Sakchu, North Korea. A subsequent aerial search failed to reveal any trace of the missing aircraft or pilot.
18. Pilot: Major Deltis H. Fincher, USANG
Date of Casualty: 22 August 1993
While patrolling the assigned area at an altitude of more than 37,000 feet, enemy fighters were encountered and engaged in battle. During the ensuing action, one of the enemy planes attacked Major Fincher's F-86 and he began violent evasive maneuvers. His plane did not appear to be damaged at this time and he subsequently inquired as to whether he was still being pursued by the MIG. His wingman had lost visual contact during the battle and received no response to his radio call advising Major Fincher of this fact. No further messages were received from Major Fincher and his F-86 was not observed again. An extensive aerial search failed to reveal any trace of the missing aircraft or pilot.
19. Pilot: Captain Troy G. Cope, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 16 September 1952
After several encounters with enemy fighter aircraft while participating in a fighter sweep operations along the Yalu, Captain Cope radioed that his ammunition was exhausted. Accompanied by another flight member he headed downstream on a course south of the Manchurian border and parallel to the Yalu. Approximately 10 miles south of Antung, two flights of MIGs were
sighted and, while maneuvering to attack, the accompanying pilot noticed three other enemy aircraft in the area. He promptly radioed this information to Captain Cope who acknowledged the message. Because of the prevailing conditions, the two F-86s became separated. Efforts to re-establish visual or radio contact with Captain Cope were unsuccessful. An extensive aerial search revealed no traces of Captain Cope or his aircraft.
20. Pilot: 2nd Lieutenant Jack H. Turberville, USAF
Date of Casualty: 18 November 1952
After completing a combat patrol mission over the Chong Chong River, North Korea, the two F-86s in his flight began the return flight to base at approximately 40,000 feet. Upon reaching a point near the Han River, Lieutenant Turberville radioed that he was having difficulty with his oxygen. The message was somewhat garbled and appeared to end abruptly. His plane was then observed to nose down sharply and to disappear into an overcast at an altitude of about 36,000 feet. The flight leader followed Lieutenant Turberville into the overcast and emerged at 25,000 feet, but sighted no trace of the missing aircraft. An extensive aerial search revealed no traces of Lieutenant Turberville or his aircraft.
21. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Donald R. Reitsma, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 22 December 1952
While patrolling along the Yalu River, Lieutenant Reitsma and his element leader encountered and engaged eight enemy fighters in combat. During the ensuing action, Lieutenant Reitsma radioed that his engine was out and that he was heading south toward Chodo Island of the western coast of Korea. He subsequently transmitted a message which revealed that he was twenty miles south of Long Dong, a North Korean peninsula approximately 85 miles north of Chodo. He further advised that his radio receiver was not operating. Lieutenant Reitsma was not heard again and an extensive aerial search revealed no traces of Lieutenant Reitsma or his aircraft.
22. Pilot: 2ns Lieutenant Bill J. Stauffer, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 26 January, 1953
Lieutenant Stauffer was on a combat air patrol over North Korea when six MIGS were intercepted. During the battle, his aircraft was observed to have crashed into a small hill in an inverted position. Lieutenant Stauffer was not observed to have bailed
23. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Paul J. Jacobson, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 12 February 1953
Over the town of Sinuiju, Lieutenant Jacobson's flight encountered and engaged in battle six enemy aircraft. Lieutenant Jacobson was last seen at an altitude of approximately 36,000 feet and was apparently experiencing no difficulty at the time. Following the battle, he failed to rejoin the flight and air search of the area failed to reveal any trace of him. An intelligence report from an interrogation of a captured Chinese soldier revealed that at 1000 hours on 16 February 1953, a UN pilot was shot down over the Sinuiju, North Korea. The pilot was captured and taken to Antung where he was placed on exhibition in the marketplace and labeled a "crook of the air" by a Communist officer. A brief description of the pilot was given and to a degree the information appears to conform to the official date of record concerning Lieutenant Jacobson. Although the date of 16 February is at variance with the date his F-86 was lost, it has been established that no other UN plane became missing in the Sinuiju area during the period in question.
24. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Richard M. Cowden, USAF
Date of Casualty: 9 March 1953
No circumstances of loss known.
25. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Robert R. Niemann, USAF
Date of Casualty: 12 April 1953
Lieutenant Niemann and his wingman were on patrol in the Sui Ho reservoir area. Enemy aircraft were encountered by Lieutenant Niemann and his wingman and during the ensuing action he was heard to say "Here he comes again." No further transmission was received from Lieutenant Niemann whose F-86 was last seen at an altitude of 15,000 feet. Repeated attempts to contact him by radio were unsuccessful and an air search of the area revealed no trace of him or his plane. NOTE: Lieutenant Niemann's name appears on the "List of 59" entitled "A List of United States Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through an Interrogation Point." Additionally, The Joint Commission Support Branch believes that further information on Lieutenant Niemann exists in
the Russian archives as concluded in its "Preliminary Analysis of Korean War Interrogation Material" report dated June 1993.
26. Pilot: Captain Frank E. Miller, Jr., USAF
Date of Casualty: 27 May 1953
No circumstances of loss known.
27. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant John E. Southerland, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 6 Jun 1953
As Lieutenant Southerland's flight was preparing to attack an enemy target, he radioed that his F-86 was experiencing engine trouble and he requested to remain at high altitude until the bombing attack was completed. Immediately after this transmission, flames were observed coming from the fuselage of his aircraft and seconds later the F-86 rolled violently to the left and started downward. Lieutenant Southerland was seen to bail out of his airplane at an altitude of 12,000 feet. Enemy fire appeared to be concentrated on his parachute as he descended but he was not observed to be injured. Lieutenant Southerland landed in the Kumsong area, several miles behind enemy lines, and his parachute was seen on the ground for several mintutes before it disappeared from view. Efforts to establish visual or radio contact were unavailing and the search was suspended after three hours due to intense enemy ground fire and poor visibility.
28. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Allan K. Rudolph, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 19 June 1953
Upon arriving in the Yalu River area, Lieutenant Rudolph reported that his F-86 had developed engine trouble. The decision was made to abort the mission and as Lieutenant Rudolph's flight turned to the south, a ball of flame was observed coming from the tail pipe of his aircraft. He reported that the engine was no longer operative and he was advised to head for water where his rescue coul be more easily effected. Lieutenant Rudolph was observed to pull up slowly into the overcost at an altitude of approximately 16,000 feet. Lieutenant Rudolph's wingman followed him into the overcast, but upon breaking into the clear saw no trace of Lieutenant Rudolph or his aircraft. A report from a radar controller revealed that the missing officer had turned south as per instructions and his course was tracked by radar until he reached a point four miles northeast of Nemsi-dong, at which time the F-86 faded from radar. An aerial search of the
route taken by Lieutenant Rudolph proved unavailing.
29. Pilot: Captain Charles E. Gunther, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 19 June 1953
No circumstances of loss known.
30. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Jimmy L. Escalle, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 19 June 1953
While performing a low-level reconnaissance of roads in North Korea, Lieutenant Escalle and his wingman sighted several camouflaged trucks and began a strafing attack. After breaking off the target, Lieutenant Escalle radioed that he was making another attack since he had sighted more vehicles in the area. No further transmissions were recieved from him and efforts to re-establish radio contact proved unavailing. A subsequent aerial search of the area were Lieutenant Escalle was last seen revealed the wreckage of an aircraft but no trace of the pilot, was found.
31. Pilot: 2nd Lieutenant Gerald W. Knott, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 20 July 1953
Lieutenant Knott was flying a rescue cap mission over a downed pilot. The downed pilot was spotted in a boat that was paddled by Koreans or Chinese. The flight leader and Lieutenant Knott went down to take a look. As they went down, Lieutenant Knott seemed to drift toward and under his leader. He went straight in and crashed. Joint Commission Support Branch has documents (TFR 138-321 to 138-324) which were turned over by the Russian Side of the Joint Commission on 13 April 1993. These documents are after action reports of Soviet AAA batteries stationed in North Korea. They attest that a battery of Field Post Number 83554 shot down an F-86, which crashed on the shore of the bay, at 1612 hours. The report states that a search group of FPN 83554 located wreckage with a tail number of 12756 and that the pilot of this aircraft successfully ejected and was captured by the Chinese Volunteers. Lieutenant Knott was flying F-86-E number 51-2756.
Sources: USAF Casualty Affairs and U.S. Army Central Investigation Laboratory Hawaii.
Korean War USAF F-86 Pilots
Who Were Captured and Repatraited
Name Date of
Casualty Date of
1. Maj Ronald D. Shirlaw 3 Apr 51 2 Sep 53
2. 1Lt Bradley B. Irish 24 Oct 51 4 Sep 53
3. 1Lt Fred T. Wicks 24 Oct 51 2 Sep 53
4. 1Lt Dayton W. Ragland 28 Nov 51 28 Aug 53
5. 1Lt Charles E. Stahl 7 Jan 52 6 Sep 53
6. 1Lt Daniel D. Peterson 15 Jan 52 31 Aug 53
7. 1Lt Vernon D. Wright 15 Jan 52 5 Sep 53
8. 1Lt Michael E. Dearmond 21 Apr 52 3 Sep 53
9. Col Walker M. Mahurin 13 May 52 6 Sep 53
10. 1Lt Charles M. Kerr 21 May 52 6 Sep 53
11. 1Lt Vance R. Frick 21 Jun 52 6 Sep 53
12. 1Lt Roland W. Parks 4 Sep 52 31 May 55
13. 1Lt Paul C. Turner 14 Sep 52 31 May 55
14. 1Lt Edwin L. Heller 7 Apr 53 31 May 55
15. 1Lt Harold E. Fischer 7 Apr 53 31 May 55
[NOTE: placed the above as I did for easy reading-WEBMASTER]
Source: USAF Casualty Office
1. Background. The following Soviet officers were identified during the Korean War by U.S. intelligence as staffing the secretariat that ran the POW camp system for the Communist side:
a. Secretary General: Takayaransky
b. Director General, POW control bureau: Colonel Andreyev
c. Deputy Director, POW control bureau: Lt. Col. Baksov
d. Representatives of the North Korean People's Army, General Kim I: alias Pak Dok San (ethnic Korean Soviet officer)
Question. Can these officers be made available for interviews? Will the files for this secretariat be made available.
2. Background. Colonel Gavriil Korotkov described a General Staff-based analytical group, of which he was a member, reporting to Marshal Rodion Malinovskiy, then Commander-in-Chief, Far East Military District, which conducted intensive interrogations of large numbers of U.S. POWs.
Question. Where are the records of this organization? Have the archives of the General Staff and Far East Military District been reviewed?
3. Background. Based on interrogations, Colonel Gavriil Korotkov;s General Staff-based analytical group prepared a report which assessed the morale of U.S. servicemen in Korea. Colonel Korotkov stated that he has seen this document in the archives at Podol'sk.
Question. Where is this document and can it be made available to the Joint Commission?
4. Background. Colonel Korotkov stated that all reports on U.S. POWs from his analytical group were forwarded to the Headquarters, Far East Military District. The political group's reports were also forwarded directly to the Soviet Army's Main Political Administration.
Question. Where are these reports? Have the archives of the
Far East Military District and the Main Political Administration been reviewed?
5. Background. In 1950 the MVD produced a thousand-page study on the exploitation of foreign POWs. This TOP SECRET document was entitled: About Spies, Operative Work with POWs and Internees taken Prisoner During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People, 1941-1945. This document should give important information on the system for the control of POWs at the time of the Korean War.
Question. Where is this document?
6. Background. On 30 March and 1 April 1993, retired KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Lukianovich Klimovich related how F-86s and pilots had been captured in Korea and transported to aircraft design bureaus in Moscow. This was confirmed at the Sukhoi and MiG Design Bureaus. At the latter, Professor Yevgeniy I. Rushitskiy confirmed specifically confirmed this and stated that Research Institute of the Air Force.
Question. Where are the records from the three design bureaus dealing with the technical exploitation of the F-86, of whch the interrogation of the pilots was a part?
7. Background. Colonel Alkesandr Seymonovich Orlov has stated that he helped a Pravda correspondent obtain and interview, with KGB permission, with a US POW named Lieutenant Colonel Black, a senior wing staff officer (believed to be Vance Eugene Black). Since two distinguished former Soviet officers remembered this officer over forty years after the Korean War because he was considered an important intelligence catch, it is likely that there is an interrogation protocol.
Question. Where is the interrogation report on Lieutenant Colonel Vance Eugene Black?
8. Background. Colonel Orlov stated in a 1992 interview with Task Force Russia that the interrogation protocols he prepared questions for should have been kept in the archival fonds of the GRU, Soviet Advisory Group, and 64th Fighter Aviation Corps.
Question. Have the archives of the GRU, Soviet Advisory Group, and 64th Fighter Aviation Corps been thoroughly searched for these intelligence protocols?
9. Background. Retired Lieutenant General Khan San Kho stated in a 1992 interview with Task Force Russia that as a Soviet officer seconded to the North Korean People's Army, he had assisted in the transfer of thousands of South Korean POWs into 300 to 400 camps in the Soviet Union, mostly in the Taiga but some in Central Asia.
Question. Where are these camps? What was the program by which the South Korean POWs were transported to the Soviet Union? Who were the officers involved in this operation? What archives contain the records of this operation? What other United Nations Command POWs were included in this program?
10. Background. Both 1Lt Roland Parks, USAF, and Cpl Nick Flores, USMC, were captured and interrogated by Soviet forces during the Korean War, turned over to the Chinese and eventually repatriated.
Question. Where are the interrogation protocols on these two men?
11. Background. The archival markins on the interrogatino protocols associated with the list provided by the Russian side of the 59 U.S. aircrew who passed through an interrogation point show that many interrogation files are missing.
Question. Where are the missing interrogation protocols?
12. Background. The Russian side turned over a list of effects of an F-86 pilot named Neimann, who was described as dead. However, Viktor A. Bushuyev stated that the Soviets attempted to interrogate and F-86 pilot named Niemann who resisted interrogation, claiming that his wounds excused him. There is a missing U.S. F-86 pilot named 1Lt Robert F. Neimann.
Question. What happened to 1Lt Neimann? If Soviet records show him dead, and a Soviet officer describes him as alive, did he die in Soviet custody? Have the files of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps been searched for this protocol?
13. Background. Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Roschin has been quoted in an article in the Soviet press he remembers seeing a report on the capture of an American pilot named Crone in conjunction with a special operation in 1951 to capture an F-86. The U.S. is missing Cpt. Willima D. Crone, USAF pilot, shot down on 18 June 1951.
Question. Have the files of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps
been searched to find the interrogation protocol for Cpt. William Crone?
14. Background. An intelligence collection requirement for F-86 aircraft and pilots was obviously functioning for a period during the Korean War. Such a requirement, according to Soviet officers, could only have been levied by the KGB, either Beria himself or one of his deputies. Major Amirov has stated that such a collection requirement was indeed levied by the KGB but through the Ministry of Defense.
Question. Have the KGB Archives been searched for this collection requirement, similar to the one issued by the KGB for the capture of pilots during the Vietnam War? Have the Ministry of Defense Archives been reviewed for this collection requirement?
15. Background. Former Soviet Major Avraham Shifrin stated that Soviet Air Force General Dzhakhadze, of the Ministry of Defense support regiment stationed at Bykova, transported F-86s pilots to Kansk in the Soviet Union at the order of the KGB.
Question. Have the records of this regiment been reviewed for its involvement in the transportation of U.S. aircraft parts and pilots to the Soviet Union?
16. Background. In an interview with Dr. Paul Cole, Major Valerii Armirov stated that a special air force unit had been organized under General Blagoveshchenskii, with the mission to capture F-86 aircraft and pilots. He cited Lieutenant General Georgii Lobov, Commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, as his source.
Question. Have the archives of the Soviet Air Force been reviewed for any reference to this special unit?
17. Background. General Lobov stated in an interview that 64th Fighter Aviation Corps had 70 teams out looking for downed American pilots.
Question. Has the Russian side been looking for member of these 70 teams? If not, will they do so?
18. Background. U.S. Air Force POWs were gathered into a special camp during the Korean War. At one point, all B-29 crewmen were put through intensive interrogation.
Question. Why did the Soviets order all USAF POWs segregated into a special camp? Where are the interrogation reports from the B-29 crewmen?
19. Background. A number of GRU officers have been interviewed under the auspices of the Russian side of the Joint Commission; however, no former officer of the MGB/KGB have been provided.
Question. Will the Russian side provide the U.S. side with former officers of the MGB/KGB for interview?
20. Background. A number of former Soviet officers, including retired MVD Lieutenant General Yezerskiy, and inmates of the GULAG system state that foreign POWs such as the Americans would have been forced to assume new identities.
Question. Will the Russian side provide an explanation of this policy and a list of the new identities forced upon U.S. POWs?
Individual Sources of Information
Cited in this Study
Major Valerii Amirov
Colonel Viktor A. Bushuyev
Mrs. Aleksandra Y. Istogina
Lieutenant General Kan San Kho
Mr. Nikolai D. Kazerskiy
Lieutenant Yuriy L. Klimovich
Colonel Gavriil I. Korotkov
Lieutenant Colonel Valerii Lavrentsov
Lieutenant General Georgii Lobov
Mr. Gregorii N. Minayev
Colonel Aleksandr S. Orlov
Colonel Georgii Plotnikov
Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir M. Roshchin
Professor Yevgeniy I. Rushitskiy
Colonel Valentin Sozinov
Mr. Vladimir Y. Voronin
Mrs. Lidia Hallemaa
Mr. Enn Kivilo
Mr. Felix Pullerits
Mr. Artur Roopalu
Mr. Elmar Vesker
Mr. Boris Uibo
Mr. Jokubas Bruzdeilinas
Mr. Romas Kausevicius
Mr. Apollinaris Klivecka
Mr. Povilas Markevicius
Mr. Bronius Skardzius
Mr. Jonas Zilaitis
Mr. Avraham Shifrin
Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso, USA
Brigadier General Michael Dearmond, USAF
Colonel Harold E. Fischer, USAF
Corporal Nick A. Flores, USMC
Captain Mel Giles, USA
Colonel Edwin L. Heller, USAF
Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski, Journalist
Sergeant Daniel Oldwage, USAF
Mr. Shu Ping Wa, formerly of the CPA
Lieutenant Colonel Delk Simpson, USAF
Soviet Officers Whose Names Are
Associated with Combat Operations and
Interrogations of U.S. Korean War POWs
Close review of available documentation yields the following list of Russian names, some with official titles. These names should be researched and those individuals still living and available for interview should be contacted.
(a) Korea area
BELENKO--Commander of AAA unit, Field Postbox 54892 Nov 51, near Pukhakni, Simchen district, Senchen, N.Korea. (TFR 76-18)
KOZLOV, Major (fnu)--senior intelligence officer of Field Postbox 54892 in late 1950; signed reports on interrogations of US pilots (TFR 76-30 & 76-32)
KUZNETSOV, (fnu) -- member of 54892 staff, prepared questions for interrogation of US pilots in late 1950 (TFR 76-30 & 76-32)
LEVADNYJ, Sr., Sgt. P.A. -- his AAA unit downed a US aircraft in Nov 51 (Pyongyang Highway) (TFR 76-18)
PLOTNIKOV (fnu) -- translator at Field Postbox 54892 in Spring of 1952 (TFR 76-42)
PODLINENSTEV -- intel officer, Korea, Nov 51, possibly Chief of Intelligence (TFR 76-18_
RAZUVAYEV (fnu) Lt Gen -- TFR 42-10, Ambassador to Korea:
(1) mentioned in first Zanegin message on use of Soviet interpreters w/US POWs (TFR 42-3);
(2) author of message to VASILEVSKIJ and to SHTEMENKO concerning capture of General Dean in Korea (TFR 2-4);
(3) mentioned in Zanegin's message on use of Soviet interpreters with US POWs (TFR 4-20);
(4) mentioned in Central Committee & Politburo communications on issue of UN POWs (TFR 42-9 et seq.).
SAN'KOV, Col.--Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Field Postbox 54892, mid-1953 (TFR 76-33, 76-34, and 37-66 through 37- 100)
SOKOLOV--Field Postbox 10899, recipient of messages or routing officer (TFR 76-18)
SUSLIN, Col. -- Chief of Staff of Unit, Field Postbox 54892, early 1951; other staff members may include MAMAYEV and KHASANCHIN (TFR 76-28, TFR 76-25)
TASHCHAN, Guards Lt Col --Chief of Intel for unit Field Postbox 54892 in Feb 53. (Spelling of name is peculiar.) Additional staff members may include MUNKUYEV, ZUBKOV. (TFR 76-35 through 76-42 and 76-24) YANUSHEVICH--Chief of Staff, AAA unit Field Postbox 10899,
Nov 451 (TFR 76-18)
ZANEGIN, B. -- wrote two messages concerning use of Soviet interpreters in Korea (TFR 37-44 and 37-45); one message on POW "Harding" in China (TFR 4-14)
(b) China area
IGOSTOSERDOV, Gen (fnu) -- posted in Mukden early 1951, (TFR 76-25).
KRYMOV (fnu)--addressee of POW report ("Harding"), June 1952 (TFR 4-14)
MAKAROV (fnu)-- sent POW report ("Harding") , June 1952 (TFR 4-14)
Prepared for computer distribution by the POW Network
Now again, cross reference these posts:
THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR "The MIA Cover-Up"
POWs IN LAOS: SOME STILL SURVIVE HELP BRING THEM HOME
On April 16, five members of the Select Committee -- Senators Kerry, Smith, Robb, Brown and Grassley -- embarked on a ten-day mission to Southeast Asia. Members of the delegation spent three days in Vietnam. Their purpose was twofold: first, to obtain the necessary assurances of cooperation from senior Vietnamese leaders; and, second, to ensure that those guarantees of access would be carried out.
Hardly likely. In 1971, two years before any peace agreement, John Kerry, a Vietnam veteran who became a peace activist, said that ``points'' presented by Hanoi-Vietcong delegations in Paris, and their conversations with him and other Americans, showed prisoners would be returned. So, he said, the U.S. should not ``stall'' any longer.
And repinging, the McCarty Files:
McCarthy Files which has some POWs interviewed:
The government of the United States knew all the POWs did not come home. The families of the missing knew it, too. Withheld from the families was massive amounts of POW/MIA intelligence. This intelligence showed that the number of POW's left behind was much, much larger than the acknowledged 389. According to Col. Philip Corso, aide to President Dwight Eisenhower, the number was somewhere between 900 and 1000. Intelligence also showed that many of the POWs were transported to China and the former Soviet Union.
One of the known POW's, left behind was Roger Dumas. Roger was with a group of American POW's ready for release during "Operation Big Switch." Shortly before his release North Korean soldiers removed Roger from the group. Witnesses said... they just took Roger out of the line.
To this day, the fate of Roger Dumas is unknown. Is he alive, today? Is he one of the 20 - 30 live POW's, United States intelligence indicates is alive in North Korea, today? Or, was he one of the hundreds of POWs moved to China and the former Soviet Union?
One prisoner believed moved to the Soviet Union is Ronald Van Wees. For over 40 years, his mother Rita gathered documentation showing that many hundreds of American soldiers were not returned at the end of the war in Korea. In 1957, she received a report stating her son was alive in the Soviet Union.
Recent revelations, before a congressional committee on POW's held in North Korea or moved to the Soviet Union, is not new information to Bob Dumas. For years he, and Rita Van Wees, spoke of this information. Sadly, no one listened.
If we had, perhaps our Vietnam War POW/MIA's would have not suffered the same fate as their Korean War brothers --- abandonment.
The following report is a summary of information obtained by the U.S. Russia Joint
Commission on POW/MIAs, and by analysts of the Defense POW/Missing Personnel
The information, referred to as the "Memoirs," was provided to the analysts through an
interview with a source who had been living in internal exile m the former Soviet Union.
Our analysts translated the interview with the source, and passed it to the Russian side of
the Commission during the Commission's plenary meeting in Moscow in late 1999 In
addition, U.S. analysts stationed full-time in Moscow are using this report to investigate
leads and examine archives m Russia which may shed some light on the information in
It should be noted that the information in the "Memoirs" relates to the 1940s and 1950s,
and most of it is collated from second, third or fourth hand reports.
A relatively small portion of the "Memoirs" is excerpted from the original as the
information does not relate to the POW/MIA issue, or the information would tend to
reveal the identify of the source.
In the spring of 1954, a new worker, who had previously served as a radio operator
aboard fishing vessels belonging to the Far Eastern Flotilla, arrived at the Leningrad Gold-
prospecting Brigade in Partizanskit (Udereslu District, Krasnoyarskii Region). He recounted
that, in n when he was fishing some forty miles from the Island of Okusiri in the
Sea of Japan, he "forced his way into" discussions about a certain aircraft that had crashed
Within a few minutes, a "radio message" arrived from the base of the Trawler Fleet, stating that
all vessels belonging to the flotilla were to commence at once a search for the crewmembers.
Immediately thereafter, an encoded message arrived from the base's deputy political officer
directing that the "enemy spy pilots," or their corpses, if they were found, be brought at once
"under the strictest secrecy" to the coast guard ships belonging to the Border Patrol Just one
point was not clear From whom was this "strictest of secrets" being kept? From the fishermen
of an enormous flotilla scattered across the oceans and seas-who were supposed to be the ones
searching for those involved in the crash? For days, it seemed that the entire communications
network was saturated with transmissions by crews of the search aircraft Then, suddenly,
everything went silent
A week later, we radio operators were informed in the Port of Ol'ga that an American
military spy plane had been downed over our territorial waters by air defense (PVO) units, had
fallen into the sea and that the entire crew had perished Why were they so incredibly quick to
bury the Americans, who, unlike our pilots and sailors, had top-quality personal rescue gear? .
Two months later, the captain of the fishing vessel on which the worker served served, returned
from Khabarovsk (He had been visiting with his sister there ) He told the radio operator that not
all the crew members of the "American" [aircraft) had, in fact, died "back then" (in June) and that
ten of those people were now in pre-trial solitary confinement in a prison in the city of
Svobodnyi, near Blagoveshchensk To keep them away from curiosity seekers, they were
transferred there immediately from the internal prison of the Khabarovsk MGB [i e , Ministry of
State Security, predecessor organization of the KGB, trans ] The worker added that his captain
was unfazed by this and that he knows the truth -- His sister was married to "just about the most
prominent figure in the Khabarovsk Regional Committee" [of the Communist Party, trans] In
reply to the worker's question, "What happens now"," the captain answered.
"They will be squeezed for what is required And, of course, they will finish them off
They'll be worked to the bone and shipped off to Zeya and not for the first time
Svoboduyi is where they have their principal drowning base In echelons, straight from the
trains, they had been drowning people for thirty years like nothing And that's all They
definitely will be counted in all the docunents as having drowned See, even TASS made the
announcement: They fell, as it were, into the sea"
The report alarmed me a great deal
In the very beginning of 1953, a courier from the Udereiskii Regional KGB
summoned me to the Nizhne-Angarskoe Geological Reconnaissance Directorate in Motygino
I was informed that, at the direction of the senior geologist, Ivanchenko, I was being sent to handle an emergency situation at the Northern mining enterprise On that same day, with an
escort and two geologists, we flew off to Krasnoyarsk We were met there by representatives of
the director of the Regional GRU He reported that, together with other specialists, I was to fly to
the north, where a ChP (Extraordinary Event) took place at one of the enterprises constituting the
"integrated system" A crust of ice within the ground had burst apart and flooded the area of the
elevator Responding to my retort that I lacked the proper educational background, and, therefore,
the results of my expertise (or my suppositions) would be considered incorrect. He waved in
front of my face a thick folder with my "Personal File " the discussion, he
announced, "Around here what matters we not your diplomas but your actions! Don't get
gloomy, young man Go! You do your work and I'll worry about freeing you from exile. . ."
The following day - it was January 8th - along with two geologists from Motygine and
another three specialist from the "26th [Post Office] Box, (Krasnoyorsk), we flew out toward the
Island of Dikson. (approximately 2,000 kilometers to the north of Krasnoyarsk) Two or three
days later -- there was a blizzard and the airports were closed -- we flew for about three hours to
the village of Solnechnyi (?) on Bol'shevik (an island in the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago)
There we once again "sat" because of the weather Finally, after flying across the Vil'kitskn
Gulf, we landed in the tundra, some 160 kilometers from Chelyuskin Bay The site was called
It was inmates who worked here at the mining enterprise since the camp was right next to
the mine The reason for the emergency situation -- an ignorance of elementary engineering --
could have been clarified without having to fly out to the site Its consequences could have been
eliminated as well by instruction from a competent engineer What was needed were experienced
pyrotechnic specialists and demolition experts And they sent us a demolition-qualified inmate
tall, exhausted by hunger and the Artic, with a very characteristic, slightly elongated artistic face
on which the unnatural protrusion of gray eyes in sockets sunken from emaciation revealed
someone ill with exophthalmos goiter In an accent clearly that of an English speaker, he also
only identified himself as a citizen of the United States of America, Allied Officer Dale His
statement did not appear to make any impression on my colleagues In fact, on the return trip,
already in Krasnoyarsk, one of them heard me say "Tell me, please An American! An ally
And also in the camp" He retorted "And they're not only in Rybak You have as many as
you want of them in Strelka! So much for our 'so-called allies'"
Somewhat later, after having returned to Udereya, I asked those who had escaped from
Strelka about our "allies" Yes, they knew about the Americans, but they had no contact with
them From the very moment of their arrival on the territory of the Enterprise, they were all kept
I was unable to converse with the American prisoner Dale The camp guards
"monitored" me very closely Even before we entered his area, I and all the others were warned
that it was strictly forbidden to speak with anyone!
Six days later, we flew to Dikson Only then did I learn that we were in a uranium mine.
In Kranoyarsk I was compelled to sign a non-disclosure statement with regard to
everything that I had seen and heard in Rybak In Noril'sk, many years later, a colleague who
had worked with me in Udereya at the time in question, related that many of the Americans "who
had fallen into our hands in 1945 from the liberated Fascist camps" were held in Rybak and
probably perished there. "
My status as an exile did not permit me to clarify anything at all about those Americans
who were alive from the aircraft downed in the Far East This applied even in the case of those
Americans who were located much closer -- in Rybak or in Strelka But at least in the case
of Rybak I had a chance to see one of them with my very own eyes! I could also not but believe
those who fled from Strelka, who trusted me with their lives, and who understood perfectly the
price of such information
But then, in Udereya, my sad experience showed that the "flow" of Americans from
the prisoner of war camps in Germany and in the Far East, and now from Korea was proceeding
at a robust pace, filling in the bottomless hell of the GULag I first met these people in Peveka
There, in the region to which I was sent after the hospital (as a result of an accident in "Zemlya
Bunga") four Americans, specialists in automation systems, were being detained They were sent
there from the mining camps of the Northwestern Directorate of Sevvostlag to delve into the
functionality of mobile electric power stations that reached Chaunskaya Guba under the Lend-
Lease program . Later, at the very beginning of navigation in the Sea of Okhotsk, I met a still
another group of Americans in the summer of 1948, at the Magadan transfer point in the Bay of
Nagaev There were 14 of them and they had just been taken from the holds of a ship
transporting slaves: helpless, enfeebled by a week-and-a-half's worth of tossing on the seas,
hunger, exhaustion, and desperation I cannot single out anyone of them They all appeared
uniformly lifeless and faceless But I recall how many of them there were and the number of their brigade
"1014." I recall the name of their brigade leader Geldol'f He, too, was
indistinguishable from the others, except, perhaps, by his height He was tall and, for a tall
person, very round-shouldered. It is difficult for me to remember anyone's individual features,
anyone's eyes, because in enormous barracks with three levels of wooden cots it was dark and
hazy, as in a crypt What I also recall is the physical appearance and name of the American
doctor in the group of fourteen, a small but thick-boned fellow named Gertsige
And this is all that I can recall about the meeting in the Bay of Nagnev
Both the brigade leader and the doctor knew a bit of German. They said that they had
served with the navy somewhere out at sea There they were seized by the Japanese in 1943
They were detained in camps, first in the Philippines (?), then in Manchuria, outside of Harbin,
where they were duped by Soviet "liberators " There was very little opportunity to communicate
with them One night they were taken off to the depths of Kolyma, into the bottomless abyss
of its vastness We were incomparably better off A week later we were loaded into the hold of a
military transport heading into the Bay of Vanin, toward construction site "501" . .
Just to finish this point I did not have any direct contact with Americans in Peveka I
saw them several times as they were taken by convoy to and from the port But a doctor from
Leningrad told me about them on numerous occasions The doctor even provided the names of two of them Filipp (Pill') Etth and Frederkink (or Frederling). I might be in error here That is
During the latter half of the 1960s, I once again had occasion to hear about the fate of the
crewmembers aboard the American plane downed in the Far East in June(?)1952 I was called
upon to fly out to Komsomol'sk-na-Amure on a business trip with the deputy director of my
institute. "those" years this fellow was the director of DAL'STROL,
i e , from the viewpoint of the Nurenberg charge sheet, he was a war criminal of the first order
and then, in a moment of particularly "sincere closeness," I made my decision
He was not in the least surprised by my question He replied at once
"Yes, at first ten people were alive. Yes, first they were brought to Khabarovsk But, then, of
course, they were sent off to Svobodnyi They were to have been met by people
from the Ministry of Defense They were not met, though You see, there was some screw-up
in Moscow Well, I can tell you that they were not met What happened to them after that, I do
not know And I would advise you not to know as well Let the leadership worry itself about
Later that very same year, in Murmansk, an acquaintance who was a friend and
erstwhile colleague of the Deputy Director "throughout the Far East," repeated almost word-for-
word the testimony of the former DAL'STROI director but went on to clarify "The guys from
within 'worked over' the Americans so badly that only eight were take .And
those had nowhere to go after all that. And so what? Do know what sort of arrogance they
had? They were Americans! You understand !!!"
"They probably drowned them," I offered as a supposition
"Well, well! And how did you find that out? He probably bared his soul to you,
In 1973, I had my birthday celebration, to which I invited only my closest friends The
group included the husband of my classmate He was a general with an outstanding service
Much was said over 19 years of complete mutual trust and affection While
accompanying the general after an evening at our home, I decided to ask him whether he knew
anything about "those" Americans [His reply ]
"I know only that they did not come over our way If that had been the case, they would be alive
and healthy And, by now, they would have been back home for a long time, across the ocean. I
know that Zhukov was aware of the extraordinary event (ChP) that occurred in the summer of
1952. I know that Zbukov immediately contacted Stalin directly with a request that be involve
himself in the fate of the American pilots, who as he understood, were lusted from the very
beginning as having perished But neither Stalin nor his underlings responded to the disgraced
marshal. Lastly, I know that, as soon as he became deputy minister of defense in 1953, the marshal directed a search for people and documents. But Beria's archives, as it were, had neither
those people nor the documents about them Probably, 'nothing was there any longer.' "
In the 1980s, I once again was in the Far East, to which I was inextricably drawn by
the undisclosed secret regarding the loss of the American aircraft My companion on these trips was
a new acquaintance I became acquainted with him and convinced him to transfer over to my
institute, into the scientific field, I must say, all for the same reason his many years of
involvement in the geographical area of constant interest to me Before we met, he was for many
years a supervisory official in two agencies in the capital and directed energy-related and
hydromechanical construction in the Far East And, as an advisor to the minister, he had to have
been closely acquainted with those who could have and rr ive known the truth about the
Extraordinary Event (ChP) of thirty years before Two years of persistent searching by him, who
unquestionably was himself intrigued by the idea of revealing the crime, shed no new light on the
course of events of the summer of 1952 or related details But he did learn the names of two
crewmembers of that aircraft, BUSH and MOORE, who will forever remain in the soil of the
Khabarovsk Region And however blasphemous this thought may appear to the uninitiated, let
people take my word By their horrible fate they were spared the vastness of the GULag's
underworld a prison isolation cell with the proud name "Svobodnyi," which is in close
proximity to Blagoveshchensk! And many others
In the fall of 1951, a group of American - POWs (?) from Korea (7) arrived at the
Kirovskij mining camp, Uderejskij administrative district, Krasnoyarsk region
However, in the beginning of 1952, they disappeared without trace In any case, during
the liquidation of the prison camp during the winter of 1951 and into 1952, none of them
were among the frost bitten prisoners, who were marched in column to Motygmo (in the
south part of the region) and offered medical assistance
A worker from Kirovskij, a deportee, witnessed how "late at night, on Russian
Christmas, a group of approximately 20 persons, maybe slightly more, were led from
the camp along the Venisminovkij road [note the road connecting the town of Kirovsk and
The deportee's daughter and her friend, a Cossack, witnessed that during the last
days of December 1951 "more than 20 prisoners, wearing bare threads and half frozen,
were moved along the road to Veniaminovkij "
The daughter of the manager of Veniaminovkij, stated that "on Christmas we
were given a present; frost bitten prisoners being led and driven like cattle by the NKVD
They did not speak Russian They only said "American, American" and "eat, eat" They
wanted food Then, in the morning, around 6o'clock, they were marched away to
somewhere further However, further lies only a wasteland, mountainous, desolate and
uninhabited, the taiga a dead-end
A driver and hunter from village of Chinuel, observed from his car, prisoners of
some sort that were speaking, but not in Russian, coming at him and being marched
passed his car along the road The guards were trying to prevent the prisoners from
talking This was early in the morning, on Christmas He could not understand why
prisoners were being marched on a holiday(?) Why to the north? There is nothing
there, there is no work for them to do
That evening, when he returned to his home in Chinuel, the column was passing
the mouth of the Ishimbi River it seemed, towards him, to Chinuel itself
The next day, around 7am he was going back to Kirovsk when he again encountered the
same column of prisoners, having t h i n n e d o u t It was approaching the
town of Kameaka, nearing the river.
Yet another witness He worked as a dredge operator at the Kirovskij mine
In February 1952, while hunting in the lower reaches of the Parenda, where it empties into
the Kwnenka river, he happened upon small clearing already slightly covered with snow
For some reason it had been covered over with beams of logs The dogs immediately
were aroused. They dragged out some type of boot - worn out at the heel , slippers and
even a shoe, resembling American shoes by the - copper nails Forcing him to put on his
glasses, in disbelief as to what they had in their teeth
He had heard rumors and became quite nervous. Especially disturbing to him was
the behavior of his dogs They were nervous, whimpering, scratching at the snow and
barking in a manner unlike any that they had before on the hunt. He tried to dig up the
ground - covered in a half meter of snow Suddenly, the snow was up to his waist But
beneath, the ground was already frozen although, clearly the ground had been turned-up
and filled back in It was obvious that someone had been buried here and the dogs began
to back up and howl like near a corpse...
He stopped tempting fate, - left The hunt was over
A week later, he met with his friend, who worked for the militia. His friend
recommended he keep quiet for God's sake...
In July 1952, my friend and I, based on this information, tried to locate that
clearing However, the swamp had flooded over.
In the fall, we again began to search But, we had been "sold-out" We were
questioned by the police and held for ten days in detention
In the 1960s, I again tried to locate this burial site However, the taiga had
completely grown over it I was assisted by very kind people. Again, someone did not
like my search Just like the incident of the shooting of the Americans in Bodajbo, in
Moscow, again to the, prosecutor's office, USSR (local Government District Attorney's
office) the official car arrived . .
Then, in August 1964, I officially requested from Krasnoyarsk . . "as to the fate of
American prisoners of war at the Krovskij mining camp " But of course I did not receive
a reply So, I then submitted a letter to the USSR prosecutor's office itself However, the
reply was not from Pushkinskij, but from Kuovskij - from the military prosecutor's
office In the reply, on a carbon copy, it stated "...regarding the fates of citizens of the
USA, held at the Kirovskij Springtime camp, the Prosecutor of the Krasnoyarsk region
has no information "
The Prosecutor, USSR, through the military forced the regional Krasnoyarsk, to
reply That reply stated there were such persons, however, we do not know where they
A list was compiled by a woman containing 22 names of citizens of the USA
imprisoned in the Kirovskij camp during the winter of 1951 to 1952. When this person
arrived at Kirovskij, she worked as a sanitation worker Part of her duties included
cleaning toilets at the camp She put the list together over a months time It is not
complete, since she was not able to ask anyone for help
During ten years of repression even she herself had forgotten about this Because
she is alone, in an exile brought about from working in the zone of the camp
By 1951, this once slim figured, fan-haired, gray-eyed beauty had turned into an
old woman But, to this "old woman" I devoted to my investigative work She was able
to recall and "Shed light on everything" She was able to record only 22 names
of Americans, as she was being carefully watched She was not even able to get their first
names One day, she managed to sneak a pencil in, broke it into pieces and handed them
out to the Americans so they could record their names and addresses on pieces of
newspaper Several days later, she smuggled them out, covered in filth, in a canvas bag
She cleaned them, dried them, placed them in a empty fruit jar, and buried them
During Christmas of that year, when the Americans were being marched to north
toward Veniaminovkij, she disappeared without a trace, just like the Americans And I
remain, still hopeful of finding this glass jar
2 Sep 1979
1 Al'bertson, Sam [Albertson, Sam]
2 Foster [Foster]
3 Xetch [Hatch]
4 Lion, Dtopdzh [Leon, George]
5 Sikssmit [ ? Smith]
6 Ambroze [Ambiose]
7 Miller [Miller]
8 Devis [Davis]
9 Summerbi [Summerby]
10 Budher Allan [Butcher, Allan]
11 Dzhonson, Xubert [Johnson, Hubert]
12 Veksiei [Vexler or Veksler]
13 Kuk, Irving [Cook, Irving]
14 Morin [Morin]
15 Larsen [Larsen]
16 Boyar [Boyar or Boyer]
17. Fisher [Fisher]
18. Gel'fand [Galvan, Halvan]
19. Natazon, Filipp [Natazon, Philipp]
20. Gershfel'd [Gershfield or Hershfield]
21 Sich, Garri [Seech, Gary or Harry]
22 Kajzer [Kaiser]
At the end of June - beginning of July 194 1, during the massive repression against
prisoners by the NKVD (town of Kuybishev), many foreigners were executed In July
1943, there was another wave of and executions, except now it was against foreign
specialists (a list of l38 names,who were executed in l941) I found myself in the town
of Kuybishev, and I found out the reason for the executions
Counterintelligence "SMERSH" (headed by Abakymov), during this period
"cleansed" the areas of any unnecessary specialists - Americans and Swedes, that were
utilized from 1936 for the construction of underground industrial complex by the
Shiguiev Mountains (on the right bank of the Volga River, opposite the town of
All of them were recruited by Soviet representatives in Germany and Great Britain,
and according to the official paperwork worked in "Third World countries" Once the
contract was formed, their fates were sealed The head of "recruitment" of foreign
specialists was Leonid Skoblinskiy, who until 1929 was the head of the political section
of the VChK-OGPY predecessor to the NKVD) In the 1930s, he was the secretary of
the Party Bureau of the Soviet Bank in Paris And, during 1941 - 1943, under the cover
of [WWII], SMERSH "finished" its dealings with the Americans and Swedes. They
were killed in the transportation tunnels that were labeled "Liter Zero One " [After the
executions) they were taken out of the tunnels and buried near cemeteries of the German
POW camps The actual cemetery was located of the south border of the "industrial
zone" of the Separate Labor Point No 5 in Kpaishe (in the area of the Kuybishev
From May 1941 till November 1943, I was a prisoner and worked in the complex
"Liter Zero One." I knew very well what was happening during that tune. A witness to
all the crimes was my foreman Somehow he escaped the liquidation Another witness
who informed us of everything that went on in these tunnels I had a list of the executed
Americans and Swedes, that was prepared by my comrades [who were killed] But in
November 1943, this list was lost possibly, the area where the Americans and Swedes
were buried is still open (i.e free from construction) This area was "free' in 1957, when
I visited it in search of witnesses
16 November 1961
Actually most of the lists on prisoners were lost in November 1943, when we had to
off load members from the "Baku Stage", and I had to destroy the lists However, I was
able to save the list containing foreigners, by writing it on the inside of my jacket, and
later turned this list into the contents of my second letter
The head of the medical examiner's office of the labor camp also gave me the first
and last names of the executed foreigners (including Americans) Her department made
up the forms on all foreign prisoners, who were executed without a trial These forms
listed fiction "history of illness" and made up the causes of death (according to the
GULAG statistics, these documents were coded by the number "08".
22 December 1994
In November - December 1945 from the occupied Manchuria (by the Soviet
Army) a MVD convoy took out six groups of prisoners containing American POWs that
were held in Japanese prison camps in 1943 - 1945 The itinerary for the convoys were
"Dunfanhoon -- Chita -- Luan Ude" and Chan -Chun - Chita -- Ulan Ude" It was known
to the convoy that these six groups of prisoners were going to a special GULAG to work
on the railroad between Ulan Ude and Ulan Bator. Actually, all the Americans from the
convoy, once it reached Ulan Ude, were transferred to winter camps in Bodaibo (North
Siberia). They were all executed there
At the end of 1940s - begginning of 1950s, when the interior forces were
demilitarized, some of them stated that Americans were executed in the Bodaibo prison,
a place that "traditionally" hosted executions from the 1930s of middle-class Kozaks
from Zabaikal and Don (Andnus Krulikas and Vasilty Komov) (There were a total of
200 individuals who were executed)
Perm-36 Special Camp, located in Perm, Russia. This site is now a museum.
The Gulag Study is a compilation of reports asserting that U.S. servicemen were held in Soviet camps and prisons. The study draws upon accounts from varied sources, many of whom claim to have been incarcerated in the Soviet Gulag system. The memoirs of a former Soviet Gulag inmate who lists several names that correlate to missing U.S. servicemen comprise a significant contribution to this study, which was originally prepared as a working document by the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. The Gulag Study was released to the public in February 2001, and is accessible through the DPMO and JCSD web pages.
Recent interviews with refugees, defectors, and others; U.S. diplomatic and military archival material; and other first-hand and indirect reporting sources have contributed to an extensive database for managing information regarding alleged sightings of Americans, particularly members of the armed forces, detained in Russia and the former Soviet Union. This database also includes the names of individuals who have been repatriated, including foreigners erroneously identified as Americans. The sheer volume of this information lends credence to the fact that U.S. servicemen were detained in the Soviet prison camp system following World War II, and during the Korean, Vietnam, and Cold Wars. The U.S. side of the Commission compiled and substantially expanded the database immediately after the 16th Plenum for delivery to the Russian side in April 2000.
JCSD personnel have conducted preliminary investigative trips to the major locations of prisons and camps in the former Soviet Union. These trips provided an initial logistics review, familiarization with the area, sampling of prisoner cards for known names, and personal interviews to determine potential leads and sources for further investigation. In October 2000, JCSD personnel traveled to Vorkuta in the Komi Republic in order to establish a research agreement with the Russian Memorial society. A team of ten Russians will review both prisoner index cards in the Vorkuta Archives and prisoner memoirs in the Vorkuta museum in an effort to determine whether U.S. POWs were detained in the Komi Republic.
In May 2001, JCSD personnel traveled to Perm to meet with government officials from the Perm Oblast. During the visit they also took the initial steps toward establishing a research agreement with the Perm chapter of the Memorial society, similar to the one with Vorkuta. In addition to archival research, this contract will include interview expeditions to the sites of former camps in Perm Oblast.
Additionally, JCSD has conducted interviews with former inmates of the Gulag, camp guards, workers and administrators, academicians and veterans in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. These interviews have unearthed valuable leads for further investigation. In addition, JCSD's contemporary interviews correspond well to those conducted under contract by the Polish Karta Center's research project. Karta searches for American citizens missing since World War II on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Finally, JCSD analysts conduct analysis of historical reports obtained through archival research at the National Archives and Records Administration, the Library of Congress and other archives and libraries in the United States. These documents range from State Department cables to U.S. military debriefings of German and Japanese POWs repatriated from the Soviet Union during the 1950s.
Regardless of the credibility that either side of the Commission ascribes to any single source of information, existing evidence supports further investigation into the issue of possible American POWs in the former Soviet Union.
U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAs
1745 JEFFERSON DAVIS HWY, SUITE 800
ARLINGTON, VA 22203
June 27, 2002
The attached document is the third in a series of updates to our "Gulag Study," a report to family members and the public at large about the work being done to investigate the issue of American servicemen allegedly detained in the Soviet prison-camp system, or Gulag, throughout the Cold War period.
In this edition you will find the results of research conducted not only in the Russian Federation but right here at home, at the National Archives. Our researchers have been combing through one particular set of records known as the "wringer Reports," a voluminous collection of data based on the de-briefings of former German and Japanese prisoners of war. To date a number of promising leads have been culled from these materials and are being examined against our already extensive record holdings.
The work at the National Archives in proceeding in tandem with our ongoing field investigations in Russia. You will note the extensive coverage in the report to the expedition this past March to the Sakha-Yakutia region of northeast Siberia, where our teams launched previous visits in November 1997 and August 1998, after receiving reports of an American Korean-War veteran (see pages 40-43). As this update is being prepared for release, a similar inquiry is underway in areas of the Komi Republic. This has been a region of considerable interest to us over the life of our program and is the focal point of a broad-based research effort drawing on the resources of local archivists, historians, and social activists.
We trust you will find the Fourth Edition of our study informative and expect to publish the next update some time later this year.
// Signed //
Norman D. Kass
The Gulag Study
Direct any questions or comments concerning this study to:
Major Tim Falkowski, Project Manager
Phone: (703) 602-2202, extension 209
Chief Petty Officer Michael Allen, Gulag Study Analyst
Phone: (703) 602-2202, extension 235
Gulag Study Contents
Soviet Prison Camps and Other Detention Facilities, By Region Camp Region
Camps in the Area of Moscow
Camps in the Area of Vladimirskaya
Camps in the Area of Mordovska
Camps in the Area of Rostov
Camps in the Area of Kirov
Camps in the Area of Komi
Camps in the Area of Molotov (Perm)
Camps in the Area of Chelyabinsk
Camps in the Area of Novosibirsk
Camps in the Area of Krasnoyarsk
Camps in the Area of Irkutsk
Camps in the Area of Yakutsk
Camps in the Area of Chita
Camps in the Area of Magadan
Camps in the Area of Khabarovsk
Camps in the Area of Primorskiy Krai
Camps in the Area of Kazakhastan
Camps in the Area of Moscow
In 1947, while in pre-trial confinement in Potsdam, a Polish witness shared a cell with a U.S. Army sergeant, reportedly a gunner. The witness believed that the sergeant had unintentionally entered the Soviet Zone in Berlin by car and had been immediately arrested. The source described the American as a sturdy fellow, whose father was a farmer. The American gave the source an overcoat. They spoke German, although both spoke it very poorly. They met again at the Lubyanka Prison in Moscow at the turn of 1948. 1
A follow-up interview with the source revealed that in the winter of 1948-1949, he saw the same American in the Transit Prison at Sverdlovsk-Na-Urale. He waved at the American from afar and never saw the American again. Some time after this encounter, source heard from a French officer that the American was shot and killed while attempting to escape. 2
Monino Air Force Academy
During a series of interviews in 1996, a Soviet veteran who lived in Minsk claimed to have seen a U.S. POW in May or June 1953. The POW reportedly was a Korean War F-86D pilot whose plane had been forced to land. The pilot landed his plane undamaged, was captured, and his aircraft taken to Moscow. The incident occurred in the late spring of 1953. According to the witness--who served in An Dun, China, from December 1952 through February 1954--the pilot was sent to Moscow the day after his forced landing, "because Stalin wanted to speak with him." The witness said that his commander, Colonel Ivan Nikolayevich Kozhedub, interrogated the pilot. He believed the U.S. POW was not injured. The witness stated that the late General Vasiliy Kuzmich Sidorenkov had a picture of the American POW, which Sidorenkov showed to him years ago, declaring, "that's our American." He stated that the U.S. POW depicted in the photo was white, with light brown hair and blue or light brown eyes, was about five feet seven inches tall, and had a two and half inch scar above the right eye. The witness revealed that this pilot later became an instructor and taught at the Monino Air Force Academy in Moscow from 1953-58. The U.S. POW did not speak Russian and served at Monino under an assumed Russian name. He did not know the name and could not recall any other details about the U.S. POW, who reportedly taught air battle techniques and tactics and assisted the Soviets in figuring out a U.S. radar sight (radio-lokatsionniy pritsel). 3
Krasnaya Presnya Prison
In a letter to President Nixon, repatriated American John Noble reported that, inscribed in the wall of Krasnaya Presnya Prison in Moscow, he saw the name of a Major Roberts or Robbins, with his American address and the inscription, "I am sick and don't expect to live through this....". 4 In 1958 Mr. Noble reported this incident had occurred in Orsha Transit Prison. Inscribed on a cell wall in the transit prison in Orsha, Byelorussia, (where he was imprisoned prior to his confinement at Krasnaya Presnya) was the name Roberts, Robertson, or Robins followed by a date in mid-August 1950 and "Maj., U.S.A.". 5 [Major Frank A. Roberts, and Captains Robert Roberts and Edward Robbins, are among the 125 service members missing from WWII with the last name of Roberts or Robbins.]
Moscow Transit Prison
In 1954, a German returnee reported meeting an American Army or Air Force captain while detained in the Moscow Transit Prison in 1949. Source was imprisoned in one cell with 19 other German officers from February to April 1949. For three to five days in March another prisoner was placed in source's cell. This prisoner spoke broken German with an American accent and also spoke fluent Russian. He claimed to be a captain in the U.S. Army or Air Force. The Soviet Internal Security Forces reportedly arrested him in the USSR while operating as an agent. Source described him as 30-35 years old, five feet eleven inches tall, slim, athletic build, black hair, slender face with a straight nose and medium-sized ears. He was reticent, but energetic. He gave the impression of being well educated. Source had no further information about the man. 6
Camps in the Area of Vladimirskaya
A United Press release, dated 1 September 1955, reported that nine Austrians and one Italian were released from a Russian prison camp. The returnees reported that U.S. servicemen Wilfred Cumish [returned], Sidney Sparks [returned], Frederick Hopkins [returned], and Grisham [not returned] were in the same camp. 7 [Captain David Howard Grisham, USAF, went missing from the Korean War on 3 September 1950].
Camps in the Area of Mordovska
Several repatriated Iranian witnesses claimed that, at this location in 1953, they knew of an American, a Colonel Jackson, who had been reportedly kidnapped by the Soviets in Berlin. 8
In March 1955 a repatriated German POW informed U.S. Air Force debriefers that in June 1954, while interned in a prisoner of war camp awaiting repatriation to Germany, he met three alleged Americans who had arrived in the camp from Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg). One was approximately 43 years old, five feet nine inches tall, stout build, blond hair with gray streaks combed back, brownish-gray eyes, and a full face. Although born in Russia, his parents immigrated with him to the United States where they later became U.S. citizens. He claimed to be former a Military Policeman who accidentally crossed into the Soviet Sector of Berlin shortly after World War II. The second was described as approximately 30 years old, five feet one inch tall, with a stout build, blond curly hair, and gray eyes. He was called "Jolly", spoke German and worked at the camp dispensary. The third was described as a black man, 30 years old, five feet ten inches, and had a slim build. He did not speak German or Russian. The alleged Americans never received any packages from the Red Cross or any mail. On 27 December 1954, they told the German good-bye, stating that the Russian authorities had informed them they would be repatriated. The source had no further information about where the Russians transported the alleged Americans. 9
Potma Camp No. 18
An Estonian witness alleged that he met a U.S. POW from Korea in 1952. The POW's first name was Gary or Harry. The POW was still at the camp when the witness left in the autumn of 1953. 10
Potma Camp No. 19
A Polish witness was the chief of a work brigade in Camp No. 19 in Potma, working primarily in the forest. He claimed there were a few Americans among the 17 nationalities in his brigade. 11
Potma Camp No. 385
In 1960, a German source reported that while interned in the Soviet Union he met two American military personnel. Source met the first American in the autumn of 1957 at Potma Camp No. 385, Sub-camp No. 11 and last saw him in the autumn of 1959 in Sub-camp No. 7. The American was named Jack. He was a light-skinned African-American, 28-30 years old, six feet five or six feet six inches tall, and slender. Jack's mother was part Native American. He had lived in Saint Louis, Missouri. Jack had originally served with the U.S. Constabulary in Bad Hershfeld, Germany as a "First Sergeant." Jack showed source a photo of himself wearing a uniform with a 7th Army patch and Constabulary insignia. Source could not remember any rank insignia. After serving in Bad Hershfeld, Jack returned to the United States. At an unknown date Jack returned to Europe as a member of the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). He was stationed at Celle Airfield during the Berlin airlift, and later with the Military Police in Berlin as a "Sergeant Major." Jack showed the source a second photograph of himself in an "Ike" jacket with Air Force staff sergeant stripes and airborne (parachute) insignia above the jacket pocket. The third photograph was of Jack in a military police uniform with a white garrison cap with visor, leggings, Sam Brown belt, and a .45 holster. In this picture, Jack was standing in front of a military police jeep with the Memorial Church in Berlin in the background. The United States Army Europe and USAFE emblem with "Highway Patrol" in the center appeared just below the windshield of the jeep. Reportedly, Jack went out one evening in Berlin and awoke the next morning in the custody of Soviet authorities in the town of Karlshorst. He was not allowed to write friends or relatives. 12
Source met the second alleged American in Sub-camp No. 11-1 in 1958. This individual claimed to have been a Marine who fought the Japanese in the Philippines during World War II. He was arrested in Manchuria around 1944 supposedly because he was of Russian heritage. He was between 36 and 38 years old. This individual was permitted to write and receive mail from New Jersey via an unknown location in Sweden.
A former German POW met an American prisoner, John Hansen, in August 1955, after having previously heard about him from another prisoner as early as 1953. John Hansen spoke both German and Russian and was described as five feet six inches tall, medium build with brown hair and gray eyes. 13 [SGT John Hansen, GM2C John Hansen, and 1LT John Hanson are missing from WWII. These three are among the 88 service members with the last name of Hansen or Hanson missing from WWII.]
Saransk Camp No. 8
In 1955, a CIA source reported meeting an American from Philadelphia who was a pilot during World War II. He was fairly tall, very strong, and approximately 30 years old with light brown hair and gray eyes. 14
According Despatch 1716 from Hong Kong airpouched you a recently arrived Greek refugee from Manchuria reported seeing several hundred American POW's being transferred Chinese trains to Russian trains Manchouli late 1951 and early 1952. Some POW's wore sleeve insignia indicating they were Air Force non-coms. Great number Negro troops also observed. This report corroborates previous indications UNC POW to might have been shipped to Siberia during Korean hostilities.
United States has been greatly concerned general subject UNC personnel who may still be Communist custody. Department has just accepted British offer make representations Peiping behalf UNC personnel who may be Chinese Communist custody. Question raising this matter informally Geneva under careful consideration.
Unless you perceive objection request you approach highest available level Foreign Ministry and leave Aide Memoire undicating reports have now come attention United States Government which support earlier indications that American Prisoners of War Korea had been "transported into Soviet Union and are now Soviet custody. Request fullest possible information these POW's and their reparation earliest possible time.
In your discussion with Foreign Office, you mad desire inform Soviets without revealing source that we have reliable accounts transfers POW's Manchouli.
Memorandum for: Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action
From: John F. McCreary
Subject: Legal Misconduct and Possible Malpractice in the Select Committee
1. As a member of the Virginia State Bar, I am obliged by Disciplinary Rule DR-1-103(a) to report knowledge of misconduct by an attorney "to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violations." Under Rule IV, Paragraph 13, of the Rules for the integration of the Virginia State Bar, this obligation follows me as a member of the Bar, regardless of the location of my employment, for as long as I remain a member of the Virginia State Bar. Therefore, I am obliged, as a matter of law and under pain of discipline by the Virginia State Bar, to report to you my knowledge of misconduct and possible prima facie malpractice by attorneys on the Select Committee in ordering the destruction of Staff documents containing Staff intelligence findings on 9 April 1992 and in statements in meetings on 15 and 16 April to justify the destruction.
2. The attached Memoranda For the Record, one by myself and another by Mr. Jon D. Holstine, describe the relevant facts, which I summarize herein:
a. On 9 April 1992, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, in response to a protest by other members of the Select Committee, told the Select Committee members that "all copies" would be destroyed. This statement was made in the presence of the undersigned and of the Staff Chief Counsel who offered no protest.
b. Later on 9 April 1992, the Staff Director, Frances Zwenig, an attorney, repeated and insured the execution of Senator Kerry's order for the destruction of the Staff intelligence briefing text. I personally delivered to Mr. Barry Valentine, the Security Manager for SRB-78, the original printed version of the intelligence briefing text. I also verified that the original was destroyed by shredding in the Office of Senate Security on 10 April 1992, along with 14 copies.
c. On 15 April 1992, the Staff Chief Counsel, J. William Codinha of Massachusetts, when advised by members if the Staff about their concerns over the possible criminal consequences of destroying documents, minimized the significance of the act of destruction; ridiculed the Staff members for expressing their concerns; and replied, in response to questions about the potential consequences, "Who's the injured party," and "How are they going to find out because its classified." Mr. Codinha repeatedly defended the destruction of the documents and gave no assurances or indications that any copies of the intelligence briefing text existed.
d. On 16 April, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, Senator John Kerry, stated that he gave the order to destroy "extraneous copies of the documents" and that no one objected. Moreover, he stated that the issue was "moot" because the original remained in the Office of Senate Security "all along."
e. I subsequently learned that the Staff Director had deposited a copy of the intelligence briefing text in the Office of Senate Security at 1307 on 16 April.
3. The foregoing facts establish potentially a prima facie violation of criminal law and a pattern of violations of legal ethics by attorneys in acts of commission and omission.
a. It is hornbook law that an attorney may not direct the commission of a crime. In this incident two attorneys, one by his own admission, ordered the destruction of documents, which could be violation of criminal law.
b. Neither the Staff Chief Counsel nor any member of the Select Committee made a protest or uttered words of caution against the destruction of documents, by admission of the Chairman, Senator Kerry. The Chief Counsel has an affirmative duty to advise the Staff about the legality of its actions, and, in fact, had earlier issued the general prohibition to the Staff against document destruction.
c. The Chief Counsel's statements during the 15 April meeting to discuss the document destruction showed no regard for the legality of the action and displayed to the Staff only a concern about getting caught. By his words and actions, he presented to the Staff investigators an interpretation of the confidentiality and security rules that the rules of the Select Committee may be used to cover-up potentially unethical or illegal activity.
d. The Staff Director's action in placing an unaccounted for copy of the intelligence briefing text in the Office of Senate Security on 16 April constitutes an act to cover-up the destruction. Throughout the 16 April meeting, all three attorneys persisted in stating that the document had been on file since 9 April. This is simply not true.
4. I believe that the foregoing facts establish a pattern of grave legal misconduct - possibly including orders to commit a crime, followed by acts to justify and then to cover-up that crime. Even absent criminal liability, the behavioral pattern of the attorneys involved plays fast and loose with the Canons of Legal Ethics and establishes that one or more of the attorneys on the Select Committee are unfit to practice law. I am obliged to recommend that this report be filed with the appropriate disciplinary authorities of the State Bars in which these attorneys are members.
John F. McCreary, Esquire
Memorandum for: Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action
From: John F. McCreary
Subject: Possible Violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, by the Select Committee and Possible Ethical Misconduct by Staff Attorneys.
1. Continuing analysis of relevant laws and further review of the events between 8 April and 16 April 1992 connected with the destruction of the Investigators' Intelligence Briefing Text strongly indicate that the order to destroy all copies of that briefing text on 9 April and the actual destruction of copies of the briefing texts plus the purging of computer files might constitute violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, which imposes criminal penalties for unlawful document destruction. Even absent a finding of criminal misconduct, statements, actions, and failures to act by the senior Staff attorneys following the 9 April briefing might constitute serious breaches of ethical standards of conduct for attorneys, in addition to violations of Senate and Select Committee rules. The potential consequences of these possible misdeeds are such that they should be brought to the attention of all members of the Select Committee, plus all Designees and Staff members who were present at the 9 April briefing.
2. The relevant section of Title 18, U.S.C., states in pertinent part: Section 2071. Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally (a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 795)
3. The facts as the undersigned and others present at the briefing recall them are presented in the attached Memorandum for the Record. A summary of those facts - and others that have been established since that Memorandum was written - follows.
a. On 8 April 1992, the Investigators' Intelligence Briefing Text was presented to Senior Staff members and Designees for whom copies were available prior to beginning the briefing. Objections to the text by the Designees prompted the Staff Director to order all persons present to leave their copies of the briefing text in Room SRB078. Subsequent events indicated that two copies had been removed without authorization.
b. On 9 April 1992, at the beginning of the meeting of the Select Committee and prior to the scheduled investigators' briefing, Senator McCain produced a copy of the intelligence briefing text, with whose contents he strongly disagreed. He charged that the briefing text had already been leaked to a POW/MIA activist, but was reassured by the Chairman that such was not the case. He replied that he was certain it would be leaked. Whereupon, the Chairman assured Senator McCain that there would be no leaks because all copies would be gathered and destroyed, and he gave orders to that effect. No senior staff member or attorney present cautioned against a possible violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, or of Senate or Select Committee Rules.
c. Following the briefing on 9 April, the Staff Director, Ms. Frances Zwenig, restated to the intelligence investigators the order to destroy the intelligence briefing text and took measures to ensure execution of the destruction order. (See paragraph 3 of the attachment.) During one telephone conversation with the undersigned, she stated that she was "acting under orders."
d. The undersigned also was instructed to delete all computer files, which Mr. Barry Valentine witnessed on 9 April.
e. In a meeting on 15 April 1992, the Staff's Chief Counsel, J. William Codinha, was advised by intelligence investigators of their concerns about the possibility that they had committed a crime by participating in the destruction of the briefing text. Mr. Codinha minimized the significance of the documents and of their destruction. He admonished the investigators for "making a mountain out of a molehill."
f. When investigators repeated their concern that the order to destroy the documents might lead to criminal charges, Mr. Codinha replied "Who's the injured party." He was told, "The 2,494 families of the unaccounted for US Servicemen, among others." Mr. Codinha then said, "Who's gonna tell them. It's classified." At that point the meeting erupted. The undersigned stated that the measure of merit was the law and what's right, not avoidance of getting caught. To which Mr. Codinha made no reply. At no time during the meeting did Mr. Codinha give any indication that any copies of the intelligence briefing text existed.
g. Investigators, thereupon, repeatedly requested actions by the Committee to clear them of any wrongdoing, such as provision of legal counsel. Mr. Codinha admitted that he was not familiar with the law and promised to look into it. He invited a memorandum from the investigators stating what they wanted. Given Mr. Codinha's statements and reactions to the possibility of criminal liability, the investigators concluded they must request appointment of an independent counsel. A memorandum making such a request and signed by all six intelligence investigators was delivered to Mr. Codinha on 16 April.
h. At 2130 on 16 April, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, convened a meeting with the intelligence investigators, who told him personally of their concern that they might have committed a crime by participating in the destruction of the briefing texts at the order of the Staff Director. Senator Kerry stated that he gave the order to destroy the documents, not the Staff Director, and that none of the Senators present at the meeting had objected. He also stated that the issue of document destruction was "moot" because the original briefing text had been deposited with the Office of Senate Security "all along." Both the Staff Director and the Chief Counsel supported this assertion by the Chairman.
i. Senator Kerry's remarks prompted follow-up investigations (See paragraphs 4 through 9 of the attachment) and inquiries that established that a copy of the text was not deposited in the Office of Senate Security until the afternoon of 16 April. The Staff Director has admitted that on the afternoon of 16 April, after receiving a copy of a memorandum from Senator Bob Smith to Senator Kerry in which Senator Smith outlined his concerns about the destruction of documents, she obtained a copy of the intelligence briefing text from the office of Senator McCain and took it to the Office of Senate Security. Office of Senate Security personnel confirmed that the Staff Director gave them an envelope, marked "Eyes Only," to be placed in her personal file. The Staff Director has admitted that the envelope contained the copy of the intelligence briefing text that she obtained from the office of Senator McCain.
3. The facts of the destruction of the intelligence briefing text would seem to fall inside the prescriptions of the Statute, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, so as to justify their referral for investigation to a competent law enforcement authority. The applicability of that Statute was debated in United States v. Poindexter, D.D.C. 1989, 725 F. Supp. 13, in connection with the Iran Contra investigation. The District Court ruled, inter alia, that the National Security Council is a public office within the meaning of the Statute and, thus, that its records and documents fell within the protection of the Statute. In light of that ruling, the Statute would seem to apply to this Senate Select Committee and its Staff. The continued existence of a "bootleg" copy of the intelligence briefing text - i.e., a copy that is not one of those made by the investigators for the purpose of briefing the Select Committee - would seem to be irrelevant to the issues of intent to destroy and willfulness; as well as to the issue of responsibility for the order to destroy all copies of the briefing text, for the attempt to carry out that order, and for the destruction that actually was accomplished in execution of that order.
4. As for the issue of misconduct by Staff attorneys, all member of the Bar swear to uphold the law. That oath may be violated by acts of omission and commission. Even without a violation of the Federal criminal statute, the actions and failures to act by senior Staff attorneys in the sequence of events connected with the destruction of the briefing text might constitute violations
of ethical standards for members of the Bar and of both Senate and Select Committee rules. The statements, actions and failures to act during and after the meeting on 15 April, when the investigators gave notice of their concern about possible criminal liability for document destruction, would seem to reflect disregard for the law and for the rules of the United States Senate.
John F. McCreary
Memorandum for the Record
From: John F. McCreary
Subject: Obstruction of the Investigation
1. I am concerned that recent lines of investigation have been seriously compromised by leaks of sensitive information by the Committee Staff Director to the Department of Defense. Leaks to the Department of Defense or other agencies of the Executive Branch of my Memoranda for the Record are interfering with follow-up discussions with useful witnesses. Moreover, they are endangering the lives and livelihood of two witnesses.
Leak of Information on Jan Sejna
2. Irrespective of leaks outside the government, Bill LeGro, attended a meeting of the US-Russia Joint Commission group in Washington on 28 October 1992 at the Department of State. The discussion featured information provided by Sejna. LeGro stated that Ambassador Malcolm Toon called for his dismissal. DIA personnel defended Sejna as to his expertise on Central Europe, but not as to his information on other areas, particularly POW related.
3. Irrespective of leaks outside the government, Bill LeGro attended a meeting of the US-Russia Joint Commission group in Washington on 28 October 1992 at the Department of State. The discussion featured information provided by Sejna. LeGro stated tat Ambassador Malcolm Toon call for his dismissal. DIA personnel defended Sejna as to his expertise on Central Europe, but not as to his information on others areas, particularly POW related.
4. On 30 October 1992, I learned from Bill LeGro that he was directed to read a letter from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Select Committee that discredits Sejna's information. The letter reportedly indicates that Sejna's information has been checked and not been confirmed by his former government. At the time this letter was received, the Staff had decided to take Sejna's deposition but had not yet scheduled a deposition of Sejna. In addition, my MFR was written from memory, and did not do justice to all that Sejna stated, either in detail or in context. As of this writing, we do not know what Sejna knows or will say under oath, yet his testimony has already been written off. This anticipatory discrediting of a Select Committee potential witness is tantamount to tampering with the evidence.
Suspected Leak of Information on Le Quang Khai
5. The second issue of suspected misconduct concerns witness Le Quang Khai. Although Le made a public statement concerning POWs on 12 September 1992, no agency of the US government contacted him concerning his POW information. He told me on 26 October that some men who represented themselves as FBI agents contacted him to attempts to recruit him to return to Vietnam as a US intelligence agent for six months. After which his request for asylum would be favorably considered.
6. On 30 October, Mr. Robert Egan of Hackensack, New Jersey, who is a close friend of Mr. Le and the intermediary whereby the Committee Staff met Mr. Le, informed McCreary and LeGro that the FBI had again contacted Mr. Le. A person representing himself as an FBI person called on 30 October to set up a meeting with Le to discuss Le's working as an intelligence agent for the FBI's POW/MIA office.
7. So far informal checks indicate there is no such office. Secondly, this contact occurred three days after my return from taking Le's deposition in Hackensack on 26 October. I observed a copy of the MFR with apparent routing designators written in the top margin on the desk of Frances Zwenig on 28 October.
8. The contact with Le two days after preparation of my MFR, despite the passage of a month since his public declarations, is highly suspicious and more than coincidental. The circumstances of both contacts in which persons identifying themselves as FBI without showing credentials or other evidence of authenticity or authority and also making a pitch to recruit Le are also highly suspicious.
9. An internal Department of Defense Memorandum identifies Frances Zwenig as the conduit to the Department of Defense for the acquisition of sensitive and restricted information from this Committee. Based on the above sequences of events, I must conclude that Frances Zwenig continues to leak all of my papers to the Defense Department. Her flagrant disregard of the rules of the Senate and her oath of office are now jeopardizing the livelihood, if not the safety, of
Senate witnesses. In addition, the Department of Defense's continuing access to sensitive Committee Staff papers is resulting in obstruction of the investigations by the Senate Select Committee by various agencies of the Executive Branch.
John F. McCreary
Search continues for last MIA from '91 Iraq war BY ROGER ROY The Orlando Sentinel
(KRT) - Investigators have yet to prove that missing Gulf War pilot Capt. Scott Speicher was ever held in the Iraqi prison cell where his initials were found etched in the wall, the head of the Pentagon's search for missing Americans said Wednesday.
Speaking to members of the American Veterans convention meeting in Orlando, Jerry D. Jennings, deputy assistant secretary of defense, vowed to continue the search for Speicher, the only American still missing from the 1991 war with Iraq.
The hunt for Speicher remains a top priority for American forces in Iraq, where a $1-million reward is being offered for information about the missing pilot and special teams of U.S. investigators are following every lead, said Jennings. "We will not cease these efforts until we ?have recovered him alive or have his remains," Jennings said. A Navy pilot based in Jacksonville, Speicher, then 33, was flying an F/A-18 Hornet on a bombing run the first night of the 1991 Gulf War when he was shot down over Iraq. He was declared killed in action, but his body was never recovered. He left behind two children and a wife, who has since remarried.
In the years after the war, military officials gathered information suggesting Speicher likely survived ejection from his jet and may have been captured.
In 2001, Speicher's official status was changed to missing in action, and last year to missing/captured.
The search took on new momentum after an Iraqi defector claimed to have seen Speicher alive in Iraq as late as 1998. And in April, at the close of the war with Iraq, investigators found the initials MSS etched in the wall of Hakmiyah prison in Baghdad. Speicher's full name is Michael Scott Speicher. But military officials now question the reliability of the defector's account. Investigators were searching for any source of DNA in the prison, which could be compared with samples from Speicher to prove he was there.
Jennings would not say whether DNA was found in the prison cell. But he said there was still no proof putting Speicher in the cell.
There were several sets of other initials carved into the cell walls. And within the "MSS" initials was another letter not part of Speicher's initials, leading some investigators to question the tie to Speicher.
So far, Jennings said, "There's no evidence that he was ever held in that room."
Because the Iraqis denied capturing him, Speicher may have been held outside the normal channels, Jennings said.
"There's just no end of places he could be held," he said. "As long as there's territory that hasn't been investigated, we've got leads to pursue."
--- ©© 2003, The Orlando Sentinel (Fla.).
Text previously released under E.O. 12812
and submitted to Senate Select Committee
By U.S. Department of State
The possibility exists that Americans may be present in Indochina on a "voluntary" basis. This could include civilian or ex-military individuals who stayed behind in Vietnam purposely,
AWOLs, deserters, and POWs whom the Vietnamese might say remained voluntarily.
U.S. law, regulation, and custom recognize the freedom of American citizens to travel freely, and to have privacy. If a citizen overseas does not wish his whereabouts revealed to inquiring relatives, that right must be respects. (sic)
If we receive a substantiated report that an American is in Vietnam, we should seek to determine to what degree his presence there is voluntary. The USG should contact Vietnamese authorities, to request that a U.S. consular officer, interview that person to determine if he wishes to stay or leave Vietnam. If the Vietnamese refuse a consular interview, we should seek the assistance of a third party (e.g. the British, UNHCR or ICRC) to request a meeting with the American. In the event that the interview is held, if the American wishes to leave, that right must be insisted on with Vietnamese authorities. State Department regulations on welfare and whereabouts, 7 FAM 100-188, should be consulted, with attention to the section on servicemen when relevant.
If an American somehow passes word to us that he desires to leave Vietnam (as in the Garwood case), we should contact Vietnamese authorities to request that the person be permitted to leave. If the Vietnamese deny that such a person is in Vietnam and if we are satisfied that he is there, we then can pressure the Vietnamese by asking the British or some other country which has an Embassy in Hanoi to intervene on our behalf. If the Vietnamese continue to refuse, we can consider further steps, such as public disclosure of the case.
If reliable, substantiated information reaches the USG that Americans are being held prisoner in Indochina, the following steps will be considered, in light of prevailing circumstances:
--- immediate coordination among concerned branches of the USG;
---develop public affairs position;
--- seek greater intelligence on identity, location and condition of POWs;
---initiate reception/repatriation plan;
---diplomatic contact with the relevant government: requesting immediate release of the prisoners;
---advise relatives if identities are known. Depending on developments resulting from the above steps, further action which might be considered include;
---further contacts with relevant government;
---contact with ICRC or other international body, requesting they visit prison site and contact prisoners;
---contact third governments for assistance;
---advise other governments of our information and intended actions;
---consider further public affairs aspects of issue.
If the Indochina Government continues to refuse to acknowledge it holds an American, several additional steps can be taken, depending on the country involved, the number o persons held prisoner, the firmness of our information, their location, and many other factors.
Prisoner(s) in Vietnam
In the face of Vietnamese intransigence, our most obvious recourse would be to exert as much public pressure on Vietnam as possible, including press statements, denunciation in UN fora, etc. The next stop in escalating pressure could be to request allies to consider threatening Hanoi with an economic embargo. Under extraordinary circumstances, in which the number of POWs was large and our information was beyond question [ ] action could be considered.
Prisoner(s) in Laos
In the face of Lao intransigence, we would have somewhat greater leverage than with Vietnam because we have diplomatic relations with the country. If public pressure failed to achieve results, we could impose an American trade embargo, ask the Thais to close the border, [ ] break diplomatic relations, under extraordinary circumstances a [ ] could be considered,
Prisoner(s) in Vietnamese-Controlled Kampuchea
In the event that POWs are determined to be held in the PRK, we will be unable to make direct appeals to that government because of our refusal to recognize its legitimacy. All inquiries will have to be through IOs which are resident in Phnom Penh to deal with relief matters (e.g. UNHCR). Any POWs held in Kampuchea would almost
certainly be under the control of the Vietnamese military, so any sanctions could be applied against Vietnam as logically as against the PRK. We could consider holding up payments for Kampuchea relief until the POW issue is resolved. The unstable conditions in Kampuchea might facilitate the success of a [ ] and for the same reason it is less likely that POWs are being held than in Vietnam or Laos)