TWA Flight 800: Attacked, destroyed, covered-up

worldnetdaily.com ^ | Posted: October 7, 2004 | Jack Cashill

[Blue Eyes]

Who would have ever believed you could take down a large American commercial airliner, on American soil, with a shoulder launched missle... until the concept was proven?

This raises the question, though, of why it hasn't been repeated? The effort was successful, though the perps received no credit, at least in the US media (did the foreign press ever give credit on this?). If the hunt-down of the perps had been successful, Bubba would have been bragging about it. If the hunt-down was not successful, as some on this thread have mentioned, then why did the perps not do it again? Was it just to show it could be done?

[okimhere]

Isn't it curious how the name 'Jamie Gorelick' shows up...

My first thought, too. And that she should be investigated and prosecuted for her part in so many problem events (to put it mildly!). But it will never happen.

When there were so many first-person testimonies putting the lie to the center-tank-fumes theory, remember Rush vigorously saying over and over that Jim Kallstrom was a personal friend and therefore Rush just knew good old Jim would never cover up? That was the most shallow argument in the world but how the Clinton crowd must have loved the support!

[tdadams]

why did the perps not do it again? Was it just to show it could be done?

Exactly, and that's why this strikes me as a 'proof of concept' attack. The point is only to show what's possible, not necessarily promote a new standard method of attack.

[wagglebee]

Thanks for the ping! You beat me to it!

I knew the day TWA 800 went down that there was no way it was what it seemed to be. The Klintoons solution to all crimes was to pretend they didn't occur, thus they could brag about the reduction in crime.

I saw the link to Ron Brown's murder/accident/Arkancide. IMHO this is the crime that BJ could still be impeached for and stripped of his "title" and perks.

http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=1999/1/31/173313

[Blue Eyes]

Exactly, and that's why this strikes me as a 'proof of concept' attack. The point is only to show what's possible, not necessarily promote a new standard method of attack.

Okay, I can buy that. Do you see the 9-11 plane hijacking attacks the say way? Was that a proof of concept attack, as well? If it was, then all of the effort and money spent to tighten up airport security would been needless, except to thwart copycats.

This proof of concept idea is new to me. It's very interesting.

[f zero]

these are not multiple conspiracies, but all part of one major political fix, the mother of all fixes

[robertpaulsen]

"Purchase "Mega Fix: The Dazzling Political Deceit That Led to 9-11" now!"

Ah.

I wonder how many copies he'd sell if he claimed it was indeed the center fuel tank.

[cyborg]

I know I'm not the only one that believes the truth is out there :o)

[ravingnutter]

Related story:

John Kerry seemed to have his sights on Al Gore's Achilles' heel. After the events of Sept. 11, the story of how Al Gore helped subvert the investigation into TWA 800 and undermine airport security may yet prove to be a career-killer. Kerry's "slips" may have put Gore out of the race even before he got in.

Two weeks after advanced copies of "First Strike" started circulating around Washington, Gore withdrew from the presidential race. His withdrawal shocked Washington. It did not shock Sanders and me. We expected it. Kerry plays hardball, too.

Source

[DCPatriot]

Uh...two words.

SHOE BOMBER!

Richard Reid was a copycat bomber.

What I want to know is why the current Administration is impotent and uncaring not to get to the bottom of all this.

Clinton should be indicted for dereliction of duty...Gorelick and Berger should be in orange jumpsuits right now.

[mhking]

[Blue Eyes]

What I want to know is why the current Administration is impotent and uncaring not to get to the bottom of all this.

Excellent question.

[cyborg]

:D

[tdadams]

Do you see the 9-11 plane hijacking attacks the say way? Was that a proof of concept attack, as well? If it was, then all of the effort and money spent to tighten up airport security would been needless, except to thwart copycats

I don't think so. I think that was an attack intended to be known as a terrorist event. It was meant to be a spectacle. It struck at high-profile, very symbolic structures. It was intended to strike fear in Americans and let us know we could be attacked in our heart. I think it would be repeated if strong counter measures weren't taken (as they are being taken now).

[John O]

please see:

DOWNSIDE LEGACY AT TWO DEGREES OF PRESIDENT CLINTON
SECTION: REMEMBERING THE DEAD
SUBSECTION: TWA800 –– RESEARCH PROJECT
Revised 10/12/00

We worked long ond hard on this, matching up ship/aircraft tracks etc. It's long but it's a good read.

TWA800 was a shootdown.

[tdadams]

In addition to what I just posted, hijacking an airplane is already a proven concept. It's been done many, many times. No one's flown one into a building as a terrorist act, but neither is it necessary to do so to prove it could be done. Once a hijacker has control of a plane, he can obviously fly it into a building, into the ground, into the water, etc.

That's why I think that was different from TWA 800. Hijackings were already a proven concept. Shooting down a commercial airliner with a shoulder fired missle was not, until July 1996.

[Blue Eyes]

You note some very distinct differencs -- scope, target, intended outcome. Makes sense.

On a different note, I have a question for the group. Wasn't TWA 800 heading for Paris? Has the French government said anything about or been involved in the investigation?

[tang-soo]

I've posted this top a few other threads. Please ignore if you've seen it before ...

I called our local Clear Channel station the night after this story broke and spoke for about 10 minutes describing the procedures used to handle classified information. The following is a basic description of what I said ...

1) A person who wishes to review classified information at a given facility must have his/her clearance on file with the security office that has legal custody of the information.

2) Once they arrive to the facility, they must show their credentials to identify themselves, sign into the facility - maybe issued a badge indicating their clearance and access and escorted to the room where the material will be reviewed.

3) A quick sidebar on program access and document marking. The term "Access" refers to the concept of "Need to Know". The fact you have a clearance that matches the level required to have access to the material does not establish your "need to know". It must be determined by someone like a program manager or security personnel that your job function requires access to certain information. If you are granted access, you may be required to go through another level of investigation. Some levels of access (at least the ones I was exposed to) are known as "Special Need to Know" or SNTK (pronounced Snick) and "Special Access Required" or SAR. Programs with these designations require special prominent markings on each page of a classified document along with the classification level. Believe it or not, after all the markings (top and bottom) there usually is enough room for the content of the page.

4) I should also mention that each paragraph of the document starts with a designation indicating the classification level of that paragraph. This would look like (U), (C), (S), (S/SAR), (S/SNTK), (TS) or (TS/SAR). Every page is marked top and bottom based upon the highest level of any paragraph on that page. ie. it's possible to have an unclassified page in a top secret document. And as you might think, the overall classification of the document is classified at the highest level of any single page.

5) This next point is especially important in light of the current investigation. Every page is marked "Page x of y Pages". For example page 13 of a 32 page document would be clearly marked in the banner section of the page "Page 13 of 32 Pages". This is done for obvious reasons - if any page is missing, it can be accounted for. The page count is also part of the document's registration in the security catalog.

6) Once in the room, the container (probably a safe i.e. a very heavy duty file cabinet with heavy combination locks with different combinations on each drawer) is opened. This process should be logged by security personnel.

7) The documents are taken from the container. All classified documents are stamped (each page) with items such as a control number, date of creation, level of clearance (top and bottom), program name indicating what access is required and eventual dispensation (i.e. when the material is designated to destruction if applicable).

8) If the documents are classified "top secret", each document has a log on the cover sheet. EACH time a person has access to this information, they must sign and date it.

9) The material is not to be removed (ie stuffed in underwear, socks ... etc) without approval of security personnel. If this takes place, the transfer is documented on both ends of the transaction. If the material is top secret or above, it requires at least two cleared people as an escort.

10) If you travel overnight, the material is not to be kept in your hotel/motel room but instead must be taken to an approved facility. Arrangements are usually made in advance. Security people do not like suprise visits. They like to make them but not receive them.

11) No photocopies are to be made or notes copied without the proper security personnel logging this activity and making appropriate markings (mentioned above) on the documents.

12) This material is frequently audited by internal security agents and is subject to "suprise" audits conducted by military, FBI or other external security personnel.

13) People given access to this type of information are briefed and attend classes on how to handle this material - ie. no excuses for "honest mistakes".

14) As the NSA for the Clinton administration, I imagine Berger was personally responsible that this protocol was designed, implemented and enforced by his staff - at least in an appropriately managed administration. This would apply to government employees, officials, military personnel and civilians under contract and extended clearances issued by the DoD, DoE or other intel operations.

15) As such, ANYBODY who has worked in this environment and heard Mr. Berger's comments yesterday about being "sloppy" and "an honest mistake" knows beyond any doubt that he was not only lying, but this was a premeditated act.

16) I left the aerospace business(as an engineer) in 1993 so these comments are based upon the security world of that time. Only Lord knows how the Clinton administration changed things during his 8 years.

That summarizes what I mentioned to Steve Cannon of WTVN 610 AM (Columbus, Oh) the night after the story broke.

I should have added another issue that may pertain to the current case. The concept of "Working papers". This would be scratch material that is never intended to end up in a document being prepared. For example, preliminary drafts, graphics with various scales, handdrawn sketches, ... etc. Usually, this kind of material is kept in a folder or envelope which is marked as a regular document would be. This folder falls under the same criteria as a regular document ie locking up when not being used ... etc. Usually, this material is collected on a regular basis when the work is finished and tossed into a "burn barrel". The burn barrel is emptied periodically by cleared personnel and either burned or processed through an approved shredder (ends up as dust).

The latest word I have heard is that this material was classified "Code Word Access". Folks, if true, this is "Above Top Secret" ie. John Pollard type material.

So the question comes to mind, why would anybody do such a thing under conditions where he knew he stood a huge chance of being caught? The mission must have been extraordinary for such a risk. The presumption is that he wanted to alter or remove and destroy material that implicated either himself, or quite possibly Mr. Clinton. The fact that some of the material is "lost" implies that regardless of the consequences, the mission has been accomplished with his current situation collateral damage.

Webb Hubbell's infamous quote "I guess I'll have to roll over again for Hillary" comes to mind. Another example of the Clinton whirlwind leaving a trail of destruction in its wake.

I should stress that I'm no security expert - but I did work in that environment for nearly 12 years as an engineer in the aerospace industry (stealth technology). Amongst my duties, I was also the secured computer contact person during our department's audits with "The customer" and the FBI. This included things like proving procedures were being followed concerning the registering, cataloging and tracking of classified storage media, secured networks, hardcopy audit trails ... etc. It was not very exciting work - very boring but also needed.

Because of this work, I have a good idea of what that part of the world looks like. Who knows though after #42 and his crowd. I remember how O'leary (spelling) turned the DoE upside down with her wacky ideas of security. Remember the classified media supposedly found behind the copy machine during the Wen Ho-Li case? I have a friend who works for a private computer consulting firm that is contracted by the DoE and I think the DoD to perform inspections at government and contractor facilities. He told me the rules changed significantly during Clinton's years (to the worse) but I have no first hand knowledge.

[SnarlinCubBear]

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