Posted on 11/20/2004 3:21:40 AM PST by IAF ThunderPilot
Hello and Shalom, The war on terrorism started long before 9/11 or the Palestinian Intifada against Israel.
Here is the story of the first modern war against terrorism:
Introduction
The War in Lebanon can be divided into two phases. The first was a conventional war, which lasted from June 6 to August 23 1982, when the terrorists were expelled from Beirut. The second phase, which lasted for the next three years, was a counter-insurgency campaign. The first phase was limited by both Israel and Syria because they were determined to isolate the fighting, not allowing it to turn into an all-out war. During this phase, Israeli forces were numerically superior, allowing Israel to maintain both the initiative and an element of surprise. Syria fielded six divisions and 500 planes, while Israel had eleven tank divisions and eleven infantry brigades, in addition to 600 planes.
At the beginning of the war, the IDF advanced along the shore, crossed the Awall River, went into Beirut, and then continued north through the Shouf Mountains along the flank of the main Syrian forces in the Beka'a Valley, threatening their rear as well as comminications between Beirut and Damascus.
The second phase was directed against the terrorists. It was not a conventional war in any way. Despite the large number of forces involved and the high casualty rate, there are few lessons to be learned for the future battlefield.
Background
Israel has long sought a peaceful northern border. But Lebanon's position as a haven for terrorist groups has made this impossible. In March 1978, PLO terrorists infiltrated Israel. After murdering an American tourist walking near an Israeli beach, they hijacked a civilian bus. The terrorists shot through the windows as the bus traveled down the highway. When Israeli troops intercepted the bus, the terrorists opened fire. A total of 34 hostages died in the attack. In response, Israeli forces crossed into Lebanon and overran terrorist bases in the southern part of that country, pushing the terrorists away from the border. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew after two months, allowing United Nations forces to enter. But UN troops were unable to prevent terrorists from reinfiltrating the region and introducing new, more dangerous arms.
Violence escalated with a series of PLO attacks and Israeli reprisals. Finally, the United States helped broker a ceasefire agreement in July 1981. The PLO repeatedly violated the cease-fire over the ensuing 11 months. Israel charged that the PLO staged 270 terrorist actions in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and along the Lebanese and Jordanian borders. Twentynine Israelis died and more than 300 were injured in the attacks.
Meanwhile, a force of some 15-18,000 PLO members was encamped in scores of locations in Lebanon. About 5,000-6,000 were foreign mercenaries, coming from such countries as Libya, Iraq, India, Sri Lanka, Chad and Mozambique. Israel later discovered enough light arms and other weapons in Lebanon to equip five brigades. The PLO arsenal included mortars, Katyusha rockets and an extensive antiaircraft network. The PLO also brought hundreds of T34 tanks into the area. Syria, which permitted Lebanon to become a haven for the PLO and other terrorist groups, brought surface-to-air missiles into that country, creating yet another danger for Israel.
Israeli strikes and commando raids were unable to stem the growth of this PLO army. The situation in the Galilee became intolerable as the frequency of attacks forced thousands of residents to flee their homes or to spend large amounts of time in bomb shelters. Israel was not prepared to wait for more deadly attacks to be launched against its civilian population before acting against the terrorists.
The final provocation occurred in June 1982 when a Palestinian terrorist group led by Abu Nidal attempted to assassinate Israel's Ambassador to Great Britain, Shlomo Argov. The IDF subsequently attacked Lebanon again on June 4-5, 1982. The PLO responded with a massive artillery and mortar attack on the Israeli population of the Galilee. On June 6, the IDF moved into Lebanon to drive out the terrorists in "Operation Peace for Galilee."
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger defended the Israeli operation: "No sovereign state can tolerate indefinitely the buildup along its borders of a military force dedicated to its destruction and implementing its objectives by periodic shellings and raids" (Washington Post, June 16, 1982).
"On Lebanon, it is clear that we and Israel both seek an end to the violence there, and a sovereign, independent Lebanon," President Reagan said June 21, 1982. "We agree that Israel must not be subjected to violence from the north."
The initial success of the Israeli operation led officials to broaden the objective to expel the PLO from Lebanon and induce the country's leaders to sign a peace treaty. In 1983, Lebanon's President, Amin Gemayel, signed a peace treaty with Israel. A year later, Syria forced Gemayel to renege on the agreement. The war then became drawn out as the IDF captured Beirut and surrounded Yasser Arafat and his guerrillas.
The success
1982: Operation Peace for the Galilee
In the spring of 1982, Palestinian terrorists entrenched themselves in Southern Lebanon, creating an informal state-within-a-state. From there they dispatched terrorists on murderous missions abroad and fired Katyusha rockets and artillery at civilian targets in Israel's northern Galilee region. On June 3, 1982, Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov was gunned down and critically wounded near his London home. The next day Israeli jets bombed P.L.O. ammunition depots and training bases. This triggered a massive P.L.O. bombardment against Israel's northern settlements, causing extensive damage and loss of life.
On June 6, the IDF launched Operation Peace for the Galilee with the purpose of removing the threat to Israel's northern settlements. Israeli units advanced along three major north-south routes, destroying P.L.O. bases and their terrorist infrastructure along the way.
IAF fighters and attack helicopters bombed terrorist strongholds, clearing the way for the ground forces. Transport helicopters provided around-the-clock tactical, logistic support. They airlifted fuel and ammunition to front-line troops when the three narrow roads which wind their way north into Lebanon became clogged. They also played a life-saving role by rapidly evacuating wounded to Israeli hospitals.
But the most spectacular achievement of the war was the destruction of the Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in the Bekaa Valley. The IAF was equally impressive in air-to-air combat, downing about 90 Syrian Migs without loss.
Future historians will point to many important features of the air war over Lebanon. First and foremost, the IAF re-affirmed its undisputed aerial superiority. This was the first major conflict in which F-15's and F-16's could demonstrate their awesome prowess. It was also the first time that the IAF employed the Cobra and Defender attack helicopters on a wide scale. One of the war's greatest successes was achieved by its smallest participant: the locally produced mini-RPV (remotely piloted vehicle).
These tiny, propeller-driven craft beamed down real-time intelligence to air force and battlefield commanders, giving them a decisive edge in the rapidly unfolding combat arena. Another source of pride for the Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI) was the superb performance of the Kfir fighter bomber. Last but not least, honorable mention will be saved for the F-4 Phantom, which pounded home a reminder that it will be around for quite some time.
The Destruction of the Syrian Surface-to-Air Missiles (June 9, 1982) In the spring of 1981, Israeli reconnaissance photography revealed a dangerous new development. Syria had begun to move Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) batteries into the neutral territory of Lebanon. During the course of the next year, Syria built up an overlapping network of SAMs, which included Soviet SA-2, SA-3 and mobile SA-6 missiles in the Bekaa Valley and along the Zabadani mountain range above it. The density of SAM site locations was unmatched anywhere in the world—including the U.S.S.R. itself!
Because the SAMs were so effective in 1973, many experts had come to believe that “the missile had clipped the aircraft's wings.” Few realized the intensity with which the IAF had prepared to settle the score with its ground-based adversary.
On the fourth day of the war, in a coordinated attack utilizing decoys, anti-radiation missiles and several locally developed systems, the IAF methodically destroyed every one of the threatening SAM batteries. It was almost as if fighter pilots were exacting a kind of personal revenge for the harsh treatment they had received years earlier, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
During the attack, the Syrians sent up dozens of interceptors. Twenty-two Mig-21's and Mig-23's were downed in mass dogfights. Stripped of its surface-to-air defense, Syria continued to flood the Bekaa Valley with fighters over the next few days. Israeli F-15's and F-16's roamed the area without fear of SAMs and raised the total number of aerial victories to about 90. Incredibly, not a single Israeli fighter was lost during the risky attack against the SAMs or in the ensuing dogfights. The IAF once again proved that it was master of the skies.
Ping
BTTT
Pleace read my thread: "Israel Defence Forces Born In Battle; The existment of the Jewish State" This thread is about the IDF in general, the War of Independence and the Six Days War. Found at:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1284121/posts
please tell us more about the opportunity sharon had to kill arafat, was this at this time, and why didnt he do it ?
In simple answer: United Nations
Then in 1985 IAF bombed the PLO headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia, however Arafat escaped.
It may vary on the definition of modern, but I think the first modern war on terror would be the Algerian War of Independence 1954-1962 instead, which resulted Imperial France to lose another colony. It proved France is vulnerable to terrorism and that they are nothing but losers. Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda of Iraq is said to have study from the Algerian War of Independence for his plan in Iraq. However, Zarqawi forgot that America was much more strengthful than the brainless frogs that lost many of their colony.
Good read.
Sooner rather than later. Israel understands that.
Never should an Arafat be left to stew as long as he was allowed.
Altlough Arafat continued his way of terror, the Peace for Galilee operation and the war in Lebanon iliminated the terrorists bloody attacks on Israel, and IAF again showed its air superiority after this superiority was shaken in 1973 Yom Kipur War.
After the Six Days War and Yom Kipur War the arabs understood that a total war against Israel will not destroy the Jewish State, so they choosed the gurilla fighting, in hope that this time they would win.
The arabs soon understood that they cannot defeat the Jewish State by gurilla terrorists, and they are now beginning to understand it again in Gaza.
However its important to understand that Israel could do much more back in 1982, and listening to the UN was a huge mistake.
I guess the lesson to be learned is that if you are going to feed a snake to the garbage disposal, feed the head in first.
Israel is doing that. The local top leadership of the terrorist groups are getting younger and younger, and their capabilities are demonstratably less and less. Old men think with their brains...
Good article, thanks for posting!
"listening to the UN was a huge mistake." Ain't that the truth, it always is, especially for Israel and the US. The UN is nothing but a hate-USA and hate-Israel forum. The US would do well to leave the UN and tell it to leave US soil. Maybe the UN could meet in Paris, a far more suitable environment.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.