Posted on 03/21/2005 11:31:23 AM PST by BenLurkin
A recent report by the Government Accountability Office that labels the F-35 joint strike fighter program "unexecutable" does not take into account changes already made to the program plan, officials say. The report by Congress' investigative arm is the first of five annual reviews of the JSF program required by Congress.
The F-35 is intended to be a stealthy, relatively low-cost, high-performance aircraft for use by the Navy, Air Force and Marines, as well as by Britain's Royal Navy and Royal Air Force and other U.S. allies.
The fighter - a portion of which is produced by Northrop Grumman Corp. in Palmdale - is to replace a variety of aircraft, including the Harrier, A-10, F-14, F-16 and F/A-18.
According to the GAO, the F-35 is the Pentagon's most expensive aircraft program with estimated life-cycle costs approaching $600 billion: $245 billion for development and procurement and $344 billion to maintain and operate the aircraft over its lifetime.
The report criticizes the JSF program decisions that led to cost increases, reduced orders and delayed delivery dates.
"Continued program uncertainties about the aircraft redesign, software development, flight test program, and procurement quantities make it difficult to estimate the total amount of resources needed," the report stated. "Given the uncertainties, the program needs more time to gain knowledge before committing to a new, more accurate business case."
Recognizing problems in the design development phase - particularly the issue of excessive weight in the Marine Corps' short-takeoff-vertical-landing variant - JSF program officials last year initiated a replanning effort, delaying the program by about a year.
"We feel the replan effort captures the concerns raised in the (GAO) report," said Kathy Crawford, spokeswoman for the Pentagon's JSF program office.
The replan provides a balance of technological, cost and schedule risks, she said.
The program had started replanning when the GAO initiated its report, a fact acknowledged by investigators.
"The current pause to replan JSF development and production provides the program this opportunity (to gain knowledge before committing to a new, more accurate business case)," the report stated.
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Corp. was selected as the aircraft's prime contractor in 2001 following a competition pitting two design teams against one another.
Lockheed's entry, the X-35, was a concept demonstrator to prove the technologies, not a prototype of the fighter. Additional engineering and designing was needed to come up with the operational design.
As the numerous operational systems were added to the basic airframe, designers encountered problems in exceeding the weight limit for the airframe.
During the replanning effort, engineers addressed the weight issue, making numerous trade-offs to bring the design within performance and weight requirements.
"They have done an excellent job at that," Crawford said.
Due to the accelerated nature of the program, the weight issue was found and addressed much earlier than in traditional development programs, Lockheed spokesman John Smith said.
The JSF program is unusual, with three variants of the same basic airframe and an accelerated process.
"We're breaking new ground," Smith said. "There's really no precedent for what we're doing."
The first F-35 aircraft - an Air Force variant intended to be used for flight test - already is under production at three different sites, including Northrop Grumman's facility at Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale.
Northrop is the subcontractor responsible for the center fuselage of the fighter. The first of the fuselages will be sent to Lockheed's Fort Worth facility this spring to be mated with the rest of the aircraft, Northrop spokesman Jim Hart said.
Program officials decided to continue production of the first aircraft while working on the replanning effort in order to keep the rest of the program on track, Crawford said. Therefore, it will not incorporate the weight-saving changes that the remaining aircraft will feature.
Work on the second aircraft is expected to begin later this year, Smith said.
The first flight is expected for the first time in August 2006. The first flight of the STOVL version is scheduled for 2007.
Flight testing will take place at Lockheed's Fort Worth facility, Edwards Air Force Base and Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md.
The first operational squadron - the STOVL version for the Marine Corps - is scheduled to be fielded in 2012, with the first Air Force and Navy squadrons becoming operational the following year, Crawford said.
Three airframes: basic, carrier-landing, and... ???
The technological advances, ability to successfully incorporate seemingly contradictory requirements, and repeatedly meettin challenge after challenge, all make this the most incredible aircraft program ever. Of course the problem with most of these congressional investigative committees is that they don't have anyone on the committe that understands engineering, manufacturing, cost analysis, program management, or economics. It's a wonder anything has ever been developed for our military.
I thought both entries were excellent machines. The Boeing had the advantage of using some more proven methods and technology, but I agreed with the Pentagon's assessment that the Lockheed Martin X-35 had the cutting edge advantage with its new propulsion system design and VTOL fan.
All in all, in the long term we're looking at a fighter that will kick butt for 30-40 years, barring advances in anti-gravity, and artificial intelligence. (A touch of humor. Relax.)
I do think the Boeing team should be considered seriously for inclusion in the mix. They have a solid design team for working out the kinks in systems. Lockheed has a flair of innovation that Boeing lacks. Together, they'd probably build a spanking nice fighter.
basic fighter for the USAF
carrier landable for the USN
and VTOL for the USMC
Basically you have an Air Force version, a Navy version, and a Marine version. The Marine version is STOVL (short take off / vertical landing). I'm not sure if the Navy version for carrier landings has STOVL capability or not, but one would think that STOVL would be pretty advantageous for use on carriers.
Probably one each for bombing, aerial combat, and close in ground support?
OTOH, the boeing version was so butt ugly that no self-respecting pilot would ever admit to flying the thing. Plus, boeing never even attempted to develop a demonstrator that incorporated the multiple roles. With Boeing's entry it was always an either/or scenario.
BTW, flew the F-35 simulator two years ago. If it's anything like the real McCoy....schweet!
I saw the Boeing entry (pictures of) and yes it was ugly. But according to what I heard, it was a basic airframe for demonstrating what they could do. It was not an attempt to try and sell the look of the aircraft, since the airframe had not been finalized.
Lockheed did good by choosing to fit their prototype with a sleek fighter's airframe and cosmetics. It gave the Pentagon a better idea of what to expect in the final product, but nowhere near a final spec.
From the article: "The JSF program is unusual, with three variants of the same basic airframe and an accelerated process."
It is essentially ONE airframe with three variants.
Nah, STOVL isn't really handy for today's carriers. That's what the Gator Freighters are for.
Military spending does help the economy.
The Engineering and Science that goes into a fighter is immense.
Actually it isn't; the Marine version with STOVL sacrifices quite a bit of range for the extra weight of the STOVL stuff. The Fleet carriers are plenty big enough and the arrestor wire/catapult system works fine.
If I remember correctly, the Abrams had a lot of problems early on.
Don't hear a lot complaints now.
Vertical Take Off and Landing.
Red6
They also did much more to develop an a/c that met seemingly conflicting design requirements. They were able to demonstrate with one prototype the ability to meet dual requirements while Boeing's two prototypes each were able to meet one requirment but not the other. That was a pretty significant factor -- much more than cosmetic appearance -- in the source selection.
Actually it's one basic airframe with three variants.
In the 80s the media (60 minutes especially) were obsessed with the "weapons that don't work" angle....story after story after story.
Real problem is the MSM isn't qualified to really tell whether a program is actually in trouble or not. Can't distinguish between, say, the Sgt. York or the Abrams.
I don't think the F-35 is a complete disaster but on the scale of things they have fairly serious problems; mainly weight, from what I hear.
I'm just glad we have excellent aircraft that can hold the line until the F-35 is up and running.
If it is true that the bases are covered, I will be impressed. Surely a thing or two has been learned from previous "joint" fighter enterprises. The A-7 and the F-4 were successful aircraft, but their "jointness" was more the product of spreading money around. Correct me if I'm wrong.
It will be interesting to me how having just two aircraft in fighter operations will impact all the jockeying for pilot and wing commander slots. This was a big deal in the Air Force.
If it is true that the bases are covered, I will be impressed. Surely a thing or two has been learned from previous "joint" fighter enterprises. The A-7 and the F-4 were successful aircraft, but their "jointness" was more the product of spreading money around. Correct me if I'm wrong.
It will be interesting to me how having just two aircraft in fighter operations will impact all the jockeying for pilot and wing commander slots. This was a big deal in the Air Force.
Cool, I bet it will be.
And yes, the Boeing design was flawed from the outset by using the Harrier method of providing for the vertical lift for the vertical landing, but they are flaws with which the pilots of the Harriers were already familiar with, as are officials in the Pentagon. Boeing had the advantage of designing around a system that had been in use for a while now. L/M, on the other hand, designed a new system, that didn't have the Harrier's problems with the hot exhaust. The lift fan dispersed the hot exhaust sufficiently so as to reduce that as a danger significantly.
I didn't say the Boeing was better. I agreed with the choice to go with L/M. But even the Boeing entry was at least a full generation more advanced than the Harrier, assuming they were given a chance to finish and polish it.
what exactly is wrong with the Osprey? I think it has corrected the problems that showed up two years ago. Is the concept bad or the roll out?
I don't think the USAF had anything to do with the development of the F-4; it was a pure Navy project at the time. It was adopted by the USAF after the Navy already had it in active service.
The classic example of the botched joint "do everything" aircraft program was the F-111.
Lockheed Martin and its principal industrial partners Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems are employing an array of advanced and highly accurate manufacturing machines to help the F-35 achieve its goals of affordability, quality and assembly speed. Assembly of the center fuselage began in May at Northrop Grumman’s facility in Palmdale, Calif. BAE Systems will begin assembling the aft-fuselage and tails later this year in Samlesbury, England. Those subassemblies will be shipped to Fort Worth, where they will be mated with the wings and forward fuselage for final assembly. The F-35’s first flight is planned for 2006.
The F-35 will set new standards for assembly precision and pace. New milling machines are accurate to within 50 microns -- about one-third the width of a human hair -- to ensure that the F-35’s outer shape is exact and meets its low observability (stealth) requirements. During full-rate production, assembly time for an F-35 is expected to be less than half that of current-generation fighters.
L.S. coment:
I can understand the desire to involve England in the design/manufacture process of F-35.
This also connects to sister commonwealth partner Australia who is also a F 35 purchaser.
Pratt & Whitney Canada will receive $100 million US over 20 years to make bladed compressor rotors for the Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter.
Canada invested $150 million US in the F-35 program, and has won almost 130 production contracts valued at $1.5 billion US.....with more contract expansion possible.
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A post from an internet chat site
Japan is currently debating whether to cut short her Mitsubishi F-2 (sort of an enlarged F-16) production to and acquire the F-35. In fact, the Japanese aerospace industry may even be trusted enough to be allowed to license built the F-35 using US supplied and domestic parts. Afterall, they are the only nation is allowed to license build the F-15 and currently have an advanced aeronautical infrastructure -- good enough to be the builder of ALL the wings that go into Boeing's upcoming 7E7 airliner (probably 787 by the time it flies in 2006).
What will be news is if Japan steps up an request the purchase of the F-22. She'll probably get it too -- she was afterall an F-15 customer when it was a spanking new fighter and she is the first country to get AEGIS.
another poster coment:
Consider this, Japan is currently hosting the Kitty Hawk CVBG (@Yokosuka) and the ESSEX LHD amphibious strike group (@Sasebo). She also allows the US the use of Okinawa as its forward base and airfield. Not only does Japan allow American aircraft, ships, personnel and sprawling US bases on her soil, she pays for 70% of the cost of basing that stuff there! No other nation has allowed this degree of US military presence within their borders much less pay for it!
L.S.'s coments:
Ya...if Japan joins the F35 program and ends up building .
This entire program has has taken a drunk stagger ...slept it off in a park,,,and finally arrived home.
I like the idea of protectionism......its not a good path when Americans loose jobs at home with areospace being farmed out overseas.
Clearly the machinery is there to do F 35...whoo hoo..thats critical.
Yet I am reflecting that having Japan as partner in F-35 [Primary] would have kept the soring cost overuns down and cut out the decision process confusion.
Japanko's are very brilliant in system problem solving.
They can make an idea reality faster than anyone..and do it at minimal cost.
J 35 program....
To many white people in the room.....time for tea : )
F 35 will become a good platform.....not a F-22...not even close.
If the U.S. was unable to do F 35 alone...they should have chosen Japan....Japan who has clearly kicked in way more than poffy Great Britian since WW-2.
Japan with the engineering prowess.
Japan.....a critical partner in the chess game against evil China.
Better hope the Frenchies in Quebec do not strike and throw off F-35 engine production.
Or Englands goofy gov who becomes confused when some Royal Navy type shows up a tea time with "Halt the program.......we just discovered"!
Frankly...F-35 should be soley a U.S. project.
Farm out non cadillac version to approved builders at a later date...after the aircraft is extant in all 3 formats and with all the bugs worked out.
How much is an F35 gonna cost? Big Bump on the F111 comment, one plane to do it all (again?, Oh crap, here we go again)
Three versions of F-35: Air Force F-35A(CTOL), Marines F-35B(STOVL), and Navy F-35C(CV)
F-35A is $28M, F-35B is $35M, and F-35C is $38M. (FY94)
Putting a weapon on it wont negate the fact that it cant sustain any battle damage to the engines or worse the propsand not drop out of the sky like a brick. Hell it crashes on its own stateside.
True. They need a an F-15 variant or the new F-16 with conformal fueltanks.
what is your background on your assertions about the ability to fly? Have you flown in this ship? are you an engineer or pilot? I worked with Bell and saw this ship. Many people who worked with choppers for years think this is the future. What makes you think it is not?
Raise your hand if you think that the MOST EXPENSIVE FIGHTER IN WORLD HISTORY is going to be used for close in ground support as its backers now claim ("will replace the A-10").
Hmmm, no hands. I'm shocked...
I'm an engineer *and* a pilot. The V-22 concept is solid, but can't be scaled up as large as the Osprey.
The fundamental problem with the V-22 Osprey as it stands is that its structure can't handle the vibrations (harmonic and otherwise) from the massive engines and props.
Such vibrations are far less important on smaller size aircraft, as the same steel/aluminum stress points are getting much less wear and fatigue when dealing with the smaller engines and smaller props on vehicles with less size and heft.
But the V-22 shakes, vibrates, and shocks itself to death. In the short term, the V-22 can meet all of its onerous design parameters such as payload weight, takeoff distance, landing distance, range, and speed...but doing all of those grand things comes at a price: metal fatigue. Metal for the hull, metal for the wings, metal for the motor mounts, even the metal in the electrical wiring...it all suffers tremendously.
So after a few flights, V-22's start having problems...generally different problems for each craft, but that's the unpredictable nature of metal fatigue. Some of those problems are potentially fatal, too.
In short, the V-22 does everything that it is asked to do. What it *wasn't* asked to do was to last very long, and it doesn't. It can't. The doomed beast vibrates itself to death, by design.
Scale it down to carry a lighter load, fly slower, not fly as far, have smaller engines, have smaller props...and it would be a great aircraft. Until then it is a giant death trap.
A good concept, but a flawed implementation. The V-22 design simply isn't ready to be implemented on so large a vehicle.
Call it a hunch....but I think Mr Cruise missile is going to be the first rounder in numeric should certain powers square off.
Granted..we are still early in that phase.....yet its likely to take off numerically in the next decade.
So ya...How good will F 35 be in the cruise missile kill role.?
I have read many glowing reports on F 35....and then the ..*Classified coment regarding performance.
along with whatever stores an aircraft has for taking out cruise missiles....the old Israeli version of gun delight will be a reality.
Aircraft with gun capability can still get cruise missiles when [their]missiles are spent.
I guess the benchmark for F-35 will be a comparison to Israels F-16I with its Python 4/5's...and its gattling gun.
I'm wondering though if F-16I is limited ...in that the tech line on F-16'S 2 inboard wing hardpoints are for heavy ordinance.
Israel is novel for overcomming problems...I suppose they could find a way to make all the wing hardpoints carry Python 4/5's.....maybe even dual up hardpoint rails.....ride could possibly haul 12 or more? Pythons....plus whatever they want on wing tip.
A dedicated cruise missile killer with lots of loiter time.
F-35 can carry 8* short range missiles...is that correct?
Each hardpoint on the wing that is used for fuel or muni's is said to be a 10% redux in the stealth dept.
Probably way to early to rate F-35.
But I am wondering : )
HERE IS ANOTHE OPINION:
Cost, Design Flaws Still Plague MV-22 Osprey
By Ralph Omholt
Make no mistake about it, the MV-22 Osprey is not a revolutionary advancement in military aviation. It is, rather, a tax-dollar profiteering nightmare and a poorly conceptualized disaster in the making.
The MV-22 Osprey is designed to take off and land like a helicopter but fly like an airplane, and is intended to replace the Marine Corps' aging fleet of CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters. To its supporters, the Osprey comes across as a combat fantasy machine. If you need speed, the Osprey can deliver under certain limited conditions. With refueling, it does have extended range.
But if anything goes wrong with the machine or its flight profile, you have a near-certain physical disaster. Its chief disadvantages are an overabundance of critical moving parts and the dangerous transition from cruise flight to a hover that leaves the aircraft at a critical disadvantage in unpredictable conditions, including the rigors of combat. So far, thirty people have died in a series of Osprey crashes - just during developmental testing.
By any pragmatic standard, an upgraded design of the Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopter would be superior to the Osprey, particularly relative to cost and combat reliability. Given the mission of a helicopter - not an airplane - the Chinook is fast enough, with a healthy payload capability and a proven combat record. Even the smaller UH-60 Blackhawk sufficiently approaches the Osprey payload, speed and range capability, with respect to pragmatic combat demands.
But the Osprey does have the dogged backing of its prime contractor and political allies in Congress. Bell Helicopter enjoyed a near-monopoly on Army helicopters during the Vietnam War, but today, as Bell-Textron, the company no longer enjoys the lion's share of military helicopters - and clearly wants it back.
The Osprey has another disadvantage - outrageous cost to develop, repair and replace. In 2000, the Congressional Research Service reported that the total cost of a proposed fleet of 458 Ospreys would be $38.1 billion, for a unit cost of $83.1 million per aircraft (the Marine Corps, using different accounting methods, has argued that the unit cost will be only $44 million per Osprey).
The overarching problem is that the fundamental design of the MV-22 clearly appears to be flawed.
Despite official insistence earlier this year that the Osprey program has recovered from the two fatal crashes in 2000 and is entering a two-year testing program in good shape for production approval in 2006 or 2007, a number of questions remain unanswered about the Osprey design.
The greatest disadvantage of the Osprey is its unforgivingness of human error. The Osprey's massive rotors, mounted at the ends of the wings, are known to create an unstable and dangerous airflow during the "hover" regime, even in relatively ideal conditions. Imagine a landing an aircraft sensitive to airflow in windshear or unanticipated heavy icing conditions.
Uncertainty over the Osprey's performance in sensitive maneuvers is linked to a second related concern: Can the aircraft even make what are termed "combat maneuvers" without risking the aircrew and passengers?
In an article last spring, The Fort Worth Star-Telegram revealed that seven times during 21 high-altitude test flights, an MV-22 suddenly began to roll when it flew the same maneuver that triggered a crash in Arizona in 2000 that killed 19 Marines. In one incident, an MV-22 lost 2,000 feet of altitude before the pilots regained control, a margin for error that probably would not exist in a military operation, the newspaper reported.
"There is a flight characteristic here that doesn't exist in a helicopter," said J. Gordon Leishman, a University of Maryland aerospace engineering professor and helicopter aerodynamics expert who has studied tilt-rotor aircraft.
The Star-Telegram noted that the current V-22 flight manual says pilots should descend no faster than 800 feet per minute when flying at speeds of 40 knots or less - a slow, gradual descent not unlike that of a commercial airliner.
A third problem is the Osprey's vulnerability to ground fire.
Imagine the human frailty with a few well-placed rounds from a small caliber rifle, let alone a machine gun or an RPG. Imagine the effect of asymmetrical lift during takeoff or landing from the blast of an artillery round - less the shrapnel and blast debris. As the Pentagon learned to its horror in Mogadishu in October 1993, when Somali fighters downed several Blackhawk helicopters with RPG grenades an intelligent enemy can easily take down a sophisticated helicopter.
Despite that sobering experience, as well as recent combat "lessons learned" in Afghanistan, the Marine Corps and Air Force (which is considering a CV-22 model for special operations) are still struggling to find a successful way to arm the Osprey with either a cannon or .50 cal. machine gun. The newsletter Inside the Navy reported on Sept. 30, 2002, that the airframe design now rules out either a nose-mounted cannon or side-aiming weapons and a proposed "fix" may not be found until 2004.
Given these as-yet uncorrected flaws and limits, it is easy to picture an MV-22 aircrew going into a "hot" Landing Zone (LZ). As the LZ is nearing, the aircraft commander briefs the copilot.
"Okay, we'll approach from the south; go-around will be up the valley, to the north- hour-and-a-half fuel remaining. Intel advises no anti-aircraft; small arms only," the aircraft commander tells his crew. "We'll hope they don't have any hand helds (missiles). IRS says the wind should be from the west; I'll estimate 15 knots on landing - plan wing-low touchdown, facing north. Terrain rises to the north, so on departure or go-around we'll need height over speed until 1,000 feet above the ground."
The pilot continues, "Pathfinder should have an infrared beacon going from a covered position. He'll advise on any known unfriendlies. Standard arrival, we'll slow to a glidepath at 50 feet, max descent rate 200 feet-per-minute. You call out sink rate and radar altitude, the crew chief will call out anything that looks bad. The weather's been reported dry, we'll expect a dust storm. If we can identify a distinct treeline, we'll attempt to land to it. Everybody be on the lookout for bad-guys. Any sign of ground-fire and we'll return fire from the doors and abort the landing. If we lose an engine, we'll unload anything not tied down and initiate a 90-270 go-around; exit to the south. If we have a catastrophic failure, we'll take what we can get straight ahead - minimum speed."
"As briefed, Chalk two and three will cover our exit, if we get any serious ground fire. After departure, we'll orbit for fire-cover on chalk two and three. If anybody goes down, the remaining ships will recover any casualties. Any questions?"
The co-pilot responds, "Sir, the IRS is showing 40 knots of wind at 2,000 feet; that could end up as tailwind, coming around the hills and up the valley. What then?"
The pilot thinks for a few moments. "Ah, we'll have to see what we get when we get there; in the meantime, we fly the aircraft. We might have to transition to hover early. If we see a tailwind coming on, we'll deal with it. And hope we don't have any ground fire; tailwind equates to an extended hover."
The crew chief then speaks. "Sir, the weather guys said we might see some snow. What's the plan if we get into serious icing?"
"The LZ is supposed to be dry," the pilot insists. "I don't anticipate a problem."
"Sir, I'm not trying to make trouble," the crew chief comes back, "but we've got to maintain 2,000 feet above ground level until the LZ, that leaves the risk of icing as we get closer. Right now, we're only at 40 degrees, that will drop as we climb up the valley. Do we abort after a given accumulation?"
The pilot concedes, "Yeah, a solid quarter inch and we'll split. If we have to, we'll drop to 500 feet to stay out of it. Getting nervous?"
The co-pilot answers, "No sir, just that we've got a stacked deck if anything goes wrong. Every time one of these things go down, it's always pilot error. The approach technique leaves us exposed to ground fire at a hover for 30 seconds in and 20 seconds out. Thirty seconds, if we have to abort from a hover. That's a lot of time in the 'dead zone.' We're maxed out, now, nobody has the lift to carry many casualties, even if we dump the equipment and ammo. We've got 200 miles to the nearest hospital, even if we make it out in one piece. Two birds down and a lot of people are going to die."
"I know."
The harsh reality - two full decades after the tilt-rotor concept first appeared on design blueprints - is that a fantasy mission has been invented to justify the Osprey and the profits of its manufacturer. As a radically more practical matter, an upgrade of the Vietnam era helicopters is needed to fill the pragmatic role of the combat helicopter. With the exception of the heavy-lift helicopters in the Chinook/Skycrane class, that has already been accomplished. For basic utility requirements, the Huey and Blackhawk are still practical answers to the military requirements.
Between technical and operational problems, combat vulnerability and keen pilot proficiency requirements, the Osprey creates far more problems than it solves.
Ralph Omholt is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at skydrifter@attbi.com.
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