RUSSIA, THE VATICAN AND THE POLISH FACTOR

The first wave of interest in the events in the Vatican has passed. It is not hard to imagine, though, that a second wave will sweep the global community when John Paul II's successor is announced. This event has a particular significance for Russia. The new pope will obviously not be Polish, and the Polish factor has always determined, to a great extent, the relations between the Vatican and Russia.

There are several reasons, but the main one is that difficult Polish-Russian relations over the centuries often made Polish priests politicians. Churches often became anti-Russian revolutionary-political clubs, and Polish religious figures would assume the role of political leaders contrary to their original calling as servants of God. Finally, Polish priests arriving on Russian soil would immediately forget about their spiritual missions and subjugated them to national and political interests. Father Kenar, a member of the French Order of Assumption, once wrote in frustration, "The Poles from Warsaw to Vladivostok equate the interests of Catholicism with their own." In another message, he noted disappointedly, "The Poles, as a rule, refuse to proselytize Catholicism among the Russians if it does not lead to increased Polish influence in the country." The global strategic plans of the Order of Assumption to spread Catholicism in Russia obviously clashed with purely selfish, as the French saw it, plans of the Poles. Another French priest, Father Boren stated with irritation, "The Poles are skilled manipulators." These quotations are taken from the book Rome and Moscow written by an expert on Russia and Byzantium and a pious Catholic, Antoine Wenger.

The election of a Pole as pontiff had both positive and negative aspects for the Vatican and Russia from the outset. On the one hand, the Vatican acquired additional multinational and universal features, which were then essential for Catholicism, while Moscow could hope that a pope with Slavic roots would deal with Russian affairs better than his predecessors.

On the other hand, the Vatican, for the first time was under the influence of a Pole and its resources and authority were largely used in the interests of Poland. This was inevitable, because even if John Paul II had been against it, Poland would have never missed the chance to increase its political influence using the authority of a Pole at the head of the Holy See. While the communist regime, which collapsed largely due to the efforts of Catholic Church, ruled Poland, the "nationalization" of the Vatican by the Poles was not that obvious. Modern-day Poland, though, openly benefited from its "family ties" with the Vatican. The authoritative image of the pope followed Poland regardless of whether it acted as speaker for the new EU members, conducted negotiations with Moscow, or sent Mr. Kwasniewski to "appease" the orange revolutionaries in Ukraine. Is Poland to blame for that? I do not think so. If a Latin American candidate is elected as the new pope, the political influence of Latin America will automatically increase and Spanish will be certainly heard more often within the Vatican's walls.

During the long years of the last papacy, the Vatican obviously become tired of Polish, and the Polish "invasion" of Rome during the pope's funeral accentuated this effect even more. Therefore, it is not hard to predict the decline of Polish influence in the Catholic Church and the world in general. It is impossible to say just how much influence Poland will lose after the death of Karol Wojtyla, but there can be no doubt that the losses are going to be considerable. The Poles will not certainly yield their positions without a fight, but defeat is inevitable. After all, they have lost their leader.

Changes will come to Russia, as well. It is going to be a slow, but steady process. Polish Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz, the head of Catholic Church in Russia, might be sent home and replaced by a French priest, for instance. The Vatican might also change its approach to dialogue with Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Only time will show whether the change will be positive or negative. The Poles knew and understood Russia, but emphasized political aspects of the dialogue, which did not help it develop. Therefore, the ROC would probably welcome new participants in the dialogue on the Vatican side.

The Kremlin will not have serious problems with new Vatican authorities either. The secular authorities in Russia in the past few centuries were more tolerant of Catholicism than the Orthodox Church. They primarily defended the interests of Orthodox believers, but respected the interests of Catholics as well, mainly because they appreciated the help of foreign specialists residing on Russian territory, the majority of whom were Catholics.

One of the last issues Pyotr Stolypin, a prominent political figure in tsarist Russia, dealt with during his lifetime, was relations between the Catholics and the Orthodox believers. On the day of his assassination in Kiev, the premier received a French delegation, which asked him to defend Father Evrar, who the police had erroneously accused of being a Jesuit. After reviewing the details of the case and receiving Father Evrar's assurances that he would proselytize Catholicism only among his compatriots, Stolypin allowed the priest to remain in Russia. Father Evrar later wrote in his memoirs, "I will always cherish his memory because he was...an honest, direct and unselfish person, a man of principle in all matters related to politics and religion."

If Rome sends a new "Father Evrar" to Russia and subdues the enthusiasm of Polish priests, if the Kremlin, following Stolypin's example, skillfully brings together the interests of the Russian state, the Orthodox Church and the Catholics in Russia, Moscow and the Vatican will have a certain chance to lead a civilized coexistence under the rule of the new pope.

==The only reason you don't agree with TTS and his conspiracies is because he thinks that you are also commies.

They don't sound like commies to me. I do, however, think Lech Walesa was working with the Communists. If you want to see my theories on Poland, they begin with Anatoly Golitsyn's 1984 book NEW LIES FOR OLD (any serious comments from the Poles in this thread would be most appreciated):

WESTERN MISINTERPRETATION OF EVENTS IN POLAND

Page 328: “Because the West has failed either to understand communist strategy and disinformation or to appreciate the commitment to it of the resources of the bloc security and intelligence services and their high-level agents of political influence, the appearance of Solidarity in Poland has been accepted as a spontaneous occurrence comparable with the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and as portending the demise of communism in Poland. The fact that the Italian, French, and Spanish Communist parties all took up pro-Solidarity positions gives grounds for suspecting the validity of this interpretation.”

“Western misreading of events led to predictions of Soviet intervention in Poland in 1981, which turned out to be unjustified. It may lead to more serious errors in the future.”

“There are strong indications that the Polish version of ‘democratization,’ based in part on the Czechoslovak model, was prepared and controlled from the outset within the framework of bloc policy and strategy. For twenty years the Polish Communist party had been working on the construction of a ‘mature socialist society’ in which the party and its mass organizations would play a more active and effective political role. In 1963 the party’s ideological commission was set up. In 1973 new means of coordinating the activities of youth organizations were established. In 1976 a new law was adopted on the leading role of the party in constructing communism and on the party’s interaction with the Peasant and Democratic parties. In the same year all youth organizations, including those of the army, were merged into one Union of Socialist Polish Youth.”

Page 329: “Party membership increased from 1 million in 1960 to 3 million in 1980. In the same period Polish trade unions increased their membership from 5 to 13 million. The Union of Socialist Polish Youth had 2 million members in 1980. By the end of that year, 85 percent of the army’s officer corps were party members. All Poles of Jewish origin had been eliminated from the army.”

“Throughout the twenty-year period Polish leaders have been fully involved in the coordination mechanisms of the bloc, such as Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, as well as in bilateral meetings with other communist parties. The Polish security service took part in the conference in Moscow in 1959 of bloc security services at which their new political role was discussed and means of coordination were improved. Poland was among the countries visited by Mironov, the originator of this new political role, when he was head of CPSU’s Administrative Department.”

“Significantly two of the key figures in recent Polish events, the so-called ‘renewel,’ took up important positions soon after the ‘Prague Spring’ in 1968: Jaruzelski became Minister of Defense, and Kania became head of the Polish communist party’s Administrative Department, with responsibility for the affairs of the Polish security service. In 1971 Gierek took over from Gomulka and the future leader of Solidarity, Walesa, began his political activity. Gierek and members of other important departments, including Kania’s Administrative Department, consulted with their Soviet counterparts in Moscow. In the same year the Polish and Czech leaders had several meetings. In 1973 an agreement on ideological cooperation was signed between the two parties. In 1977 a delegation led by Gierek signed an agreement on the further strengthening of cooperation between them. Gierek also took part in Crimean summit meetings in the 1970s at which strategic questions were discussed.”

“In the course of the 1970s Kania was promoted to be Minister of the Interior and a member of the Politburo with responsibility for supervising the army and the security police. He also acted as the government’s principal link with the politically active Catholic church. After the ‘renewel’ had begun, Kania was further promoted to be leader of the party. Two other security chiefs were also promoted, Moczar to membership in the Politburo and Kowalczyk to be deputy premier. These promotions are the clearest indication of the involvement of Kania and the security services in the preparation of the Polish ‘renewel.’”

Page 330: “There was intensive consultation between Polish and Soviet leaders and party officials in the two years preceding the ‘renewel.’ Among the more significant items, apart from Comecon and Warsaw Pact meetings, were the appointment of a new Soviet ambassador to Poland in 1978 (Aristov, a senior party official from Leningrad); a conference in Moscow of bloc officials (including Poles) on organizational matters and mass organizations; Jaruzelski’s visit to Moscow in 1978; the meeting of Jaruzelski and the commander in chief of the Warsaw pact forces in 1979; two meetings in 1978 and 1979 between Soviet and Polish party officials responsible for strategy and coordination of the communist movement, at which there were discussions on international and ideological questions; visits to Moscow by Cruchek, the chairman of the Polish trade union organization, and by Shidlyak, head of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society, who discussed the strengthening of Soviet-Polish cooperation with his Soviet counterpart, Shytikov. This last visit is particularly interesting, since between February and August, 1980—just before the ‘renewel’—Shidlyak was head of the Polish trade unions.”

“In 1979 Gierek had two meetings with Brezhnev and separate meetings with the Czechoslovak, East German, West German, and French Communist party leaders. At the meeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea in August 1979, the discussion focused on ‘favorable new conditions for joint action against Europe.’ In February 1980 a Soviet publication referred to the strengthening of fraternal relations between the two countries resulting from agreements reached at their meetings.”

“A Polish party delegation attended a twenty-nine-party conference in Hungary in December 1979 that discussed relations between communists and social democrats and perspectives for European security. Suslov, the late leading Soviet ideologist and strategist, headed the Soviet delegation to the Polish party congress in February 1980. At the congress Gierek attacked NATO and the deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe and offered to act as host to an East-West disarmament conference in Warsaw. In May 1980 Brezhnev, Gromyko, and other senior Soviet officials attended a conference of bloc leaders in Warsaw. In his introductory speech Gierek said that the conference would open new prospects for peace and security in Europe and the world. His speech was the only part of the proceedings to be published.”

Page 331: “There were frequent consultations between Polish party officials responsible for the press, TV, and radio with their Soviet collegues, suggesting preparation of the Soviet and Polish media for a forthcoming important event.”
“Brezhnev awarded honors to Gierek and Jaruzelski in 1978 and Gierek honored Rusakov, head of the CPSU’s department for bloc affairs, in February 1980. The awards can be seen as recognition of the contributions made to the preparation of the ‘renewel’ by some of its key figures. It may also be surmised that Gierek’s departure from the scene was envisaged at this stage. He doubtless had good reason for saying, shortly after his dismissal, that ‘proper appraisal of the Polish developments in the 1970s could only be made from a certain distance in time.”

“All of the foregoing evidence points to the conclusion that a major development in Poland, the ‘renewal,’ was planned thoroughly, and well in advance, by the Polish Communist Party in cooperation with its Communist allies and with a view to furthering the Communist strategy for Europe. The conclusion is further supported by the evidence of the Polish Communist Party’s involvement in the formation and functioning of Solidarity.”

Page 334: “The creation of Solidarity and the initial period of its activity as a trade union may be regarded as the experimental first phase of the Polish ‘renewal.’ The appointment of Jaruzelski, the imposition of martial law, and the suspension of Solidarity represent the second phase, intended to bring the movement under firm control and provide a period of political consolidation. In the third phase it may be expected that a coalition government will be formed, comprising representatives of the Communist Party, a revived Solidarity movement, and of the church. A few so-called liberals might also be included. A new-style government of this sort in Eastern Europe would be well equipped to promote Communist strategy by campaigning for disarmament, for nuclear-free zones in Europe, perhaps for a revival of the Rapacki Plan, for the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and ultimately for the establishment of a neutral, socialist Europe. The revival of other elements of Communist strategy for Europe [such as human rights negotiations] would be timed to coincide with the emergence of such a government.”

Page 335: “A coalition government in Poland would in fact be totalitarianism under a new, deceptive and more dangerous guise. Accepted as the spontaneous emergence of a new form of multi-party, semi-democratic regime, it would serve to undermine resistance to Communism inside and outside the Communist Bloc. The need for massive defense expenditure would increasingly be questioned in the West. New possibilities would arise for splitting Western Europe away from the United States, of neutralizing Germany, and destroying NATO.”

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