Posted on 05/31/2005 10:00:56 PM PDT by Pikamax
c
By MICHELLE FAUL The Associated Press Tuesday, May 31, 2005; 9:20 PM
SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico -- They fed them well. The Pakistani tribesmen slaughtered a sheep in honor of their guests, Arabs and Chinese Muslims famished from fleeing U.S. bombing in the Afghan mountains. But their hosts had ulterior motives: to sell them to the Americans, said the men who are now prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.
Bounties ranged from $3,000 to $25,000, the detainees testified during military tribunals, according to transcripts the U.S. government gave The Associated Press to comply with a Freedom of Information lawsuit.
A former CIA intelligence officer who helped lead the search for Osama bin Laden told AP the accounts sounded legitimate because U.S. allies regularly got money to help catch Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. Gary Schroen said he took a suitcase of $3 million in cash into Afghanistan himself to help supply and win over warlords to fight for U.S. Special Forces.
(Excerpt) Read more at washingtonpost.com ...
Start killing them on the battlefield instead of capturing them and the entire problem with Gitmo will go away. Any ones with useful information will offer it up voluntarily to save their own skins. Otherwise shoot them on the spot.
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| Posted by SmithL On News/Activism 05/31/2005 12:58:19 PM CDT · 31 replies · 1,252+ views AP ^ | 5/31/5 | MICHELLE FAUL SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico -- They fed them well. ThePakistani tribesmen slaughtered a sheep in honor of their guests, Arabs and Chinese Muslims famished from fleeing U.S. bombing in the Afghan mountains. But their hosts had ulterior motives: to sell them to the Americans, said the men who are now prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. Bounties ranged from $3,000 to $25,000, the detainees testified during military tribunals, according to transcripts the U.S. government gave The Associated Press to comply with a Freedom of Information lawsuit. A former CIA intelligence officer who helped lead the search for Osama bin Laden told... |
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So what't the story here? This is Certainly Not News(tm).
All it proves is that Muslims can't even trust Muslims.
A great waste of money in my opinion, paying for trash, that we then have to house in Gitmo for years, while at the same time allowing the Pakistanis to fly their fighters out with helicopters in a country where WE OWNED the airspace.
I really fail to see the problem here. If the detainees have a gripe with the people who sold them them out, let them go after them.
I might contribute to a bounty on murderers and terrorists, but who in their right mind would want to buy a Muslim?
US Spy Ordered to Bring Home Bin Laden's Head on Dry Ice AFP ^ | Tue May 3
He's also been peddling his book on NPR.
Bump!
Like we give a rip.
If there were no such thing as Democrats, this is probably what would happen.
The SSS strategy needs to be implemented, since the sheethead world is very disturbed with how we treat illegal combatants captured on the field of battle....
SSS - Shoot, Shovel and Silence
Semper Fi
Shoot, shovel and slience! EXCELLENT.
So are we to understand that terrorists are now considered "sources" for the Washington Post?
>>>So are we to understand that terrorists are now considered "sources" for the Washington Post?
Yes - especially those who've been conditioned to lie about their experience in captivity.
Mr. [Richard] Clarke told the agency to carry on with planning and begin drafting the legal documents necessary for covert action.In March 1998, planners conducted a third rehearsal and briefed Mr. Clarke on the outcome. In a note to Mr. [Sandy stuffed-pants] Berger on March 7, Mr. Clarke described the operation as "somewhat embryonic" and the C.I.A. as "months away from doing anything."
The chief of the bin Laden unit at the agency thought the plan was "the perfect operation." The required infrastructure was minimal, and the plan had been modified to keep Mr. bin Laden in hiding for up to a month before handing him over to the United States, thus enhancing the chances of keeping American involvement hidden.
The C.I.A. field officer in charge, Gary Schroen, called the tribal leaders' abilities "professional and detailed," according to the report. Mr. Schroen said the plan was "about as good as it can be," meaning a 40 percent chance of capturing or killing Mr. bin Laden. Yet even the best planning, he added, would not prevent that point when "we step back and keep our fingers crossed."
Military officers reviewed the capture plan and, the bin Laden station chief said, "found no showstoppers."
There were, however, concerns, according to the report. The commander of Delta Force, the elite military unit, felt "uncomfortable" leaving Mr. bin Laden a captive of the tribal leaders for so long, while the commander of joint special operations forces, Lt. Gen. Michael Canavan, feared for the safety of the tribal leaders within Tarnak Farms.
At that point, however, Mr. Berger worried about what would be done with Mr. bin Laden if he was captured. The hard evidence against Mr. bin Laden that would lead to any conviction was still skimpy, Mr. Berger said, and there was a danger of bringing him back to the United States only to see him acquitted.
------- "Kidnapping of bin Laden Was Rehearsed in '98 but Scrapped, 9/11 Report Says," By THOMAS CRAMPTON, The New York Times, July 26, 2004
Well, if you stoop low enough to source what currently passes for democrats.... what's a little terrorist or two?
Abso-damn-lutely -- they're "sources."
"Start killing them on the battlefield instead of capturing them "
roger this.....
and the problem is...?
Thomas Powers, "The Trouble with the CIA"
But there is a group of intelligence dissidents in Washington who think this would be a historic mistake. They argue that the CIA's failure to grasp the scope of al-Qaeda's plans reveals deep structural problems within the agency that go far beyond ordinary questions of funding and who reports to whom, and that no attempt to identify weaknesses or correct problems can go forward while George Tenet remains in charge. The criticisms come not from think tanks or bureaucratic rivals of the CIA like the FBI, but from a vocal group of former intelligence officers—mostly young, mostly field officers from the Directorate of Operations (DO), mostly well-respected and destined for solid careers until they chose to leave—who believe that the CIA is in steep decline. The most vocal of these critics is Robert Baer, a twenty-year veteran of numerous assignments in Central Asia and the Middle East whose last major job for the agency was an attempt to organize Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s—-shuttling between a desk in Langley and contacts on the ground in Jordan, Turkey, and even northern Iraq.
That assignment came to an abrupt end in March 1995 when Baer, once seen as a rising star of the DO, suddenly found himself "the subject of an accusatory process." An agent of the FBI told him he was under investigation for the crime of plotting the assassination of Saddam Hussein. The investigation was ordered by President Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake, who would be nominated to run the agency two years later. The Baer investigation was only one of many reasons that the intelligence organizations resisted Lake, forcing him to withdraw his name in 1997, and clearing the way for George Tenet.
Eventually, the case against Baer was dismissed with the help of the Washington lawyer Jeffrey Smith, who served as the agency's general counsel under John Deutch. But for Baer the episode was decisive. "When your own outfit is trying to put you in jail," he told me, "it's time to go."
Baer's was one of many resignations in recent years; the dissidents' portrait of the agency which follows comes from him, from Howard Hart, from another veteran DO operator and former chief of station in Amman, Jordan, named David Manners, and from others who preferred not to be identified. They have differing career histories and views but on some things they agree. The Clinton years, in their view, saw a crippling erosion of the agency's position in Washington. Its leadership is now timid and its staff demoralized. Top officials, they say, worry more about the vigilantes of political correctness than the hard work of collecting intelligence in the field. The shock of discovering Aldrich Ames in 1994 was followed by a period of destructive self-criticism.
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