Posted on 06/22/2005 10:38:34 AM PDT by robowombat
"[Thanks for the ping, GK -- keep me posted and I'll keep you informed! Blessings -- Brian]"
Yes! If only you manage to spell my name right!
2 reasons.
1)Pakistan (our "unwavering ally" in the war on terror).
2)China. (Our friendly trading partner who threatens to invade Taiwan and whose relationship with India is tense at best and is its biggest regional economic competitor).
This article is a shot across the bow asking America not to drive India away again for Pakistan and China.
A sort of " we could have been your friends, but you sacrifised us for people that wound up being closeted enemies".
Made sense at the time for them.
America doesn't have a history of going around and invading countries, but Indias neighbors to the north did.
Also China and India were bitter enemies, In the world of India, you don't have to worry about the Americans, the Soviets won't invade you if you play nice, and your enemy happens to also be their enemy.
Worked out well to some extent.
I think they should be, but not for like 50 or 60 years at least.
From what I read, Reagan thought Saddam was going to bomb the living heck out of them, no one thought he would actually use chemical weapons (for any reason, even tactically, they aren't the best choice).
When Saddam did, everybody was stunned.
Michael Moore in one of his books conceded that Nixon was more liberal then every single president who came after him.
Also explains why Reagan hated him so much.
From what I know and heard, Nixon was the one guy Reagan just could not be nice to.
Somewhere I read that Kissinger actually would pour glasses of wine for Nixon. I have never completely trusted him. I would not rule out the possibility that he was subtly driving much of the disfunction of the Nixon WH.
an interesting insinuation....
makes me wonder if Nixon was a puppet...
RE: Snubbed India when with surprising alacrity it offered bases and assistance to Washington to prosecute its war against terrorists operating out of Afghanistan in preference to tainted Pakistani support that was acquired by dire threats
Huge, huge mistake!
Indeed, any failure to acheive alliance of a serious nature may be a fatal mistake for both countries.
RE: This article is a shot across the bow asking America not to drive India away again for Pakistan and China.
It really does not get any more simple and straight forward than this. I am frustrated that so many people still don't get it. Who would we rather partner with - Confuciocommunists and Islamomoonbats, or the world's largest free country? Seems like a no brainer to me!
I did not realize that. Fascinating! It really does explain a lot.
I think Nixon was not a puppet but was highly insecure. He was raised a Quaker. I would imagine that some of what he ended up dealing with threw him for a look versus his childhood belief system. I understand he was prone to drinking binges and self destructive emotional behavior. A smart and intelligent guy but with many, many personal problems.
look > loop.
Yes, I noticed that quote.
This article presents a very different view than the actual Nixon Papers, in my opinion.
From the Papers linked in post #18:
“A political crisis in Pakistan developed out of Bengali demands for autonomy for East Pakistan, demands which were highlighted by the results of the general election in December 1970.”
And
India's concerns and sensitivities, on the other hand, were accorded scant sympathy in the “White House. On May 13, Prime Minister Gandhi wrote to President Nixon about the "carnage in East Bengal" which "disturbed the Indian people deeply." She added that the impact of millions of refugees imposed an enormous burden upon India and impacted heavily upon its economy. There were by Indian count over 2 million refugees in West Bengal and the flow was increasing. The situation, she warned, could become explosive. (46) Indian Ambassador L. K. Jha warned Kissinger on May 21 that without evidence that Pakistan would reverse the military repression and restore the political rights of the population of East Pakistan, there was strong support in India for the idea of arming the refugees and sending them back as guerrillas. (52) By the end of May, reports were coming to Washington about Indian forces gathering along the border with East Pakistan. The United States passed the word to India that it was opposed to military intervention in the civil war. Nixon said that if India intervened militarily "by God we will cut off economic aid." (55) In a subsequent conversation with Kissinger on May 26, Nixon said that "the goddamn Indians" were promoting another war. Kissinger agreed: "they are the most aggressive goddamn people around." (59)
Nixon and Kissinger, who managed the United States response to the crisis to the virtual exclusion of the Department of State, met in Washington in June with Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and attempted to persuade him that the civil war need not evolve into conflict between India and Pakistan. When Nixon met with Singh on June 16, he tried to defuse the crisis by offering $70 million in humanitarian assistance to help offset the expenses involved in dealing with the refugees. Singh, who expanded on the "tremendous problems" created for India by the often destitute refugees, expressed appreciation for the offer but insisted that the fundamental question was how to stop the flow of refugees. It would not be possible, he said, to "buy the problem away." (73)”
And
“Nixon's view of the emerging crisis was expressed in an NSC meeting on July 16. The Indians, he said, are "a slippery, treacherous people." He felt that they would like nothing more than to take advantage of the opportunity to destroy Pakistan. Kissinger agreed that India seemed bent upon war.”
Can someone explain to me India's motivation to war with Pakistan here?
"The Indians are more devious, sometimes so smart that we fall for their line..."
Nixon felt that way about the Jews as well.
***That's why Nixon picked an Irishman for his Sec of State.
O'Kissingerahan was his name.
well said
From Thomas Barnett's interesting--and influential--book, The Pentagon's New Map, War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century. The occasion was attendance at the 2001 Indian hosted International Fleet Review.
Before I went to India I received some advice from my local intelligence unit: stuff I might look out for, questions I might ask, and good answers I might provide to tough questions from foreign officials. A basic primer on how to behave in conversation.
So when Pakistan was raised as a security issue for South Asia, a lot of pointing fingers came flying out from my Indian hosts and most of them found their way to my chest. The basic message was loud and clear: "You Americans have no real sense of how dangerous the Pakis are. But someday, when the right trolley car comes rolling down the track, we're going to jump on that car and show you truly how bad these people are! We only hope you have the sense to support the right side when it finally happens."
My reply was the same one I've been giving for years to both Pakistanis and Indians. "No one on our side wants to see this war, and if you think America is automatically going to jump in on your side and back your military, they you're wrong. All we're going to do is try our best to shut down the conflict as quickly as possible, the we're going to send in the relief workers, diplomats, and radiation experts to sort it all out." In my opinion, any nuclear exchange would be a horrific outcome for both sides, but worse for India because it would kill much of its connectivity to the global economy, whereas Pakistan--a truly disconnected state--would lose far less in the end.
My message was my own personal variant of what the U.S. Government has been telling India quietly for years. Those sorts of messages are an important component of both diplomacy and what I call the exporting of security; they just make clear to our friends what we believe are the essential security rule sets. By making those rule sets clear, in countless exchanges between our nation and India, we draw a little closer to them and they draw a little closer to us.
. . . In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan was in a world of trouble with the United States, because we knew al Qaeda was operating all over Pakistan's northern sections bordering Afghanistan.
America had no choice but to get back in bed militarily with Pakistan following 9/11 and our invasion of Afghanistan, but we also escalated our military-to-military cooperation with India, so both sides were feeling they had a big friend in the United States. . . .
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