Posted on 10/15/2005 9:18:39 PM PDT by neverdem
Trouble in July a result of problems that also triggered Columbia tragedy, engineers say
NASA officials announced Friday they will aim for a May launch of the next shuttle mission after investigators blamed application problems for the potentially deadly foam insulation loss that accompanied Discovery's late July liftoff.
The shuttle fleet was grounded by the unexpected shedding of fuel tank insulation as the spacecraft lifted off July 26 on the first mission since the fatal 2003 Columbia accident.
Space agency officials outlined a recovery strategy on Friday as an internal engineering team said the foam was most likely loosened by application problems that also triggered the Columbia tragedy.
"We haven't set a launch date, but we are clearly aiming for May," Bill Gerstenmaier, NASA's associate administrator for space operations, told reporters at a briefing at the Johnson Space Center.
The greatest schedule uncertainty may rest with delays at NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility, the tank production plant in New Orleans. Hurricane Katrina swept the area Aug. 29, leaving the plant largely intact but heavily damaging the homes of workers and wiping out roads, electrical power and other utilities.
NASA will aim for a liftoff between May 3 and May 23.
As Discovery climbed into orbit on July 26, tracking cameras captured a 36-inch-long piece of foam tearing away from a 37-foot-long foam fixture on the outside of the fuel tank called the liquid hydrogen protuberance airload ramp.
The foam debris tumbled away without striking the accelerating spacecraft, but the incident dashed NASA's hope of launching again in September and resuming construction of the space station early next year.
After weeks of inquiry, the NASA "tiger team" concluded a collection of foam application problems at the Michoud plant were to blame, rather than a single oversight. The problems were imbedded in changes intended to make the fuel tanks safer after the Columbia tragedy, said Richard Gilbrech, who led the NASA investigation.
Columbia was struck at liftoff by a massive chunk of fuel-tank foam that caused severe damage under the left wing.
Shuttle managers decided to remove the section of wedge-shaped foam that struck the ship. They discussed but postponed changes to the tank's two foam airload ramps, which help to secure electrical cables and propellant plumbing to the outside of the fuel container.
The modifications required a temporary removal of the forward portion of the hydrogen airload ramp.
During removal, workers appear to have inadvertently crushed and cut into older sections of the ramp, the section that unleashed Discovery's foam, investigators believe.
The damage contributed to other weaknesses already present in the foam that NASA has since developed procedures to correct.
Agency officials blamed their own procedures rather than the actions of the Lockheed Martin workers who staff the Michoud plant.
mark.carreau@chron.com
6.5 months to address (the latest) foam issue and launch. Dang. So much for a Mars mission in my lifetime.
Gee, I thought this was about some movie star's boob job...gotta read these threads more carefully!
Well we are talking about someone living off the government payroll. I'm suprised it didn't take longer
NASA aims for May launch
Oh well back to wasting money on the spacebus. I sure am glad private industry isn't handling this (as it should). People might start expecting something to actually be produced instead of dumping our tax dollars into a bottomless pit
Thin layer of fibreglass wrap. Problem solved. (at least in my simple mind)
"Why did the shuttle's foam insulation flake off? In response to an edict from the EPA, NASA was required to change the design of the thermal insulating foam on the shuttle's external tank. They stopped using Freon, or CFC-11, in order to comply with the 1987 Montreal Protocol, an agreement designed to head off doubtful prognostications of an environmental disaster."But it was the elimination of the old foam that led to a real disaster for the shuttle program. The maiden flight with the new foam, in 1997, resulted in a ten-fold increase to foam-induced tile damage. The new foam was far more dangerous than the old foam. But NASA--a government organization afraid of antagonizing powerful political interests--did not reject the EPA's demands and thoroughly reverse their fatal decision. Instead, they sought a compromise, applying for a waiver from the EPA that allowed them to use the old foam on some parts of the external tank.
"NASA notes that it is impossible to ascertain with certainty whether it was the old or the new foam that caused the recent disaster, and environmentalists will no doubt say this means that we can't pin the disaster on them. But any unnecessary increase in risk in an enterprise so unforgiving of error, is unacceptable. The bottom line is that NASA took a much greater risk in order to comply with EPA demands. Environmentalist junk science trumped sound engineering."
-- Hannes Hacker, aerospace engineer and former NASA flight controller, here
Remember we're talking about a system that is unpainted to save mass (early tanks were white, not orange). That mass might send the system over the edge. Plus, I don't know if that layer would survive environmental (vibration, thermal) testing. Don't get me wrong -- it's not a bad idea, but I wonder if someone has already looked into it. You'd be surprised at the studies that are done with space-qualified hardware. I admit I'm a bit peeved that they're blaming the techs at the plant for the error. I mean, the techs are the guys who are hands-on and actually build the hardware, but never get any credit.
Measuring the World: From Material to Ethereal If you enjoy the hard sciences, don't miss their slide show as well as the link to the Museum of the National Institute Standards and Technology.
FReepmail me if you want on or off my health and science ping list. Anyone can post any unrelated link as they see fit.
Has anyone thought of that old crossword puzzle word : SNOOD, a hair net of high strength spider-web type fibers in a mesh overlying the foam? The added mass would be minimal but no large chunks would fall off... Nylon fibers are used in concrete, even some gypsum wallboard has fibers, why not add the same idea to the external tank foam? There, see, that didn't cost $1.5 Billion to figure out...W=P
Oh, yeah?
Is there any data on the rate of foam detachment incidents prior to, and following, the change to the "new foam"?
If the eco-fags are really responsible for the death of 7 people whose shoes no eco-fag on earth is worthy of being allowed to kiss, they should not be given a pass on this - no matter how long it takes to lay the blame - if in fact deserved - at their feet.
(After which, yes... we can start lynching them from lampposts - but that's another story)
Not awake = reminder bump. ;-)
and STILL they shy away from the F-word... "FREON"
"Why did the shuttle's foam insulation flake off? In response to an edict from the EPA, NASA was required to change the design of the thermal insulating foam on the shuttle's external tank. They stopped using Freon, or CFC-11, in order to comply with the 1987 Montreal Protocol, an agreement designed to head off doubtful prognostications of an environmental disaster.
"But it was the elimination of the old foam that led to a real disaster for the shuttle program. The maiden flight with the new foam, in 1997, resulted in a ten-fold increase to foam-induced tile damage. The new foam was far more dangerous than the old foam. But NASA--a government organization afraid of antagonizing powerful political interests--did not reject the EPA's demands and thoroughly reverse their fatal decision. Instead, they sought a compromise, applying for a waiver from the EPA that allowed them to use the old foam on some parts of the external tank.
"NASA notes that it is impossible to ascertain with certainty whether it was the old or the new foam that caused the recent disaster, and environmentalists will no doubt say this means that we can't pin the disaster on them. But any unnecessary increase in risk in an enterprise so unforgiving of error, is unacceptable. The bottom line is that NASA took a much greater risk in order to comply with EPA demands. Environmentalist junk science trumped sound engineering."
-- Hannes Hacker, aerospace engineer and former NASA flight controller, here
Only found this so far:
"The new foam has proven to be much more likely to peel or flake off, causing over a tenfold increase in impacts with shuttle tiles over the old foam." -- from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_external_tankI'm outa time. Keep searching HERE.and:
"According to Knight Ridder News Service, a retired engineering manager for Lockheed Martin Corp., the company that assembles NASA's tanks, said at a conference last September that developing the Freon-free foam had "been much more difficult than anticipated" and that the new foam "resulted in unanticipated program impacts, such as foam loss during flight." The manager noted that on the 1997 launch, the same one Katnik had studied, NASA had to replace nearly 11 times more damaged tiles than after a previous mission that had used the old foam." -- from HERE
If you recall Podesta was setting up a democrat party based think tank whose job it was to promote the democrat party out on the internet via word of mouth.
And the answer is too simple: go back to the old, politically incorrect, foam insulation.
Ho Ho Ho.. You mean Congress?
A generation ago, a coat of paint was sufficent to do the job.
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