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Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
Center for Nonproliferation Studies ^
| October 28, 2003.
| Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Posted on 11/05/2005 7:10:23 AM PST by MNJohnnie
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East Go to Iraq Special Collections. Go to Iraq's Biological Weapons Program. IRAQ
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Capabilities and Programs
Nuclear With sufficient black-market uranium or plutonium, Iraq probably could fabricate a nuclear weapon. If undetected and unobstructed, could produce weapons-grade fissile material within several years.
Engaged in clandestine procurement of special nuclear weapon-related equipment.
Retains large and experienced pool of nuclear scientists and technicians.
Retains nuclear weapon
s design, and may retain related components and software. Repeatedly violated its obligations under the NPT, which Iraq ratified on 10/29/69.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 687, which mandates destruction of Iraq's nuclear weapon capabilities. Until halted by Coalition air attacks and UNSCOM disarmament efforts, Iraq had an extensive nuclear weapon development program that began in 1972, involved 10,000 personnel, and had a multi-year budget totaling approximately $10 billion.
In 1990, Iraq also launched a crash program to divert reactor fuel under IAEA safeguards to produce nuclear weapons.
Considered two delivery options for nuclear weapons: either using unmodified al-Hussein ballistic missile with 300km range, or producing Al-Hussein derivative with 650km range. In 1987, Iraq reportedly field tested a radiological bomb.
Biological May retain stockpile of biological weapon (BW) munitions, including over 150 R-400 aerial bombs, and 25 or more special chemical/biological Al-Hussein ballistic missile warheads.
May retain biological weapon sprayers for Mirage F-1 aircraft.
May retain mobile production facility with capacity to produce "dry" biological agents (i.e., with long shelf life and optimized for dissemination).
Has not accounted for 17 metric tonnes of BW growth media. May possess smallpox virus; tested camelpox prior to Gulf War.
Maintains technical expertise and equipment to resume production of Bacillus anthracis spores (anthrax), botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene).
Prepared BW munitions for missile and aircraft delivery in 1990-1991 Gulf War; this included loading al-Hussein ballistic missile warheads and R-400 aerial bombs with Bacillis anthracis.
Conducted research on BW dissemination using unmanned aerial vehicles.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under UNSC Resolution 687, which mandates destruction of Iraq's biological weapon capabilities.
Ratified the BTWC on 4/18/91, as required by the Gulf War cease-fire agreement.
Chemical May retain stockpile of chemical weapon (CW) munitions, including 25 or more special chemical/biological al-Hussein ballistic missile warheads, 2,000 aerial bombs, 15,000-25,000 rockets, and 15,000 artillery shells. Believed to possess sufficient precursor chemicals to produce hundreds of tons of mustard gas, VX, and other nerve agents.
Reconstructing former dual-use CW production facilities that were destroyed by U.S. bombing.
Retains sufficient technical expertise to revive CW programs within months.
Repeatedly used CW against Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and against Iran in 1983-1988 during the Iran-Iraq war.
An extensive CW arsenalincluding 38,537 munitions, 690 tons of CW agents, and over 3,000 tons of CW precursor chemicalshas been destroyed by UNSCOM.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under UNSC Resolution 687, which mandates destruction of Iraq's chemical weapon capabilities.
Not a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Ballistic missiles May retain several al-Hussein (modified Scud-B) missiles with 650km range and 500kg payload. May retain components for dozens of Scud-B and al-Hussein missiles, as well as indigenously produced Scud missile engines.
Maintains clandestine procurement network to import missile components.
Reconstructing missile production facilities destroyed in 1998 by U.S. bombing.
May possess several hundred tons of propellant for Scud missiles.
If undetected and unobstructed, could resume production of al-Hussein missiles; could develop 3,000km-range missiles within five years; could develop ICBM within 15 years. Launched 331 Scud-B missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and 189 al-Hussein missiles at Iranian cities during the 1988 "War of the Cities."
Developing Ababil-100 with 150km range and 300kg payload, flight-testing al-Samoud with 140km range and 300kg payload, and producing Ababil-50 with 50km range and 95kg payload.
Cruise missiles C-601/Nisa 28 and HY-2 Silkworm with 95km range and 513kg payload.
SS-N-2c Styx with 80km range and 513kg payload.
Exocet AM-39 with 50km range and 165kg payload.
YJ-1/C-801 with 40km range and 165kg payload.
Other delivery systems Reportedly converting L-29 jet trainers to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for delivery of BW or CW.
May possess spraying equipment for BW dissemination by helicopter.
Experimented with MIG-21 as unmanned delivery vehicle for BW.
Fighter and ground attack forces may total 300 fixed-wing aircraft, including Su-25, Su-24MK, Su-20, Su-7, MiG-29, MiG-25, MiG-23BN, MiG-21, Mirage F1EQ5, and F-7. Ground systems include artillery and rocket launchers, notably 500+ FROG-7 artillery rockets and 12-15 launchers, with 70km range and 450kg payload.
 This chart summarizes data available from public sources. Precise assessment of a Iraq's capabilities is difficult because most weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs remain secret and cannot be verified independently. Although inspections by UNSCOM and the IAEA's Iraq Action Team provided detailed information about past Iraqi programs, assessing Iraq's current capabilities is difficult due to its policies of denial and deception, and the departure of UNSCOM inspectors in November 1998.
On Iraq's deception and denial policies, see: Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker (New York: Scribner, 2000). David Albright, "Masters of Deception," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54:3 (May/June 1998). Barton Gellman, "A Futile Game of Hide and Seek," Washington Post, 10/11/98. Barton Gellman, "Arms Inspectors Shake the Tree," Washington Post, 10/12/98.
On UNSCOM's efforts to disarm Iraq of WMD, see Robert Einhorn, Robert Gallucci, Dimitri Perricos, Jere Nichols, Gary Dillon, Ephraim Asculai, and Michael Eisenstadt, 6/14-15/01, transcripts from a conference, "Understanding the Lessons of Nuclear Inspections and Monitoring in Iraq: A Ten-Year Review," Washington, DC. Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). . Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Growing Crisis in Global Security, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000). Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets-The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons, (New York: Harper Collins, 1999).
 IAEA Action Team on Iraq, 7/13/01, "Fact Sheet: Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme," International Atomic Energy Agency,
. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001). Kelly Motz, undated [accessed 9/12/01] "What Has Iraq Been Doing Since Inspectors Left? What Is On Its Shopping List?" Iraq Watch, . William J. Broad, "Document Reveals 1987 Bomb Test by Iraq," New York Times, 4/29/01, p. 16. David Albright, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Past, Present, and Future Challenges," PolicyWatch #301, 2/18/98, . U.S. Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons Of Mass Destruction Programs," 2/13/98, . Steven Dolley, 5/12/98, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Unresolved Issues," Nuclear Control Institute, . Steven Dolley, 2/19/98, "Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues," Nuclear Control Institute,
. Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2001,
, pp. 85-86. David Albright, "A Special Case: Iraq," Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1997), pp. 309-50.
 United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), Report: Disarmament, 1/25/99, United Nations, . Motz undated. Steve Bowman, "Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2/17/98), pp. 1-5. Barbara Starr, "UNSCOM Inspectors Still Doubt Iraq's Arms Claims," Jane's Defence Weekly, 2/25/98, p. 18. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Cordesman 2001, pp. 81-84. Gellman 1998. Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Program," Arms Control Today, 1993, 14(3): 229-71.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000," 9/7/01,
. Motz undated. Javed Ali, Spring 2001, "Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance," Nonproliferation Review 8(1): 43-58. UNSCOM 1/25/99. Bowman 1998, pp. 1-5. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Starr 1998, p. 18. Cordesman 2001, pp. 75-79. United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "UNSCOM Main Achievements," 5/98, . Physicians for Human Rights, "Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against its Kurdish Population," (Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, 2/89), pp. 1-2.
 CIA 9/7/01. Cordesman 2001, pp.71-75. "German Assessment: Iraqi Missiles Will Reach Europe by 2005," Deutsche Presse Agentur (Berlin), 2/23/00, . Jane's Online, "Country Inventory In Service," and "Offensive Weapons, Iraq," Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems 36, 7/24/01, . National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, 9/99, . Carnegie Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project, undated [accessed 8/14/01], "World Missile Chart, . Motz undated. UNSCOM 1/25/99. Federation of American Scientists, undated, "Iraq," . Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), undated, "National Briefings: Iraq," "Ballistic Missile Capabilities by Country," and "Iraqi Ballistic Missile Capabilities," . U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Starr, p. 18. Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Grafton Books, 1989). Interview with Tim McCarthy, Senior Missile Analyst, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 4/30/98.
 National Defense Industrial Association, Feasibility of Third World Advanced Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat: Volume 2, Emerging Cruise Missile Threat, 8/99, , pp. 138-145. CDISS, undated, "Emerging Cruise Missile Capabilities," .
 CIA 9/7/01. Motz undated. Jane's Online 7/24/01. The Military Balance 2000/2001 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 141.
Updated October 28, 2003.
September 2001 update by Michael Barletta and Jeffrey Fields.
November 1998 original by Michael Barletta and Erik Jorgensen.
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
TOPICS: Foreign Affairs; Miscellaneous; News/Current Events
KEYWORDS: demslie; iraq; wmds
Where did it all go Dems? You claimed he had it when Clinton bombed Iraq in 1998 during Impeachement. You NOW claim "Bush Lied" in 2003. So in the interm 5 years, WHERE did it all go?
posted on 11/05/2005 7:10:24 AM PST
It all went to Syria and Iran. Sadam moved the stuff before the war began in March 2003.
posted on 11/05/2005 7:36:31 AM PST
Just as the media ignored the Butler and Senate Intel Reports...and the most important parts of both the Kay and Duelfer Reports, they also ignored one of Kay's most relevant revelations with regards to were Saddam's WMDs went.
In an exclusive interview with The Telegraph, Kay said that he had uncovered evidence that unspecified materials had been moved to Syria shortly before the war to overthrow Saddam:
"We are not talking about a large stockpile of weapons," he said. "But
we know from some of the interrogations of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material went to Syria before the war, including some components of Saddam's WMD programme. Precisely what went to Syria, and what has happened to it, is a major issue that needs to be resolved."
posted on 11/05/2005 7:38:20 AM PST
(Liberalism is the opiate of the *asses)
>It all went to Syria and Iran. Sadam moved the stuff before the war began in March 2003
Many of us here
take this for granted. But why
fail to make the case
publicly? Why don't they have
say this every day?
It makes me think that maybe
it didn't happen.
Clinton announces Iraq strikes: Full text
Following is the full text of US President Bill Clinton's statement on raids against Iraq launched by the United States and Britain on 16 December: Addressing the nation Good evening. Earlier today, I ordered America's armed forces to strike military and security targets in Iraq. They are joined by British forces. Their mission is to attack Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes and its military capacity to threaten its neighbours.
Their purpose is to protect the national interest of the United States, and indeed the interests of people throughout the Middle East and around the world.
Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten his neighbours or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas or biological weapons.
I want to explain why I have decided, with the unanimous recommendation of my national security team, to use force in Iraq; why we have acted now; and what we aim to accomplish.
Six weeks ago, Saddam Hussein announced that he would no longer cooperate with the United Nations weapons inspectors called Unscom. They are highly professional experts from dozens of countries. Their job is to oversee the elimination of Iraq's capability to retain, create and use weapons of mass destruction, and to verify that Iraq does not attempt to rebuild that capability.
The inspectors undertook this mission first seven and a half years ago at the end of the Gulf War when Iraq agreed to declare and destroy its arsenal as a condition of the ceasefire.
'Saddam will use these weapons again'
The international community had good reason to set this requirement. Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there is one big difference: He has used them. Not once, but repeatedly: Unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops during a decade-long war, not only against soldiers, but against civilians; firing Scud missiles at the citizens of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iran; and not only against a foreign enemy, but even against his own people, gassing Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq.
The international community had little doubt then, and I have no doubt today, that left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will use these terrible weapons again.
The United States has patiently worked to preserve Unscom as Iraq has sought to avoid its obligation to cooperate with the inspectors. On occasion, we've had to threaten military force, and Saddam has backed down.
Faced with Saddam's latest act of defiance in late October, we built intensive diplomatic pressure on Iraq backed by overwhelming military force in the region. The UN Security Council voted 15 to 0 to condemn Saddam's actions and to demand that he immediately come into compliance.
Eight Arab nations - Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman - warned that Iraq alone would bear responsibility for the consequences of defying the UN.
When Saddam still failed to comply, we prepared to act militarily. It was only then at the last possible moment that Iraq backed down. It pledged to the UN that it had made, and I quote, a clear and unconditional decision to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. I decided then to call off the attack with our airplanes already in the air because Saddam had given in to our demands. I concluded then that the right thing to do was to use restraint and give Saddam one last chance to prove his willingness to cooperate.
I made it very clear at that time what unconditional cooperation meant, based on existing UN resolutions and Iraq's own commitments. And along with Prime Minister Blair of Great Britain, I made it equally clear that if Saddam failed to cooperate fully, we would be prepared to act without delay, diplomacy or warning.
'The conclusions are profoundly disturbing'
Now over the past three weeks, the UN weapons inspectors have carried out their plan for testing Iraq's cooperation. The testing period ended this weekend, and last night, Unscom's chairman, Richard Butler, reported the results to UN Secretary-General Annan.
The conclusions are stark, sobering and profoundly disturbing. In four out of the five categories set forth, Iraq has failed to cooperate. Indeed, it actually has placed new restrictions on the inspectors. Here are some of the particulars:
Iraq repeatedly blocked Unscom from inspecting suspect sites. For example, it shut off access to the headquarters of its ruling party and said it will deny access to the party's other offices, even though UN resolutions make no exception for them and Unscom has inspected them in the past.
Iraq repeatedly restricted Unscom's ability to obtain necessary evidence. For example, Iraq obstructed Unscom's effort to photograph bombs related to its chemical weapons programme.
It tried to stop an Unscom biological weapons team from videotaping a site and photocopying documents and prevented Iraqi personnel from answering Unscom's questions.
Prior to the inspection of another site, Iraq actually emptied out the building, removing not just documents but even the furniture and the equipment.
Iraq has failed to turn over virtually all the documents requested by the inspectors. Indeed, we know that Iraq ordered the destruction of weapons-related documents in anticipation of an Unscom inspection.
So Iraq has abused its final chance. As the Unscom reports concludes, and again I quote:
'Iraq's conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in the fields of disarmament.
'In light of this experience, and in the absence of full cooperation by Iraq, it must regrettably be recorded again that the commission is not able to conduct the work mandated to it by the Security Council with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons programme.'
'Clear and present danger'
In short, the inspectors are saying that even if they could stay in Iraq, their work would be a sham. Saddam's deception has defeated their effectiveness. Instead of the inspectors disarming Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors.
This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize the chance. And so we had to act and act now. Let me explain why:
First, without a strong inspection system, Iraq would be free to retain and begin to rebuild its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes in months, not years.
Second, if Saddam can crippled the weapons inspection system and get away with it, he would conclude that the international community - led by the United States - has simply lost its will. He will surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction, and someday - make no mistake - he will use it again as he has in the past.
Third, in halting our air strikes in November, I gave Saddam a chance, not a license. If we turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of US power as a check against Saddam will be destroyed. We will not only have allowed Saddam to shatter the inspection system that controls his weapons of mass destruction program; we also will have fatally undercut the fear of force that stops Saddam from acting to gain domination in the region. That is why, on the unanimous recommendation of my national security team - including the vice president, the secretary of defence, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the secretary of state and the national security adviser - I have ordered a strong, sustained series of air strikes against Iraq.
They are designed to degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbours. At the same time, we are delivering a powerful message to Saddam. If you act recklessly, you will pay a heavy price. We acted today because, in the judgment of my military advisers, a swift response would provide the most surprise and the least opportunity for Saddam to prepare.
If we had delayed for even a matter of days from Chairman Butler's report, we would have given Saddam more time to disperse his forces and protect his weapons. Also, the Muslim holy month of Ramadan begins this weekend. For us to initiate military action during Ramadan would be profoundly offensive to the Moslem world and, therefore, would damage our relations with Arab countries and the progress we have made in the Middle East.
That is something we wanted very much to avoid without giving Iraq's a month's head start to prepare for potential action against it.
Finally, our allies, including Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, concurred that now is the time to strike. I hope Saddam will come into cooperation with the inspection system now and comply with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. But we have to be prepared that he will not, and we must deal with the very real danger he poses.
'A long-term strategy to contain Iraq' So we will pursue a long-term strategy to contain Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction and work toward the day when Iraq has a government worthy of its people:
First, we must be prepared to use force again if Saddam takes threatening actions, such as trying to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems, threatening his neighbours, challenging allied aircraft over Iraq or moving against his own Kurdish citizens. The credible threat to use force, and when necessary, the actual use of force, is the surest way to contain Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programme, curtail his aggression and prevent another Gulf War.
Second, so long as Iraq remains out of compliance, we will work with the international community to maintain and enforce economic sanctions. Sanctions have cost Saddam more than $120 billion - resources that would have been used to rebuild his military. The sanctions system allows Iraq to sell oil for food, for medicine, for other humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people. We have no quarrel with them. But without the sanctions, we would see the oil-for-food programme become oil-for-tanks, resulting in a greater threat to Iraq's neighbours and less food for its people. The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world.
The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government - a government ready to live in peace with its neighbours, a government that respects the rights of its people. Bringing change in Baghdad will take time and effort. We will strengthen our engagement with the full range of Iraqi opposition forces and work with them effectively and prudently.
The decision to use force is never cost-free. Whenever American forces are placed in harm's way, we risk the loss of life. And while our strikes are focused on Iraq's military capabilities, there will be unintended Iraqi casualties.
Indeed, in the past, Saddam has intentionally placed Iraqi civilians in harm's way in a cynical bid to sway international opinion. We must be prepared for these realities. At the same time, Saddam should have absolutely no doubt if he lashes out at his neighbours, we will respond forcefully.
Heavy as they are, the costs of action must be weighed against the price of inaction. If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbours. He will make war on his own people.
And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them. Because we're acting today, it is less likely that we will face these dangers in the future.
Americans won't be distracted
Let me close by addressing one other issue. Saddam Hussein and the other enemies of peace may have thought that the serious debate currently before the House of Representatives would distract Americans or weaken our resolve to face him down. But once more, the United States has proven that although we are never eager to use force, when we must act in America's vital interests, we will do so.
In the century we're leaving, America has often made the difference between chaos and community, fear and hope. Now, in the new century, we'll have a remarkable opportunity to shape a future more peaceful than the past, but only if we stand strong against the enemies of peace.
Tonight, the United States is doing just that.
May God bless and protect the brave men and women who are carrying out this vital mission and their families. And may God bless America.
posted on 11/05/2005 7:47:31 AM PST
Why don't they have TV analysts say this every day?
posted on 11/05/2005 8:04:12 AM PST
by Just A Nobody
(I - LOVE - my attitude problem! WBB lives on.)
posted on 11/05/2005 9:38:01 AM PST
(Dig deeper, more ammo.)
>It all went to Syria and Iran. Sadam moved the stuff before the war began
>>Why don't they have TV analysts say this every day?
Hey, now, there are some
who make their living at least
pretending that they
Why aren't they making this
a major issue?
Hell, they sure were loud
about Harriet Miers!
Why not noise on this?!
LOL - the only voice I have heard repeatedly comment on this is Rush! Rush can do it because HE IS EIB! He answers to no one.
I wish Rush, Brit Hume, John Gibson and Neil Cavuto would get together and get their own cable channel. If algor can do it, why not the good guys?
Note to self: go buy 10 copies of John Gibson's new book since no one will have him on to pimp it.
posted on 11/05/2005 10:44:02 AM PST
by Just A Nobody
(I - LOVE - my attitude problem! WBB lives on.)
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