Skip to comments.March 2003 Top Secret Memo: TRANSFER OF SPECIAL AMMUNITION (POTENTIAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS) Translation
Posted on 04/17/2006 8:40:37 AM PDT by jveritas
click here to read article
Thank you very much, I greatly appreciate this comment.
Thanks, it makes it hard when searching Lexis Nexis or google!!
I am sure he will :)
Thanks Dog. Great to know this.
STL - you've GOT to check out JVeritas' work. He's translating Iraqi prewar documents and there's some seriously mind-blowing stuff here. The world NEEDS to know about this.
Saddam was planning a soviet style defense of Fortress Baghdad as in Fortress Stalingrad. He thought that the real fight will be in Baghdad where the US will suffer a lot of casualties there that will turn the public opinion against the war and force the US to withdraw. He failed miserably.
Bimp? Is this a new entry in the FR lexicon of unique coinage, to join the infamous 'set your beebers to stune', 'what a maroon', and of course 'I'm going to take a shower now'?
That is great. Tony Snow is the only national Radio Talk Show Host that has been talking about these documents. I hope more of our guys on Radio will follow his steps. There are a lot of very important facts and TRUTH in these documents that can turn the debate about the war heavily in our favor.
From (Highlighted Links available thru this Link ...):
U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Center for Operational Analysis has completed the unclassified historical report of military operations conducted in Iraq, reflecting the Iraqi civilian and military leaderships perspective of events.
By Jennifer Colaizzi
USJFCOM Public Affairs
(SUFFOLK, Va., - March 24 , 2006) - Can history be wrong? Not exactly, but history can be distorted if data is provided by only one sides perspective.
U.S. Joint Forces Command has released an unclassified historical report of military operations conducted in Iraq. The twist is that this historical report reflects the Iraqi civilian and military leaderships perspective of events.
Opinions are not facts; one data point is not a trend, and a group of data points from a single perspective isnt going to convince anyone, said Army Brig. Gen. Anthony Cucolo, U.S. Joint Forces Commands (USJFCOM), Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) director.
So, how do you find ground truth in battle analysis? There are multiple options, but only one good answer, according to Cucolo.
Ground truth is getting the red side, or enemys, perspective from red, said Cucolo. Looking at the enemys actions through American military eyes, or even through the eyes of an expert trained in the enemys battle and culture, is valuable, but its still a friendlys view of red.
The overthrow of Saddams regime during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided an opportunity to study an adversary.
Its the first time since World War II, we had an opportunity to evaluate military events from both our own perspective and the perspective of the opposing political and military leadership, Cucolo said.
This means reading their documents, reading their orders, interviewing their commanders and civilian leaders and asking what happened.
This two-year project of delving into the decision-making processes of the former adversary, started in 2003 and became known as the Iraqi Perspective Project (IPP).
The Iraqi military leaders wanted to tell their side of the story.
Military professionals like to explain their actions, talk tactics, talk strategy, and give their view of what happened and why, the general said. You get in a room, roll out a map in front of a former Iraqi general and say, hey sir, we understood you were here when this happened, what were your actions?
According to Cucolo, in terms of lessons learned, the historical approach implemented during the IPP provided excellent results.
If I want to capture the most accurate history I can, I want to hear what you did and how you made decisions. Ill get more through dialogue than if I go about it and say, Where were you on the night of April 6? It makes interviewees inhibited, said Cucolo.
The IPP team conducted more than 100 interviews; 23 with senior members of the former regime.
Interviews conducted by the IPP team included: Saddams personal secretary, Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as Chemical Ali, the secretary of the Republican Guard, both Republican Guard corps commanders, the commander of the Special Republican Guard, the director of military intelligence, division commanders and others.
To augment the interviews conducted in Baghdad, the IPP team also reviewed thousands of captured documents and the transcripts of hundreds of hours of secret regime recordings. They also mined hundreds of existing interrogation transcripts.
The initial classified report has been used in a variety of Department of Defense training courses, including Capstone, Pinnacle, and courses at the Joint Forces Staff College.
According to USJFCOM officials, the IPP report provides useful lessons learned that can be factored into ongoing and future operational planning against a similar closed regime.
Noteworthy items mentioned in the unclassified IPP report include:
Iraqi regime belief that Russia and France would act on behalf of their own economic interests in Iraq to block any UN Security Council actions to authorize an invasion.
Fedayeen Saddam planned for attacks in Europe (including London) and the Middle East
Saddam was more concerned about internal revolt than a coalition invasion; therefore bridges were not blown, oil fields were not torched, and the south was not flooded all part of the inadequate and ineffective military planning done prior to the invasion.
Saddam and his inner circle believed their own propaganda
Chemical Ali was convinced Iraq no longer had WMD, but many colleagues never stopped believing in them.
Years of UN sanctions and coalition bombing had reduced the military effectiveness and usefulness of the Iraqi military forces.
Military and ministry leaders lied to Saddam about the true state of their capabilities.
Iraq military capability was also eroded by irrelevant guidance from the political leadership, creation of popular militias, prominent placement of Saddam relatives and sycophants in key leadership positions, and an onerous security apparatus.
The regime ordered the distribution of ammunition around the country to support a prolonged war with the coalition, but not to support the insurgency or a guerilla war.
The IPP report is just one example of the work JCOA does on a daily basis.
We fill a void. While services do a great job of tactical and component lessons learned and the Joint Staff does strategic lessons learned, we do the operational level, said Cucolo.
Cucolo stated the IPP is a step in the right direction, but the directorate is still studying documents to further expand picture of regime.
Eyespysomething is doing a great job in organizing these documents and making ping list.
Eyespy can you please add Mr. Lynch to the ping list on the Iraqi Pre-War documents. As always thank you very much for your help.
That is the same place Ray.
Thank you :) A book is a potential idea in the future.
Maybe Sean Hannity will pick these up, finally, and knowing he is a lurker hopefully he has noticed how important they are. His cartoon sidekick, Alan Colmes, should really go nuts over these obviously faked(sarq) documents.
Chemical Ali was convinced Iraq no longer had WMD, but many colleagues never stopped believing in them.
I hope that Sean and Rush will talk about these very important documents.
Hopefully each of us Freepers will diludge Rush, Sean, Britt, Ann, Laura, Tony and all the others on Your Most Important Work translating these Bombshell documents on Saddam's WMD's.Take care and Congratulations on Your Work.
would recall what was said regarding chemical weapons?
Or Special Weapons.....
122mm howitzer, 15,300m.
Could have been brought to Baghdad to be better guarded by the Special Republican Guard. Or, brought in for the gotterdammerung that didn't happen. Saddam wouldn't have worried over much about collateral damage in Shiite neighborhoods.
All our guys were in MOPP gear for weeks. Must have been some reason for that.
I know there is no mention in the documents that jveritas has translated either about the US troops not invading until they were in a certain position. The one document that jveritas translated in regards to the Russians had to do with them selling Mig 29 parts to Iraq.
BELOW FROM THE TWO ARTICLES.
"In December 2002, Russias Middle East envoy, Yevgeny Primakov (former Russian Intelligence Chief), flew to Baghdad under the front of making one last chance for peace with the dictator. As soon as his plane landed, it was allegedly loaded with sensitive materials and flown directly to Belarus. People speculate as to whether or not it was WMD, WMD equipment, documents, people, or things the Russians didnt want the US to get their hands on, but in any event the plane was loaded with things the US wanted. There is no doubt that the Russians did send GPS jammers to confuse American satellite-guided bombs, night vision goggles, special anti-tank missiles, and Russian advisors.
Many of the Russian-made weapons procured through Syria's front companies-like SES International-had come from Belarus. After the fall of Saddam's regime, it was found that many of the senior leaders who had fled went to Syria and Belarus (sometimes in that order). If one asks, "What happened to all that WMD?" Then a finger can be pointed towards the former Soviet Republic at the very least for enabling the former leaders of Saddam's regime to escape and orchestrate an insurgency, clearly for removal of "sensitive items" from Saddam's regime, and very likely for accepting Saddam's WMD, WMD equipment, documents, and people.
Here it is. The info that Saddam got from the Russians was that we would not attack until troops were in place in Turkey. Because that hadn't happened, Saddam did not expect the attack to come when it came.
Bump for the truth to come out
There's also this:
By telling Saddam that the main attack on Baghdad would not begin until the Army's 4th Infantry Division arrived around April 15, the Russians reinforced an impression that US commanders were trying to create to catch the Iraqis by surprise.
The attack on Baghdad began well before the 4th Infantry arrived, and the Saddam regime collapsed quickly.
Both stories are in among the PreWarDocs, though they are not documents translated by jveritas.
Hugh Hewitt is reading Josephs translation on the air right now....on his show.
I didn't do it, you never saw me, you can't prove a thing.
Now let's... moveon.org
Thank you Dog for the update. That is really great.
Is there an online link?
Sorry, got to the party late...
Attaboy, jveritas! Don't burn out though. Make sure you get your mind off of documents and on to some R&R periodically.
Since most of the important comments have already been made, I'll stick to the lighter stuff by pointing out that you guys are all wrong.
SPECIAL WEAPONS ARE THE ONES THAT GET FIRED FROM A SHORT YELLOW TUBE!
No problem ... just had to get home from work to find them. That's the great thing about FR. I forget three times as much as I ever remember, but someone else can always remind me.
Kudos, for the heavy lifting, JV. Let me second Coop's excellent point and add one more: Cross-link (read "footnote the Hell out of") as much of this as possible. The loony left won't buy in, anyway, but it won't be for a dearth of factual data exposing the cavernous divergence between reality and their perception of it.
Keep updated off-site backups of your hard drive volume(s) or, better, operate synchronized mirror volumes at multiple locations. Insurance against the "prone to sudden disappearance" characteristic of some kinds of information.
"The spelling of names...
Rasheed and Rashid.
Al Mira, Al Mirah, Al-Mirah, Al-Mira
Abdallah and Abdullah.
Are these still the same, even with the different spellings? Does Al Mirah mean the mirror?"
Hard to say, but many names don't have a common spelling even though many linguists use a common arabic dictionary.
absolutely, especially when you consider that there is ubdoubtedly internal Iraq sources that have never been revealed for their own protection.
sure thing, it concerned me as well
****************************AN EXCERPT *****************************
As regular readers know, we've been cautious about drawing conclusions from the tiny number of Iraqi documents that have so far been made public under Project Harmony. But today, jveritas at Free Republic, whose translation efforts we linked to here, has come up with what appears to be a highly significant memorandum.
This is how he introduces the translation:..........
See beginning of this thread or the link.....
The apparent significance of this document requires no elaboration. Transferring a load of ordinary munitions from Najaf to Baghdad would presumably not require the approval of the Army's Chief of Staff; nor would it be the subject of a top secret memo; nor would arrangements for "special vehicles" be necessary. Hugh Hewitt writes:
More at the Powerline Link above..........
You guys need to see some of the questions being raised on the Powerline Blog,...see link above....
Interesting the Powerline readers say the munitions are too small to deliver WMD. Is there another meaning of "special ammunition"?
The 14.5 mm round was used originally for anti-tank rounds, though by the 1950s it was no longer effective against tanks but remained effective against other armored vehicles.
It's also a Russian round. Wonder if the "special ammunition" is what Russia gave them?
The first priority ammunition from the document is all large enough to deliver WMD. jveritas ... is there anything about the document that might suggest why one was first priority and one was second priority? Does the classification of first vs. second priority mean something more than what's obvious (ie. is "priority" a code word for something else or can it be translated in another way)?
Is there a way I can log in at Powerline and answer some of the questions?
Special Ammunition is not any other ammunition, what is special about 155 mm shells if it does not contain Chemical Weapons. The Iraqi used the term "Special Ammunition" exclusively to designate "Chemical Weapons".
Most of this 262 pages document is about spreading different types of ammunitions, and only this 9 pages top secret memo use the term "Special Ammunition". As I said before this term is not loosely used by the Iraqis it is a very specific term to designate "Chemical Weapons Ammunition".
Conventional air defense munitions.
Yeah I hear you, but is there any reason that conventional ammo would be on the manifest along with the chemical munitions? Seems odd that they were consigned the same "special" status, even though they were cat 'B'.
I was wondering if there was anywhere in the document that would further explain.