Skip to comments.March 2003 Top Secret Memo: TRANSFER OF SPECIAL AMMUNITION (POTENTIAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS) Translation
Posted on 04/17/2006 8:40:37 AM PDT by jveritas
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That's my recollection. I know the stories are in the PreWarDocs list.
The spelling of names...
Rasheed and Rashid.
Al Mira, Al Mirah, Al-Mirah, Al-Mira
Abdallah and Abdullah.
Are these still the same, even with the different spellings? Does Al Mirah mean the mirror?
My thoughts exactly.
Tony Snow talked this morning enthusiastically about the recent revelations. It shows that a number of our friends in the conservative media are finally getting the truth out to their listeners.
That's good news, I hope more of the media will pick up on it. Tony Snow is a friend of FR and jveritas spoke on his show one day last week.
Mirror is Al Miraya or AL Miraa't in Arabic.
Al Mira can be a name in the Iraqi dialect more rather than a common Arabic word. In each Arabic dialect there are 5 to 10% of the words, specially name of places, that are not not the same in other dialects.
Thank you. I hope that the word will go out on this documents and others.
Again Joseph great job.
Thank you very much, I greatly appreciate this comment.
Thanks, it makes it hard when searching Lexis Nexis or google!!
I am sure he will :)
Thanks Dog. Great to know this.
STL - you've GOT to check out JVeritas' work. He's translating Iraqi prewar documents and there's some seriously mind-blowing stuff here. The world NEEDS to know about this.
Saddam was planning a soviet style defense of Fortress Baghdad as in Fortress Stalingrad. He thought that the real fight will be in Baghdad where the US will suffer a lot of casualties there that will turn the public opinion against the war and force the US to withdraw. He failed miserably.
Bimp? Is this a new entry in the FR lexicon of unique coinage, to join the infamous 'set your beebers to stune', 'what a maroon', and of course 'I'm going to take a shower now'?
That is great. Tony Snow is the only national Radio Talk Show Host that has been talking about these documents. I hope more of our guys on Radio will follow his steps. There are a lot of very important facts and TRUTH in these documents that can turn the debate about the war heavily in our favor.
From (Highlighted Links available thru this Link ...):
U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Center for Operational Analysis has completed the unclassified historical report of military operations conducted in Iraq, reflecting the Iraqi civilian and military leaderships perspective of events.
By Jennifer Colaizzi
USJFCOM Public Affairs
(SUFFOLK, Va., - March 24 , 2006) - Can history be wrong? Not exactly, but history can be distorted if data is provided by only one sides perspective.
U.S. Joint Forces Command has released an unclassified historical report of military operations conducted in Iraq. The twist is that this historical report reflects the Iraqi civilian and military leaderships perspective of events.
Opinions are not facts; one data point is not a trend, and a group of data points from a single perspective isnt going to convince anyone, said Army Brig. Gen. Anthony Cucolo, U.S. Joint Forces Commands (USJFCOM), Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) director.
So, how do you find ground truth in battle analysis? There are multiple options, but only one good answer, according to Cucolo.
Ground truth is getting the red side, or enemys, perspective from red, said Cucolo. Looking at the enemys actions through American military eyes, or even through the eyes of an expert trained in the enemys battle and culture, is valuable, but its still a friendlys view of red.
The overthrow of Saddams regime during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided an opportunity to study an adversary.
Its the first time since World War II, we had an opportunity to evaluate military events from both our own perspective and the perspective of the opposing political and military leadership, Cucolo said.
This means reading their documents, reading their orders, interviewing their commanders and civilian leaders and asking what happened.
This two-year project of delving into the decision-making processes of the former adversary, started in 2003 and became known as the Iraqi Perspective Project (IPP).
The Iraqi military leaders wanted to tell their side of the story.
Military professionals like to explain their actions, talk tactics, talk strategy, and give their view of what happened and why, the general said. You get in a room, roll out a map in front of a former Iraqi general and say, hey sir, we understood you were here when this happened, what were your actions?
According to Cucolo, in terms of lessons learned, the historical approach implemented during the IPP provided excellent results.
If I want to capture the most accurate history I can, I want to hear what you did and how you made decisions. Ill get more through dialogue than if I go about it and say, Where were you on the night of April 6? It makes interviewees inhibited, said Cucolo.
The IPP team conducted more than 100 interviews; 23 with senior members of the former regime.
Interviews conducted by the IPP team included: Saddams personal secretary, Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as Chemical Ali, the secretary of the Republican Guard, both Republican Guard corps commanders, the commander of the Special Republican Guard, the director of military intelligence, division commanders and others.
To augment the interviews conducted in Baghdad, the IPP team also reviewed thousands of captured documents and the transcripts of hundreds of hours of secret regime recordings. They also mined hundreds of existing interrogation transcripts.
The initial classified report has been used in a variety of Department of Defense training courses, including Capstone, Pinnacle, and courses at the Joint Forces Staff College.
According to USJFCOM officials, the IPP report provides useful lessons learned that can be factored into ongoing and future operational planning against a similar closed regime.
Noteworthy items mentioned in the unclassified IPP report include:
Iraqi regime belief that Russia and France would act on behalf of their own economic interests in Iraq to block any UN Security Council actions to authorize an invasion.
Fedayeen Saddam planned for attacks in Europe (including London) and the Middle East
Saddam was more concerned about internal revolt than a coalition invasion; therefore bridges were not blown, oil fields were not torched, and the south was not flooded all part of the inadequate and ineffective military planning done prior to the invasion.
Saddam and his inner circle believed their own propaganda
Chemical Ali was convinced Iraq no longer had WMD, but many colleagues never stopped believing in them.
Years of UN sanctions and coalition bombing had reduced the military effectiveness and usefulness of the Iraqi military forces.
Military and ministry leaders lied to Saddam about the true state of their capabilities.
Iraq military capability was also eroded by irrelevant guidance from the political leadership, creation of popular militias, prominent placement of Saddam relatives and sycophants in key leadership positions, and an onerous security apparatus.
The regime ordered the distribution of ammunition around the country to support a prolonged war with the coalition, but not to support the insurgency or a guerilla war.
The IPP report is just one example of the work JCOA does on a daily basis.
We fill a void. While services do a great job of tactical and component lessons learned and the Joint Staff does strategic lessons learned, we do the operational level, said Cucolo.
Cucolo stated the IPP is a step in the right direction, but the directorate is still studying documents to further expand picture of regime.
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