Posted on 05/04/2006 5:03:26 AM PDT by SJackson
Who messed up Iraq? Donald Rumsfeld is the usual nominee. For conservative hawks, attacks on the U.S. Defence Secretary provide a way to attack the war without attacking the larger administration. And for liberal opponents of the war, attacks on Rumsfeld provide a way to attack the war without attacking the military that planned and executed that war.
Now comes an important new book, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, by New York Times correspondent Michael Gordon and retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor. Their story bears hard on Rumsfeld. But it daringly points a finger at a normally blame-proof figure: the general who actually planned and led the Iraq campaign: General Tommy Franks, head of U.S. Central Command during both the Afghan and Iraq wars.
It was General Franks who adamantly refused to engage in post-war planning for Iraq. Long before George W. Bush was elected president, CentCom (then led by Gen. Anthony Zinni--a future opponent of Bush's decision to overthrow Saddam) had drawn up a contingency plan for war with Iraq. This plan was a huge and heavy Colin-Powell-style plan, which contemplated the use of at least 380,000 troops. It deviated in almost every way from the plan actually adopted in 2003--with one exception. To quote Gordon and Trainor: "There was a gaping hole in the occupation annex of the plan. CENTCOM would have the responsibility of general security. But there was no plan for the political administration, restoration of basic services, training of police, or reconstruction of Iraq." The principal author of the Zinni plan: his deputy, Tommy Franks.
As the war plan moved from the realm of the contingency to the realm of the real, Franks continued to refuse to think about what would happen after the shooting ceased. Gordon and Trainor again: "Franks told his commanders that his assumption was that Colin Powell's State Department would have the lead for the rebuilding of Iraq's political institutions and infrastructure."
In October, 2002, however, Franks' assumption was invalidated: At Rumsfeld's insistence, the President agreed that the Department of Defence would assume overall responsibility for the postwar occupation.
Rumsfeld's civilian deputies, Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith, welcomed this responsibility as an opportunity to put Iraqis in charge of their country's reconstruction. But there was only one organized group of Iraqis able to serve as a transitional, provisional government: Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress (INC). And General Franks fully shared the fierce, almost unreasoning, hatred for the INC that pervaded the State Department and CIA.
The INC, for example, proposed to recruit a brigade of Free Iraqi forces to enter Iraq with the coalition. "Franks remained unenthusiastic, to say the least. After a briefing from [Feith's aide Bill] Luti on his pet project, Franks turned to Feith in a Pentagon corridor, letting him know where he stood: 'I don't have time for this f--king bullshit,' Franks exclaimed."
Franks wanted to race to Baghdad as rapidly as possible. To achieve his plan, he bypassed thousands of Iraqi Fedayeen fighters. These black-garbed guerillas ambushed and killed American soldiers--and then faded into the landscape. The Americans could not chase or identify them because Franks' determination to travel light had sent U.S. forces into battle with few or no interpreters.
In late March, Franks' deputy commander, John Abizaid, discreetly asked the INC for help. Chalabi offered 1,000 men. Gordon and Trainor point out that while Franks had previously disdained Luti's proposal to train a carefully screened Iraqi force, his command now proposed a variant of the plan "conceived in haste to deal with unexpected difficulties."
But by the time the INC men landed in southern Iraq, the emergency had passed, and Franks had reverted to his previous attitude. "The fighters arrived with virtually no provisions and no welcome. They were ushered into a busted-up hangar. . . . For weeks, [the local commander] scrambled to find a way to arm and equip them. . . . They never played a significant military role."
Franks flew into Baghdad on April 16 to meet with senior U.S. commanders. He told them they should prepare to pull out within 60 days. "Franks laid down the rule that was to guide the next phase of the operation: The generals should be prepared to take as much risk departing as they had in their push to Baghdad." Franks intended to hand over responsibility to a new Iraqi government. But he himself had guaranteed that no such government was waiting to go.
Franks lived by his own "quick out" principle. He retired from the army in July, 2003, selling his memoirs for a reported $5-million, booked a busy speaking schedule, and joined the board of the Bank of America.
Hindsight is 20/20. What were the options, and what were the likely results of taking various options? Second guessing generals is easy to do after the fact.
I find it absolutely amazing that these fellows have 20/20 hindsight. When will they ever learn that democracy doesn't happen overnight, nor do we "run" other countries governments with our armed forces. To do so would really be so un-American, and I'm glad we don't.
Frum is critical of everything and/or anyone in the Bush Administration.
The DoD wins the War,
State wins the Peace.
Seems to me handing reconstruction over to the State Dept would have been snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.
In retrospect you're probably right, absent an American desire to maintain a military government for a period of years. However that decision belongs to Rumsfeld's boss.
I thought Bremer was Powell's choice.
May be David Frum should write a great book telling us how did this happen because the facts absolutely show us otherwise.
Correct, as productive as second guessing politicians.
So now the a-holes are going after Tommy Franks.
Why would you say this? Bremer was a complete failure and they have taken the role away from DoD and handed it back to state.
Every bullshit artist in the world is coming out of the woodwork to write aa book,think I'll do one.
That tells me all I need to know.
Who would buy a book on an incomplete subject?
I agree, but in this case Intelligence predictions from both America and Britain, pointed to the fact that to forestall a insurgency there would be a need for a phase four plan, stabilization and pacification.
And that with Saddam's removal the American military would need to run the country until the necessary infrastructure was put into place.
That said when proper direction came down from up top, the American military went straight into action, and has evolved real professional stabilization pacification tactics and strategy.
You are exactly correct; the year that Bremer was put in charge is the year that State was put in charge. I think things have reversed themselves and DOD is back in charge...which is why things are moving in the right direction now. Bremer replaced Garner, but I don't know any history behind that decision.
You are absolutely correct!
Exactly.
Thanks for rejecting the basic and tired premise of this article:
Iraq as quagmire.
Rummy took post war control away from State.
I lost interest after seeing New York Times in the article.
WRONG!!! Bremer was chosen by Rumsfeld and reported directly to Rumsfeld.
I read on FR that Powell was the one who put Bremer in charge, but do not remember the reasons behind it.
There is enough blame to go around for decisions made at the beginning of the war. However, these people playing the blame game now instead of looking back after the war is over is stupid.
OK, I stand corrected; I will have to do some research on this. Garner was chosen first, and then replaced by Bremer, and I thought that was a State decision.
Actually, Iraq has gone just fine from the invasion till now. What did people expect this job to be like? Invade a country, occupy it, set up a new government, rebuild all institutions, put the old regime on trial -- what did people EXPECT that to look like? Cleaning up New Orleans after a flood?
The real problem here is the massive level of niavete about what what a war takes.
It's relatively easy to armchair quarterback any plan after the fact.
What we are NOT told is what Franks' marching orders were. If Franks was told to minimize casualties and end the high-intensity phase as quickly as possible, then he did exactly as directed -- and my memory tells me that this was exactly what was ordered.
Franks absolutely destroyed the enemy, and if he had not done so, we wouldn't be talking about anything except his failure at the critical mission he was assigned, the mission that had our troops most at risk....the war phase. Given the pre-war build-up, Franks was far more concerned with a chemical/biological attack and preparation for that....and they should have been.
It's so easy looking backward to nitpick.
Ummm . . . in case nobody has noticed, we have won in Iraq. Iraq has a new democratic government, al Qaeda has suffered a crushing, humiliating defeat and we are just mopping up now.
How many of these books about the war written by NYT correspondents are fiction? Why should anyone consider this to be any different?
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1619849/posts
Inadvertent Assistance (Bush approved plan to keep the Iraqi Army, but Bremer overturned it)
NY Times ^ | April 23 2006
Posted on 04/23/2006 12:08:17 AM PDT by jmc1969
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1560920/posts
The Bremer Paradox - His political stumbles made Iraq's transition harder.
Wall Street Journal ^ | Jan. 19, 2006 | ROBERT L. POLLOCK
Posted on 01/19/2006 6:30:59 AM PST by conservativecorner
Show me the perfect war??????
Thank you.
So President Bush went to war with a war plan that was incomplete?
I think if we'd known then what we know now, namely that Saddam Hussein was a paranoid, corrupt, crazy, and criminally incompetent manager, we probably would've planned for the complete and utter collapse of Iraqi civil services and law and order.
Iraq used to be one of the more modern and advanced Middle East countries, and nobody really anticipated the extent to which Saddam's regime had caused the civil service in that country to rot and fester.
Most Americans have trouble wrapping their mind around the relatively low level of corruption that we tolerate in our own government. Understanding what third world countries and predominately Islamic countries have to put up with is beyond comprehension. Heck, I've seen Americans deny that the Democrat led urban centers in our country have problems that stem from the systemic corruption of the Democratic Party. If anything, Democrats tolerate it more than Republicans, and when a Republican is caught with their hand in the honey jar, even the Republicans join in to castrate the offender.
I've tried to outline the problems with corruption in American Samoa. There are a lot of similarities between third world countries and what happens in American Samoa, Puerto Rico, Guam, and our inner cities. The difference is primarily one of degree with our states on the low end of the scale, the territories in the middle, and the third world countries and Muslim tyrannies a far and distant leader.
Who would buy a book on an incomplete subject?
__________
Don't read much history, do you?
(I know what you mean, it just sounded funny)
On Monday morning everybody can safely play quarterback.
Has something recently gone wrong in Iraq? Why all the hand wringing?
Abazaid had a plan to keep the Iraqi Army, retrain it, add Kurds and Shia, and have it be the Army of Iraq. Bush signed off on this plan, however Bremer stabbed him in the back by ordering the Iraqi Army disbanded. That one mistake cost more American and Iraqi lives and helped form the insurgency more then any thing else done in the war.
Things are going very much in the right direction in Iraq. It is therefor necessary for the left to ratchet up the rhetoric to the contrary.
The jump cut geopolitical mentality is incapable of thinking about anything at all. All crimes and problems must be solved by the end of the show.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1624566/posts?page=35#35
POWELL WANTED MORE TROOPS
Neal Nuze ^ | 5/1/06 | Neal Boortz
Posted on 05/01/2006 6:40:58 AM PDT by NotchJohnson
Also see #37
The coauthor: General Bernard E. Trainor
That lifts the thing out of the realm of being just another press book.
I have been thinking we must be winning, else why all the press discussion of what went wrong.
It seems that American casualties are down, Iraqi casualties are down, the government is beginning to function, and everyone is asking what went wrong.
Absolutely.
State has been completely dominated by ineffective, and often anti-American, liberals for decades.
There is nothing in State's track record that should give anyone even the slightest hope they would have been capable of pulling this off.
Bush's theory is that the west's larger security problem in the middle east can only really be solved when governments in the region are representative of the people and not run by dictators, whether baathist or islamic. Typically, though not always, governments truly derived from the people are more likely to live in peace with their neighbors.
The majority of the careerists at State have NEVER bought into this idea. State would happily toss aside the hard work of creating bottom-up democratic institutions in Iraq for short-term stability and appeasing the Gulf arab states.
So if State had been in charge from the beginning there would have been no hope for real change in Iraq, and it would have been only a relatively short time before another dictator, baathist or islamic, had his boot on the heel of the Iraqi people with the end result of no net progress in the middle east.
I say that because no rational person trusts the State Dept. They are the UN within.
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