Full Text of Majority Opinion in Yesterday's NY Same Sex "Marriage" victory

We hold that the New York Constitution does not compel recognition of marriages between members of the same sex. Whether such marriages should be recognized is a question to be addressed by the Legislature.

Plaintiffs and petitioners (hereafter plaintiffs) are the members of 44 same-sex couples. Each couple tried unsuccessfully to obtain a marriage license. Plaintiffs then began these four lawsuits, seeking declaratory judgments that the restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples is invalid under

the State Constitution. Defendants and respondents (hereafter defendants) are the license-issuing authorities of New York City, Albany and Ithaca; the State Department of Health, which instructs local authorities about the issuance of marriage licenses; and the State itself.

In Hernandez v Robles, Supreme Court granted summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor; the Appellate Division reversed. In Samuels v New York State Department of Health, Matter of Kane v Marsolais and Seymour v Holcomb, Supreme Court granted summary judgment in defendants' favor, and the Appellate Division affirmed. We now affirm the orders of the Appellate Division.

All the parties to these cases now acknowledge, implicitly or explicitly, that the Domestic Relations Law limits marriage to opposite-sex couples. Some amici, however, suggest that the statute can be read to permit same-sex marriage, thus mooting the constitutional issues. We find this suggestion untenable.

Articles 2 and 3 of the Domestic Relations Law, which govern marriage, nowhere say in so many words that only people of different sexes may marry each other, but that was the universal understanding when Articles 2 and 3 were adopted in 1909, an understanding reflected in several statutes. Domestic Relations Law § 12 provides that "the parties must solemnly declare . . . that they take each other as husband and wife." Domestic

Relations Law § 15 (a) requires town and city clerks to obtain specified information from "the groom" and "the bride." Domestic Relations Law § 5 prohibits certain marriages as incestuous, specifying opposite-sex combinations (brother and sister, uncle and niece, aunt and nephew), but not same-sex combinations. Domestic Relations Law § 50 says that the property of "a married woman . . . shall not be subject to her husband's control."

New York's statutory law clearly limits marriage to opposite-sex couples. The more serious question is whether that limitation is consistent with the New York Constitution.

New York is one of many states in which supporters of same-sex marriage have asserted it as a state constitutional right. Several other state courts have decided such cases, under various state constitutional provisions and with divergent results (e.g., Goodridge v Department of Public Health, 440 Mass 309, 798 NE2d 941 [2003] [excluding same-sex couples from marriage violates Massachusetts Constitution]; Standhardt v Superior Court, 206 Ariz 276, 77 P3d 451 [Ariz Ct App 2004] [constitutional right to marry under Arizona Constitution does not encompass marriage to same-sex partner]; Morrison v Sadler, 821 NE2d 15 [Ind 2005] [Indiana Constitution does not require judicial recognition of same-sex marriage]; Lewis v Harris, 378 NJ Super 168, 875 A2d 259 [2005] [limitation of marriage to members of opposite sex does not violate New Jersey Constitution]; Baehr v Lewin, 74 Haw 530, 852 P2d 44 [1993]

[refusal of marriage licenses to couples of the same sex subject to strict scrutiny under Hawaii Constitution]; Baker v State, 170 Vt 194, 744 A2d 864 [1999] [denial to same-sex couples of benefits and protections afforded to married people violates Vermont Constitution]).

Here, plaintiffs claim that, by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, the New York Domestic Relations Law violates two provisions of the State Constitution: the Due Process Clause (Article I, § 6: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law") and the Equal Protection Clause (Article I, § 11: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof").

We approach plaintiffs' claims by first considering, in section III below, whether the challenged limitation can be defended as a rational legislative decision. The answer to this question, as we show in section IV below, is critical at every stage of the due process and equal protection analysis.

It is undisputed that the benefits of marriage are many. The diligence of counsel has identified 316 such benefits in New York law, of which it is enough to summarize some of the most important: Married people receive significant tax advantages, rights in probate and intestacy proceedings, rights to support from their spouses both during the marriage and after it is dissolved, and rights to be treated as family members in obtaining insurance coverage and making health care decisions.

Beyond this, they receive the symbolic benefit, or moral satisfaction, of seeing their relationships recognized by the State.

The critical question is whether a rational legislature could decide that these benefits should be given to members of opposite-sex couples, but not same-sex couples. The question is not, we emphasize, whether the Legislature must or should continue to limit marriage in this way; of course the Legislature may (subject to the effect of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L 104-199, 110 Stat 2419) extend marriage or some or all of its benefits to same-sex couples. We conclude, however, that there are at least two grounds that rationally support the limitation on marriage that the Legislature has enacted. Others have been advanced, but we will discuss only these two, both of which are derived from the undisputed assumption that marriage is important to the welfare of children.

First, the Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex than in same-sex relationships. Heterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the birth of children; homosexual intercourse does not. Despite the advances of science, it remains true that the vast majority of children are born as a result of a sexual relationship between a man and a woman, and the Legislature could find that this will continue to be true. The Legislature could also find that such relationships are all too often casual or

temporary. It could find that an important function of marriage is to create more stability and permanence in the relationships that cause children to be born. It thus could choose to offer an inducement -- in the form of marriage and its attendant benefits -- to opposite-sex couples who make a solemn, long-term commitment to each other.

The Legislature could find that this rationale for marriage does not apply with comparable force to same-sex couples. These couples can become parents by adoption, or by artificial insemination or other technological marvels, but they do not become parents as a result of accident or impulse. The Legislature could find that unstable relationships between people of the opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be born into or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus that promoting stability in oppositesex relationships will help children more. This is one reason why the Legislature could rationally offer the benefits of marriage to opposite-sex couples only.

There is a second reason: The Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and a father. Intuition and experience suggest that a child benefits from having before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what both a man and a woman are like. It is obvious that there are exceptions to this general rule -- some children who never know their fathers, or their mothers, do far better than some who grow

up with parents of both sexes -- but the Legislature could find that the general rule will usually hold.

Plaintiffs, and amici supporting them, argue that the proposition asserted is simply untrue: that a home with two parents of different sexes has no advantage, from the point of view of raising children, over a home with two parents of the same sex. Perhaps they are right, but the Legislature could rationally think otherwise.

To support their argument, plaintiffs and amici supporting them refer to social science literature reporting studies of same-sex parents and their children. Some opponents of same-sex marriage criticize these studies, but we need not consider the criticism, for the studies on their face do not establish beyond doubt that children fare equally well in samesex and opposite-sex households. What they show, at most, is that rather limited observation has detected no marked differences. More definitive results could hardly be expected, for until recently few children have been raised in same-sex households, and there has not been enough time to study the longterm results of such child-rearing.

Plaintiffs seem to assume that they have demonstrated the irrationality of the view that opposite-sex marriages offer advantages to children by showing there is no scientific evidence to support it. Even assuming no such evidence exists, this reasoning is flawed. In the absence of conclusive scientific evidence, the Legislature could rationally proceed on the common- sense premise that children will do best with a mother and father in the home. (See Goodridge, 798 NE2d at 979-980 [Sosman, J., dissenting].) And a legislature proceeding on that premise could rationally decide to offer a special inducement, the legal recognition of marriage, to encourage the formation of oppositesex households.

In sum, there are rational grounds on which the Legislature could choose to restrict marriage to couples of opposite sex. Plaintiffs have not persuaded us that this longaccepted restriction is a wholly irrational one, based solely on ignorance and prejudice against homosexuals. This is the question on which these cases turn. If we were convinced that the restriction plaintiffs attack were founded on nothing but prejudice -- if we agreed with the plaintiffs that it is comparable to the restriction in Loving v Virginia (388 US 1 [1967]), a prohibition on interracial marriage that was plainly "designed to maintain White Supremacy" (id. at 11) -- we would hold it invalid, no matter how long its history. As the dissent points out, a long and shameful history of racism lay behind the kind of statute invalidated in Loving.

But the historical background of Loving is different from the history underlying this case. Racism has been recognized for centuries -- at first by a few people, and later by many more -- as a revolting moral evil. This country fought a civil war to eliminate racism's worst manifestation, slavery, and passed three constitutional amendments to eliminate that curse and its vestiges. Loving was part of the civil rights revolution of the 1950's and 1960's, the triumph of a cause for which many heroes and many ordinary people had struggled since our nation began.

It is true that there has been serious injustice in the treatment of homosexuals also, a wrong that has been widely recognized only in the relatively recent past, and one our Legislature tried to address when it enacted the Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act four years ago (L 2002, ch 2).

But the traditional definition of marriage is not merely a byproduct of historical injustice. Its history is of a different kind.

The idea that same-sex marriage is even possible is a relatively new one. Until a few decades ago, it was an accepted truth for almost everyone who ever lived, in any society in which marriage existed, that there could be marriages only between participants of different sex. A court should not lightly conclude that everyone who held this belief was irrational, ignorant or bigoted. We do not so conclude.

Our conclusion that there is a rational basis for limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples leads us to hold that that limitation is valid under the New York Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and that any expansion of the traditional definition of marriage should come from the Legislature. This Court is the final authority as to the meaning of the New York Constitution. This does not mean, of course, that we ignore the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of similarly worded clauses of the Federal Constitution. The governing principle is that our Constitution cannot afford less protection to our citizens than the Federal Constitution does, but it can give more (People v P.J. Video, Inc., 68 NY2d 296, 302 [1986]). We have at times found our Due Process Clause to be more protective of rights than its federal counterpart, usually in cases involving the rights of criminal defendants (e.g., People v LaValle, 3 NY3d 88 [2004]) or prisoners (e.g., Cooper v Morin, 49 NY2d 69 [1979]). In general, we have used the same analytical framework as the Supreme Court in considering due process cases, though our analysis may lead to different results.

By contrast, we have held that our Equal Protection Clause "is no broader in coverage than the federal provision" (Under 21 v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344, 360 n 6 [1985]). We find no inconsistency that is significant in this case between our due process and equal protection decisions and the Supreme Court's. No precedent answers for us the question we face today; we reject defendants' argument that the Supreme Court's ruling without opinion in Baker v Nelson (409 US 810 [1972]) bars us from considering plaintiffs' equal protection claims. But both New York and Federal decisions guide us in applying the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. A. Due Process In deciding the validity of legislation under the Due Process Clause, courts first inquire whether the legislation restricts the exercise of a fundamental right, one that is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 721 [1997], quoting Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 503 [1977] [plurality opinion]; Hope v Perales, 83 NY2d 563, 575 [1994]). In this case, whether the right in question is "fundamental" depends on how it is defined. The right to marry is unquestionably a fundamental right (Loving, 388 US at 12; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 384 [1978]; Cooper, 49 NY2d at 79). The right to marry someone of the same sex, however, is not "deeply rooted"; it has not even been asserted until relatively recent times.

The issue then becomes whether the right to marry must be defined to include a right to same-sex marriage.

Recent Supreme Court decisions show that the definition of a fundamental right for due process purposes may be either too narrow or too broad. In Lawrence v Texas (539 US 558, 566 [2003]), the Supreme Court criticized its own prior decision in Bowers v Hardwick (478 US 186, 190 [1986]) for defining the right at issue as the right of "homosexuals to engage in sodomy." The Lawrence court plainly thought the right should have been defined more broadly, as a right to privacy in intimate relationships.

On the other hand, in Washington v Glucksberg (521 US at 722- 723), the Court criticized a lower federal court for defining the right at issue too broadly as a "right to die"; the right at issue in Glucksberg, the Court said, was really the "right to commit suicide" and to have assistance in doing so.

The difference between Lawrence and Glucksberg is that in Glucksberg the relatively narrow definition of the right at issue was based on rational line-drawing. In Lawrence, by contrast, the court found the distinction between homosexual sodomy and intimate relations generally to be essentially arbitrary. Here, there are, as we have explained, rational grounds for limiting the definition of marriage to opposite-sex couples. This case is therefore, in the relevant way, like Glucksberg and not at all like Lawrence. Plaintiffs here do not, as the petitioners in Lawrence did, seek protection against State intrusion on intimate, private activity. They seek from the courts access to a State-conferred benefit that the Legislature has rationally limited to opposite-sex couples. We conclude that, by defining marriage as it has, the New York Legislature has not restricted the exercise of a fundamental right (see also concurring op of Judge Graffeo at 5-13).

Where no fundamental right is at issue, legislation is valid under the Due Process Clause if it is rationally related to legitimate government interests (Glucksberg, 521 US at 728; Hope, 83 NY2d at 577). Again, our earlier discussion answers this question. Protecting the welfare of children is a legitimate governmental interest, and we have shown above that there is a rational relationship between that interest and the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples. That limitation therefore does not deprive plaintiffs of due process of law.

Plaintiffs claim that the distinction made by the Domestic Relations Law between opposite-sex and same-sex couples deprives them of the equal protection of the laws. This claim raises, first, the issue of what level of scrutiny should be applied to the legislative classification. The plaintiffs argue for strict scrutiny, on the ground that the legislation affects their fundamental right to marry (see Alevy v Downstate Med. Ctr., 39 NY2d 326, 332 [1976]) -- a contention we rejected above. Alternatively, plaintiffs argue for so-called intermediate or heightened scrutiny on two grounds. They say that the legislation discriminates on the basis of sex, a kind of discrimination that has been held to trigger heightened scrutiny (e.g., United States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 532-533 [1996]).

They also say that discrimination on the basis of sexual preference should trigger heightened scrutiny, a possibility we left open in Under 21 v City of New York (65 NY2d at 364). We reject both of these arguments, and hold that the restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples is subject only to rational basis scrutiny.

By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, New York is not engaging in sex discrimination. The limitation does not put men and women in different classes, and give one class a benefit not given to the other. Women and men are treated alike -- they are permitted to marry people of the opposite sex, but not people of their own sex. This is not the kind of sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving; the statute there, prohibiting black and white people from marrying each other, was in substance anti-black legislation. Plaintiffs do not argue here that the legislation they challenge is designed to subordinate either men to women or women to men as a class.

However, the legislation does confer advantages on the basis of sexual preference. Those who prefer relationships with people of the opposite sex and those who prefer relationships with people of the same sex are not treated alike, since only opposite-sex relationships may gain the status and benefits associated with marriage. This case thus presents the question of what level of scrutiny is to be applied to legislation that classifies people on this basis. We held in Under 21 that "classifications based on sexual orientation" would not be subject to strict scrutiny, but left open the question of "whether some level of 'heightened scrutiny' would be applied" in such cases (id. at 364).

We resolve this question in this case on the basis of the Supreme Court's observation that no more than rational basis scrutiny is generally appropriate "where individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement" (City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 US 432, 441 [1985]).

Perhaps that principle would lead us to apply heightened scrutiny to sexual preference discrimination in some cases, but not where we review legislation governing marriage and family relationships. A person's preference for the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the birth of children is relevant to the State's interest in fostering relationships that will serve children best. In this area, therefore, we conclude that rational basis scrutiny is appropriate.

Where rational basis scrutiny applies, "[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest" (id. at 440). Plaintiffs argue that a classification distinguishing between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples cannot pass rational basis scrutiny, because if the relevant State interest is the protection of children, the category of those permitted to marry -- opposite-sex couples -- is both underinclusive and overinclusive. We disagree.

Plaintiffs argue that the category is underinclusive because, as we recognized above, same-sex couples, as well as opposite-sex couples, may have children. That is indeed a reason why the Legislature might rationally choose to extend marriage or its benefits to same-sex couples; but it could also, for the reasons we have explained, rationally make another choice, based on the different characteristics of opposite-sex and same-sex relationships. Our earlier discussion demonstrates that the definition of marriage to include only opposite-sex couples is not irrationally underinclusive.

In arguing that the definition is overinclusive, plaintiffs point out that many opposite-sex couples cannot have or do not want to have children. How can it be rational, they ask, to permit these couples, but not same-sex couples, to marry?

The question is not a difficult one to answer. While same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are easily distinguished, limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples likely to have children would require grossly intrusive inquiries, and arbitrary and unreliable line-drawing. A legislature that regarded marriage primarily or solely as an institution for the benefit of children could rationally find that an attempt to exclude childless opposite-sex couples from the institution would be a very bad idea.

Rational basis scrutiny is highly indulgent towards the State's classifications (see Heller v Doe, 509 US 312, 320-321 [1993]). Indeed, it is "a paradigm of judicial restraint" (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001], cert denied, 534 US 826 [2001]). We conclude that permitting marriage by all opposite-sex couples does not create an irrationally over-narrow or overbroad classification. The distinction between oppositesex and same-sex couples enacted by the Legislature does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

We hold, in sum, that the Domestic Relations Law's limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is not unconstitutional. We emphasize once again that we are deciding only this constitutional question. It is not for us to say whether same-sex marriage is right or wrong. We have presented some (though not all) of the arguments against same-sex marriage because our duty to defer to the Legislature requires us to do so. We do not imply that there are no persuasive arguments on the other side -- and we know, of course, that there are very powerful emotions on both sides of the question.

The dissenters assert confidently that "future generations" will agree with their view of this case (dissenting op at 28). We do not predict what people will think generations from now, but we believe the present generation should have a chance to decide the issue through its elected representatives.

We therefore express our hope that the participants in the controversy over same-sex marriage will address their arguments to the Legislature; that the Legislature will listen and decide as wisely as it can; and that those unhappy with the result -- as many undoubtedly will be -- will respect it as people in a democratic state should respect choices democratically made.

Accordingly, the orders of the Appellate Division in each case should be affirmed without costs.

Here's a tidbit from 365gay.com:

New York City) LGBT civil rights groups say today's ruling by the New York State Court of Appeals that same-sex couples have no constitutional right to marriage is not the end of the issue.

The high court, in a 4 - 2 ruling issued Thursday morning (story) said that defining marriage is an issue for the Legislature and that is where LGBT groups say they will focus their attention.

Lawyers involved in the omnibus case involving four different lawsuits brought by 44 gay and lesbian couples said they have not lost their resolve.

"The question for the Legislature is an easy one: whether to follow through on the support of the majority of voters in this state to end discrimination against their gay friends and neighbors," said Susan Sommer, Senior Counsel at Lambda Legal and lead attorney on one of the four cases.

Empire State Pride Agenda said it is organizing statewide rallies tonight to call for swift legislative action in granting equal access to marriage.

The rallies will be held in seven locations across the state, including New York City, Long Island, the Hudson Valley, Albany, Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse.

“It is unacceptable that the Court has turned its back on New York’s long history of equality and justice,” said Alan Van Capelle, Pride Agenda Executive Director.

“Today’s decision is far from the end of the battle for New York’s lesbian and gay families. The Court has had its say, and now it is time for our elected officials to stand against discrimination and support marriage equality."

Several Democratic members of the Legislature are supporting quick action by lawmakers.

“We in the legislature must continue to fight to help ensure that same-sex couples are afforded the right to marry," said New York State Senator David Paterson. "It is, quite simply, the fair and just thing to do. No one should be denied equality or basic fundamental protections under the law.”

The Washington D.C.-based National Stonewall Democrats called on New York Democrats to get behind legislation that would grant marriage equality.

Currently, legislation to grant such recognition to same-sex couples has been authored by Democratic State Senator Thom Duane, and is supported by the New York State Democratic Party. Democratic gubernatorial nominee and Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has vowed to introduce such legislation if elected this November.

"The majority of New Yorkers support marriage equality and we are now seeing a new generation of Democrats emerge in the Empire State whose leadership will help turn that support into law," said Jo Wyrick, NSD Interim Executive Director.

"Although Republican Governor George Pataki strongly opposes marriage recognition for same-sex couples, LGBT Democrats throughout New York will soon help elect a Governor who has vowed to lead his fellow Democrats in enacting legislation granting full marriage equality to same-sex couples."

Pataki praised the ruling Thursday.

"I am satisfied that today's decision by the State's highest Court to uphold our position that marriage is between a man and a woman is the right one," the governor said.

Sen. Duane said he will push for a vote on his gay marriage bill but predicted a major battle in the legislature.

"Instead of a moral, legal and constitutional victory, the LGBT community now faces a dragged-out political street brawl in the State Senate and Assembly. That is a shame. It did not have to be this way," he said.

New York same-sex couples reacted with shock at the ruling.

“Equal protection under the law has not been granted to my partner and me, together for over thirteen years in a committed, loving relationship.” said Manhattan resident Scott Sinclair, speaking about his long-term relationship with Rob Buchanan.

“To treat our relationship different than that of opposite-sex couples is discriminatory and we are shocked at the Court’s ruling. This can not continue and my partner and I, along with many others, will take this matter to our elected representatives,” said Sinclair.

Albany resident Darcy Rickard agreed.

“It is now time for my legislators to support my family,” said Rickard. “My family is based on love. And that love needs the protections that come with marriage.”

In Rochester, Jo Meleca and Christine Voigt called the ruling "appalling".

“As tax-paying, law-abiding Americans we deserve the full rights of citizenship," said Meleca.

Support for same-sex couples is also pouring in on the national level.

“Today’s tortured and intellectually strained decision is beyond disappointing," said National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Executive Director Matt Foreman.

"It is insulting to gay and lesbian people and our families. It is an egregious departure from the New York Court of Appeal’s long and proud tradition of advancing liberty and dismantling discrimination. It is a disgrace to the constitution and the people of New York.”

“In allowing the state of New York to continue to discriminate against gay and lesbian couples, the state Court of Appeals abdicated its responsibility to uphold the due process and equal protection clauses of the state Constitution, said People For the American Way Foundation President Ralph G. Neas in a statement.

"Instead, the Court relied on tired assumptions about parenting and procreation in determining that gay and lesbian New Yorkers can properly be considered second-class citizens when it comes to marriage and denied the important protections for their families that only marriage provides. The legal analysis embraced by the Court’s majority was wrong," Neas said.

Davina Kotulski, Executive Director, Marriage Equality USA said the court had abrogated its responsibility.

"Today in New York we see the total wholesale abandonment of the historic role of the judiciary to protect the rights of the minority from the tyranny of the majority," said Kotulski.

"Instead of properly determining that all New Yorkers are entitled to equal protection under the State Constitution, the New York Appeals Court has taken the position that lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender New Yorkers are only entitled to the civil rights that the popular opinion of the day permits."

The New York ruling is unlikely to affect same-sex marriage cases before two other state supreme courts: New Jersey and Washington.

"Today's decision in New York has zero impact on -- and is no indication of -- how the New Jersey Supreme Court might rule on marriage for same-sex couples. Not even the slightest," said Garden State Equality chair Steven Goldstein in a statement.

"On LGBT rights as well as on other social issues, New Jersey law has long been different from New York State's and the laws of other states. Additionally, New Jersey courts have been among the most fair-minded in the country, from allowing same-sex couples to adopt jointly to holding that the Boy Scouts may not discriminate against a gay scoutmaster."

In California where a same-sex marriage case will be argued in a mid level appeals court next week the National Center for Lesbian Rights said the New York ruling is unlikely to be used as a precedent.

“California courts are unlikely to be swayed by the reasoning in today’s decision," said NCLR legal director Shannon Minter.

"Unlike New York, the California legislature and California courts have taken a strong stand that lesbian and gay parents and their children need and deserve equal legal protections. Because of this clear policy, a California court could not accept a desire to treat some families as superior to others as a legitimate basis for discrimination in marriage," Minter said.

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