World Terrorism: News, History and Research Of A Changing World #5

http://www.isria.info/FILES/2006/SEPTEMBER/09292006__15.htm

Russia Demands UN Security Council Meeting on Georgia By Peter Heinlein United Nations 28 September 2006 Russia has asked for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council to discuss the arrest of five Russian army officers in Georgia. Russia asked for the emergency session Thursday, after Georgia arrested the five Russian officers on charges of spying. Closed consultations were immediately scheduled for later in the day. Russia earlier recalled its ambassador from the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and ordered a partial evacuation of Russian personnel and their families. Russia's deputy U.N. ambassador, Konstantin Dolgov, called the arrests "very troubling news." He told VOA, Moscow wants the Council to take up the matter as a threat to regional peace and security.

"Very unfortunate, destabilizing the region, on the part of Tbilisi," he said. "So, we think that it's high time for the Security Council to get seized of the matter." Russian diplomats say the request for an urgent Council meeting came from Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Lavrov, on a trip to Russia's far east, was quoted as calling the spying charges "absurd." He demanded the officers' immediate release. Relations between Moscow and Tbilisi have been increasingly tense since Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili came to power in the wake of the country's peaceful "Rose revolution" in 2003. In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly last Friday, Saakashvili accused Russia of what he termed a "gangster occupation" of the disputed Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Russian officers were detained Wednesday, after Georgian police and guards surrounded the regional headquarters of Russian troops in Tbilisi. Reports say 12 Georgians suspected of involvement were also detained. Russia's defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, was quoted Thursday as calling the arrests "an outrage." Georgia has long accused Russia of backing separatist forces in the two breakaway regions. Russia deployed peacekeepers to both areas, after they declared independence from Tbilisi in the early 1990s.

http://www.isria.info/FILES/2006/SEPTEMBER/09302006__24.htm

Ukraine denies sale of sophisticated radar to Iran IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency Moscow, Sept 29, IRNA Ukraine-Iran-Kolchuga Radar Kiev on Friday ruled out certain media reports that it wants to sell Kolchuga early warning radar systems to Iran. A member of Ukraine's Presidential Office and military advisor of President Viktor Yushchenko on Friday called the report "baseless." He stressed that Ukraine has not delivered any sophisticated radar system to Iran. The Kolchuga is intended to detect the take-off and formation of aircraft groups at ranges beyond those of existing radars, as well as determine the course and speed of targets while designating them for air-defence systems. It can identify aerial targets through their emissions and identify the mode of aircraft weapon control systems.

Meanwhile a source at Ukraine's Foreign ministry, denying sale of Kolchuga equipment to Iran, noted that similar reports had already been released on sale of the radar systems to Iraq. In 2001-2002 the country was alleged to have illegally sold the smart equipment to Saddam Hussein's regime. However, having launched military operation in Iraq, the US admitted that they were false allegations against Ukraine. None of such equipment was found in the territory of Iraq, the US proved. Jane's Defence Weekly (JDW) reported on Friday Ukraine had sold Kolchuga radio intelligence complexes to Iran. According to experts, acquirement of such equipment has been aimed at reinforcement of anti-aircraft defence. The military system was designed in the former Soviet era and each set of it is sold for dlrs 25 million. 1486/1420

http://www.isria.info/FILES/2006/SEPTEMBER/09302006__5.htm

Georgia says 1 Russian released, 4 charged with espionage RIA Novosti 29/09/2006 11:46 TBILISI, September 29 (RIA Novosti) - The Georgian Interior Ministry said Friday that one Russian serviceman has been released and four officially charged with espionage in a scandal that threatens to wreck already tense bilateral relations. Six men were arrested Wednesday at the start of what has become a dispute overshadowing all previous spats between the two former Soviet stable mates, but a spokesman for the ministry said one officer, Amir Aslanyan, is a Georgian and not Russian as was previously thought. Shota Khizanishvili also said 11 Georgian citizens, also detained Wednesday, were facing espionage and treason charges. He added that a Tbilisi court would decide on the terms of custody for the Russian officers until a trial later on Friday.

The official also confirmed the release of one Russian, contract NCO Ruslan Skrylnikov, on Friday morning. "He was the driver of the detained [Russian officers], and was released after answering a few questions put by investigators," Khizanishvili said. The confrontation continued as the Georgian Foreign Ministry said Thursday deputy foreign ministers from the two countries, Georgy Mandzhgaladze and Grigory Karasin, would meet in Moscow to discuss the growing furor. However, a source in the Russian Foreign Ministry said the meeting was not on Karasin's agenda. The Russian Foreign Ministry also announced Thursday that it was recalling its ambassador to Tbilisi for consultations and was evacuating some embassy staff and all family members over safety concerns. On Friday, a plane landed at Tbilisi airport to take to Moscow Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko and some embassy officials, Ivan Volynkin of the embassy said. Russian diplomatic sources also said the plane would also take 50 people from the families of the embassy staffers and would land near Moscow at 7 p.m. (3 p.m. GMT).

http://www.isria.info/FILES/2006/SEPTEMBER/09302006__10.htm

apan's Cabinet to Tackle North Korean Abduction Issue By Steve Herman Tokyo 29 September 2006 In one of his first significant actions as Japan's new prime minister, Shinzo Abe has established a special team to deal with the lingering issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korean agents. Japan's government on Friday established what it calls a Cabinet headquarters, led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, to deal with the issue of Japanese kidnapped during the Cold War era by North Korea. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki says the team is to include all members of the Abe cabinet. Shiozaki says the special team will take what he calls comprehensive measures and will be a clearinghouse for strategic intelligence dealing with North Korea. The goal, he says, is to bring about the quick return of any remaining survivors.

Pyongyang has admitted that its agents kidnapped 13 Japanese who were taken to North Korea to train its spies in Japanese language and culture. Five were allowed to return to Japan following an unprecedented meeting between then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in 2002. But North Korea has insisted all the others have died. That contention was met with great skepticism by families of those kidnapped and many politicians here. The Japanese government, which thinks more of its citizens may have been snatched than North Korea admits, has said it is not satisfied with the answers it has received so far from Pyongyang. Mr. Abe, who took office on Tuesday, is known as a hardliner on the abduction issue. Several members of his cabinet have similar stances on the matter. There are no diplomatic ties between Tokyo and Pyongyang. Japan has said that discussions about establishing formal relations cannot begin until the abduction issue is resolved.

http://www.isria.info/FILES/2006/SEPTEMBER/09292006__9.htm

Jets to be sold to Mexico, Brazil, pilots trained in Venezuela RIA Novosti 28/09/2006 11:46 BUENOS-AIRES, September 28 (RIA Novosti) - Russia's state-owned arms exporter said Thursday it will soon sign deals to export Sukhoi warplanes to Mexico and Brazil, and will open helicopter maintenance and pilot training centers in Venezuela. Rosoboronexport's regional department head, Sergei Ladygin, said: "We hope that Sukhoi planes will soon appear in Latin American countries." Speaking on the sidelines of a military exhibition in Argentina, SINPRODE-2006, Ladygin said Rosoboronexport will also offer a modernized version of the Mig-29 Fulcrum fighter to Mexico and Brazil. The official said the company will also continue to cooperate with Venezuela by building helicopter maintenance and pilot training centers in the country. "

A technical support center in Venezuela will provide maintenance and upgrading services, including the repair of Russian helicopter engines," he said, adding that Russia will export 58 Mi-17B5 Hip H, Mi-35M Hind and Mi-26T Havoc helicopters to Venezuela. A visit by Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez to Russia in July yielded arms deals worth $3.5 billion. Venezuela bought 24 Russian Su-30MK Flanker-C air superiority fighters for $1.5 billion. The first two planes will be delivered to Venezuela by the end of the year, and deliveries will be completed by the end of July 2008, Ladygin said. He added that the Latin American country paid for the contracts with hard currency. The official also said that Rosoboronexport will sign contracts with the Chilean Air Force and land troops for the purchase of Mi-17B5 Hip H helicopters. "This summer, Chile received a prototype helicopter that has been flown in all climate conditions and has gained a good reputation," he said.

http://www.isria.info/FILES/2006/SEPTEMBER/09292006__6.htm

Georgia says to give media recordings of Russian "spies" RIA Novosti 28/09/2006 17:11 TBILISI, September 28 (RIA Novosti) - Georgia's interior minister said Wednesday he would provide the media with audio and video recordings confirming that Russian officers had been spying in Georgia. Six Russian soldiers and officers have been detained over the last 24 hours for allegedly being involved in espionage. "The files reliably show officers of Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate personally conducting intelligence activities, personally recruiting Georgian nationals and carrying out unlawful activities," Vano Merabishvili told a briefing. The minister also said that during the arrest, Georgia had taken into account all international norms. Charges will be brought Friday. Tensions between Russia and Georgia have been rising in the past few years over the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the breakaway Georgian republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the current scandal has done nothing to improve the atmosphere.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said Wednesday that the accusations were "unsubstantiated" and called them "the latest gross attack that confirms that anti-Russian course of the Georgian leadership." Sergei Ivanov, Russia's defense minister and also a deputy prime minister, also raised the temperature Thursday by saying seven other Russian servicemen - a junior officer and six soldiers - had been subjected to violence when their car was stopped in the western city of Batumi on Wednesday night. "They were beaten up, [and] their weapons and car were confiscated," he said. "Then at about 3 a.m. (11 p.m. GMT) they were released." Ivanov described the Georgian authorities' actions as "total lawlessness and hysteria." But Shota Khizanishvili, a spokesman for the Georgian Interior Ministry, categorically denied the assault accusations. "That did not happen," he said. "Police did not beat up the Russian servicemen."

29 September 2006
New Bolivian bases, risky but prudent

Venezuela's possible involvement in the creation of new military bases in Bolivia may be a cause for concern, but the realities of Bolivia's territorial integrity and drug-trafficking challenges made the bases a prudent move.

Commentary by Sam Logan for ISN Security Watch (29/09/06)

When Bolivian President Evo Morales announced his intention on 19 September to install at least three military bases along Bolivia’s remote eastern border, he triggered a series of reactions that rippled across South America and all the way to Washington.

Morales’ geopolitical power play has been buttressed by the promise of Venezuelan financing, likely in the form of a donation or a special loan. But Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s involvement in the creation of new military posts in Bolivia has clouded opinion over what actually may be a prudent decision by Morales.

The location of two bases has been made public: One post will be constructed on the Paraguay river at Puerto Quijarro in the lowland regions of eastern Bolivia, some 200km north of the border with Paraguay and practically on the frontier with Brazil.

According to news reports, the base will house up to 2,500 Bolivian soldiers and include an airstrip. The projected construction costs hover around US$22 million.

The other known location is Riberalta, north of La Paz, also located on a major river system.

Chavez’s involvement in the development of closer ties between the Bolivian and Venezuelan armed forces was publicly verified when he and Venezuelan Defense Minister General Raul Baudel visited Bolivia in May. During the visit, they signed a series of feel-good agreements on a mutual understanding about creating a region-wide army with the help of Venezuelan finance and, perhaps in the future, Venezuelan-manufactured AK-103 assault rifles.

It is easy to see how Chavez has some influence over Morales’ decision-making, especially when it comes to military matters. But the regional heavyweight, Brazil, continues to make its presence felt.

On 22 September, only days after Morales’ announcement, the Commander in Chief of the Brazilian Armed Forces, General Francisco Roberto De Alburquerque, met with Bolivian Defense Minister Walker San Miguel and the Commander of the Bolivian Army, General Freddy Bersatti, as well as other high-ranking Bolivian generals. He traveled to Bolivia to reinforce two important facts.

First, there are close ties between the Bolivian and Brazilian armed forces. The meeting, which was the first time a Brazilian general had traveled to Bolivia, will likely result in a renewed cadet- and officer-exchange program to strengthen ties between the two countries' current and future officers.

Second, the Bolivian army relies on Brazilian manufacturing and maintenance expertise and spare parts for a large percentage of its armored fleet of land transport vehicles. The Brazilian general likely made this point very clear.

Meanwhile, Paraguayan leaders, even if a little miffed by Morales’ announcement, are just as relaxed as the Brazilians. They do not have the leverage, but can count on support from the US in the event that the situation in Bolivia’s lowlands unraveled.

The presence of US military forces in Paraguay in 2005 raised regional alarms of increased military presence in the heart of South America. While an expanded presence has not been discarded, one certainty has emerged: The US and Paraguayan armed forces have increased their levels of communication and support. In 2005, at least 400 US Marines passed through Paraguay to assist with troop training.

Some South American analysts believe that Chavez has used Morales as a proxy agent to increase geopolitical friction between Bolivia and Paraguay. The argument follows that Paraguay, if threatened, would call on Washington for support. The resulting increased US presence in Paraguay would give Chavez more reason to maintain his anti-imperialist rhetoric. This situation would ostensibly give the Venezuelan president more support for his plans for a regional military force.

Washington would likely not fall into such a trap, but leaders there do lament the lack of regional leadership from Brazilian President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva, who has been distracted with his fight for political survival. If da Silva is re-elected he would certainly assert more pressure, but from behind the scenes. For now, the message delivered by Brazil’s top military commander will suffice.

Morales does not need Chavez or da Silva to make decisions about protecting the integrity of his nation. When the opposition, led by Jorge Quiroga, organized a strike that united four Bolivian states in the eastern region, it showed a level of seriousness that warranted attention from the Morales administration. Rumors of a civil war in Bolivia have begun to swirl.

Like Morales' decision to nationalize Bolivia's energy companies, the announcement of new military bases was intended for a domestic audience. While not as complicated as nationalizing energy assets, building three or four military bases in some of the country’s most remote regions will not be an easy task.

The process will reveal the true relationship between Bolivia’s armed forces and the Morales administration.

Ties between the two have been strained since Morales sacked 25 generals in January this year after he uncovered an operation to deactivate Chinese-made anti-aircraft missiles. The president's move, some believe, opened the way for promotions of Bolivian military officers more loyal to the Morales administration and, by proxy, the Venezuelan armed forces.

New bases in Bolivia’s remote Amazon region would give Morales a limited amount of control over secessionist states run by the opposition, but he would not use the military to crush marches and protests. It would go against everything in his pre-presidential past as an organizer, activist and street protester.

More important, however, is the effect these new bases will have on the regional drug trade between Bolivia and Brazil. The river system that borders the two countries facilitates movement of coca paste and cocaine that is fed into Brazil or shipped abroad to Africa, Europe and the US. It is no mistake that the planned location of the bases at Riberalta and Puerto Quijarro are on rivers.

While the use of the armed forces to fight the drug trade should remain limited in deference to national police forces, an increased presence of the Bolivian state in its most remote regions is a positive sign for those in Washington and elsewhere who are concerned with the so-called projection of sovereignty problem that many South American countries, including Bolivia, struggle with.

The world may be concerned with Chavez’s ulterior motives for new bases in Bolivia, but the realities of the country's territorial integrity and challenge with drug trafficking must be considered.

On balance, the decision may be a prudent one. Still, it remains to be seen if these bases will even see the light of day, or if Venezuelan or other funding materializes to turn Morales’ announcements into reality.

Judging from the struggling energy nationalization process, the gap between words and reality in Bolivia remains wider than we think.

Sam Logan is an investigative journalist who has reported on security, energy, politics, economics, organized crime, terrorism and black markets in Latin America since 1999. He has just published his first e-book entitled “The Reality of a Mexican Mega Cartel” and is currently completing his work on “Nice Guys Die First,” a forthcoming non-fiction narrative about organized crime in Brazil.

The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).

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Blog on Mex. border:

http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2006_09_01_gritsforbreakfast_archive.html

http://www.google.com/search?q=e-book+entitled+%E2%80%9CThe+Reality+of+a+Mexican+Mega+Cartel%E2%80%9D&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

[links to several reports on this riot in Mexico, on this page]

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N30254192.htm

Copter flyovers raise Mexico tourist town tensions
01 Oct 2006 01:29:07 GMT
Source: Reuters
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By Adriana Barrera

OAXACA, Mexico, Sept 30 (Reuters) - Helicopters flew low over the conflict-torn Mexican colonial city of Oaxaca on Saturday, raising fears of an imminent police offensive against striking teachers and leftist protesters.

The streets around the center of the tourist city have been occupied for months by thousands of striking teachers and left-wing activists trying to bring down the state government, headed by Gov. Ulises Ruiz.

President Vicente Fox has said he will resolve the situation before he leaves office at the end of November, and has not ruled out the use of force if talks fail.

Up to seven helicopters, some of a style used by the Mexican navy, flew low over the city's famed monasteries and central square.

Flavio Sosa, leader of the Popular Assembly of the People of Oaxaca, or APPO, an alliance of leftist groups organizing the protests, said a government official told him in a telephone call the helicopters were doing reconnaissance.

Activists brandishing sticks boosted their presence at barricades constructed from burnt-out vehicles, and said they were on "maximum alert" in preparation for a possible attempt to bring the streets back under government control.

"This is Fox's responsibility and it would be lamentable that he stains his hands with Oaxacan blood," said Sosa as activists singing protest songs filled Oaxaca's central square, until recently a quiet haven popular with tourists who drank the region's fiery Mezcal liquor in street cafes.

"This is an open provocation from the federal government," he said.

The protesters accuse Ruiz of stealing an election, authoritarian rule and heavy-handed tactics in dealing with his opponents.

Ambushes and paramilitary-style drive-by shootings have killed five activists since the conflict began more than four months ago. The activists say Ruiz ordered the shootings.

Ruiz denies involvement in the shootings and said he would not step down.

"I see (a solution) soon," he told Reuters on Saturday. "The law must be applied to those who break the law."

Oaxaca state, famed for beaches, highland towns and elaborate cuisine, is also one of Mexico's most impoverished regions. Tensions often run high between its poor Indian population and authorities.

Talks between the federal government, protesters and Ruiz seemed to be advancing before the weekend, but many in Oaxaca fear a street battle is looming.

Interior Minister Carlos Abascal said on Friday the situation in Oaxaca was "grave."

"Everything has its limits, and that limit is very close," he told reporters.

AlertNet news is provided by

from:

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http://www.columbiatribune.com/2006/Oct/20061001Feat004.asp

Last of a five-part series
Judgment Day
After 2½ years, an early-morning call and a quick departure.

By JOHN FENTON WHEELER
Published Sunday, October 1, 2006

A judge can’t be a journalist. But a journalist can be a judge and often is. I proved that on Sept. 6, 1969, just shy of 25 months after Fidel Castro had publicly raked me over the coals for saying I was a journalist, not a judge.

RELATED STORIES
• Part 1: Dateline Havana
• Part 2: In the line of fire
• Part 3: In from the cold
• Part 4: Ruins after revolution
• Part 5: Judgment Day

In fact, during those months, I probably had been making judgments on most stories I wrote about Cuba. I am sure I thought I had arrived at such judgments fairly and with reasonable objectivity. After all, not everything the government said was news or amounted to much. Except for the words that came out of Castro’s mouth.

On Sept. 5, a Friday, the Cuban government announced it had caught a Mexican diplomat spying for the United States. It identified him as Humberto Carrillo Colon, the press counsel at the Mexican Embassy in Havana, a man I knew professionally but only barely socially. Specifically, the government said Carrillo was spying for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. It demanded he be turned over to the Castro government for trial.

The accusation became public when it was published in the Communist Party newspaper Granma two days after Havana had sent a formal note to the Mexican government charging Carrillo had exchanged coded radio messages with the CIA somewhere in Florida and in Nassau, Bahamas.

Mexico diplomatically denied the charges. Mexican Ambassador Miguel Cobian Perez called the note “inadmissible” and said Carillo was in his custody, presumably at the embassy, and would be flown out of Havana on the next available flight. He declined to talk further to me or other reporters about the case. In Mexico City, Mexican Foreign Minister Antonio Carrillo Flores — no known relation to the Havana Carillo — called the Cuban accusation “unacceptable,” but he said Carrillo would be recalled from his diplomatic post in Havana.

In breaking the story, Granma reported that Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa’s note to the Mexican foreign minister said the Cuban government began hearing coded broadcasts from CIA locales in Florida and Nassau on April 7, 1968, about a month after Carrillo arrived in Havana. The note said coded broadcasts going the other way, from Havana to Nassau and Florida, were traced to Carrillo’s Havana residence. It added that the Mexican diplomat “procured information on the activities of leaders of the Cuban government, especially on our prime minister, Major Fidel Castro, putting to use not only this information to penetrate confidential matters of our government but also eventually so that it could be used for attacks on the lives of these leaders.”

Carrillo also was accused of using diplomatic correspondence, normally inviolate, to pass information to the CIA.

Granma’s news story went on to say the Cuban Foreign Ministry note also asked that the Mexican government renounce Carrillo’s diplomatic immunity and that he be turned over to Cuban authorities to be tried for “grave crimes committed against our country.” This was aggressive talk from Havana to Mexico, the only Latin American country to have diplomatic relations with Cuba, and I noted it in my story.

Carrillo also spied on his own embassy and his own ambassador, the Cuban note said, and added that Carrillo left Cuba for 15 days in 1968 to receive training as a “Mexico operative” and on his return from Mexico on Dec. 10 that year he brought in modern radio equipment supplied by the CIA. Havana said all of Carrillo’s spying activities were carried out “in compliance with instructions received from the CIA.”

Two questions popped up immediately for me. One concerned the CIA. With Richard Nixon now in the White House, was the intelligence agency still trying to kill Castro? And, two, how did the Cubans get into a diplomatic pouch or bag? I left the first question alone but included the second one in a follow-up story on Granma’s report the next day. In Western Union cablese, it said: “IT UNEXPLAINED HOWEVER HOW HAVANA COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGENTS KNEW WHAT INSIDE MEXICOS DIPLOMATIC BAG GRAF.” That seemed fair enough to me. How did they know? Diplomatic correspondence was supposed to be untouchable.

But in the next paragraph I wrote, also in cablese: “ANOTHER QUESTION LIKELY BE LEFT UNANSWERED WAS WHETHER IN FACT CARRILLO WAS WORKING FOR THE CIA STOP CUBANS SAID THEY HAVE QUOTE IRREFUTABLE UNQUOTE PROOF HE WAS GRAF.”

That paragraph clearly was subjective, beyond the limits of objectivity. The Cuban government had already answered yes to the question of whether Carrillo was a CIA spy. And the Mexican government, while saying the charges were “inadmissible,” had neither confirmed nor denied whether they were true. Anyway, the Mexican government probably didn’t know whether, as the Cubans had alleged, Carrillo was spying on his own embassy. What I had written could amount to strike three by any Cuban umpire’s count. That meant I could be out.

Perhaps I was prescient. For some reason I can’t remember, I thought I should clip the story as it clattered off the AP Western Union machine. I eventually did clip those two paragraphs. I know now why I have saved them. They showed clearly I had made a judgment, again questioning whether the Cubans had proof of a CIA plot to get Castro. Guess who wouldn’t like that? Whose boots I had stepped on?

On Sunday, Granma came out with more details on Carrillo’s activities, including reports he had advised the CIA of seeing “mysterious” objects off Havana’s shore, perhaps indicating some kind of secret Cuban military weapon or something equally nefarious. This nonsense brought back Castro’s words at the Organization of Latin American Solidarity conference two years earlier when he said it would be naive to think the CIA was a “perfect ... very intelligent organization.” I thought if the CIA had paid Carillo, and it must have then, the organization wasn’t very intelligent at all. Granma included other details more interesting: a list of numbers, radio frequencies Carrillo was said to have used in his transmissions between Havana and Nassau and between Havana and somewhere in Florida. Even on first glance, they rang true. As I read Granma, I thought about the few times I had talked to Carrillo at diplomatic receptions or at the Mexican Embassy and tried to remember any of our conversations. I recalled talking about the coffee plants Mexico was providing gratis for Havana’s Green Belt, but no political conversations. I doubted there had been any. If Carrillo had heard about Castro’s public chastisement of me before he came to Havana and mistakenly thought we somehow could be on the same team, he never showed any indication of it.

Later that day, Eduardo Kuri, a newly arrived correspondent for the Mexican news agency Amex, invited my wife, Ann, and me to a beach house outside Havana for a swim. There he called me aside and told me Carrillo had used the same beach house, and one time by chance when Kuri was there he had seen a folded piece of paper with numbers like those published in Granma fall from Carrillo’s swim trunks. I resolved I would go back to the Mexican Embassy early Monday morning and ask them about the list of numbers published in Granma. I expected I would get no reply, and though it would end up as a fruitless effort at getting any confirmation from the embassy, I would do an updated story reporting more Cuban evidence that Carrillo was a CIA spy. I never got the chance.

The telephone call from the Cuban Foreign Affairs Ministry came a little before 3 a.m. It was Telesforo Diaz. He said I was to be at the ministry at 3 o’clock. I had sensed several times that he had a strong dislike for me, and one of my first thoughts was that he had called at that hour to be petty. I decided he meant 3 o’clock in the afternoon, rolled over and went back to sleep. Sometime after 3:30 a.m. Diaz called again. I was awake this time instantly, and I suspected something serious was in the offing. As I drove to the ministry, I could see all the lights were on in the press section. I saw no other correspondents’ cars, and I knew for certain what was up.

Diaz could barely restrain his joy as he told me the government was expelling me for writing what he called anti-Cuban news. He said I was to catch the plane to Mexico in two hours, at 6 a.m. I asked him whether I could initiate a call to my office in New York. He smiled, the first time I had ever seen him do so, and said nothing. There was nothing left for me to say but “thanks” and “so long.” The whole procedure had taken less than two minutes. My two years, seven months and almost 26 days in Cuba were over. My first feeling was not of relief, but of regret. I thought Castro had made a mistake, and I still think so. And I had lost my job in Cuba. It was Sept. 8, 1969.

While Ann threw things into suitcases, I asked the telephone operator to put me through to the AP’s number in New York. The call went through, which had never happened before. I told Harris Jackson on the foreign desk, one of the best editors I ever encountered, what was happening and why. Then I went to the AP office and scooped up what files I could. I took Saturday’s Western Union copy of my story and clipped out the two paragraphs I felt had brought the government down on me.

No time to go through the photo file. I had never thought about the AP peso account in the National Bank of Cuba before and didn’t now. On the way to the apartment I glanced at the new, 1968 AP Volkswagen Variant station wagon in the underground garage beneath my building, an AP present via Canada to make the Cuba correspondent’s life easier.

As I entered the apartment building, I saw two members of the CDR watching me. Then I called the AP chauffeur, Esmond Grant. He was almost too frightened to drive us to the airport. Christopher Skeate, a friend from the British Embassy, and Dick Spier, another friend who was manager in Havana of the Dutch airline KLM, drove along with us. Security stopped them inside the airport terminal, and they waved goodbye. At the check-in counter, Cubana de Aviacion demanded 48 dollars, not pesos, for excess baggage. They finally accepted Cuban pesos after I told them I hadn’t had any dollars for two years and a Foreign Ministry official who had met me at the counter intervened. Ann and I were taken to a small security room where we waited for about four hours because the flight was that late in taking off. The security officials were polite and offered coffee, which Ann refused. She thought it might be doctored.

Carrillo was on the same plane, an obvious arrangement by the government to demonstrate it was throwing out the CIA spy and the Yanqui journalist at the same time. Carrillo boarded the plane after we did and was seated toward the front, protected by Cuban security and another Mexican diplomat. I never saw or heard of him again.

As Ann and I flew toward Mexico City, I wondered what else we had left behind. Damp swim suits. A record player. Some Czech dishware. A cat. And my Pentagon identification card. At last Castro could have his “proof.” Except it wasn’t.

As the Vietnam War escalated, AP General Manager Wes Gallagher had decided all foreign correspondents should have a Pentagon identification card in case they suddenly were called on to go to Vietnam. I had deliberately dumped my card behind a heavy piece of furniture when I discovered it in my wallet as I went to apply for a Cuban driver’s license the first week I was there. It stayed there, forgotten, the entire time I was in Cuba. I doubt it would have made any difference even if the government had known about the Pentagon ID card. They knew after 2½ years I had nothing to do with the CIA. I was being expelled as an unwanted American journalist.

I also thought about Diaz, Raul Lazo Sotolongo, who preceded Diaz, and Ramiro del Rio, who preceded Lazo. Two years later when Francisco “Paco” Tiera Alfonso testified in Washington, he identified Del Rio as an intelligence agent. I suppose Diaz and Lazo were, too. Paco, without saying so before his Senate quizzers, also shed some light on how Carrillo might have been uncovered as a CIA agent. Paco identified Carrillo’s compatriot and supposed friend, Mexican journalist Marta Solis, with whom the diplomat had frequent contact, as working for Cuban intelligence.

On the day I was expelled, Granma reported my expulsion on Page 4. A headline saying “A Yankee Correspondent Expelled” topped this one paragraph story from the Cuban news agency Prensa Latina: “Because of news stories unfounded, distorted and frankly hostile to Cuba, John Fenton Wheeler, the correspondent of the North American news agency AP, was expelled from the country today.”

The next day the Cuban Foreign Ministry offered an expanded version: “In the morning of the 8th of the present month, Mr. John Fenton Wheeler, the correspondent of the North American news agency AP, was expelled from our country.

“The motives which led to this decision were news stories sent by this correspondent obfuscating and putting in doubt the facts reported by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba in relation to the agent of the CIA, Mr. Humberto Carrillo, press aide of the embassy of Mexico in Cuba.

“This inadmissible and unacceptable behavior of Mr. Wheeler is nothing new; he began his groundless, distorted and frankly hostile campaign against Cuba on his arrival in our country in February 1967.”

There was, however, part of the Cuban Foreign Ministry note that belied the conclusion that I had been expelled only because the government felt I had doubted CIA intervention. The note also declared that I had been considered an enemy almost from the day I landed in Havana and began a “hostile campaign against Cuba.” Had my very first story been hostile? If so, why hadn’t I been tossed out a lot earlier? No, I decided, my other misdeed besides being what the government considered was an apologist for the CIA was being an AP correspondent, one of those people who Castro had said distort the news when they “write daily.” The fact that I would no longer be around to keep track of the government’s drive for 10 milllion tons of sugar production did not register with me at the time. It might not even have been a part of Castro’s thinking. But if the harvest was going to fail, he certainly would not have wanted the AP to report that before he did.

In Mexico City, I called Gallagher in New York and confirmed our safe arrival on the flight from Havana. “Don’t worry,” the head of AP told me. “We’ve been kicked out of better countries.”

I think neither he nor I thought the AP’s ouster from Cuba would last nearly three decades.

John Fenton Wheeler is a former foreign correspondent and bureau chief with The Associated Press who covered Cuba, Spain, Portugal, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Algeria, Morocco and Angola. He has lived in Columbia since 1994. This series was adapted from his unpublished manuscript about his Cuba years.

Copyright © 2006 The Columbia Daily Tribune. All Rights Reserved.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/K/KS_JUDGES_IMMIGRATION_MOOL-?SITE=MOCOD&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2006-10-01-14-34-49

Oct 1, 2:34 PM EDT

Demand has Kansas judges helping with immigration cases

WICHITA, Kan. (AP) -- Federal judges in Wichita have had to help out in New Mexico, which doesn't have enough judges to hear all of its illegal immigrations cases.

J. Thomas Marten and Monti Belot have been sitting in on federal cases in Las Cruces, N.M., to hear immigration cases, which two years ago, surpassed drugs and weapons charges as the most prosecuted crimes by the U.S. government. The judges estimate that immigration issues take up nearly half their criminal dockets.

Brent Anderson, who prosecutes immigration cases in Kansas, has also witnessed the flood of cases along the Rio Grande, while helping out at the U.S. attorney's office in El Paso, Texas.

"At the border you have to see it to believe it, and if you don't see it you don't believe it," Anderson said. "But it's not just at the border anymore. It's now in the interior of the United States, and it's increasing."

Immigration cases have also nearly doubled in Kansas the past three years, and continue climbing, Anderson said. He estimates half of all criminal cases in Wichita's federal courthouse include defendants who are illegal immigrants. They're accused of illegally working in the U.S., or transporting illegal immigrants or coming back after being deported. They also face drug and weapons charges.

"That tells you there's something going on in our society," Anderson said. "And that is, law enforcement is spending half of its time investigating foreign nationals illegally in the United States. That means those resources aren't available for other things."

Chicago lawyer Taher Kameli said immigration cases probably will continue to increase in Kansas and states to the south.

A graduate of Washburn Law School, Kameli formerly worked for the Shawnee County district attorney's office in Topeka. Now, he travels across the country practicing what he calls immigration criminal defense.

When judges Marten and Belot head southwest, they face what some local judges and lawyers call "the rocket docket."

"The last time I went there, on my first day, we picked five juries," Marten said. "We started at 9 o'clock in the morning and went until 8 that night. We had four trials over the next seven days, and we had a jury left for the next judge coming in."

Nationwide, a federal judge can expect to handle 87 felony cases at one time.

With such a crunch on the courts, efficiency is crucial. Pre-sentence reports are prepared well in advance and prosecutors and defense lawyers must work together to arrive at a fair plea deal for the defendants.

"I feel, and I think everybody down there feels, justice is done," Belot said. "Even though the volume is greater, and people are moved through the system faster, every attempt is being made to treat the people reasonably."

---

Information from: The Wichita Eagle, http://www.wichitaeagle.com

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Copyright © 2006 The Columbia Daily Tribune. All Rights Reserved.

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370015

Volume 4, Issue 11 (June 2, 2006) | Download PDF Version

Islamic Radicalism in Mexico: The Threat from South of the Border

By Chris Zambelis
The ongoing controversy surrounding the debate over illegal immigration and border security issues in the United States, specifically as it applies to the porous U.S.-Mexico frontier and the status of millions of undocumented workers and other migrants that enter the country each year from Mexico, continues to dominate headlines. Although the overwhelming majority of those entering the United States from Mexico each day are in search of opportunity, many observers worry that it is only a matter of time before al-Qaeda exploits this vulnerability for its own ends.

In assessing this threat, Muslim communities in Mexico have come under increasing scrutiny by U.S., Mexican and international security officials both as potential enablers for terrorist infiltration and as ideological sympathizers for the brand of radicalism characteristic of al-Qaeda. Muslim conversion trends in Mexico and Latin America have also raised concerns, especially given al-Qaeda's successes in luring some Muslim converts to its cause. To date, however, these assessments have been way off the mark and in many respects divert attention away from the far more pressing threats at hand. A closer look at the nature of Islam and the outlook of Mexican Muslims may explain why.

Islam in Mexico

Compared to other countries in Latin America that are home to sizeable Muslim communities with longstanding ties to the region, Mexico's Muslim minority is tiny. At the same time, it is one of the most diverse and dynamic in the region. Despite varying figures and scant data, only a couple thousand Muslims are believed to live in the overwhelmingly Roman Catholic country. Nearly all are Sunni Muslims. Of this group, approximately half trace their origins to what is modern-day Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, mostly the descendants of traders and peasants who emigrated from the Middle East in the latter part of Ottoman rule. Mexico's Arab Muslim community is assimilated in major urban centers such as Mexico City. Significantly, Mexico is also home to a much larger Arab Christian community, also originating from the Levant, which numbers in the tens of thousands. Both communities share close ties and feel a shared sense of pride for their common Arab heritage [1].

Mexican Converts

The other segment of Mexico's small Muslim community is made up of Mexicans who converted to Islam in recent years. Islam is one of the fastest growing religions in the world, partially as a result of intermarriage and religious conversion. This trend is also evident elsewhere in Latin America, despite the longstanding influence of the Roman Catholic Church. In fact, widespread and growing disenchantment with the Catholic Church is leading many Mexicans and others in the region to find spiritual solace elsewhere, including Islam.

One of Mexico's longest running and most influential Muslim organizations is the Centro Cultural Islamico de Mexico (CCIM). Founded in 1995, the CCIM is a Sunni Muslim organization based in Mexico City. It is led by Omar Weston, a British Muslim convert who was born Mark Weston. It runs two mosques and an array of social welfare and education programs that include Arabic language training and a dawa (call) for conversion. It also has links with Muslim communities elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean (http://www.islam.com.mx). Despite some vague and unsubstantiated reports, there is no evidence implicating Weston and the CCIM to radicalism or terrorism.

Mexico is also home to a number of small Sufi orders led by two women, Sheikha Fariha and Sheikha Amina, the most prominent being the Nur Ashki Jerrahi order, a branch of the Halveti-Jerrahi Tariqat community of dervishes based in the Masjid al-Farah in New York City and other major U.S. cities. The group has branches in Mexico City, Curernavaca and Oaxaca (http://www.nurashkijerrahi.org). The group has been described as adhering to an unconventional blend of traditional Sufi mysticism and New Age ideologies [2]. There is no evidence implicating these groups to radicalism or terrorism.

The Murabitun (the Almoravids, after the African Muslim dynasty that ruled North Africa and Spain in the 11th and 12th century) also has a presence in Mexico (http://www.cislamica.org). The group is a well-funded international Sufi order based in Granada, Spain that claims thousands of followers across the globe, including many European converts. It is also regarded as one of the most aggressive missionary movements in Latin America and a major rival of Omar Weston's CCIM. It was founded in the 1970s by Sheikh Abdel Qader as-Sufi al-Murabit, a Scottish Muslim convert born Ian Dallas who was formerly a playwright and actor. Dallas is a controversial figure who, among other things, is a vocal critic of international capitalism and modern forms of finance. Although there is no evidence linking him or his organization to violence or terrorism, he has been accused of harboring pro-Nazi leanings and other radical ideologies. Othman Abu-Sahnun, an Italian Muslim convert and former ranking member of the Murabitun who had a falling out with the group, dedicates an entire website accusing his former leader of extremism, corruption and being party to alleged sinister conspiracies involving Freemasonry (http://www.murabitun.cyberummah.org).

Chiapas

In recent years, Mexico's volatile and impoverished southern state of Chiapas, which is home to a predominately indigenous population that traces its ethnic and cultural lineage to the Mayans, has been the target of Muslim missionaries. The indigenous peoples of Chiapas are underserved and face severe discrimination in Mexican society. In fact, these circumstances are one of the main reasons why Evangelical and other Protestant Christian sects target them in search of new adherents, an ongoing trend in Chiapas and elsewhere in Latin America. In an effort to win over converts, Christian missionary organizations have been running social welfare and humanitarian programs for decades targeting Mexico's indigenous communities. In doing so, they emphasize what they describe as the failure of the Roman Catholic establishment to cater to the spiritual and material needs of the people in the region, often with great success [3].

Muslim missionary groups, especially the Murabitun, which is led by Aurelino Perez in the region, and Omar Weston's CCIM, use similar tactics in an effort to win over adherents in Chiapas. In addition to providing much needed social welfare and humanitarian aid, the Murabitun argue that Catholicism represents a vestige of European imperialism that is directly responsible for the destruction of Mayan culture. Likewise, Catholicism is seen as a tool of the state that is to blame for the poverty and plight of the indigenous peoples. The anti-capitalist message of the Murabitun in particular also resonates with some of the impoverished locals. Murabitun discourse even emphasizes what it describes as the close cultural and ethnic links between the indigenous peoples of the region and the Muslim Moors who once ruled Spain. Therefore, conversion to Islam represents a reversion to their original identity, essentially an assertion of cultural and ethnic identity long suppressed by European colonialism. The Murabitun went as far as to engage Subcommandante Marcos and his Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), following the group's armed rebellion in Chiapas in 1994, in an effort to gain support (http://www.ezln.org.mx).

The number of indigenous peoples who have converted to Islam is believed to number in the hundreds. Significantly, the majority of indigenous peoples converting to Islam are among those who previously converted to Protestantism and other sects. Although religious affiliation in Chiapas tends to be more pluralistic relative to the rest of Mexico due to the influence of indigenous beliefs and customs, Mayans who turn away from the Catholic Church often face discrimination and violence. Many have even been expelled from their homes by violent gangs and are now known locally as the expulsados (the expelled). For example, many of the Muslims of Chiapas trace their lineage to the Tzotzil Mayan village of San Juan Chamula. A large segment of this community was expelled decades ago for adopting Evangelical Christianity. They now reside in Nueva Esperanza, an impoverished section of San Cristobal [4].

In addition to the Murabitun, Muslim missionary activity in San Cristobal has been attributed to the efforts of a group known as the Mission for Dawa in Mexico, represented locally by Esteban Lopez Moreno, a Muslim convert from Spain who is also linked to the Murabitun [5]. Organizations such as the Murabitun and other Muslim groups line up alongside Pentecostals, Jehova's Witnesses, Mormons and other proselytizers in the hunt for new adherents. Under these circumstances, impoverished locals will often convert to a new faith based on which congregation could provide the most benefits. Many, however, take their newfound faith seriously. With the financial support of local and international groups, Mayan Muslims made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 2005, the first group from Chiapas to do so [6].

Reports pointing to possible terrorist links with Muslim missionaries in Chiapas have surfaced in the Mexican and Spanish media. Spanish authorities have raised suspicions about possible links between Spanish members of the Murabitun living in Chiapas and radical Islamists in Spain. Other reports have even linked the group with Basque separatist movements such as ETA. Othman Abu-Sahnun is a proponent of this theory (http://www.murabitun.cyberummah.org). Mexican authorities have also investigated the activities of the Murabitun due to reports of alleged immigration and visa abuses involving the group's European members and possible radical links, including to al-Qaeda [7]. Despite these allegations and extensive media hype in Mexico and other Spanish-language press, no concrete evidence has surfaced to date substantiating such claims.

Conclusion

U.S. policymakers and security officials should continue to worry about border security and the potential for al-Qaeda infiltration into Mexico. Given the evidence to date, however, any potential inroads by al-Qaeda into Mexico is not likely to come through ties with Mexico's Muslim community—and this includes local converts or otherwise. Washington would be better served by concentrating its resources to confront Mexico's weak institutions, corruption, the influence of drug and other criminal gangs and poverty that may be exploited by al-Qaeda as a means to a greater end, as they have all too often in other parts of the world.

Notes

1. Luz Maria Martinez Montiel, "The Lebanese Community in Mexico: its Meaning, Importance and the History of its Communities," The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993).
2. Natascha Garvin, "Conversion and Conflict: Muslims in Mexico," International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World Review [Netherlands], Spring 2005).
3. Thelma Gomez Duran, "Muslalmanes en Chiapas," WebIslam: Islam en Latinoamerica, No. 132, July 20, 2001.
4. Bill Weinberg, "Islamic Sect Targets Chiapas Indians," Native Americas Journal, August 28, 2003.
5. "Los musulmanes del sureste mexicano," Univison, October 4, 2004.
6. Dawn, January 28, 2005.
7. Natascha Garvin, "Conversion and Conflict: Muslims in Mexico."

Find this article at:

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370015

Needs a good check:

http://www.google.com/search?q=Conversion+and+Conflict%3A+Muslims+in+Mexico&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

Hezbollah???

http://www.google.com/search?q=The+Lebanese+Community+in+Mexico%3A+its+Meaning%2C+Importance+and+the+History+of+its+Communities%2C%22+The+Lebanese+in+the+World%3A+A+Century+of+Emigration&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

http://www.google.com/search?q=Islamic+Sect+Targets+Chiapas+Indians&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

Nuclear and border:

http://www.google.com/search?q=potential+for+al-Qaeda+infiltration+into+Mexico&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

This will prove interesting:

http://www.google.com/search?q=drug+and+other+criminal+gangs+and+poverty+that+may+be+exploited+by+al-Qaeda+&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

http://www.google.com/search?q=ties+with+Mexico%27s+Muslim+community&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

http://www.google.com/search?q=terrorist+links+with+Muslim+missionaries+in+&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

http://www.google.com/search?q=Mission+for+Dawa+in+Mexico&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

http://www.google.com/search?q=Mayan+Muslims+made+the+pilgrimage+to+Mecca+&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

How muslims claim an area, based on prior relationship:

http://www.google.com/search?q=Murabitun+discourse+even+emphasizes+what+it+describes+as+the+close+cultural+and+ethnic+links+between+the+indigenous+peoples+of+the+region+and+the+Muslim+Moors+who+once+ruled+Spain&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

Volume 4, Issue 7 (April 6, 2006) | Download PDF Version

Al-Qaeda in the Andes: Spotlight on Colombia

By Chris Zambelis
Colombian authorities claim to have dismantled an extensive counterfeit passport ring in January 2006 that allegedly supplied an unknown number of Pakistanis, Egyptians, Jordanians, Iraqis, and others purported to be working with al-Qaeda with Colombian, Portuguese, German, and Spanish citizenship, enabling them to travel freely in the United States and Europe. Bogota also mentioned that the network had ties to Hamas militants (al-Hayat, January 28; Caracol Radio, January 26).

In contrast, U.S. Justice Department and Department of Homeland Security officials expressed surprise at Bogota's announcement while emphatically disputing its claim, alleging that they had no knowledge of known links between the document forgery operation and any brand of Islamist terrorism, let alone al-Qaeda. Instead, they acknowledged that the sting operation involved Colombians posing as members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the country's largest and most powerful rebel group, interested in purchasing forged documents and possibly even weapons (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Report, January 27). Washington classifies FARC as an international terrorist organization.

Since the September 11 attacks, Washington fears that radical Islamist terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda may exploit Latin America's porous borders, endemic corruption, and weak institutions to gain a foothold in the region in order to infiltrate U.S. territory or to stage attacks against vital U.S. interests in the region. Many observers believe that Colombia, a strong ally of Washington, with its vibrant narcotics trade, ongoing insurgencies, robust energy reserves, and proximity to the Panama Canal and other vital shipping lanes, represents an ideal target.

FARC's extensive involvement in the drug business and its documented ties to regional and international drug cartels and organized crime, coupled with the control it wields over large swathes of Colombian territory out of Bogota's reach, is of particular concern. In a worst case scenario, Washington worries that al-Qaeda may cultivate alliances of convenience with organizations such as FARC or others involved in the drug trade in order to raise finances or procure armaments. At the same time, it is important to note that there is no credible evidence pointing to this kind of formal cooperation. At the very least, however, terrorist organizations can exploit established money laundering and finance networks used by narcotics traffickers and organized crime syndicates in the region, especially the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE), to fund future operations (El Siglo, June 25, 2003).

It is against this background that Colombian and regional governments have played on U.S. concerns by moving to curry favor with the U.S. to further their own domestic agendas and international standing in the context of the Bush Administration's war on terrorism. In doing so, they often highlight the alleged threat of al-Qaeda or other brands of radical Islamist terrorism within their own borders.

Based on the evidence, this latest attempt by Bogota is a case in point in that it likely represents an effort to enhance its position in the eyes of Washington and the international community in its longstanding war with FARC guerillas. Since one of the alleged members of the smuggling ring, Jalal Saadat Moheisen, happened to be of Palestinian descent, it is likely that Colombia seized the opportunity to win political points in Washington by pointing to a possible link to Middle East terrorist networks.

What makes Colombia's bold claims especially interesting is that the sting operation was in fact led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials and other investigators, who worked in concert with their Colombian counterparts in the Department of Administrative Security (DAS).

Normally, references to alleged al-Qaeda infiltration are enough to gain the attention and headlines governments in Latin America seek. For example, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras have pointed to alleged al-Qaeda links with the Maras street gangs that terrorize their cities. Mexican officials have hinted at al-Qaeda involvement with rebel indigenous groups in Chiapas. Trinidadian authorities have employed similar tactics when it comes to discrediting their own homegrown Islamist opposition centered in the Afro-Trinidadian Muslim community.

U.S. concern over the strong showing by Hamas in the recent Palestinian elections is likely responsible for Bogota's decision to include Hamas alongside al-Qaeda in its recent claims of radical Islamist involvement in the document forgery ring.

Islam in Colombia

Colombia is home to a small, albeit diverse, Muslim population. Most Colombian Muslims are of Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian origin, but Arab Christians from the Levant with a long history in the country dating back to the Ottoman era far outnumber their Muslim counterparts. In contrast, unlike elsewhere in the region, Arab Muslims made their presence felt in Colombia beginning in the late 1960s and 70s after a wave of migration from the Middle East that was prompted by the Lebanese Civil War and other regional tensions (Los Cromos, April 1, 2005).

Recent Muslim migrants from the Middle East tend to be more pious and traditional compared to their second and third generation kin who have become assimilated into Colombian society. For example, many still speak Arabic and live in tight-knit communities, not unlike immigrant communities elsewhere. Demographic assessments on Colombia's Muslim population vary. According to some local reports, Colombia's Muslim population numbers approximately 15,000 adherents (webislam.com, January 4, 2005).

As a result of intermarriage and religious conversion, Islam has become one of the fastest growing faiths in Colombia and Latin America. Growing disenchantment with the Roman Catholic Church establishment in Colombia and elsewhere in the region has also led many to seek spiritual guidance elsewhere. Many former Roman Catholics that have strayed from the Church have come to see Catholicism as a European colonial tradition that was imposed on the peoples of the Americas. Therefore, conversion to Islam represents an assertion of ethno-national, as well as spiritual, identity. Protestant missionaries have been making inroads into Latin America for many of the same reasons for decades, especially among underserved communities and indigenous populations.

Colombian Christians who become Muslims find solace in Islam's reverence of Jesus Christ and Mary. Other Muslim converts see Islam as a native tradition untainted by the region's colonial experience. Many Muslims in Colombia also emphasize what they believe are their natural cultural and even ethnic links with Arabs and Muslims, stemming from Spain's Moorish heritage. In this regard, conversion to Islam symbolizes a reversion to their original state, which they see as having been suppressed by colonialism. There is also evidence suggesting that Colombian Muslims are becoming more open about asserting their identity, especially since Bogota abolished Catholicism as the official state religion in an effort to promote a broader definition of Colombian identity.

Many analysts are alarmed by increasing Muslim conversion trends, which they interpret as a sign of radicalization, especially in light of al-Qaeda's proven successes in luring Muslim converts to their cause. Despite these concerns, there is no evidence that Muslim conversion in Colombia or elsewhere in Latin America stems from a turn to political radicalization.

Maicao

Although accurate demographic measures are hard to come by, the municipality of Maicao, in northeastern Colombia in the department of La Guajira, an indigenous reserve located along the border with Venezuela and the Caribbean, is home to Colombia's largest Muslim community. Maicao's Muslim population is believed to number anywhere between 4,000 to 8,000 adherents. Maicao is also home of the Omar Ibn al-Khattab Mosque, which was completed in 1987. It is Colombia's largest mosque and is counted as one of the largest in South America (Latino Muslim Voice, December 2003).

Most of Maicao's Muslims are Sunni Arabs from the Levant, especially Lebanon, while a minority originates from Syria and Palestine. Maicao is also home to a small Shiite Arab population. The region's Arab community lives alongside the Way'uu, an indigenous group. As a result of its position on the coast, La Guajira has always lured immigrants seeking potentially lucrative trade opportunities and jobs, especially migrants from the Middle East.

Maicao is also a free trade zone (FTZ) and a known center of smuggling of counterfeit goods such as cigarettes and electric appliances, arms, and narcotics, money laundering, and other illicit forms of commerce to Venezuela, Central America, and the Caribbean. According to some reports, recent efforts by Bogota to enforce tax codes and root out corruption and smuggling hit Maicao's merchants particularly hard, especially Arab Muslims who figure prominently in the local economy. This includes merchants engaged in both legal and illegal business. As a result, Maicao's Arab Muslim population is said to be dwindling, as local merchants seek out opportunities elsewhere in Colombia and in the region (Los Cromos, April 1, 2005).

Many observers worry that al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations can exploit Maicao and the Colombian island of San Andres, another FTZ located off the coast of Panama, to raise funds to finance operations. San Andres is also home to a sizeable Arab Muslim and Christian community. FTZs in Colon, Panama, Iquique, Chile, Margarita Island, Venezuela, and elsewhere in the region are frequently cited as potential terrorist finance centers.

Conclusion

Despite a lack of concrete evidence to date, Colombia appears susceptible to al-Qaeda infiltration, but it is highly unlikely to come in the form of an alliance with FARC or the radicalization of Colombia's Muslims. In contrast, Colombia's weak institutions and ongoing conflict may present an opening for radical Islamists to gain a foothold. Given this background, it is important to consider the politics behind allegations of al-Qaeda infiltration, as they may divert attention away from the far more pressing themes shaping the threat at hand.

Find this article at:

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369952

Volume 4, Issue 7 (April 6, 2006) | Download PDF Version

Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Potential Scenarios

By Catherine Zara Raymond

The MV Limburg was attacked by terrorists in the Gulf of Aden in 2002, an example of the threat posed by maritime terrorism.
In Southeast Asia, home to one of the world's most strategic sea lanes—the Straits of Malacca, and the world's second largest port, Singapore—the vulnerability of the maritime sector is of great concern. As a result, over the last few years various scenarios of how terrorists might carry out an attack in the maritime domain have been put forward by the media and academics alike. Many of these potential scenarios are extremely unlikely due to their complicated nature and their sheer impracticability. Nevertheless, a great number of these scenarios have remained unchallenged due to a lack of knowledge of the geography of the region, local shipping patterns and the nature of the commercial shipping industry in general. This has led to a misunderstanding of the threat posed by maritime terrorism.

This article seeks to address this problem by examining the credibility of a number of these scenarios. In addition, several other scenarios will be discussed which have received little or no attention in the literature on maritime security but which if carried out by terrorist groups could potentially have a serious impact on both Singapore and the efficient flow of global trade through the region's strategic sea lanes.

Scenario: Ship Sunk to Block the Straits of Malacca

In an article in Singapore's major broadsheet newspaper, the Straits Times on March 27, 2004, an "expert" on maritime security is quoted as saying that "If terrorists want to mount a maritime strike here [Southeast Asia], sinking a ship in the Malacca Straits is the likely attack of choice." He goes on to say that "It would enable them to wreak economic havoc worldwide by blocking the sea lane, and is also the easiest way to attack."

This scenario is clearly impossible for one key reason: the narrowest point of the marked channel in the Malacca Straits is at One Fathom Bank, where the width is 0.6 nautical miles. Even if a ship was sunk at this point, which itself is not necessarily an easy task to accomplish, it would not block the Straits. Ships could continue to use the waterway by simply navigating around the sunken vessel.

Scenario: Tanker as Floating Bomb to Strike Ports

The second possible scenario was summed up by Singapore's Foreign Minister George Yeo in a speech given to the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 29, 2005: "Terrorists could hijack an LNG [Liquefied Natural Gas] tanker and blow it up in Singapore harbor. Singapore, of course, would be devastated. But the impact on global trade would also be severe and incalculable" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore). As this statement implies, the potential threat of terrorists hijacking one of the many vessels passing through the region, particularly those carrying high-risk cargos, such as LNG, crude oil or other such inflammable chemical products, is of great concern to the Singapore government.

In addition, the high number of pirate attacks in the region, a number of which have involved the hijacking of these more high-risk vessels, has led to worry that terrorists could use copycat methods to takeover a vessel for more sinister reasons. In a visit to Malaysia in 2005, Vice Admiral Terry Cross of the U.S. Coast Guard told the media that the ease with which pirate attacks were taking place in the Malacca Straits could "alert terrorists to the opportunities for seizing oil tankers" and that "these could be used as floating bombs" (The Straits Times, April 18, 2005). In a similar vein, when the 1,289-ton MT Tri Samudra was boarded by pirates in the Malacca Straits, the regional manager of the International Maritime Bureau was quoted as saying: "This is exactly the type of tanker that terrorists would likely use to attack a shore-based port or other facility" (The Business Times Singapore, March 15, 2005). The Tri Samudra is a chemical tanker that was carrying a full cargo of inflammable petrochemical products when it was hijacked.

There are a number of issues related to this scenario that need to be considered when assessing how likely it would be and what particular form it would take. The first issue is the differing capacity of each vessel and its cargo to cause damage and the means by which this could be made possible by determined terrorists. The second issue is the actual impact on the port or facility itself.

LNG tankers and their potential role in a scenario of this kind have probably received the most attention. In its liquid state, natural gas is not explosive, and it is in this form that it is shipped in large quantities via refrigerated tankers. Once in the open air, LNG quickly evaporates and forms a highly combustible visible cloud. It has been reported that if ignited the resulting fire could be hot enough to melt steel at a distance of 1,200 feet, and could result in second-degree burns on exposed skin a mile away (Council of Foreign Relations, February 11). A fire of this magnitude would be impossible to extinguish. It would burn until all its fuel was spent. The impact of such a fire on a port like Singapore would be devastating. There would be loss of life and severe structural damage in the immediate area. This would mean that the port would have to operate at a reduced capacity, causing delays in trade and a loss of business.

The most likely way that terrorists would carry out an attack using an LNG tanker would be to create an explosion onboard the vessel as it is rammed into the target. If powerful enough this could rupture the hull and cause the gas to escape. The force required to breach the hull and tank, however, would almost certainly cause a fire at the tank location which would ignite the gas as it escaped rather than causing a cloud of fire or plume. Thus, the potential damage would be limited somewhat to the tanker's location.

If the vessel chosen was an oil tanker carrying crude oil or petroleum products, its explosive capability would depend on the nature of the cargo and whether or not the vessel had a full load. Crude oil itself is difficult to ignite; its vapor, however, which may remain in the tanks after the vessel has unloaded its cargo, is more easily ignited. The most likely risk to the target port or facility is that of a localized fire, explosion (particularly in the case of volatile petroleum products), and the consequences of a potential oil spill.

The risk from a vessel carrying chemical products is also worrisome. Chemical products may pose a toxicity risk in addition to being highly volatile. Like LNG tankers, chemical tankers are designed with the maximum provisions for safety. The vessels are designed in such a way as to maintain space between tank walls to prevent incompatible cargos from coming into contact with each other. The safeguards in place, however, may not always be sufficient and may not be designed to guard against deliberate sabotage. In addition, general cargo vessels and container ships (which may not have such safeguards in place) are also sometimes used.

Scenario: Malacca Straits Blocked by Mines

One scenario that has not received much attention is the potential for the Malacca Straits to be blocked by mines. There are two variations of this scenario, both equally alarming. The first is that terrorists mine the Straits and the authorities are alerted to this fact either by a declaration from the perpetrators or because a ship hits a mine. The second is that terrorists merely claim to have mined the Straits and simulate a mine attack on a ship to add credibility to their claims. In each scenario, assuming that there is little or no information on the exact area of the Straits that has been mined, the impact would be the same—the Malacca Straits would be closed to shipping traffic, forcing the vessels, particularly those on international voyages, to reroute around the Lombok and Sunda Straits. This would cause severe delays to shipping as these alternate routes are longer. Additionally, shipping costs would increase and world trade would be affected. The impact on the region's economies could be severe if the closure lasted more than a few days.

Scenario: Missile Launched at Aircraft from Vessel

The final scenario, and again one which has not been widely discussed, is terrorists using a portable surface-to-air missile (SAM), launched from a ship, to bring down a commercial airliner. This would be of concern to Singapore where planes coming into land must make their descent over the busy shipping lane—the Singapore Straits. While arrangements may be in place to reduce the possibility of a SAM being fired from the shore in Singapore, the same cannot be said about ships passing off-shore.

SAMs can be purchased on the black market for a starting price of $10,000 and have a range which puts aircraft that are landing or in a holding pattern waiting to land well within their targeting capability. The missile could be launched from one of the many hundreds of small vessels transiting the Singapore Straits. The impact on Singapore would be massive; not only due to the loss of life, closure of the airport and the immediate effect on the Singaporean economy, but because there would be no way of guaranteeing that a similar attack would not be carried out in the future. Short of inspecting the contents of every ship that passes though the Singapore Straits, the law enforcement agencies can do very little to reduce this particular threat.

Conclusion

The key to gauging the extent of the threat posed by maritime terrorism lies not only in an assessment of the capabilities and motivations of the terrorist groups themselves, but also in an understanding of the maritime environment, shipping practices, the vulnerabilities of the commercial shipping industry and the response capabilities of those agencies tasked with safeguarding the region's shipping lanes. Uninformed claims regarding potential maritime terrorist scenarios, which are based on a misunderstanding or a complete lack of knowledge of these key factors, has led to a misinterpretation of the threat from maritime terrorism. This must be rectified if there is to be any hope of reducing the threat.

Find this article at:

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369950

[Do you remember this, it is the one I referred to a couple days ago, would they change the Chinese Scientists to farmers ???LOL of course]

Man gets prison for nuclear hoax

By Onell R. Soto
UNION-TRIBUNE STAFF WRITER

September 30, 2006

A Mexican drug addict who smuggled immigrants was sentenced to three years in prison yesterday for triggering a hoax that prompted a national security alert, a coast-to-coast manhunt and fears that terrorists would detonate a nuclear bomb in Boston.

José Ernesto Beltran Quiñonez, 34, apologized in San Diego federal court during the sentencing for falsely telling a 911 operator in January 2005 that two Iraqi men and four Chinese chemists were awaiting an atomic bomb.

Beltran said he was high on methamphetamine when he placed four calls from a cell phone to the California Highway Patrol.

To back up his claims, he threw a plastic bag containing travel documents and photos of four Chinese people he claimed were part of the plot over a border fence and told authorities where to find it.

“I don't know why I did it. I wouldn't want to do any harm to this country,” Beltran said, noting that his mother and siblings live in the United States.

After his extradition from Mexico in February, the Mexicali taxi driver told agents he was trying to create a lockdown at the border in order to harm other smugglers who owed him money.

Defense lawyer Dorn Bishop told a judge that Beltran genuinely believed the other smugglers were involved with terrorism, although he made up the part about the nuclear bomb being smuggled through a cross-border tunnel.

Bishop said his client is mentally unstable and sometimes delusional, and that he called officials in Spain six years ago after seeing a vision that a church, a car and a bridge would be blown up.

Prosecutor Alessandra Serano said officials have not been able to confirm that Beltran made the calls to Spain. She said last year's hoax was much more sophisticated than a bomb threat to police called in by a drunk.

Federal agents launched a massive investigation in response to Beltran's calls and the bag with the photos, said Dan Dzwilewski, head of the San Diego FBI office.

Assisted by Mexican officials, agents from several U.S. agencies activated an emergency command post, scoured the border looking for a tunnel, used voice analysis to track down Beltran and issued alerts to police nationwide about the supposed terrorists, Dzwilewski said.

The scare was discussed at President Bush's security briefings and forced Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney to skip Bush's second inaugural so he could return to Boston to assure residents they were safe.

The Chinese in the photos turned out to be farmers, one of whom had been in immigration custody in San Diego for two months.

“This was a planned disruption,” U.S. District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz said. “It's not just a couple of phone calls.”

The judge also said the sentence will allow Beltran to get mental-health and drug treatment in prison.

Family members said they hoped Beltran would take advantage of such treatment.

“I really think he needs help, because he's done it before,” said a cousin, Juan Rodriguez.

Onell Soto: (619) 293-1280; onell.soto@uniontrib.com

Links referenced within this article

onell.soto@uniontrib.com
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/MAILTO:onell.soto@uniontrib.com">http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/MAILTO:onell.soto@uniontrib.com

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http://www.google.com/search?q=Mexico+Muslims+News&client=netscape-pp&rls=com.netscape:en-US

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29 September 2006
US Helsinki commission concerned about SCO

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe - or Helsinki Commission, as it is known in the United States - held a congressional hearing on 26 September to investigate the impact of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Central Asia, a region where Washington's strategic, political, and economic interests are growing stronger.

By Heather Maher for RFE/RL (29/09/06)

Commission Chairman Senator Sam Brownback (Republican, Kansas) titled the hearing: "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is It Undermining US Interests In Central Asia?"

A US expert on the region, Martha Brill Olcott of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the committee the answer is "no."
Venting frustration

"The existence of the SCO will never serve US interests, but it need not directly hinder them," she said. "It's easy to criticize the SCO as a union of non-democratic states. But I would argue that these states are not bound together by their common interest in keeping member states from becoming democracies. They are bound together by a shared set of security interests and a shared set of perceived risk."

Olcott acknowledged that the SCO's annual meetings have in recent years become a forum for member states Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to vent their frustration with US foreign policy, but she said the virulent anti-Western rhetoric that sometimes results is more posturing than a reflection of actual policy.

In response, Brownback noted that the SCO summit in July 2005 called on Washington to set a deadline for the withdrawal of the US military presence in Central Asia. The United States at that time had two military bases in the region, one in Uzbekistan and one in Kyrgyzstan. That call reinforced the suspicion, he said, that one of the SCO's underlying purposes is to weaken US influence in the region.
Expansion unlikely

India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan are observer members of the SCO, and Brownback told the committee that Iran - who he called "the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism" - wants to be promoted to full-member status.

But Olcott said an expansion of the SCO is unlikely for several reasons. She called the group's economic mission "ill-defined" and said until a more concrete strategy is agreed on, the organization is not likely to add new members who may end up competing with Russia and China for the rich natural resources Central Asia has.

Within the existing group, she said, SCO members are likely to become increasingly important economic partners for each other, especially in the area of energy. Olcott said Russia and China are already competing for the oil and gas reserves of Central Asia - and China - in particular, looks to the region for help with its energy and security issues.

The mutual advantage the SCO provides its members in this area begins to diminish, she said, if it begins to admit other large oil- or gas-producing states like Iran, or states with large competing markets, like India.

But she added that because China and Kyrgyzstan are already members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - and Russia and Kazakhstan have WTO ambitions - the SCO isn't likely to evolve into an exclusive regional trade organization of its own.
Not promoting human rights?

Moving to other potential spheres of influence, Brownback expressed deep concern about what he said is the SCO's negative impact on democracy and human rights in Central Asia.

"In a glaring challenge to the aspiration of the region's people for freedom and representative government, the SCO's executive secretary has been quoted as saying 'the time for color revolutions [such as those in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan] in Central Asia is gone,'" he said. "In fact, Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, has sought to use participation in the SCO as a way to overcome isolation [after Andijon]."

Olcott responded by saying that China, at least, has little interest in the domestic politics of Central Asia, except as policies relate to the treatment of ethnic minorities like China's Uyghurs.

"This is the one place where the Chinese government has placed very serious pressure on the Central Asian states to restrict the political rights and to outlaw, in particular, the Uyghur groups," she said.

But she warned against a US policy of trying to interfere in the relationship between Central Asia and China.
China behaving thus far

"It is not in US interests to create chasms in the relationship between the Central Asian states and China," she said. "The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in particular understand that there is no way that the fate of their countries can be fully separated from that of China. For now, at least, China is behaving responsibly in Central Asia. Beijing sees the SCO as a way to parry Russian influence and, even if only indirectly, to keep the states from becoming exclusively European in outlook."

As to the Central Asian states' relationship with Russia, Olcott described it as "useful." She explained that the SCO provides Central Asian leaders with a "buffer" they can use to balance Russian and Chinese influence in the region.

She told the committee that one Central Asian foreign minister told her, in private, that the biggest advantage his country gets from membership in the SCO is a way to "oppose Moscow" when there is a clash between his country and Russia on a given issue. When that happens, they bring it to the SCO and it becomes a topic for all members to discuss, which effectively neutralizes Russia's position.

And to further allay the committee's fears of extensive cooperation on security matters, Olcott said Russian suspicion of China runs very deep, and there is a limit to how much security cooperation can actually exist between SCO members.

"The security goals of Russia and the SCO do not fully overlap," she said. "And Russia itself would be very uncomfortable with intelligence sharing between the Central Asian states and Beijing, if all the SCO members were to share intelligence. I'm sure some limited intelligence sharing goes on, but not the kind of intelligence sharing that goes on between Russia and the Central Asian states."

Also testifying was US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher. He told the committee that US policy in the region is to treat all five Central Asian nations as sovereign and independent states. The United States' overall goal, he said, is to support the development of stable, democratic nations integrated into the world economy and cooperating with each other, the United States, and US partners to advance regional security and stability.

That strategy involves three aspects, he said: fostering security cooperation, expanding commercial and economic opportunity, and promoting internal political and economic reform.
State department not troubled

Boucher said the United States has been trying to forge ties in several areas to Central Asia - economic, security, and political - and strengthen relations between the region and Western groups like NATO, the EU and the OSCE.

"We're promoting multiple linkages to the world in-region," he said. "We think a country should never be left with one option, one market, one trading partner, one vital infrastructure link. More choices for them means more independence. More independence means more opportunity to exercise their own sovereignty. And that's our goal for the countries of Central Asia. We'll continue to pursue it by working with the countries individually and with the multilateral organizations that share our goals in Central Asia."

Brownback asked Boucher about the SCO's "vocal opposition to the exportation of democracy." Boucher responded by saying the SCO has a policy of "cooperation without questions" by its members.

He said the SCO "gives them a club to go to and be happy with each other and not face any criticism."

When Brownback asked whether this is an attempt by the Chinese to "get a leg up on [the US] economically" by not asking any questions of leaders who oppose democracy and human rights, Boucher said he does not believe so. He said for China it is "business as usual" to pursue its economic interests anywhere in the world it needs to without regard for how a given economic partner treats its citizens or runs its government.

When Brownback quoted a US expert as saying that the SCO is "the most dangerous organization Americans have never heard of" and that it is "more than just an economic organization, the SCO is a potential Warsaw Pact," Boucher said he doesn't see it that way. The countries of Central Asia, he said, have options and opportunities and can get out of any organization just as they got in.

But when Brownback concluded by saying the SCO is worth watching closely in case it takes an "aggressive trajectory," Boucher agreed.

Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave. NW, Washington DC 20036. Funded by the US Congress.

Printed from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16734
Online version provided by the International Relations and Security Network
A public service run by the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich © 1996-2004

* In Brief: Kyrgyz disillusionment
* SE Asia looks to palm oil for energy answers
* In Brief: New Bolivian bases, risky but prudent
* Commentary and Analysis: US Helsinki commission concerned about SCO
* Commentary and Analysis: GUAM brings frozen conflicts to world stage
* Commentary and Analysis: Mugabe warns off protesters
* Commentary and Analysis: Russia plans to evacuate Georgia

SE Asia looks to palm oil for energy answers

Indonesia and Malaysia are the latest countries to invest in the biofuel trend by increasing palm oil production, but some experts believe ramping up crop output is not an acceptable means to an end.

Editor's note: This is the third in a three-part series by ISN Security Watch's Carmen Gentile on biofuels.

By Carmen Gentile for ISN Security Watch (29/09/06)

Southeast Asian nations are working to capitalize on the global biofuel bonanza that has already gripped Latin American countries like Brazil and sparked US agricultural and energy companies' interest in fast-tracking their own ambitions to create a viable corn-based ethanol industry.

Indonesia and Malaysia, in particular, are increasing their production of palm oil - traditionally used in food, hair and other products, it can also fuel vehicles and generators - in hopes that world demand for renewable fuel sources will continue growing despite a recent dip in oil prices to around US$60 a barrel. Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand are also reportedly keen on entering the market and are planning to create new biofuel plantations in the coming years.

"If oil prices remain high, palm oil could be a big break out export for both countries," Edward Yu, an international oil seed analyst at the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at Iowa State University, told ISN Security Watch.

Banking on continued high oil prices, Indonesian and Malaysian leaders are taking the most aggressive approach among their Southeast Asian counterparts, inaugurating ambitious new plans for augmenting their respective palm oil outputs.

Last month, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono pledged US$110 million to his country's farmers to assist them in the planting of palm trees and other biofuel crops. Indonesia's Research and Technology Minister Kusmayanto Kadiman also recently announced that his ministry was planning to build four biodiesel plants at a total cost of US$33 million and increase crop development to a half million hectares per year.

Kadiman said the government was prepared to spend a total of US$1 billion to achieve its goal.

Meanwhile, Malaysia has already approved the construction of 52 new biofuel processing plants, and starting next month, will begin mixing five per cent biofuels with its diesel. Leaders there say that amount will eventually be increased to 20 percent.

The mixture initiative is part of a larger Malaysian proposal to reduce the country's dependence on fossil fuel and increase the competitiveness of its own palm oil sector.
A helping hand from price fixing

Due to price fixing at government-owned gas stations, Indonesia's own biofuels are currently slightly cheaper than fossil fuel diesel. Without government intervention, biofuels and blends containing renewable energy sources and petroleum would actually cost consumers more at this stage of the industry's infancy.

"The biggest impediment of biofuel popularization is its higher price than conventional fuel," wrote Tomohide Sugino, a project leader for the UN Center for Alleviation of Poverty through Secondary Crops' Development in Asia and the Pacific, in a Jakarta Post newspaper commentary published earlier this year.

"Roughly speaking, the production cost of biofuel is twice as much as gasoline [...] the forerunners who have successfully increased biofuel consumption have provided tax exemptions or subsidies to their biofuel producers."

Much like when Brazil subsidized its then-nascent ethanol industry in the 1970s, Indonesia is hopeful that a dose of federal assistance will get the sector up and running. Then, with time and a growing worldwide demand for alternatives to oil, the biofuel industry will be ready to stand on its own two feet.

Their collective fuel ambition has already gotten a boost from the palm oil food product industry, which in recent years has grown by more than 25 percent. Malaysia has increased palm oil yield from 11.8 million metric tons in 2001, to a projected 15.9 million metric tons this year. During the same period, Indonesia has experienced even greater growth, surpassing Malaysia, which was once the regional leader in the sector. In 2001, Indonesia produced 9.2 million metric tons of the oil, with a projected yield increase to 16.3 million metric tons by the end of this year.

Though both countries continue to increase their palm output, they do differ in their ratio of usage. Malaysia, for example, cultivates 70 percent of its crop for industrial uses, including household products as well as fuel, while the remainder goes into food products. As for Indonesia, the reverse is true, with 30 percent used for fuels and other industrial products.
Palm oil production: a disaster in the works?

While Southeast Asian leaders and growers hail palm oil and other biofuel crops as economic saviors, some are convinced the industry will eventually open a Pandora's box of starvation, animal extinction and other environmental disasters.

Indonesia and Malaysia argue that expanding palm oil production means planting more crops, which in turn could add a million more jobs. Critics counter that by increasing palm oil acreage, other crops like cocoa and rubber must be reduced, costing jobs in those respective sectors, and thereby shifting the work force from one crop to another without real change to the employment rate.

Another criticism of the palm oil boom stems from its recent price hike due to rising fuel demand. This has made it prohibitively expensive for the poorer segments of the population, who rely on palm oil for cooking and as a component to many basic food items sold in supermarkets.

Dennis Avery, a senior fellow at the Washington, DC-based Hudson Institute and director for the Center for Global Food Issues, is an ardent critic of the palm oil aspirations of Indonesia and Malaysia and other efforts to supplant fossil fuels with biofuels.

Corruption among officials in those countries intent on expanding the biofuel sector - and willing to give companies the green light to clear large tracks of land to do it - is another concern expressed by biofuel critics.

"The land cost is massive and people don't realize that land is the world's scarcest resource," Avery told ISN Security Watch.

He noted that increasing soil erosion and the clear-cutting of tropical forests to make room for additional crops are among the industry's other sins, adding that palm oil production was also a direct threat to numerous species of rare and endangered animals in the region.

Avery blamed environmentalists in part for propagating biofuel as an eco-friendly alternative to fossil fuels and for damaging the reputation of other energy sources like nuclear power and coal.

"The environmental movement is now risking the very wildlife they claim to want to protect and backed the world into a ridiculous corner," Avery said.

"How can these people say: 'let's take a huge chunk of land and use it to produce automotive fuels' and still consider themselves protectors of the environment?" he asked.

Carmen Gentile is a senior international correspondent for ISN Security Watch. He has reported from Iraq, Afghanistan and Bolivia for ISN Security Watch, and Haiti, Venezuela and elsewhere for Newsweek, The Boston Globe, The Washington Times and others.

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29 September 2006
GUAM brings frozen conflicts to world stage

The countries that make up GUAM (now renamed the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM) are pushing for a resolution of their "frozen" conflicts at the United Nations.

By Nikola Krastev for RFE/RL (29/09/06)

On the sidelines of the 61st UN General Assembly currently under way in New York, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova on 25 September held ministerial-level talks, where they discussed the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniester.

In the last 15 years, frozen conflicts in the GUAM region, namely in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, have affected the lives of over 16 million people. Not only that, but they've remained a threat to international peace and security, according to a joint statement by the GUAM foreign ministers to the General Assembly.
Greater awareness needed

The push for greater recognition seems to have worked. A discussion on frozen conflicts in the General Assembly is now scheduled for 6 November. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov said that GUAM will continue preparatory activities until that time.

"The GUAM heads of state in their joint declaration on the issue of conflict settlement called upon [UN] states and international organizations to further facilitate, within their competence, the process of settlement of conflicts in the GUAM area," he said. "Therefore, the inclusion of the new item on the conflicts in the GUAM area in the agenda of the General Assembly is an attempt to raise [the] awareness of the assembly about dangerous developments emerging from those unresolved conflicts."

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk told the General Assembly that the protracted conflicts continue to destabilize peace and security in the region, and prevent economic development. What's needed, he said, is global awareness.

"It is an important step that will help to draw the attention to the need of more active and effective steps of the international community in order to achieve progress and settlement in conflicts on the territory of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova," Tarasyuk said. "These conflicts are among the main obstacles for the full-scale democratic transformations in the region, which is among the core elements of the regional policy of Ukraine."
International help needed

Georgia, in particular, is placing high hopes on the General Assembly debate. It is dealing with two frozen conflicts - in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In November, South Ossetians will vote in a referendum on independence.

Speaking at the General Assembly on 22 September, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili said international organizations needed to lend a hand to find a solution.

"The essential elements of this package must include the demilitarization of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, backed by the active engagement of the UN, OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the European Union and other international organizations," Saakashvili said. "This must include direct dialogue between parties on the ground, and here I mean the central Georgian government and the separatist authorities - so that together we can assume responsibility for rebuilding the peace."
Russian objections

Russia, however, is not impressed. It dismissed the GUAM member states' attempts to engage a wider UN audience in matters that Moscow considers foreign-policy priorities. In particular, Russia supports independence drives in Transdniester and South Ossetia.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the GUAM initiative a "propagandistic step" and said that hearings at the General Assembly will not produce anything positive.

And last week in an interview with a Greek newspaper, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that Moscow will not allow GUAM peacekeepers into frozen-conflict zones, regardless of what is discussed at the General Assembly.

As Russia is a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council, it certainly won't be plain sailing for GUAM.

Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave. NW, Washington DC 20036. Funded by the US Congress.

Printed from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16733
Online version provided by the International Relations and Security Network
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No one believes we managed to survive a mid-air collision

Must be more to this story....

29 September 2006
Kyrgyz disillusionment

The Kyrgyz people may now regret the Tulip Revolution that ousted Askar Akayev, known for nepotism and corruption. In just over two years, four political assassinations and numerous scandals later, the situation is decidedly worse.

Commentary by Ustina Markus in Almaty for ISN Security Watch (29/09/06)

When former Kyrgyzstan president Askar Akayev was ousted from power in March 2004 in the "Tulip Revolution," the Kyrgyz were optimistic about a new future. His successor, Kurmanbek Bakiev, promised to fight corruption, nepotism, clansmanship and a range of issues plaguing the country. A year and a half on, the Kyrgyz have lost that optimism.

Throughout the country, people feel that Bakiev has not only failed to deliver on his promises, but that he himself is an even worse offender than Akayev in regard to nepotism, unchecked corruption and the criminalization of society.

Signs pointing to disillusionment with Bakiev appeared early on when a leading opposition figure and prosecutor general, Azimbek Beknazarov, was removed from his post in August 2005, shortly after the July presidential elections. Beknazarov wanted to aggressively examine the Akayev family’s business holdings for any improprieties. The following month, another leading opposition figure, Roza Otunbayeva, had her nomination as foreign minister rejected. Both became vocal critics of the president.

In addition, two governors who obtained their appointments after the Tulip Revolution were dismissed - Anvar Aktykov, governor in Osh, and Jusupjan Jeenbekov, governor of Jalalabad. Jeenbekov noted that he was fired shortly after he had argued with the president’s brother, Janysh Bakiev.

Other signs pointing to Bakiev’s weak control over governing structures were the murders of four parliamentary deputies since the new president came to power. The deaths were frequently blamed on business dealings, and the commonly held view in Kyrgyzstan is that there has been a great deal of jockeying for position since the Akayev family fled the scene.

One of the deputies, Rysbek Akmatbayev, was an alleged mobster who had been elected to parliament just before his assassination. His brother Tynychbek, also a deputy, had been killed the year before while visiting a prison. Tynychbek Akmatbayev’s killing sparked protests led by Rysbek and demands for the resignation of Bakiev’s prime minister, Felix Kulov. Also murdered were Jyrgalbek Surabaldiev who was gunned down in broad daylight in June 2005 and Bayaman Erkinbaev, who was shot and killed as he was getting out of his car in September that same year.

While those killings may have been linked to suspect business dealings, an attack on Otunbayeva's home reportedly was not. In November 2005, a small explosive device was thrown into the opposition figure's home. She was not injured. Otunbayeva is not noted to be involved in any corrupt business dealings.

While the assassinations and protests continued, the press noted how many of Bakiev’s relatives held government appointments. Jusupbek Bakiev, a younger brother of the president was the deputy director of the Agency for Community Development. Jusupbek stepped down because of criticism over nepotism. He died in March from natural causes. Other brothers have held on to their posts. Adil Bakiev is Kyrgyzstan’s trade representative to China; Marat Bakiev is the ambassador to Germany; and until this month, Janysh Bakiev was the deputy director of the country’s security agency.

Even more grating to those who supported the anti-Akayev revolution is the president’s son, Maksim. He is rumored to have acquired a number of business interests since his father took office, as well as to have made attempts to gain control of several media outlets.

Rumors around Maksim Bakiev’s assets have not encouraged investors, nor has the general business environment. After Akayev’s ouster, the largest coal mine was forcefully taken over by Nurlan Motuev, the leader of the radical political group Joomart. The mines remained outside of government control for over a year until Motuev was arrested in May and charged with taking over state property.

Indeed, though Bakiev had pledged to uncover any shady business dealings of the Akayev family, not a single business asset has been returned to the state.

If the nepotism, assassinations of deputies, criticism by former supporters, and protests against Bakiev all left many Kyrgyz wondering if they were indeed better off without Akayev, Bakiev’s own behavior has confirmed to many that they were not.

Last March, the country’s foreign debt of US$2 billion - about 80 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s annual gross national product (GNP) - prompted Bakiev to appeal to creditors for debt relief under the IMF and World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCI). Most HIPCI countries are in Africa.

On national television, Bakiev said he was prepared to paint his face black if he could get the debt written off. Then he laughed heartily at his joke. Most Kyrgyz were appalled. One commented that at least Akayev could be trusted not to embarrass the country in public.

Along with the scandals, it has been noted that there is an increasing use of the country’s security forces in crackdowns.

Rafiq Qori Kamoluddin, a prominent iman from Kara-Suu, was killed by security forces in August. The following month, the Defense Ministry held unannounced armed exercises during which they surrounded the parliament building. The exercise took place just after the Defense Ministry was ordered to evacuate its offices in the parliamentary building over unpaid bills. The incident led to calls within parliament to abolish the Defense Ministry altogether.

The latest scandal to rock Kyrgyzstan centered on former parliamentary speaker Omurbek Tekebayev, who was arrested at the Warsaw airport with almost 600 grams of heroin in his suitcase. He was released two days later when film from security cameras in Kyrgyzstan’s airport showed that a security agent had picked up Tekebayev’s briefcase and took it to a closed room before returning it to where Tekebayev had left it.

The evidence that the security services were involved in the apparent framing of the opposition leader led to the resignations of the head of the National Security Service (SNB), Busurmankul Tabaldiyev, as well as Bakiev’s brother and deputy chief of the SNB, Janysh Bakiev.

Tekebayev, a presidential candidate in 2000 and an opposition leader as far back as the Soviet-era, was well known for the animosity he held for Bakiev. In February, he stepped down as parliamentary speaker after making controversial comments about Bakiev being a dog.

As a result of the regular protests against Bakiev’s government and politically related criminal activity, Kyrgyzstan is earning a reputation as a criminalized state. Kyrgyz themselves claim this is the case. As each new scandal tops its predecessors by its audacity and scope, one cannot help but wonder what will happen next.

Dr Ustina Markus is an associate professor at the Kazakh Institute of Management Economics and Strategic Research. Currently she is based in Almaty completing a book on the global oil marketplace.

The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).

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