Bushehr is considered a key part of Iran's nuclear program, and it could be used to produce plutonium,http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr.htm
Plus that one project is not the entirety of Russian involvement, Russia has provided various nuclear technology and technical advice.
As far as China goeshttp://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1042.cfm
Massive technology transfers, including nuclear technology, among other things.
Both are allies with Iran, and support them militarily,economically, and politically and provide them the technology for their program. Russia is behind it, like it or not. Putin is an ex-KGB thug, and he obviously wants Iran to have nukes. It is a war against us through proxies, like the Cold War.
posted on 10/03/2006 3:27:12 PM PDT
Bushehr is considered a key part of Iran's nuclear program, and it could be used to produce plutonium,
The article you posted states, US opposition to Russian construction of Bushehr rests on three issues; first that weapons grade plutonium could be extracted from the reactor allowing the Iranians to construct nuclear weapons.
Nonsense! Your need to do your research.
Light Water Reactors and Nuclear Weapons in North Korea: Let's Be Fair With Our Comparisons
If the two light water reactors (LWRs) slated to be built in North Korea are operated to optimize power production, they will discharge about 500 kg of reactor-grade plutonium a year in highly radioactive spent fuel. However, this plutonium cannot be used in nuclear weapons until it is separated from this radioactive fuel. Typically, such separation occurs inside heavily shielded chemical processing plants, often called reprocessing plants.
North Korea's existing reprocessing plant, which is shut down and under on-site IAEA monitoring under the freeze mandated in the Agreed Framework, would require extensive and difficult modification to separate all this plutonium. Alternatively, North Korea could build another one in secret, though such a step would violate the Agreed Framework, be difficult to accomplish, and the resulting plant would be relatively large. In fact, many advanced industrialized countries, such as Britain and France, experienced intensive challenges in making the jump to facilities that could reprocess irradiated fuel from LWRs, even after accumulating years of experience reprocessing irradiated fuel from gas-graphite reactors like those currently in North Korea.
reactor-grade plutonium can be used to make nuclear explosives, and typically eight kilograms are enough to make a crude nuclear explosive. Using this amount, the LWRs could produce enough plutonium for about 60 weapons per year, relatively close to the estimate cited by Rep. Cox. However, weapon designers prefer weapon-grade plutonium to make nuclear explosives. The two reactors at Yongbyon, and likely the third larger reactor at Taechon, were designed to make weapon-grade plutonium. If all three reactors were producing weapon-grade plutonium, and they would have all been capable of doing so by about 2000, then they could produce about 180-230 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium per year. Because less weapon-grade plutonium is needed per nuclear weapon, this quantity is enough to make about 35-45 nuclear weapons a year.
Instead of reactor-grade plutonium, a LWR could produce significant quantities of weapon-grade plutonium. To do so on any large-scale, however, the reactors would need to be run at less than economically optimized levels. This is the type of activity that would be easy to detect. For example, IAEA safeguards, which North Korea must agree to before the reactors are even built, could easily detect such unusual reactor operations.
Note especially, the light water reactors are not the problem, but the heavy water reactor which Iran has been building on their own at Arak. Iran's Heavy Water Reactor at Arak
posted on 10/03/2006 4:05:27 PM PDT
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