Posted on 11/29/2006 11:26:23 AM PST by rob777
Finally, a leader has spoken about the real, essential differences in the struggle between the West and Islam, as it emanates from a contest within Islam itself over the most important things. With startling—indeed alarming—clarity, Pope Benedict XVI told his audience in Regensburg, Germany, that not only is violence in spreading faith unreasonable and therefore against God, but that a conception of God without reason, or above reason, leads to that very violence. To ensure everyone knew what he was talking about, the pope quoted from a 14th-century Byzantine emperor, Manuel II Paleologus, who was besieged by Islamic forces attempting to conquer Constantinople. The emperor denounced the effort to “spread by the sword the faith he [Mohammed] preached.”
The pope has raised a very volatile question: Is, in fact, the God of Islam without reason, or above it? Is the Muslim God unreasonable? Is Islam, therefore, based upon a theological deformation? The pope’s allusion to the teachings of eleventh-century Islamic philosopher Ibn Hazn—“God is not bound even by his own word”—suggests that possibility. However, it is more than a possibility. It is a core teaching of one of the predominant strains of Islam, if not the predominant strain. Has this always been so? How did such a conception of God develop? Is it still possible to talk about this without threats of murder? Benedict is trying to start a conversation with Islam, and it is the only one really worth having.
The pope’s remarks require a good deal of explication in the context of Islamic philosophy and theology. They need to be understood within the broader perspective of a struggle that has taken place since Islam’s inception over the status of reason and revelation. Benedict has essentially taken sides in the most fundamental debate that has ever been held within the Islamic world, and that is why his words generated such vehemence.
According to the pope, making either reason or revelation autonomous leads to a distortion of what each is. Reason raises questions that it cannot answer, and revelation’s answers cannot be understood without reason. Divorcing reason from faith, or faith from reason, leads to catastrophe; they must be in partnership. Benedict speaks of dehellenization—meaning the loss of reason, the gift of the Greeks—as one of the West’s main problems. Less well-known is the dehellenization that has afflicted Islam—its denigration of and divorce from reason. This took place over an argument, already begun in the seventh and eighth centuries, about the status of reason in relation to God’s omnipotence, and decisively affected the character of the Islamic world. The struggle had its roots in a profound disagreement over who God is.
The side in this debate most easily recognizable to a Westerner was the Mu’tazilite school, composed of the Muslim rationalist philosophers who fought for the primacy of reason. The Mu’tazilites held that God is not only power; He is also reason. Man’s reason is a gift from God, who expects man to use it to come to know Him. The status of reason determines man’s relationship to revelation. God, being reason, would not expect man to accept anything contrary to it. Through reason, man is also able to understand God as manifested in His creation. God’s laws are the laws of nature, which are also manifested in the Sharia (the divine path). Therefore, the Mu’tazilites held that the statements in the Qur’an must be in accord with reason. This means that the Qur’an, a document revealed in history, is open to interpretation. If this sounds familiar, it should: It reflects the same powerful influence Greek philosophy had upon Islam as it had upon Christianity, and which carried within it the impetus to reconcile reason and revelation.
The Mu’tazilite advocacy of reason succeeded to the extent that the teaching of a created Qur’an was enshrined as a state doctrine, proclaimed in 827 under Caliph al-Ma’mn. The Mu’tazilites fought for the primacy of reason and actually required religious judges to swear an oath that the Qur’an had been created. Their opponents, who believed in the primacy of power and the uncreated Qur’an, were punished and imprisoned. However, after the reign of Harun al-Watiq, the tables were turned on the Mu’tazilites by Caliph Ja’afar al-Mutawakkil (847–861), who made holding the Mu’tazilite doctrine a crime punishable by death. This did not end the Mu’tazilite school of thought (some fled to the more hospitable Shia areas), nor did it prevent the flourishing of the Greek-influenced faylasufs (philosophers) who followed them, such as al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. However, the long process of dehellenization and its resulting ossification had begun.
The victorious view developed a theological basis for the primacy of power by claiming that the revelation of Mohammed emphasizes most particularly one attribute of God—His omnipotence. Although all monotheistic religions hold that, in order to be one, God must be omnipotent, this argument reduced God to His omnipotence by concentrating exclusively on His unlimited power, as against His reason. God’s “reasons” are unknowable by man. God is not shackled by reason; He rules as He pleases. He is pure will. There is no rational order invested in the universe upon which one can rely, only the second-to-second manifestation of God’s will.
God is so powerful that every instant is the equivalent of a miracle. Nothing intervenes or has an independent or even semi-autonomous existence. In philosophical language, this view holds that God is the primary cause of everything, and there are no secondary causes. Therefore, what may seem to be “natural laws,” such as the laws of physics, gravity, etc., are really nothing more than God’s customs, which He is at complete liberty to break or change at any moment. As Benedict points out, this is called “volunteerism.”
The consequences of this view are momentous. If creation exists simply as a succession of miraculous moments, it cannot be apprehended by reason. Other religions, including Christianity, recognize miracles. But they recognize them precisely as temporary and extraordinary suspensions of the natural law. In fact, that is what defines them as miracles. One admits to the possibility of a miracle only after discounting every possible explanation of its occurrence by natural causes. In this school of Islamic thought, there are no natural causes to discount. As a result, reality becomes incomprehensible. If unlimited will is the exclusive constituent of reality, there is really nothing left to reason about, and the uncreated Qur’an is not open to interpretation.
The early–tenth-century thinker Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari elaborated a metaphysics for the anti-rational view by using early Greek atomistic philosophy to assert that reality is composed of atoms. The configuration of these atoms at any given moment makes things what they are. In Islam in the World, British analyst Malise Ruthven explains: “The Asharis rationalised God’s omnipotence within an atomistic theory of creation, according to which the world was made up of the discrete points in space and time whose only connection was the will of God, which created them anew at every moment.”
For example, there is a collection of atoms that is a plant. Does the plant remain a plant because it has the nature of a plant, or because Allah wishes it to be a plant from this moment to the next? The Asharites said it is only a plant for the moment. For the plant to remain a plant depends on the will of Allah, and if you say it has to remain a plant because it has the nature of plant, this is shirk—blasphemy.
The catastrophic result of this view is the denial of the relationship between cause and effect. In The Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058–1111), perhaps the single most influential Muslim thinker after Mohammed, vehemently rejected Greek thought: “The source of their infidelity was their hearing terrible names such as Socrates and Hippocrates, Plato and Aristotle.” Al-Ghazali insisted that God is not bound by any order, and that there is, therefore, no “natural” sequence of cause and effect, as in fire burning cotton or, more colorfully, as in “the purging of the bowels and the using of a purgative.” Things do not act according to their own natures but only according to God’s will at the moment. There are only juxtapositions of discrete events that make it appear that the fire is burning the cotton, but God could just as well do otherwise. (This doctrine is known as occasionalism.) In other words, there is no continuous narrative of cause and effect tying these moments together in a comprehensible way. In attacking the Mu’tazilites, the Asharites, in the words of Mohammed Khair, wished “to free God’s saving power from the shackles of causality.”
Equally as damaging to the status of reason, al-Ghazali wrote in Moderation in Belief that reason is so infected by man’s self-interest that it cannot know moral principles; they can only be known through revelation. Since reason is not a source of moral truth, concludes al-Ghazali, “No obligations flow from reason but from the Sharia [the divinely ordained path].” With this, he despatches Aristotle’s Ethics and all other moral philosophy.
To outsiders, this capricious dimension of Islam was clear as long ago as the Middle Ages when the great Jewish philosopher Maimonides (1135–1204) spoke of his experiences in Cairo to illustrate the way some Muslims think. Every morning the caliph rides through Cairo, and every morning he takes the same route. However, said Maimonides, tomorrow he could take a different route. Why? Because he is the caliph and he can do as he wills. Every morning the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. It has happened for years; it happened today. But tomorrow it might rise in the south and set in the north. That depends on the will of Allah, and there is no saying that it will not. As the Qur’an states, “Dost thou not know that God has the power to will anything?” (2:106). Maimonides concluded that “the thing which exists with certain constant and permanent forms, dimensions, and properties [in nature] only follows the direction of habit . . . . On this foundation their whole fabric is constructed.”
This conception of God directed man’s relationship to the Almighty in a specific way. A God who has no reasons cannot be known by reason. This view can and did lead to a rich vein of mysticism, most especially in the Sufism of al-Ghazali, but it also presents a problem. How should one behave toward an unreasoning God? Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), a medieval Muslim thinker who profoundly influenced the founder of Wahhabism and who has been resuscitated by the Islamists today, answered: Man’s task is not to know God. God is unknowable; do not even try to know God. Man’s job is not to love God. Man cannot love what he does not know. Man’s job is to obey. Submit. Reason plays no role, and free will is denigrated. In his attack on philosophy titled Kuzari, Judah ha-Levi, a Jewish follower of al-Ghazali, reached the logical conclusion as to how man ought to approach the revelations of such a deity: “I consider him to have attained the highest degree of perfection who is convinced of religious truths without having scrutinized them and reasoned over them.” (One wonders how one becomes “convinced” of something without having thought about it.) There could hardly be a more radical rejection of what Benedict calls “the reasonableness of faith.”
Compare this relationship to the standard definition of a Christian vocation, which is expressed in this logical order: to know, to love, and to serve God. First, knowledge of God is required. How can one love what one does not know? Of course, it is assumed that a finite creature such as man can only comprehend a small part of an infinite God, but he can know enough to inspire love. God is knowable. If one knows God, then one loves Him because God is goodness. In turn, the impulse of that love is to serve. One is naturally drawn to serve what one loves. The expression of this vocation is internally coherent and logically ordered. It is based upon a certain view of who God is and how man is capable of freely responding to Him through the use of his reason and free will.
To understand the ultimate significance of the Asharite and al-Ghazali’s teaching of an unreasoning God, it may be helpful to contrast it to the Christian teaching that was similarly tempted to such extremes, but resisted them. Why, for instance, did this exclusive preoccupation with God’s omnipotence not afflict Christianity, which is also monotheistic? Christianity holds that God is omnipotent and the primary cause of all things, as well. In fact, as Benedict pointed out in Regensburg, there were strong tendencies within Christianity to move in the very same direction, including in the teaching of Duns Scotus. The anti-rational view was violently manifested in the millenarian movements of the Middle Ages, and within the movement that was known as fideism—faith alone, sola scriptura. In its most radical form, this school held that the Scriptures are enough. Forget reason, Greek philosophy, and Thomas Aquinas. However, the anti-rationalist view in its more extreme forms has never predominated in Christianity, and it was considered broadly heretical.
As Benedict makes clear, the reason Christianity was insulated from an obsession with God’s omnipotence was the revelation of Christ as Logos in the Gospel of St. John. If Christ is Logos—if God introduces Himself as ratio—then God is not only all-powerful, He is reason. While the Mu’tazilites claimed something similar, they had no scriptural authority to confirm their position, while their opponents had many to oppose it.
In addition, Christian revelation claims that everything was created through Christ as Logos. Since it was through Logos that all things were created, creation carries the imprint of its creator as reason. Nature bespeaks an intelligibility that derives from a transcendent source. Benedict recently reiterated this view when he referred to the “world as a product of creative reason.” The laws of nature are not a challenge to God’s authority but an expression of it. Reason and Christian revelation are compatible.
Ultimately, this theological view developed into the realist metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, which then became the foundation for modern science, as Rev. Stanley Jaki, a Hungarian theologian and physicist, has explained in his voluminous writings on the origins of modern science. He has laid out the reasons modern science was stillborn in the Muslim world after what seemed to be its real start (see his extraordinary monograph, Jesus, Islam, Science). No one offers a more profound understanding of the consequences of the view of God as pure will than Father Jaki has.
The metaphysical support for natural law not only laid the foundations for modern science, but also provided the basis for the gradual development of constitutional government. The primacy of power in Islamic thought undermined a similar prospect. If one does not allow for the existence of secondary causes, one cannot develop natural law. If one cannot develop natural law, one cannot conceive of a constitutional political order in which man—through his reason—creates laws to govern himself and behave freely. Because democracies base their political order on reason and free will, and leave in play questions that Islamists believe have been definitively settled by revelation, Islamists regard democracies as their natural and fatal enemies.
The curious thing is that it does not matter whether one’s view of reality as pure will has its origin in a deformed theology or a totally secular ideology, such as Hegel’s or Hobbes’s: The political consequences are the same. As Rev. James V. Schall has shown, the notion of pure will as the basis of reality results in tyrannical rule. Disordered will, unfettered by right reason, is the political problem.
Radical Muslims translate their version of God’s omnipotence into a politics of unlimited power. As God’s instruments, they are channels for this power. Once the primacy of force is posited, terrorism becomes the next logical step to power, as it did in the 20th-century secular ideologies of power: Nazism and Marxism–Leninism. This is what led Osama bin Laden to embrace the astonishing statement of his spiritual godfather, Abdullah Azzam, which bin Laden quoted in the November 2001 video, released after 9/11: “Terrorism is an obligation in Allah’s religion.” This can only be true—that violence in spreading faith is an obligation—if, as Benedict said in Regensburg, God is without reason.
The problem today is that the side of reason in Islam lost. The ultimate consequences of the rejection of reason and the loss of causality are playing themselves out across the Muslim world. As Fouad Ajami recently observed, “Wherever I go in the Islamic world, it’s the same problem: cause and effect; cause and effect.”
It is not that the side of reason is not still there—there are some extraordinarily intelligent Muslim scholars who would like to see a neo-Mu’tazilite movement within Islam, a restoration of the primacy of reason so that they can re-open the doors to interpretation and develop some kind of natural-law foundation for humane, political, constitutional rule. According to Iranian thinker Abdolkarim Soroush, “Some of the understandings that exist in our society today of the Imams . . . or even of the concept of God are not particularly compatible with an accountable state and do not allow society to grow and develop in the modern-day sense.” Reformist Tunisian-born thinker Latif Lakhdar calls for a revival of “Mu’tazila and philosophical thought that subjected the holy writings on which the religion is based to interpretation by the human mind.” There are Muslims who will say these things, but many of them, like Soroush and Lakhdar, are in the West for their own protection.
Is there a constituency within the Muslim world that can elaborate a theology that allows for the restoration of reason, a rehellenization of Islam with Allah as ratio? It is idle to pretend that it would take less than a sea change for this to happen. If it does not, it is hard to envisage upon what basis the dialogue with Islam could take place. There are many Muslims (in Turkey and in the developing democracies of Indonesia and Malaysia, to say nothing of the democratic life followed by the huge Muslim population in India) who want to enter the modern world—with its modern science and modern political institutions—and also keep their faith. Unfortunately, the ideas gaining traction today are not theirs. That is the crisis, which is now spilling over into the West. In order to meet it, Benedict is telling us we have urgent reason to regain our own faith and to raise these all-important questions with them.
Robert R. Reilly was a special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and served as his liaison to the Catholic Church.
It's too bad that this side did not win out, perhaps there is still hope. (I confess to being an eternal optimist, but even I have my doubts)
This was very interesting. Thank you for posting it.
Excellent, indeed.
I think I'll send this one to my email list.
Betty boop, you might want to ping this one to your list.
This goes a long way in explaining why they are, well the way they are.
Indeed, Cicero! Here's the rub: For radical Islamacists, the "theological deformation" is all on the side of the West and Judeo-Christianity. Don't forget: Islam is formally "Unitarian." Thus the ignorant among them routinely proclaim that, say, Christians are polytheistic idolaters (because of the Holy Trinity).
Thus Trinitarians are widely believed to be ungodded apostates who revile Allah; and subsequently they can with justice -- under Sharia law that is -- be raped, tortured, and killed wherever they can be found, with total impunity; i.e., with the approving "seal of Allah." But if dear Mohammed might try to come up with a better solution to the "final solution" regarding "apostates," here are two juicy potential alternatives:
(1) Enslave them wholesale.To change the subject to the main bearing of the article: Is Allah bound by his own word -- which Judeo-Cristians tend to regard as Logos, or reason? Now here is a great paradox: If (illimitable) God is not bound by reason (a limit), then what kind of a universe would this be, in which we and all other creatures live? I mean, if god can lie, then doesn't that justify human lies? And if we humans are all lying to each other more or less all the time (with divine sanction), then what kind of chance does a just, peaceful, and prosperous socciety have of even forming in the first place?(2) Leave them free; but make them second class citizens; and to ensure that result, tax them into the ground.
They are never to get the idea that they are free persons living in a free country. Kill the ones who do find the cojones to say that; for they disturb the public "peace."
On the other hand, we can accept the word of Ibn Hazn. Indeed, we can see its consequences being tested in the real world, right now.
I propose that a "disordered god" -- a god so disordered that he doesn't even take himself seriously enough to honor his own word -- conduces to a "disordered world," one that preeminently contains human beings who are increasingly disordered as a consequence.
Anyhoot, to change the subject yet again: You suggested we should ping our respective lists. I don't keep a ping list anymore. Last time I did that, I got a lot of complaints, mainly in public. It was very discouraging. So now I just ping people I've been talking to recently, on threads in which we seem to have a common interest.
The other thing I dread is that your ping list probably looks a whole lot like mine, were I to construct one. :^)
Under the above two advisements, I'll try to do my best.
Thanks for the ping to this marvelous article, Cicero!
Not to speak of the incredible passage by MoMo..
"If a Muslim changes his religion, KILL HIM"- MoMo(wrath of God be upon him)
"Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached." -Manuel II Paleologus
Indeed. One may freely study the history of Islamic "diplomacy" over the past millennium-plus if one so desires. On this record we learn: Islam does not reserve lying as a legitimate tactic to the (non-Islamic) dhimmis out there only. Rather the Islamic sects also routinely lie to each other, whenever one or the other perceives an advantage is up for grabs (usually in terms of power and/or geographical extension) that if successfully seized will redound to its own particular benefit.
Does that mean that Islam can lie to itself?
Islam mouths the language of brotherhood. But its practice all too often involves the sword, and the slaughter of its own brothers. I gather this long-standing practice equips them to face the West in the present day. The historical record backs this speculation of mine.
I gather this is what you get when you have a "god" who himself has no respect for truth -- truth that he himself supposedly instantiated in the beginning, so to make a dynamic, lasting, living world.
One might as well espouse Nobel prize laureate Jacques Monod's theory that everything that exists is the product of a random, accidental development -- i.e., "evolution" by sheer, pure chance. And, indeed -- many people do believe this nowadays. Especially atheists (at least in theory) and Islamist jihadists (by actual practice).
If Allah lies, he guarantees that such a process should prevail among men -- that is, human beings. Or so it seems to me. We humans (at least the Muslims among us) must reap what "Allah sows," should we listen to him at all, and take a "lesson" therefrom.
If God is not the lynchpin of truth, and of justice -- then man has no trusty lynchpin by which he rightly may govern his life.
Or so it seems to me. FWIW.
Thanks so much for writing, dear hosepipe!
No, truth to tell I never got around to developing a ping list of my own, I suppose because I tend to be interested in a variety of subjects. So I occasionally ping people who I think might be able to draw others to an article I think is important.
I'm sorry to hear you got flak for trying to do it yourself. Awfully silly and counterproductive. It's easy enough just to ask quietly to be taken off the list, if that's what someone wants.
Excellent analysis. I think many people don't understand the profound impact this has on Islamic attitudes and how vastly different it is from the Christian understanding. But it really is the essence of the problem.
I think it's also one of the things that makes preaching to them very difficult, because they're actually not looking for rational answers and they don't want to hear reason-based arguments.
On the other hand, because their god is not Love, they don't understand that aspect of it, either, and the more mystical approach is also lost on them. Islam has got itself into a peculiar intellectual trap with no exit, in which the only argument that makes any sense to them is power and the power to subdue or dominate. And this is precisely what Christianity does not do. So then, how to preach to the Muslims?
Pardon me if I don't give a sh*t about pagan stuff,
And that is the way it should be, since they believe in different Gods.
How could it be any other way.
It is not like they believe in the same God but call Him by a different name. They each believe their God is the only God to the exclusion of beliefs held by other religions.
You are not going to reconcile: my God is the true God and your belief in another supernatural being is wrong. - tom
Thanks for the ping BB, and I agree with you on the chance that we might be re-pinging some of our friends to the point of absurdity.
Not only is God Almighty orderly and reasoned, all dimensions are aspects of His nature manifesting, and the only ones we are capable of sensing presently are time, space, life force, and the smattering of Spirit. I suspect Gos has seven dimensions to His nature and for every dimension there is a manifestation of God finitely expressed therein.
Islam is not only not in search of God for fellowship, their very demonically inspired acts show they are seeking to manipulate their demonically inspired twisted concept of the Creator, making allah owe them, as in killing sufficient numbers of 'infidels' to guarantee blessings from allah.
Such irrational possession by demonic inspiration cannot be reasoned with for reason itself is anathema to such spawn of demonic lies. In short, there is no moderate sect of Islam that can prevail and with whom the West may reason, ultimately. I suspect God Himself, in Christ's return, will be needed to cleanse the Earth of the demonic influences manifesting in Islam.
This is a fabulous article, but I'm falling asleep...so ping to myself for later....
Okay: Consider yourself pardoned -- if that's what you actually want, in the light of faith and reason, all things considered....
p.s.: BTW, were it not for those "pagans," probably you would never have heard of reason, or logic, in the first place.
Is Allah bound by his own word
A major break in judaism from paganism involves just this: Covenant. It's the difference between a capricious god(s) - throwing down gifts or tragedy willy-nilly - and one who enters into agreements (covenant) with humans. It is foundational to a just God..
I don't see how Islam can include Abraham and not covenant (Allah bound by his own word). The covenant relationship is key. It changes man's whole understanding of God from that of the pagans.
Thank you for pinging me to your comments, which I enjoyed reading. I don't have much time these days for joining the discussion, but I always read what you ping me to!
Saving for later.
In other words, there must always be a careful balance between the contempletive and the active.
Muslims believe that reason limits God's freedom, since such a God is not "free" to will evil. But a perfect being (a being possessing the fullness of being; a being of pure act) can only will the good since evil is a privation of being.
There's a reason why the Muslims went nowhere with the discovery of Aristotle's writings.
~~~~~~~~~~~~
Islamic clerics freely deny that "Allah" (aka Islam's "God")
and the (Triune) God and Creator, "the God of Moses, Abraham, and Jesus"
are one and the same...
...and they are correct!
The One, True God ("I AM") who authored the Bible, predicted (via the apostle, Paul) the coming scam of Islam, and identified the roles of the players involved:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
9 The coming of the lawless one [the prophet, Mohammed] will be in accordance with the work of Satan ["Allah"] displayed in all kinds of counterfeit miracles, signs and wonders,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
10 and in every sort of evil that deceives those who are perishing. They perish because they refused to love the truth and so be saved.
11 For this reason God sends them a powerful delusion so that they will believe the lie
12 and so that all will be condemned who have not believed the truth but have delighted in wickedness.2 Thessalonians 2:9-12 (New International Version)
New International Version (NIV
Copyright © 1973, 1978, 1984 by International Bible Society
Ibn Hazn failed to get his identities straight:
Satan (aka "Allah") is not bound even by his own word.
Thanks for the ping, BB!
Good post!
(I intended for #24 to be addressed to you, as well...)
Both, since "being" and "good" are convertible terms.
If evil is the privation of being, does that not imply that any state of being is good?
Yes, to various degrees. Even the devil possesses goodness in his nature (considered absolutely) and in his existence.
It is evident again that all evil is essentially negative and not positive; i.e. it consists not in the acquisition of anything, but in the loss or deprivation of something necessary for perfection. Pain, which is the test or criterion of physical evil, has indeed a positive, though purely subjective existence as a sensation or emotion; but its evil quality lies in its disturbing effector the sufferer. In like manner, the perverse action of the will, upon which moral evil depends, is more than a mere negation of right action, implying as it does the positive element of choice; but the morally evil character of wrong action is constituted not by the element of choice, but by its rejection of what right reason requires.
Not to be argumentative, but I'm not aware of any miracles associated with Islam. Do you know of any? Personally, I believe that the devil visited with Mohammed, so I wouldn't be surprised by any "signs and wonders" associated with Islam, but I would be surprised by miraculous healings.
Nor am I. But -- from observation of Muslims I've known, they seem to consider anything that goes well ("in sha'lla") to be a miracle.
Very good answer.
I've been thinking about this problem overnight, and came up with a couple of small observations.
It was Plato who first put the basic question in the Euthyphro 10a: "Consider this: Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"
Change that to God, and you have something like, "Does God love what is good because it is good, or is it good because He loves it?"
If you choose the first alternative, then you seem to have a God Who is less than omnipotent. Choose the second alternative, and you seem to have a goodness that is arbitrary.
Chesterton provides the answer that Christianity settled on, in "Orthodoxy." You must not choose either alternative, because the truth incorporates both alternatives.
In a similar way, I was troubled by the Islamic notion that Allah holds being in existence from moment to moment, and that an object might abruptly change into something else by Allah's whim.
But there is also a Christian belief that God sustains the universe from moment to moment, and that if He ceased to sustain it, it would cease to exist. Just as you cannot explain the existence of the universe without God, you cannot explain its continuation in existence without God.
The answer is the same Chestertonian notion: it would be heretical to settle on either alternative, but orthodoxy lies in a synthesis of both. God sustains the universe from moment to moment, but because God is also the principle of rationality, or the Logos, He sustains it according to the laws He has built into the universe, miracles excepted.
I noticed something similar. The most strident depiction against it comes through in "The Horse and His Boy" from the Narnian Chronicles. I'm reading this as a bedtime story for my six-year-old and had second thoughts when in the third chapter the young Calormene daughter of Kidrash, Aravis Tarkheena, prepares to commit suicide to escape a forced marriage to Ahoshta Tarkaan:
I dismounted from Hwin my mare and took out the dagger. Then I parted my clothes where I thought the readiest way lay to my heart and I prayed to all the gods that as soon as I was dead I might find myself with my bother. After that I shut my eyes and my teeth and prepared to drive the dagger into my heart. But before I had done so, this mare spoke with the voice of one of the daughters of men and said, 'O my mistress, do not by any means destroy yourself, for if you live you may yet have good fortune but all the dead are dead alike." . . . When I heard the language of men uttered by my mare," continued Aravis, "I said to myself, the fear of death has disordered my reason and subjected me to delusions. And I became full of shame for non of my lineage ought to fear death more than the biting of a gnat. Therefore I addressed myself a second time to the stabbing, but Hwin came near to me and put her head in between me and the dagger and discoursed to me most excellent reasons and rebuked me as a mother rebukes her daughter. And now my wonder was so great that I forgot about killing myself and about Ahoshta and said, 'O my mare, how have you learned to speak like one of the daughters of me? And Hwin told me what is known to all this company, that in Narnia there are beasts that talk,and how she herself was stolen from thence when she was a little foal. She told me also of the woods and waters of Narnia and the castles and the great ships, till I said, "In the name of Tash and Azaroth and Zardeenah, Lady of the Night, I have a great wish to be in that country of Narnia," "O my mistress," answered the mare, "if you were in Narnia you would be happy, for in that land no maiden is forced to marry against her will.
Tash, the god of he Calormenes, makes his final appearance in the Last Battle. In that stroy, Shift the ape tries to say Aslan and Tash are the same, "Tashlan." Lewis is confronting the limit of his Tao. Some wiki-picky has caught the Muslim references and tries to defend it (see entry "Tash")
This problem is often introduced through Plato, especially in college whenever Plato is read. My guess is that when this happens, the students are rarely informed that the gods that are critiqued are from the greek pantheon.
I think this is a really illuminating essay.
Well, yes: when God created the Universe, he said each part of it was "Good," and when it was complete it was "Very Good."
Being per se is good; not neutral, good
My initial reaction--without going through the entire piece--confirms what earlier posts about the Regensburg lecture seem to suggest.
The question whether God is above reason, fails to address the distinction between human reason and divine reason. If reason is creaturely, that is created, it is under God, as all creation is.
The equation of reason with God leads to the problem in the Englightenment, especially in Kant. This tendency divinizes reason, makes it capital R. Remember, enlightenment reason is based on the scope of commonality (in some instances this means the lowest common denominator). Notice that questions about the relation of God to reason is not convertible with the relation of God to being or to goodness. Perhaps our participation in the nature of God involves some aspect of reason, but the Popes' position should be taken with critical caution. Wish I had the time to untangle it.
No, since a being by definition has existence, and existence is convertible with good.
Actually, Socrates was cagy about the gods, but there was probably some reason for his enemies' accusation that he taught that they were not real, or were not just. As early as Homer, to whom many of the hymns were attributed, the justice of the gods comes under question.
The Greeks raised some of these issues early precisely because in the age of philosophy their gods posed interesting problems. I think the same is true of the Greek tragedies, although they began as integral parts of religious celebrations.
I agree.. The Pope is just a Dude with an authoritative costume.. riding a human body for transportation like the rest of us.. God said to Moses "I am that I am"(EX Ch3) thats what/whom you should tell them I am... for a reason..
It is possible that man "any man" cannot fully concieve of who and what God is.. in "their" current condition.. if ever..
Glutting themselves on the fruits of The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil(debits and credits, assets and liabilitys)[GenChs1-3] is where the "problems" all started.. Probably "the reason" God elected to allow "THE BIBLE" to happen.. You know as a ledger of good and evil.. double entry Godness displaying a Devilish attitude.. This is "good" and that is "evil" is quite simplistic.. True sometimes.... but not always..
The privation of being for a human is what we limit ourselves to "Observing".. The Observer sees what he/she wants to see.. The BIBLE expands the Observers vista to what he/she needs to see.. An Observer "with a Bible" can see over the horizon.. An Observer without the Bible is limited to the Forest and "the Trees".. and sometimes only one of those..
The Apology shows up those cagey sophists. They are the knaves who think they know, when the don't, laying claim to being wise in a wisdom that is greater than human. That is how Plato presents Socrates the philosopher philosophos in contrast to the wise man (sophos). The philosopher is not wise, but loves wisdom. This sentiment closes the Phaedrus, a dialogue about truth in speech. The author that is honest is the one who subordinates the work of his thought to the pursuit which underlies them.
I think, Phaedrus, that the epithet "wise" is too great and befits God alone; but the name "philosopher," that is, "lover of wisdom," or something of the sort would be more fitting and modest for such a man.Someone could object, "but this is about wisdom, not reason." True. But then again, we know from reading Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics that wisdom is higher than science.
Which view is more akin to Christianity? The Socratic, the Muslim, or the Enlightenment? Without making those distinctions, the term reason is used like a wild card and the question "Is God above reason" becomes subject to the power of rhetoric.
B16 criticized the "voluntarist" notion of the Islamic Allah as an arbitrry, capricious, even self-contradicting Entity whose being is centered on will and power. But note that the bulk of B16's Regensburg speech critiqes the opposite tendency found in the secular West: reason without faith.
Without faith, reason has no way to know that it is even in touch with reality, and therefore it has nothing to "reason about."
Thus the "deification" of human reason is wrong, because reason itself raises questions which reason can't answer. (To paraphrase another pope, "Reason is a student, not a teacher.")
(Human) reason itself teaches us that it is inadequate to the task: we need divine Revelation. This brings us into contact with the divine Logos, far above us, yes; yet we are made in His image.
The Pope acknowledges a spectrum of Catholic views but cites only one Islamic thinker, Ibn Hazm of Cordova, whose view of an essentially non-rational, capricious God was rejected by virtually every other Muslim. Far from teaching an irrational obedience to a non-rational deity, mainstream Islamic theology insists on the systematic use of reason, since the Koran itself asks its audience to deduce the existence of God from his orderly signs in nature. Of the two schools of Sunni orthodoxy, Ash’arism and Maturidism, the latter—the orthodoxy of perhaps 80 per cent of Muslims—is particularly insistent on the rationality of God’s actions. Abdal Hakim Murad, The Prospect
Well, personally I lean toward Aristotle and Aquinas when it comes to philosophy. But I sympathize with Pico's dream of finding a synthesis of Plato and Aristotle--maybe in the next world. Certainly Augustine did some wonderful things with Plato.
I only have two contributions for the discussion:
Thus when He says a thing, it is. He has identified Himself that same way, I AM that I AM.
Therefore, when Ibn Hazn declares "God is not bound even by his own word” he is not speaking of God, but some other spirit which by the preponderance of evidence is anti-God.
By evidence writ large in the Cosmos (Psalms 19, Romans 1:20) - we observe that what we can perceive of the Creation is intelligible, rational, logical, orderly. And therefore we discover logic, geometries, physical laws, constants and so on.
But that which applies within boundaries (in a “system”) cannot be projected to beyond the system. Thus man cannot demand God comply with his notion of logic, etc.
For instance, God has spoken prophesies (predestination) and commandments (free will.) They are both Truth because He said it even though both being true violates the principle of the excluded middle in formal logic.
Likewise, the principle of identity in formal logic - "a being is what it is" and in the negative “a being cannot both be and not be at the same time and under the same aspect" – cannot be presumed to apply beyond the boundaries of Creation. Examples include the Trinity and those who have been reborn in Christ (Galatians 2:20-21, Colossians 3:3, John 3, etc.)
A more earthy example of why a "law" cannot be projected beyond the boundaries: one cannot say a thing is random in the system if he doesn't know what the system "is." A series of numbers extracted from the extension of pi would appear random when it is actually highly determined.
Thank for your reply, Mrs. Don-o.
I am reading his speech and notice that the pundits and prodigies of natural law theory are making hay of it.
You say it quite right: "(Human) reason itself teaches us that it is inadequate to the task: we need divine Revelation. This brings us into contact with the divine Logos." I just note that the Logos of St. John is not the Logos of the Stoic. The Stoics conflated Nature with God (a tendency in the Enlightenment).
You have posited this several times lately.. Its so true..
And since literally ANY number can be the result of pi.. or even logarithmic or a sine or co-sine the word random loses much of its meaning..
Little wonder the quantum mechanics must become magicians or Shamans alluding to many dimensions.. The Quantum Mechanics have a flawed socket set.. missing sockets to adjust the nuts and bolts of the Universe.. Yes, this Universe.. d;-)~',',
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