Posted on 09/22/2007 6:16:47 PM PDT by ZacandPook
Maybe the link will work if I turn the Word Wrap on:
As for why future anthrax attacks were disrupted, see
Researcher Believes Al Qaeda Anthrax Plotters Were Captured or Killed
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-bloggers/1826227/posts
linking a 2004 article arguing the original anthrax plotters had been captured, killed, or otherwise neutralized; and that this explains why there was no subsequent attacks.
In a 2007 book, Tenet confirms the same.
“Al-Qa’ida spared no effort in its attempt to obtain biological weapons. In 1999, al-Zawahiri had recruited another scientist, Pakistani national Rauf Ahmad, to set up a small lab in Khandahar, Afghanistan, to house the biological weapons effort. In December 2001, a sharp WMD analyst at CIA found the initial lead on which we would pull and, ultimately, unravel the al-Qa’ida anthrax networks. We were able to identify Rauf Ahmad from letters he had written to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Later, we uncovered Sufaat’s central role in the program. We located Rauf Ahmad’s lab in Afghanistan. We identified the building in Khandahar where Sufaat claimed he isolated anthrax. We mounted operations that resulted in the arrests and detentions of anthrax operatives in several countries.
The most startling revelation from this intelligence success story was that the anthrax program had been developed in parallel to 9/11 planning. As best as we could determine, al-Zawahiri’s project had been wrapped up in the summer of 2001, when the al-Qaida deputy, along with Hambali, were briefed over a week by Sufaat on the progress he had made to isolate anthrax. The entire operation had been managed at the top of al-Qai’da with strict compartmentalization. Having completed this phase of his work, Sufaat fled Afghanistan in December 2001 and was captured by authorities trying to sneak back into Malaysia. Rauf Ahmad was detained by Pakistani authorities in December 2001. Our hope was that these and our many other actions had neutralized the anthrax threat, at least temporarily.”
- George Tenet, in At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, at 278-279 (April 30, 2007)
So just think of FreeRepublic as 3 years ahead of the CIA.
Shermy had a great post on FreeRepublic in 2004 about the evolution of the “domestic” theory.
One article he cites:
“November 5, 2001
The Washington Post
In Anthrax Probe, Questions of Skill, Motive; Some Terrorism Specialists Suspect an Angry Loner With Scientific Knowledge
By Peter Slevin
***
In recent days, high-ranking bureau and CIA officials have said the composition of the anthrax-laden powder and the “totality” of the evidence convinced them the conspiracy originated in the United States, either among American militants or foreign-born opponents of the United States and Israel. With little evidence in hand, federal authorities are still considering the possibility the attack was undertaken by a militant Islamic cell or individual connected to, or inspired by, the Sept. 11 plotters.”
____
The FBI had already interviewed Ali Al-Timimi. Respectfully, Randall Larsen’s position that the FBI was off target is not warranted. For example, while they pursued the various hypotheses, they exhaustively searched everywhere the hijackers were known to have been in the US.
There were two squads — we’ll call them Squad A and Squad B. We would want them both to be aggressive in exploring the various possible leads.
It was folks “outside law enforcement” — especially amateur hobbyists who knew nothing about the neo-Salafists following the principles followed by Bin Laden —overemphasizing the (at its root implausible) bioevangelist theory. The folks available to interview were those outside law enforcement.
If the FBI had talked about the infiltration at the Center for Biodefense, they wouldn’t have snagged the interceptions in 2002 of conversations with bin Laden’s (and Al-Timimi’s) mentor.
I don’t know what yahoos we’re talking about. If were talking about Rauf Ahmad, I provide a number where he can be reached for an interview by a journalist who wants to know more about that story.
Water boarding is morally repugnant and illegal. It is cruel and unusual.
Michael Scheuer says President Bush doesn’t appreciate that US policies are what they oppose — and yet Mr. Scheuer never mentions that MS’s rendition program is what they object to the most. Mr. Scheuer isn’t concerned with their treatment in countries abroad, but he should, as it underlies much of the rage that has fueled the terrorism. Like Senator Leahy says, we must be careful not to undermine the very values we are defending.
Why pleasant soothing pharmaceutical drugs — to include drugs that make you forget you were questioned — are not fully sufficient is beyond me.
Nothing personality altering.
Heck, the amount of khat consumed in Yemen in absolutely astounding — as is the proportion of land devoted to its cultivation. See Jihad Next Door (2007) about the Buffalo cell
Montasser al-Zayat met Abdel-Rahman after Montasser had been tortured for 12 hours. He was near a mental breakdown. Abdel-Rahamn came over to where he was huddled in a corner of a cell, bent over and whispered:”Rely on God; don’t be defeated.” Mohammed had spoken the words in the Koran. Al- Zayat would become one of Sheik Omar’s most trusted legal advisers and a lawyer on the defense team of El Sayyid Nosair, the Egyptian who had served as Abdel-Rahman’s bodyguard was tried in New York in 1990 for the murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane.
US Postal employee Sattar, who had been the blind sheik’s spokesman after his 1993 arrest, in a 1999 Frontline interview spoke of the role of appropriations and torture in fueling the islamist rage:
” this is the same old story happening again, and again, and again. American government don’t get it. ... The American government [is] deceiving the American people. They’re not telling them what’s really going on. You can kill Osama bin Laden today or tomorrow. You can arrest him and put him on trial in New York or in Washington. ... Tomorrow you will get somebody else, his name probably will be different, Abdullah, or Muhammad. ... It’s not going to end. Until you, take a hard, and a good look at your policies in the Islamic world and the Muslim world, as long as you’re supporting dictators like Mubarak ... as long as you are giving aid to regimes that [are worse] to their people than Saddam Hussein, things will get ugly, and you cannot control the emotion of people when you are tortured in Egyptian prison by an American trained Egyptian officer. He is torturing you, and he is bragging that he was in the United States getting his training, when the equipment that he is using is American made. ...”
The founder of Egyptian Islamic Jihad Kamal Habib (who wrote for the IANA quarterly magazine) told scholar Fawaz Gerges:
“The prison years also radicalized al-shabab [young men] and set them on another violent journey. The torture left deep physical and psychological scars on jihadists and fueled their thirst for vengeance. Look at my hands — still spotted with the scars from cigarette burns nineteen years later. For days on end we were brutalized — our faces bloodied, our bodies broken with electrical shocks and other devices. The torturers aimed at breaking our souls and brainwashing us. They wanted to humiliate us and force us to betray the closest members of our cells.
I spent sleepless nights listening to the screams of young men echoing from torture chambers. A degrading, dehumanizing experience. I cannot convey to you the rage felt by al-shabab who were tortured after Sadat’s assassination.”
In a videotape that circulated in the summer of 2001, Zawahiri said “In Egypt they put a lot of people in jails — some sentenced to be hanged. And in the Egyptian jails, there is a lot of killing and torture. All this happens under the supervision of America. America has a CIA station as well as an FBI office and a huge embassy in Egypt, and it closely follows what happens in that country. Therefore, America is responsible for everything that happens.”
An August 29, 2001 opinion column on Islamway, the second most read site for english speaking muslims, illustrates that the role of “Leahy Law” was known by educated islamists: There is an intolerable contradiction between America’s professed policy of opposition to state-sponsored terrorism, exemplified by the Leahy Law, and the U.S. Congress’ continuing sponsorship of Israeli violence against Palestinians.” The article cited “References: CIFP 2001. “Limitations on Assistance to Security Forces: ‘The Leahy Law’” 4/9/01 (Washington, DC: Center for International Foreign Policy) Center for International Foreign Policy Accessed 8/28/01.Hocksteader, Lee 2001. “The next day, in the same publication, there was an article describing the 21-page document released in Ottawa on August 29, 2001, in which the CSIS claimed that Canadian detainee Jaballah had contacts with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Shehata and sought to deport Jaballah. Shehata was in charge of EIJ’s Civilian Branch and in charge of “special operations.”
“They represent something to him,” says James Fitzgerald of the FBI Academy’s Behavioral Analysis Unit. “Whatever agenda he’s operating under, these people meant something to him.” To more fully appreciate why Leahy — a human rights advocate and liberal democrat — might have been targeted as a symbol, it is important to know that Senator Leahy has been the head of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, the panel in charge of aid to Egypt and Israel. In addition to the Senate majority leader, anthrax was mailed to the position symbolic of the 50 billion in appropriations that has been given to Israel since 1947 (and the equally substantial $2 billion annually in aid that has been keeping Mubarak in power in Egypt and the militant islamists out of power).
That aid goes to the core of Al Qaeda’s complaint against the United States. (The portion going to Egypt and Israel constitutes, by far, the largest portion of US foreign aid, and most of that is for military and security purposes.) Pakistan is a grudging ally in the “war against terrorism” largely due to the US Aid it now receives in exchange for that cooperation. The press in Pakistan newspapers regularly reported on protests arguing that FBI’s reported 12 agents in Pakistan in 2002 were an affront to its sovereignty. There was a tall man, an Urdu-speaking man, and a woman — all chain-smokers — who along with their colleagues were doing very important work in an unsupportive, even hostile, environment. The US agents — whether CIA or FBI or US Army -— caused quite a stir in Pakistan along with the Pakistani security and intelligence officials who accompanied them.
Within a couple weeks after September 11, a report in the Washington Post and then throughout the muslim world explained that the President sought a waiver that would allow military assistance to once-shunned nations. The militant islamists who had already been reeling from the extradition of 70 “brothers”, would now be facing much more of the same. President Bush asked Congress for authority to waive all existing restrictions on U.S. military assistance and exports for the next five years to any country where the aid would help the fight against international terrorism. The waiver would include those nations who were currently unable to receive U.S. military aid because of their sponsorship of terrorism (such as Syria and Iran) or because of their nuclear weapons programs (such as Pakistan). In mid-March 2003, Washington waived sanctions imposed in 1999 paving the way for release in economic aid to Pakistan. Billions more would be sent to Egypt, Israel and other countries involved in the “war against terrorism.”
In late September 2001, the Washington Post quoted Leahy: “We all want to be helpful, and I will listen to what they have in mind.” The article noted that he was chairman of both the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Appropriations foreign operations subcommittee, which were considering the legislation. “But we also want to be convinced that what is being proposed is sound, measured and necessary and not merely impulsive,” said Leahy. “Moral leadership in defense of democracy and human rights is vital to what we stand for in the world. Acts of terrorism are violations of human rights. Now is the time to show what sets us apart from those who attack us,” he said.
The options being considered in response to the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington included potential cooperation with virtually every Middle Eastern and South and Central Asian nation near Afghanistan. “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” would be the only test for foreign aid. The “Leahy Law” plays a key role in the secret “rendering” of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al Qaeda) operatives to countries like Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Algeria where they are allegedly tortured. Richard Clarke, counterterrorism czar during the Clinton Administration, has quoted Vice-President Gore saying: “Of course it’s a violation of international law, that’s why it’s a covert action. The guy is a terrorist. Go grab his ass.” Although humanitarian in its intent, the Leahy Law permits continued appropriations to military and security units who conduct torture in the event of “extraordinary circumstances.”
In an interview broadcast on al-Jazeera television on October 7, 2001 (October 6 in the US) — about when the second letter saying “Death to America’” and “Death to Israel” was mailed — Ayman Zawahiri echoed a familiar refrain sounded by Bin Laden: “O people of the U.S., can you ask yourselves a question: Why all this enmity for the United States and Israel? *** Your government supports the corrupt governments in our countries.”
A month after 9/11, late at night, a charter flight from Cairo touched down at the Baku airport. An Egyptian, arrested by the Azerbaijani authorities on suspicions of having played a part in the September 11 attack, was brought on board. His name was kept secret. That same night the plane set off in the opposite direction. Much of the Amerithrax story has happened at night with no witnesses, with the rendering of University of Karachi microbiology student Saeed Mohammed merely one example. Zawahiri claims that there is a US intelligence bureau inside the headquarters of the Egyptian State Security Investigation Department that receives daily reports on the number of detainees and those detainees that are released. At the time Ayman Zawahiri was getting his biological weapons program in full swing, his own brother Mohammed was picked up in the United Arab Emirates. He was secretly rendered to Egyptian security forces and sentenced to death rendered in the Albanian returnees case.
Throughout 2001, the Egyptian islamists were wracked by extraditions and renditions. CIA Director Tenet once publicly testified that there had been 70 renditions prior to 9/11. At the same time a Canadian judge was finding that Mahmoud Mahjoub was a member of the Vanguards of Conquest and would be denied bail, Bosnian authorities announced on October 6, 2001 they had handed over three Egyptians to Cairo who had been arrested in July. In Uruguay, a court authorized the extradition to Egypt of a man wanted in Egypt for his alleged role in the 1997 Luxor attack. Ahmed Agiza, the leader of the Vanguards of Conquest (which can be viewed as an offshoot of Jihad), was handed over by Sweden in December 2001.
One islamist, a Hamas supporter, summarized why the anthrax was sent in an ode “To Anthrax” on November 1, 2001: “O, anthrax, despite, your wretchedness, you have sewn horror in the heart of the lady of arrogance, of tyranny, of boastfulness!” In an interview that appeared in the Pakistani paper, Dawn, on November 10, 2001, Bin Laden explained that “The American Congress endorses all government measures, and this proves that .. [all of] America is responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against Muslims.”
A December 2002 conference held by “Accuracy in Media,” former State Department analyst Kenneth Dillon noted concurred that Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the key component of al Qaeda under Dr. Ayman Zawahiri, head of al Qaeda’s biowarfare program, likely targeted Senator Leahy because of his role as head of a panel of the Senate Appropriations Committee that had developed the so-called “Leahy Law” in 1998. Dillon explained, “According to the wording of the Leahy Law, the U.S. Government was authorized to ‘render’ suspected foreign nationals to the government of a foreign country, even when there was a possibility that they would be tortured, in ‘exceptional circumstances.’ When the Leahy Law was applied to send EIJ members captured in the Balkans back to Egypt, Zawahiri fiercely denounced the United States. So Leahy was a high-priority target.”
The commentators who suggest that Al Qaeda would have had no motivation to send weaponized anthrax to Senators Daschle and Leahy as symbolic targets — because they are liberal — are mistaken. The main goal of Dr. Zawahiri is to topple President Mubarak. He views the US aid as the chief obstacle and is indifferent to this country’s labels of conservative and liberal.
Zawahiri likely was surprised that the plainly worded message of the letters accompanying the anthrax was not deemed clear. Perhaps the talking heads would not have been so quick to infer an opposite meaning if no message had been expressed using words at all. Perhaps the public the sender had relied only on what KSM describes as the language of war — the death delivered by the letters — the pundits would not have been so misdirected. But why was Al Qaeda evasive on the question of responsibility for the anthrax mailings, dismissing the issue with a snicker, and falsely claiming that Al Qaeda did not know anything about anthrax? Simple. Bin Laden denied responsibility for 9/11 until it was beyond reasonable dispute. On September 16, 2001, he said: “The US is pointing the finger at me but I categorically state that I have not done this. I am residing in Afghanistan. I have taken an oath of allegiance (to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar) which does not allow me to do such things from Afghanistan.” Before that, Ayman had denied the 1998 embassy bombings too. On August 20, 1998, coincidentally on the day of strikes on camps in Afghanistan and Sudan, Ayman al-Zawahiri contacted The News, a Pakistani English-language daily, and said on behalf of Bin Laden that “Bin Laden calls on Moslem Ummah to continue Jihad against Jews and Americans to liberate their holy places. In the meanwhile, he denies any involvement in the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings.”
The targeted Senators have another connection pertinent to the Egyptian militants. The United States and other countries exchange evidence for counterterrorism cases under the legal framework of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (”MLAT”). Egypt is signatory of such a treaty that was ratified by the United States Senate in late 2000. For example, when the Fall 2001 rendition of Vanguards of Conquest leader Agizah was criticized, the US explained that it was relying on the MLAT. In the prosecution of Post Office worker Ahmed Abdel Sattar, the MLAT was described. Sattar’s attorney Michael Tigar, at trial in December 2004 explained: “Now, that might be classified, it’s true, but we have now found out and our research has just revealed that on, that the State Department has reported that it intends to use and relies on the mutual legal assistance treaty between the United States and Egypt signed May 3, 1998, in Cairo, and finally ratified by the United States Senate on October 18th, 2000. The State Department issued a press report about this treaty on November 29th, 2001 and I have a copy here.” He explained that “Article IV of the treaty provides that requests under the treaty can be made orally as well as under the formal written procedures required by the treaty, that those requests can include requests for testimony, documents, and even for the transfer to the United States ... if the treaty conditions are met.”
Vanguards of Conquest spokesman Al-Sirri was a co-defendant in the case against post office worker Sattar. In the late 1990s Sattar and he often spoke in conversations intercepted by the FBI. Al-Sirri’s fellow EIJ cell members in London were subject to process under those treaties at the time of the anthrax mailings. Those London cell members had been responsible for the faxing of the claim of responsibility which stated the motive for the 1998 embassy bombings. As reason for the bombings, in addition to the rendition recent EIJ members to Cairo, the faxes pointed to the detention of Blind Sheik Abdel-Rahman and dissident Saudi Sheik al-Hawali . Al-Hawali was the mentor of GMU microbiology student Al-Timimi who spoke in London in August 2001 alongside 911 Imam Awlaki (also from Falls Church) and unindicted WTC 1993 conspirator Bilal Philips. Al-Hawali was the mentor of GMU microbiology student Al-Timimi who spoke in London in August 2001 alongside 911 Imam Awlaki (also from Falls Church) and unindicted WTC 1993 conspirator Bilal Philips. Al-Timimi was in contact with Saudi sheik Al-Hawali in 2002 and arranged to hand deliver a message to all members of Congress he had drafted in al-Hawali’s name on the first anniversary of the anthrax mailings to Senator Leahy and Daschle.
Michael Scheuer the former chief, Bin Laden Unit, defended the extraordinary rendition program he had launched at the request of President Clinton and his advisors before Congress in April 2007. There’s always been a huge irony in Michael Scheuer’s emphasis on how OBL is attacking the US for its policies without recognizing the importance of the rendition policy is to those planning the attacks. For the purpose of true crime analysis, it’s not rendition as a policy or human rights issue that is the question presented. It is walking in the shoes of your adversary — seeing things in terms of what motivates them to act (as MS so well explained in his 2002 book).
Do you know Rep Chris Smith of NJ? Is he up on your theories?
If not please contact him and his office.
I don't know MS, but I bet he planned out his whole career. Bun Laden and his cohort did not. They were ever the opportunists -- yes they had plans like offensive coaches have playbooks but not "a plan" like the head coach of a college team has a long term plan for team development. MS doesn't understand them, imo.
I’ve not had contact with anyone like that, including Leahy. It is what the FBI thinks and does that is important and the best strategy is to have confidence in the ability and integrity of men like Mueller and others who have overseen the investigation.
While Leahy has been very sparse with his words, I think he and I would tend to think along the same lines.
First, he knows his important role in foreign relations in connection with these matters — such as his role in the approval of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treat that provides for the transfer of prisoners such as the London EIJ cell members who sent the claim of responsibility for the 1998 embassy bombings. His name is on the legislation relating to rendering of EIJ leaders and his subcommittee oversees $2 billion in appropriations to Egypt over the past decades. (The renditions and appropriations are the reason for the attack). The Leahy Law had just been discussed days earlier in the second most widely read islamist media source and his role in appropriations was being discussed in September in the Washington Post.
Second, he comes from a law and order background having been a US Attorney. I watch a lot of “Law and Order” reruns and lived in Arlington VA for 15 years.
Third, it is easy for us to stand in the shoes of our adversary — because we’re empathetic individuals who believe in the importance of the rule of law. But for the same reason, as a former prosecutor who has been briefed on the status of the investigation (however vaguely), he is very circumspect in what he says to ensure the fairness of those currently under scrutiny or who are subject to ongoing criminal prosecutions. I share the priority he places on fairness of the accused.
Fourth, as for what he thinks, I would point you to the statement he made when a small plane accidentally entered restricted airspace near the White House and Capitol in 2005. The danger passed quickly, but not before bringing back frightening memories for Senator Patrick Leahy:
“Having been one of the two Senators they tried to kill with the anthrax letter— yes, I do react to that. But here I’m far more concerned about all of the other people, because whatever the threat was they thought it was enough to threaten everybody here. And there are thousands of good men and women who work on the hill, plus the tourists, the visitors and we want to keep them safe.”
I promote my argument in outlets like Newsmax, Cryptome and the Washington Post. etc.
Anthrax Mystery: Evidence Points to al-Qaida
http://www.anthraxandalqaeda.com.
Suspect and A Setback In Al-Qaeda Anthrax Case - washingtonpost.com (page A1)
Rauf’s name was first publicly associated with the documents by [ZacandPook], a New York lawyer who maintains a Web site devoted to the 2001 anthrax attacks. ...
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2006/10/30/AR2006103001250_pf.htm
And FreeRepublic — which is the best forum of all (even though I’m a liberal like Leahy) because it allows the length necessary to address a very complex investigation. Amerithrax is best understood as a complex web of ongoing prosecutions where the DOJ is accumulating witnesses and informants with information that may bear. Politics has no proper role in true crime analysis.
I’ve been making the argument publicly since 2002.
Al Qaeda, Anthrax and Ayman - 2 visits - Apr 30
November 20, 2002 rev. (Note: Footnoted authorities are linked.)
http://www.cryptome.org/alqaeda-anthrax.htm
There’s a great email from FBI Special Agent Harry Samit to a colleague lamenting that HQ wouldn’t approve a warrant — he said he was desperate to get into the computer... and God help them all if there is an attack using the same kind of large plane.
The email was dated September 10.
If we are attacked using aerosolized anthrax, my conscience will be clear as I’ve done everything reasonably possible to explain things.
The difference in my perspective from folks like Randall Larsen is that I have reason to appreciate that the FBI and CIA have been kicking butt for years now because I’ve been more closely following the matter. Different considerations apply in the case of a national security investigation than in a criminal prosecution. The public was just confused because there were two different squads on the Task Force and because the true meaning of “domestic” (and the risk of infiltration) was overlooked. People just facilely forgot the benchmark example of the triple agent Ali Mohammed. Given that it was Ayman’s modus operandi since before Sadat’s assassination to infiltrate the army, immediately after 9/11 the military biodefense establishment should have been scrutinized for neo-Salafists with connections to the Taliban and Egyptian militant groups.
As just one example, if the FBI had explained things more plainly in early 2002, they would not have intercepted the communications between Al-Timimi and al-Hawali in 2002.
Al-Hawali was the sheik who was the express subject of OBL’s 1996 declaration of war and the 1998 claim of responsibility for the embassy bombings.
The public and media and the Congressmen just are waiting for a press release in which the FBI takes credit. Everyone is busy. The media only has time for news, not analysis.
For example, the arrest last summer of “911 imam” Awlaki from Falls Church went totally unnoticed. Beginning in San Diego, and before he and the pair of hijackers moved to Falls Church, VA, he provided spiritual guidance to hijacker Nawaf and his sidekick. When Ali Al-Timimi spoke about the signs of the coming day of judgment, the “911 imam” was in the room. They were associated with the same mosque in Falls Church. As I recall, they both spoke in Toronto and London in July and August 2001. You can catch Awlaki talking about the signs of the coming Victory on YouTube, making points radically different from the pablum he was pushing in a Washington Post chat 5 years ago (before he fled the country).
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ltcxJb29lqc
But let me say it again: the FBI and CIA have been kicking ass. The Postal Inspector JR told BattleAxe that there is much that has been suppressed or kept from the public, but it is not due to any “cover-up.” It’s the nature of such an investigation
One of the first people (Professor Boyle) to argue a “cover-up” has long been on a terror watch list, he reports. He was a former colleague of BHR on biological treaty issues. It’s time the American people not borrow their conspiracy theories from the militants or their lawyers and start focusing on the “open source” intelligence needed to keep our country secure.
I typed the wrong link for the 5,000 word Newsmax article. It’s here.
http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2007/6/6/163931.shtml?s=lh
A 10,800 word article was on google news last week.
http://globalpolitician.com/articleshow.asp?ID=3503&cid=1
So if any official with responsibility later claims they were unaware of this or that fact, then they have been reasonably diligent and should resign. The most important new facts relate to the transcripts of the lynne stewart trial that show in great detail what was being discussed in 1999.
If FBI Agent Harry Samit had been free to post on google news, 9/11 would have been avoided.
In contrast, I thought Scheuer’s 2002 book (titled something like
THROUGH YOUR ENEMIES’ EYES) was great. (though he now doesn’t stand behind some of what he said relating to an Iraqi connection dating back to Sudan).
And I respectfully disagree. Understanding motivation is key to true crime analysis. The best guide to that are intercepted communications intended to be confidential. For example, after the bombing of the Khobar towers, they intercepted a call between OBL and Ayman. OBL even back then was pointing to the detention of this sheik with whom GMU microbiology student was working. OBL told folks on the phone in a series of separate conversations, including when Ayman phoned in his congratulations, that there was a lot more where that came from until our sheik (OBL’s religious mentor) was released.
The Bioterrorism Threat by Non-State Actors: Hype or Horror? (PhD thesis -95 pp)
Authors: Christopher M. Thompson; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/thompson06.pdf
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III. U.S. POSTAL SYSTEM ANTHRAX ATTACK OF 2001
A. INTRODUCTION
With only one-half teaspoon of weaponized anthrax per letter, the perpetrator of the 2001 United States Postal System (USPS) anthrax attacks unleashed approximately 20 billion spores in each. Since the number of spores to infect 50 percent of the exposed population (termed ID50) is estimated at 8,000 to 15,000 spores, the potential lethality of
this attack was considerable. The costs of the attack were 22 known infected, 5 of which succumbed to inhalation anthrax, and a projected $6 billion plus price tag to clean up contaminated facilities and execute the ongoing investigation. A simple dispersal technique via the mail system was not anticipated to yield such an effect prior to this attack. Although the person or persons behind the attacks are still unknown, much can be
learned from these circumstances.
The focus of this chapter is threefold. First, it determines the fundamental
capabilities which allowed the person or group to obtain, weaponize, and employ the agent Bacillus anthracis. From these established capabilities, the chapter next assesses tactical success or failure of the attacks and ascertains which capabilities directly affected the ensuing outcome. Third, it builds upon the baseline capabilities established in Chapter I about the ability necessary to perpetrate such an attack. This chapter is the
second piece in a capabilities-based risk assessment of bioterrorism from non-state actors.
It adds to the results from Chapter II and when combined with the findings in Chapter IV, a comprehensive list of BW capabilities is presented along with a bioterrorism threat level assessment and subsequent recommendations to thwart the risk.
The importance of this particular study lies in three key areas. First, the lack of attribution in this case stands out as a major facet of the attack. To date, the FBI has not attributed the attack to any group or person despite an extensive search. Second, it is the first attack in which a terrorist has employed a dangerous select agent. The ability of the
perpetrator(s) to carry out an attack with such a hazardous agent is very unique, especially when doing it without attribution. Finally, government concern over anthrax has been with dispersal in aerosolized form over sizeable regions causing substantial
32
casualties. In this case, a rudimentary employment technique caused relatively few casualties; however, it exposed an estimated 10,000 people to the bacterium, caused widespread panic, and saturated local and national authorities dealing with a relatively small attack.
The group’s ability to carry out such an attack with all three characteristics sheds light upon the nature of the BW threat in two ways. The most noticeable is the major decision to employ a select agent instead of a non-select agent—crossing a previously taboo line for terrorists. Next, if a group can cause major consequences without attribution, the BW risk may again be greater than expected because the United States has no deterrent against it. In essence, this highlights the positive aspect of a capabilities-
based assessment. Just as in Chapter I, being aware of a group’s BW ability or perhaps just knowing the general capability groups are acquiring, may prove to be indicative of the threat the government should prepare for.
The case also underscores the shortcomings of a capabilities-based assessment as well. This chapter shows that capability becomes difficult to gauge due to the dual-use nature of biological manufacturing equipment, availability of anthrax (and other select agents) in many laboratories, availability of technical expertise, and the quickly growing
field of biotechnology. Judging an individual terrorist group’s capability proves difficult in this case as well. However, if the government can determine overall capability within the field and generally how it is evolving, that may prove to be the preferred use of the
capabilities-based assessment. This case demonstrates that BW capability evolved from previous attacks. Intent and vulnerability to attacks must be looked at to determine threat, but capability also must be reviewed because in this case it increased significantly in magnitude and possibly escalates the threat.
The chapter begins by providing background information on the attacks and
specifically the type of anthrax used. It next offers theories on possible perpetrators of the incidents. In similar fashion to Chapter II, the analysis section outlines capabilities leading to tactical success in the three phases required for an effective biological weapon
33
attack: obtaining or isolating a pathogen, weaponizing the agent, and employing the agent. The study ends by outlining the key reasons leading to success or failure and then overall capability displayed in the attack.
B. BACKGROUND
1. Anthrax
The disease anthrax is caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis. It forms into spores that remain dormant and protected until environmental conditions allow it to become active to cause infection. The disease is passable from person to person and exists in three types: cutaneous (skin anthrax), gastrointestinal (digestive anthrax), and inhalation (lung anthrax). Cutaneous anthrax is the least serious of the three with
approximately 20 percent of untreated cases becoming fatal. Gastrointestinal anthrax is more severe with 25 to 50 percent of the untreated cases being fatal. Inhalation anthrax is the most critical and accounted for all 5 deaths of the 22 known infected individuals in the 2001 USPS attacks (45 percent of those diagnosed with inhalation anthrax).78 This type of anthrax left untreated is astonishingly fatal in over 90 percent of the cases.79
After exposure to B. anthracis, symptoms appear anywhere from several days to over 40 days depending on the type, level of exposure, and the victim’s overall health.
Normally, people are infected by physically handling contaminated items or breathing in enough anthrax spores off of infected items.80 In cutaneous anthrax, infection develops from direct contact with the skin (the skin does not have to be broken or cut based on the experience from this attack). Gastrointestinal anthrax arises from ingesting anthrax
infected meat—a very rare occurrence. For the most critical inhalation anthrax, it requires inhaling spores one to five microns in size. This makes them large enough to escape from being filtered by the nasal passages and upper respiratory tract yet they are still small enough to lodge deep in the lungs where they become active and infectious.
78
“Anthrax: What You Need to Know,” Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/needtoknow.asp (accessed December
2006) and Daniel B. Jernigan et al, “Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax, United States, 2001: Epidemiologic Findings,” Centers for Disease Control, Emerging Infectious Diseases, October 2003,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol8no10/02-0353.htm (accessed December 2006).
79
Leonard A. Cole, The Anthrax Letters: A Medical Detective Story (Washington, D.C.: John Henry
Press, 2003), 8, http://www.nap.edu/books/030908881X/html/ (accessed July 2006).
80
“Anthrax: What You Need to Know,” Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention.
34
The ID50 number of spores necessary to infect someone with anthrax is about 8,000 to 15,000 spores; however, based specifically on this attack, the minimum infectious dose is actually much lower depending on age and the victim’s overall health. While the ID50 number may appear large, the 2 grams of powder found in one letter contained
approximately 20 billion spores.81 Even such a small amount of anthrax powder holds a devastatingly large number of spores.
The catastrophic potential of the disease caused the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to classify the agent as a Category A agent, meaning it poses one of the largest threats to society of known biological agents.82 For this reason and the survivability of anthrax in spore form, it is a prime candidate for weaponization. B. anthracis exists in 89 known strains. The one utilized in this attack, the Ames strain, is named for the city in Iowa where it was initially isolated.83
Ames is naturally existing, extremely virulent, and surprisingly resistant to vaccines. After the signing of the BTWC in the early 1970s, the United States utilized the strain to develop and test vaccines to thwart the biological weapons developed by the Soviet Union and other countries. It is a dissimilar strain from Vollum 1B which the United States used in its
offensive bioweapons program in the 1950s and 1960s.84
2. Organization, Strategy, and Personnel
Unlike the Rajneeshees case study in Chapter II, background of the group’s
organization, strategy, and personnel cannot be entirely described due to the case’s unsolved nature. Despite this, theories abound concerning the perpetrator(s). According to the FBI website, they are looking for an adult male that may work in a laboratory and works easily with hazardous materials. The individual probably has a scientific background or at least an intense fascination with science, and he possesses a solid source
81
John G. Bartlett, M.D, “Anthrax Update,” Johns Hopkins Point of Care Information Technology
(POC-IT), ABX Guide, January 12, 2002, http://hopkins-
abxguide.org/show_pages.cfm?content=F27_012802_content.html (accessed December 2006).
82
“Anthrax: What You Need to Know,” Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention.
83
Cole cites the discovery location as Texas in 1981 and that it was misnamed Ames due to an
incorrect labeling of the return address on a shipping box. Cole, The Anthrax Letters, 199.
84
Steve Fainaru and Joby Warrick, “Deadly Anthrax Strain Leaves a Muddy Trail,” The Washington
Post, Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2001, A1, http://www.anthraxinvestigation.com/wp1124.html
(accessed December 2006).
35
for the anthrax. He holds some expertise to weaponize anthrax to include the necessary equipment to accomplish it. Finally, this person is non-confrontational, lacks personal skills, holds grudges—a loner.85 The FBI formulated this synopsis from that of the Unabomber profile.86 In July 2006, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Rutgers- Newark in New Jersey, Leonard Cole, suggests that the FBI recently broadened their
profile so as not to focus on such a narrow field of possible perpetrators; however, the FBI website as of September 2006 still reflects this description.87
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Chair of the Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) working group on biological weapons, believes the individual to be an American scientist with access to anthrax or at least instructed to make it by an expert.88 She falls into what some call the “Bioevangelist” camp. This faction believes an American scientist with experience in the realm of bioweapons thought the United States was failing to give the
BW risk adequate attention. The attacker demonstrated bioterrorism’s potential and blamed it on a large threat—Al Qaeda.89 The scientist brought attention to the problem, finally summoning sufficient assets to focus on the issue. Others agree with Rosenberg.
Randall Murch, former Deputy Assistant Director in Charge of Forensic Programs for all FBI labs, holds two theories on the anthrax attacks. The perpetrator could be someone from outside the United States that sent the anthrax to a local terrorist to employ. On the other hand, the terrorist may be a “homegrown” individual with the anthrax available to him due to his profession, and that person took advantage of the 9/11 timing to employ it. Murch gravitates towards his second theory which essentially aligns
with Rosenberg’s views.90 He further believes that, “you don’t need much equipment or an advanced degree to make biological weapons. You could fit all the stuff in a
85
“Amerithrax: The Search for Anthrax,” Federal Bureau of Investigation,
http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/searchant.htm (accessed December 2006).
86
Cole, The Anthrax Letters, 189.
87
Cole, “Bioweapons, Proliferation, and the U.S. Anthrax Attack.”
88
Cole, The Anthrax Letters, 189 and Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, “Bioterrorism; Anthrax Attacks
Pushed Open an Ominous Door,” Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles, CA: September 22, 2002, M1,
http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?did=190196
741&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed December 2006).
89
Scott Shane, “Everyone Has An Anthrax Theory” The Baltimore Sun, Baltimore, MD: January 6, 2002, http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/everyoneanthraxtheory.html (accessed December 2006).
90
Cole, The Anthrax Letters, 195-196.
36
garage.”91 Both he and Rosenberg agree that someone with access to anthrax in a government or affiliated civilian program retains the knowledge necessary to obtain the equipment to weaponize anthrax at a discreet location and employ it simply through the mail system.
Still others lean more towards Murch’s first theory. David Tell of the Weekly Standard is one of those individuals. He argues that multiple details of the letters indicate foreign involvement. Two examples include the
use of all capital letters in the writing style (similar to languages like Arabic with no upper or lower cases) and that anyone familiar with anthrax would not at that time have prescribed penicillin for treatment of the disease.92 A more compelling argument arises from Richard Spertzel, a microbiologist who spent years at Fort Detrick, MD, where he worked on the U.S. offensive biological weapons program to include the anthrax program. In addition, he was Head of Biological Weapons Inspections from 1994 to 1998 for the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) team surveying Iraq’s
weapons program.93
Spertzel testified to the House Committee on International Relations in December 2001 that the anthrax, especially that of the Senators Daschle and Leahy letters, could only be produced by a group affiliated with either a current or former state weapons program. He discounts any loner theory due to the complexity of the attack. Spertzel believes this because, “the Senator Daschle letter contained anthrax that was more pure and concentrated than any found in the Soviet, U.S., or Iraqi biological programs.”94
Spertzel noted the Iraqi program did not mill dried anthrax as in the Soviet or U.S. programs. It used a one-step technique of “spray-drying” that produces the purity of anthrax found in the letters—the only known technique capable of doing so. He advocates that somehow Iraq or a former Iraqi bioweapon scientist was involved.95
91
Cited in Cole, The Anthrax Letters, 197.
92
Cole, The Anthrax Letters, 191.
93
Ibid, 202 and U.S. Congress, House, Testimony of Richard O. Spertzel, Russia, Iraq, and
OtherPotential Sources of Anthrax, Smallpox, and Other Bioterrorist Weapons, Hearing before the House
Committee on International Relations, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 5 December 2001, 16,
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa76481.000/hfa76481_0f.htm (accessed December 2006).
94
U.S. Congress, House, Testimony of Richard O. Spertzel, Russia, Iraq, and OtherPotential Sources
of Anthrax, 18.
95
Cole, The Anthrax Letters, 201.
37
Spertzel told the Washington Post in late 2002 that he was one of only four to five individuals in the United States that could produce anthrax to the purity found in the senate letters, and he may need a year to manufacture it in a suitable laboratory setting.96 Kenneth Alibek, former First Deputy Chief of the Civilian Branch of the Soviet Offensive Biological Weapons Program, takes a mixed perspective. Having actually seen pictures of the anthrax, he stated in congressional testimony, “this agent and this product
cannot be considered as a Russian or an American weapon.”97 He added that the perpetrator learned throughout the process because earlier batches were crude while later letters to Senators Daschle and Leahy contained much purer spores. For these reasons, Alibek characterizes the terrorists as less than highly trained professionals; however, they were affiliated in some way to the biosciences. The task necessitated some knowledge concerning the technology and production of anthrax to accomplish it.98
Christos Tsonas, an emergency room physician at Holy Cross Hospital in Fort
Lauderdale, FL, thinks he treated one of the 9/11 hijackers, Ahmed Ibrahim A. Haznawi, for cutaneous anthrax. In June 2001, Haznawi presented himself at the emergency room for a large lesion on his leg. Tsonas now believes that what he unknowingly treated with antibiotics was the skin form of anthrax. A follow-up investigation by a group at the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies agrees with his assessment.99
The FBI discounts the report because the type of lesion the hijacker had on his leg will never be known. If the doctor’s information is accurate, it ties the 9/11 hijackers to the attacks causing the threat to then be considerable.
96
Guy Gugliotta and Gary Matsumoto, “FBI’s Theory On Anthrax Is Doubted; Attacks Not Likely
Work of 1 Person, Experts Say,” The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.: October 28, 2002, A1,
http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?did=224293
231&sid=4&Fmt=3&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed December 2006).
97
U.S. Congress, House, Testimony of Kenneth Alibek, Russia, Iraq, and Other Potential Sources of
Anthrax, Smallpox, and Other Bioterrorist Weapons, Hearing before the House Committee on International
Relations, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 5 December 2001, 22,
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa76481.000/hfa76481_0f.htm (accessed December 2006).
98
U.S. Congress, House, Testimony of Kenneth Alibek, Russia, Iraq, and Other Potential Sources of
Anthrax, 24.
99
William J. Broad and David Johnston, “Report Linking Anthrax and Hijackers Is Investigated,”
New York Times, New York, NY: March 23, 2002,
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/anthraxhijackerslink.html (accessed December 2006).
38
While these theories speculate on organization, strategy, and who the perpetrators may be, the large disparity in opinions illustrates that many experts believe the potential capability lies within numerous groups of varying backgrounds. The question is how much capability does this person or group really hold with respect to obtaining, weaponizing, and employing anthrax?
C. ANALYSIS
Describing the methodology used by the perpetrator(s) to obtain the pathogen and to weaponize it is a complex issue. Again, it is clouded by the lack of background in the case due to its unsolved nature. Despite this, it is still worth analyzing both the methodologies because in the end, they illustrate capability to obtain anthrax and
weaponize it to some degree.
1. Obtaining the Pathogen
By far, the largest user and distributor of the Ames strain was the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, MD. It shared Ames in its pure, virulent form with the Chemical Defense Establishment at Porton Down in England (USAMRIID’s British equivalent). It was passed to many other organizations, sometimes in its virulent form and other times genetically altered rendering the agent useless for weaponization. The same group that supplied various cultures to the Rajneeshee cult in Chapter II, ATCC, provided anthrax strains to many
places, including Iraq, in the late 1980s. None of the known anthrax specimens sent to Iraq were labeled as the Ames strain. Despite this, due to imprecise labeling procedures during those times, some believe the virulent form of Ames was sent unknowingly to several less than desired locations to include Iraq.100 Over the years, many pathogens, to include this strain of anthrax, were shipped unquestioningly to a vast number of unidentified locations.
The availability of Ames worldwide is significant. As described in Chapter I, the WFCC believes nearly 1,000 germ banks to have improper security, and the Department of Health and Human Services reported in 2004 that severe lapses in control procedures for select agents existed at all 11 U.S. universities studied. With the right contacts or placement in an
organization affiliated with biosciences and technology, the capacity to gain access to
100
Fainaru and Warrick, “Deadly Anthrax Strain Leaves a Muddy Trail.”
39
Ames or other dangerous pathogens is not beyond imagination. An example of this eerily played out around the same timeframe as the U.S. anthrax attack. A microbiologist named Abdur Rauf worked for Al Qaeda in the late 1990s and into the new millennium. In 1999, he reported in a hand-written note to Al Qaeda’s deputy commander, Ayman al-Zawahiri, that he was able to effectively accomplish his goals. In previous notes, he admitted to having setbacks acquiring B. anthracis in a virulent form and obtaining the necessary equipment but later reported unspecified success in achieving both goals. Other notes comprised diagrams of makeshift laboratories and testing facilities, and another described a trip as a guest into a high-level
biological containment lab where thousands of pathogens were stored.101 This thesis is not advocating that Al Qaeda committed the USPS anthrax attacks in 2001; however, thi iinformation clearly shows motivation and intent to obtain anthrax and the necessary equipment to weaponize it. More importantly for this thesis, if the notes are true, it depicts capability or at least a heavy pursuit of that capability.
The individual actually obtaining the anthrax for the U.S. attacks may be a
homegrown scientist, someone who received help from a U.S. scientist, or someone from overseas obtaining the agent or helping with it. The identity of the individual actually obtaining the anthrax does not matter from a capabilities standpoint. It is more important to acknowledge the potential of a terrorist to obtain a dangerous pathogen due to his or her personal access or contacts.
2. Weaponizing the Agent
According to Alibek, the anthrax was not from a former U.S. or Soviet offensive program partly seen by the manufacturing process. Besides those programs using other strains, they also utilized the dry-milling process to grind the spores into a very fine powder that enhances dispersal.102 While Alibek alludes to the anthrax not being produced via the dry-milling method, his congressional testimony failed to provide an alternative theory. In contrast, Spertzel provided a theory that the anthrax was produced
101
Joby Warrick, “Suspect and A Setback In Al-Qaeda Anthrax Case,” Washington Post,
Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2006, A1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/30/AR2006103001250.html?referrer=emailarticle (accessed December 2006).
102
Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, 17.
40
by the one-step process of dry-spraying because of its quality, something he believed Iraq was capable of accomplishing based on his weapons inspections in the early 1990s.103
Adding to the debate on how the agent was manufactured, experts disagree on the quality of the anthrax in the last two recovered letters. The quality of the anthrax in these letters was significantly better than that found in the first two; however, conflicting reports have appeared from different government groups.104 Alibek says the anthrax is not from a state-run weapons program due to the particle size inconsistencies; however,
he does not discount that it is of decent quality.105 Others such as Spertzel, think it is of phenomenal purity. David Franz, former head of the Army’s biodefense lab, believes it to be of a very concentrated, pure form with “no garbage” after seeing pictures of the anthrax spores. He bases his characterization on the lack of spore coating to remove
static electric charges—weapons-grade anthrax (meaning anthrax from state-sponsored programs) would be treated in this manner to increase floating and dispersal attributes.106
In late September 2006, the FBI officially confirmed Franz’s theory that the powder did not have anything added to increase lethality. It did not, however, downgrade the purity of the powder. Instead, the FBI only clarified it was not weaponized to a state weapons program standard with anti-static additives.107
Unlike the dispute over purity and manufacturing method, expert consensus
officially states the anthrax was manufactured in the two years prior to the attack. This indicates the perpetrator recently had ties to an ample laboratory setting sufficient to produce a decent grade of anthrax. This finding refutes any idea that it was appropriated
103
Cole, The Anthrax Letters, 201.
104
Jason Pate and Gary Ackerman, “Issue Brief: Assessing the Threat of Mass-Casualty
Bioterrorism,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, March 2003, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_1a.html (accessed December 2006).
105
U.S. Congress, House, Testimony of Kenneth Alibek, Russia, Iraq, and Other Potential Sources of
Anthrax, 22.
106
“Profile: Progress in Anthrax Investigation One Year After Attacks.” Morning Edition, National
Public Radio Transcript, Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2002, 1,
http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?did=352191
121&sid=7&Fmt=3&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed December 2006).
107
Allan Lengel and Joby Warrick, “FBI Is Casting A Wider Net in Anthrax Attacks,” Washington
Post, Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2006, A1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/24/AR2006092401014.html?referrer=emailarticle (accessed December 2006).
41
from a lab sample from long ago. Perhaps more strikingly, the discovery suggests that if the perpetrator was able to recently produce anthrax, a very real threat still remains today.108
Although the attacker is unknown in this situation, one can assume several
barriers previously thought insurmountable were overcome based upon the actual ability to weaponize the anthrax. Producing the agent in whatever manner must be relatively economical. If a large transnational terrorist group like Al Qaeda was involved, they may have had more monetary assets to facilitate such an attack. Despite this, estimates put the
cost to conduct the attack at anywhere from a few thousand to $50 thousand.109 Even at the higher end of the estimate, that cost is relatively low to organize and execute a terrorist attack. In comparison, the 9/11 attacks created much greater devastation; however, they also cost nearly ten times the max estimate for the anthrax attacks at
approximately $500 thousand.110
Safety of those producing the anthrax and obtaining the necessary equipment are the other barriers thought too difficult to overcome. While it is not known if the perpetrator(s) survived the employment phase of the attack, they at least stayed alive throughout the weaponization process long enough to employ it over a nearly two week timeframe. Appropriating the essential safety equipment must have been simple enough
to avoid detection by others and especially the authorities—most likely because of the equipment’s dual-use nature in laboratories. Similarly, the ability to acquire the production equipment explains one of two scenarios. First, the production method only requires simple and commonplace items that can be found in any laboratory making obtaining them easy. Or, the required apparatus is very technical yet still obtainable from labs lacking appropriate security and accountability procedures. In either scenario, the
ability to acquire such equipment and manufacture it in a unique manner displays increased capability and relative ease in acquiring the capability.
108
David Johnston and William J. Broad, “Anthrax in Mail Was Newly Made, Investigators Say,”
New York Times, New York, NY: June 23, 2002,
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/anthraxnewlymade.html (accessed December 2006).
109
Cole, “Bioweapons, Proliferation, and the U.S. Anthrax Attack.”
110
The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (New York: W.W. Norton and Company), 172.
42
In similar fashion to the debates over how the agent was obtained, BW experts continue to deliberate the quality or purity of the anthrax spores and its method of production. Despite these unknowns, the evidence available provides valuable insight to capability. First, a terrorist undoubtedly weaponized anthrax for dispersal; therefore, capability existed to some degree. Second, the deliberation over purity and production
implies either an ability exists to manufacture anthrax in ways unproven by the former U.S. and Soviet programs (such as the dry-spraying technique) or in completely new and unknown manner altogether. A truly unique method to produce the anthrax may have been utilized. Third, the fact that it was created sometime in the two years before the attacks indicates the capability was recently obtained, but more importantly, it probably
still exists due to lack of attribution. Finally, the probable ease in gaining the safety and production equipment possibly increases the threat beyond just the simple fact that someone actually obtained anthrax in the first place.
3. Employing the Biological Weapon
Before analyzing the BW employment in this case, initially reviewing the vast
consequences of the attack speaks volumes towards success—tactically employing the weapon against a target regardless of outcome. The attacks exposed approximately 10,000 people to the anthrax spores as ultimately determined by the CDC.111 Between October 2 and November 20, 2001, the CDC identified 22 cases of anthrax from those exposed. Eleven cases were inhalational anthrax and the remaining cases were identified
as cutaneous anthrax. All 5 deaths occurred from the group of 11 inhalational anthrax patients.112
The exposure of 10,000 people to anthrax spores dictated the use of strong
antibiotics on those individuals; the CDC identified them for a strict 60-day regimen.
Estimates put an additional 20,000 people using a variety of antibiotics as a precautionary measure.113 The widespread fear and panic caused by the government and especially the media being targeted brought about the over-use of these drugs. While most terrorist
111
“Anthrax in America: A Chronology and Analysis of the Fall 2001 Attacks,” Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.: November 2002, 7,
http://www.ndu.edu/centercounter/prolif_publications.htm (accessed December 2006).
112
Jernigan et al, “Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax, United States, 2001: Epidemiologic Findings.”
113
“Anthrax in America,” Center for Counterproliferation Research, 7.
43
attacks happen instantaneously, this attack lasted for over a month and made people everywhere uneasy about opening their mail for a long time thereafter.
The economic impact of the anthrax attacks is extremely large and will probably never be fully accounted for due to the complexity of the situation. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report states that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) confirmed over 60 locations were contaminated with anthrax.114 The FBI and laboratory testing centers have spent untold millions on the investigation alone. Cole estimates the
total expenditure to be in excess of $6 billion dollars to decontaminate facilities and conduct the investigation to date.115
Approximately 2,000 CDC employees worked full-time on the case and nearly all of their 8,500 employees contributed in some way.116 Tasking nearly one quarter of the agency’s employees to work this terrorist attack inevitably impacted other programs with which those workers were associated. The monetary cost of antibiotics for those
exposed, while probably quite large, is dwarfed next to the amount spent by the thousands estimated to have unnecessarily obtained and taken antibiotics during the attack timeframe. The overall economic impact of the attacks is astonishing—estimates put the economic losses at an additional $1 billion.117
Hoaxes became another facet of the economic impact of the attacks. In just the first two months following the initial attack, the FBI responded to thousands of suspicious letters. The number of man-hours spent tracking hoaxes instead of working the actual investigation (or others) had to enormously impact operations.118 The cost of
114
“Bioterrorism: Public Health Response to Anthrax Incidents of 2001,” Report to the Honorable
Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, United States General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.:
October 2003, 9, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04152.pdf (accessed December 2006).
115
Cole, “Bioweapons, Proliferation, and the U.S. Anthrax Attack.”
116
Cole, The Anthrax Letters, 133.
117
David Ruppe, “Threat-Mongering?” National Journal, Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2005, Vol. 37,
Iss. 17, 1218,
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?index=126&did=832083281&SrchMode=1&sid=3
&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1158551714&clientId=11969
(accessed December 2006).
118
Estimates put the number of hoaxes anywhere from 1,000 to 7,000 during the first eight weeks following the initial attack. Cole, The Anthrax Letters, 180.
44
the FBI and other organizations tracking hoaxes combined with those individuals being pulled away from the actual investigation is staggering.
The perpetrator(s) unquestioningly obtained and in some way weaponized the
anthrax. They inflicted devastating consequences upon the entire nation from sickness, to death, to large economic losses, to large government clean-up expenses, and finally to marring the American psyche. How did the terrorists achieve these widespread “weapon of mass effect” types of results?
Although the FBI only recovered four letters during the ensuing investigation,
experts hypothesize that seven letters were probably sent laden with anthrax to various locations. On September 18, 2001, almost certainly the initial five letters were sent from a mailbox in Trenton, NJ. Subsequently on October 9, 2001, the terrorists sent the final two anthrax letters from the same mailbox location.119 Figure 1 depicts the trail of letters from mailbox to their final destinations.
119
“American Anthrax Outbreak of 2001,” UCLA Department of Epidemiology, School of Public
Health, http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/detect/antdetect_intro.html (accessed December 2006).
45
Figure 2. Cases of Anthrax with Paths of Envelopes and Intended Target Sites.
NY, New York; NBC, National Broadcasting Company; AMI, American Media Inc.;
USPS, United States Postal Service; CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System. *Envelope addressed to Senator Leahy, found unopened on November 16, 2001, in a barrel of unopened mail sent to Capitol Hill; **dotted line indicates intended path of envelope addressed to Senator Leahy.120
All recovered letters are indisputably from the identical source.121 Although a group may have perpetrated the attack, the letters were all prepared by a single writer as determined by the same writing style and similar messages within the letters. An FBI
120
Reprinted from Jernigan et al, “Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax, United States,
2001: Epidemiologic Findings.”
121
“American Anthrax Outbreak of 2001,” UCLA Department of Epidemiology.
46
linguistic assessment confirms with nearly 100 percent certainty that they were produced by the same individual.122
Each letter contained roughly two grams or one-half teaspoon of dry powder
anthrax based on those actually recovered.123 The letters exposed people and contaminated facilities through two methods. The primary method dispersed anthrax spores when the letters were opened. The actions of tearing open the envelopes and possibly removing the contents agitated the powder allowing it spill and become airborne. All victims developed symptoms of either inhalation or cutaneous anthrax so
the spores either settled onto their skin or were inhaled in large enough amounts to cause infection. This is a rudimentary employment tactic that would normally not make many sick; however, since the CDC identified over 10,000 people for exposure, in theory, it had the potential of still making sizeable numbers ill if not recognized fairly quickly by
the public health system.
Just weeks before the actual attacks, a study published results of testing
concerning envelope contamination with anthrax. The study used Bacillus globigii spores (a similar but non-virulent form of B. anthracis) to test the dissemination characteristics of aerosolized anthrax when a contaminated letter is opened. The results of the study staggered experts. With an envelope containing only 0.1 grams of dried anthrax, the individual opening a letter could inhale nearly 500 times the LD50 amount of spores within 10 minutes. The subsequent aerosol spread so rapidly that others within a
room would also inhale lethal doses.124
The secondary method of dispersal was unanticipated by most experts and
probably caused unintended and/or unforeseen contamination in the attack. Direct contamination and subsequent cross-contamination caused substantial damage via the
122
Linguistic/Behavioral Analysis of Anthrax Letters, Critical Incident Response Group, National
Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, Amerithrax Press Briefing: November 9, 2001.
http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithrax.htm (accessed December 2006).
123
“American Anthrax Outbreak of 2001,” UCLA Department of Epidemiology, and Bartlett,
“Anthrax Update.”
124
B. Kournikakis, S. J. Armour, C.A. Boulet, M. Spence, and B. Parsons, “Risk Assessment of
Anthrax Threat Letters,” Defence Research Establishment Suffield, Technical Report DRES TR-2001-048,
September 2001,
http://ehs.ucdavis.edu/ucbso/ReferenceDoc/RiskAssessmentofAnthrax.pdf#search=%22Risk%20Assessme
nt%20of%20Anthrax%20Threat%20Letters%22 (accessed December 2006).
47
postal sorting process. The mail system proved to be more efficient and lethal than formerly believed in spreading an agent such as anthrax and compounding its effects.
The B. globigii postal study reported that if envelopes carrying the anthrax spores were not perfectly sealed, those working in the mail systems became exposed due to the compression of mail through the processing machines.125 Even more striking was research about spores seeping through microscopic envelope pores. Another study found that thousands of pores exist in envelopes allowing one to five micron diameter particles
to pass through its walls. The analysis further suggested that compression from mail processing equipment would increase the flow of spores out of an envelope through these pores.126 This crude dissemination technique sickened and killed postal workers, contaminated dozens of postal facilities, and cross-contaminated other pieces of mail causing people to contract anthrax whose mail flowed through the sorting equipment at
similar times as the terrorist letters. The attack demonstrates the fundamental capability present when a group obtains and weaponizes a pathogen. Even crude or rudimentary techniques can cause mass effects. Military-style dissemination techniques utilizing
aerosolized anthrax are not required to greatly affect an area.
D. CONCLUSION
The perpetrator(s) tactically succeeded in obtaining, weaponizing, and employing anthrax. Terrorists in this case displayed noteworthy capability in their biological weapons program in all three areas. Although the specific details are unknown about how they obtained or weaponized the anthrax, the group made great strides just from the plain fact they obtained and weaponized a select agent. Previously, this has not been
knowingly accomplished by any person or group. The terrorists employed the weapon in a very crude manner but yielded widespread effects with great impact on many aspects of society. Did this signify success in the eye of the perpetrator(s)? It will only be known when the FBI attributes the harm done to someone. What matters and what can be said is that capability existed in all three areas to complete a BW attack with a very dangerous
125
Kournikakis, et al., “Risk Assessment of Anthrax Threat Letters.”
126
Earl Lane, “A Solution For Anthrax Mystery. Study: Spores Seep Through Paper,” Newsday,
November 30, 2001, http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/asolutionanthraxmys.html (accessed December
2006).
agent. Noteworthy as well is the apparent ease of gaining the pathogen and necessary equipment to manufacture the germ without attribution.
In contrast to Chapters II and III, the following chapter analyzes a less successful attempt at BW employment by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. The explanations for failure and summary of capability illustrated in the attack will build upon the findings of this and the previous chapter. With all three chapter findings combined, a comprehensive listing of
capability will be available with which to draw conclusions on the overall threat and make recommendations to U.S. biodefense policy.
FBI Reorganizes Effort to Uncover Terror Groups’ Global Ties
By John Solomon
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, September 26, 2007; Page A05
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/25/AR2007092502291_2.html
Borrowing from its mob-busting strategies in the 1980s, the bureau will encourage counterterrorism agents to forgo immediate arrests when an imminent threat is not present, allowing the surveillance of terrorism suspects to last longer. The aim is to identify collaborators, facilitators and sympathizers who increasingly span across multiple groups and countries, Billy said.
***
The changes have been driven partly by a growing number of FBI cases involving self-styled terrorist cells inside the United States that were inspired by al-Qaeda and bin Laden but receive support, advice or encouragement from disparate sympathizers across the globe, making group allegiances far less important.
“You don’t want to limit yourself to just assuming that one person who is a member of a certain terrorist group won’t particularly try to recruit or bring into the fold others overseas,” Billy said.
***
The effort required diplomacy with cooperating countries that became concerned that the terrorist cells might be moving toward an operational phase. A meeting was held last winter among international law enforcement agencies to decide when arrests should be made in each country and how to keep surveillance going, officials said.
***
But Laufman, who is now in private practice, cautioned that the FBI reorganization must “overcome the agent culture of the bureau” and allow intelligence analysts to drive the case agents, much like MI5’s domestic intelligence, which drives the investigations of Scotland Yard in Britain.
“The key to making this successful is to build a first-class analytical cadre, give counterterrorism analysts equivalent stature to agents in the FBI’s counterterrorism culture, and create an environment where analysts and agents continuously and seamlessly work together to identify relationships, sources of funding and operational plotting,” Laufman said.
Experts said the bureau’s future success also depends on attracting more Arabic speakers and intelligence analysts, and keeping them long enough to develop deep subject expertise.
For more anthrax beach reading, and practice separating fact from fiction, there is NOWHERE TO RUN, by Mary Jane Clark.
The anthrax suspense novel adopts my view that product can be made, for example, by a dairy processor (and then repeated centrifugation and sequential filtering).
one death follows another, Annabelle’s co-workers look to her for assurance, but she finds it hard to give comfort. To her, the circumstances surrounding the infections suggest diabolical murders.
THERE’S NOWHERE TO RUN
And when the authorities lock down the Broadcast Center, with the identity of the killer still unknown, neither victims nor the murderer can escape...
“Everyone is a suspect...
Everyone has a motive...
Everyone is in danger...”
WHEN THERE’S NO ONE TO TRUST...
Anthrax, smallpox, plague: as medical producer for television’s highly rated morning news program, Annabelle Murphy makes her living explaining horrific conditions to the nation. So when a KEY News Colleague dies with symptoms terrifyingly similar to those of anthrax, she knows the panic spreading through the corridors of the Broadcast Center is justified.
AND NO ONE IS SAFE...
“Annabelle had been working her tail off to prove herself and satisfy [her boss’s] directive to ‘make bioterrorism sexy. Seduce me. Tell me why I should care and what I can do to save myself. Keep me and all the mommies at home riveted to our television sets lest our babies lose their lives.’ With those twisted marching orders, Annabelle had been forced to be come all too knowledgeable about botulism, smallpox, tularemia, and plague.”
***
[broadcast]
As she cracked eggs over the rim of a stainless-steel mixing bowl, Annabelle listed to Constance’s introduction.
“Now in our continuing series ‘What You Need to Know About Bioterrorism,’ KEY News Medical Correspondent Dr. John Lee reports this morning on anthrax. You may be surprised at what he’s found.”
“Purifying and concentrating the anthrax spores and weaponizing them, causing the anthrax spores and weaponizing them, causing those purified spores to separate so they can linger in the air and be inhaled,, requires real laboratory skill. There is no way to account for all the anthrax strains that exist. Hundreds of scientists and technicians can get ahold of anthrax, and they know how to weaponize it.”
The medical correspondent paused to rest his hand on a piece of machinery on the lab bench. “One of the steps in making the powdered, airy form of anthrax is freeze-drying the spores. A tabletop freeze dryer can be purchased for under eight thousand dollars. So you see, the notion that only a state-sponsored biological weapons program could produce weapons-grade anthrax is a misconception.”
***
As the report ended, Thomas came out of the bedroom shoes in hand. Annabelle bend down to tie his sneaker but looked up in time to catch Dr. Lee, live on the set, holding up a tiny vial of white powder.
“Constance, we’d all like to think that anthrax is so dangerous, so deadly, that it must be well guarded, impossible, we hope, for anyone with evil intentions to get his hands on. But what I have here is a test tube containing weapons-grade anthrax. I can’t tell you how I got it, but if I could get it, so could other people. This is a weapon you can use and you can hide.”
Annabelle watched openmouthed, not believing what she was seeing. The camera closed in the vial, then pulled back to Constance, who shrank back in her seat acrsoss fromt eh medical correspondent.
“What’s wrong, Mommy?” asked Thomas.
“Nothing sweetie. But Daddy is going to have to get up and walk you guys to school this morning. Mommy has to get in to work.”
[By Chapter 36, after some initial excitement that the diaper advertising sponsor might not approve of the segment, it is revealed that the producer was just holding run-of-the-mill confectioner’s sugar. ]
But then the news correspondent who perpetrated the hoax is arrested for the death of the broadcast colleague and food service worker.
“The dexterity in keeping so many guilty-looking characters afloat at once and the revelation of a truly surprising killer makes Clark’s sixth dispatch from KEY News her best — Kirkus Reviews.
Who is guilty?
Was it the fabulist Frenchman who consulted with the network on terrorism issues and helped frame the fabulist biodefense insider?
Was it the militant islamists represented by the lawyer who first concocted the biodefense insider theory and sought to blame the Administration for the anthrax mailings (as much of the muslim world and fringe in the US does for 9/11)?
Was it the neo-Salafist microbiology PhD — preaching on the coming End of Times while working on classified work for the Navy, who had access to a device that concentrated and sequentially filtered small anthrax samples?
Or was it the colleague down the hall?
There’s an AP story out about how bioweapons scientists are hard to track.
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20070926-1117-bioweapons.html
But to understand the problem rather than just read the press release, read 2007 Zegat, SPYING BLIND.
New book by Cambridge University Press -
Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime (Hardcover)
by Barry Kellman (Author)
Al Qaeda
acquisition of bioagents, expertise, 77–79
bioviolence preparations, plots, 78–80
Encyclopedia of Jihad, 72
legality of bioviolence, 74–77
motivation for bioviolence, 73–78
principle of reciprocity, 75
anthrax
2001 attacks, 14, 34, 94, 108, 150, 157, 176
10/3 update -
“Union wants anthrax answers,” New Haven Register, 10/03/2007
http://www.nhregister.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=18877740&BRD=1281&PAG=461&dept_id=517514&rfi=6
The author of the new book Bioviolence has had extensive (unclassified) discussions with the FBI. He tells me that the rumor is that they think Al Qaeda is responsible but they are not certain.
Anthrax Letters Still Being Sorted 6 Years Later
http://www.postalmag.com/anthrax-6-years-later.htm
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