Posted on 11/19/2007 10:09:26 AM PST by BnBlFlag
And people like James Madison, Andrew Jackson, Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, James Buchanan, and Abraham Lincoln just to name a few, did not believe such a right existed. Nor did the right to steal whatever federal property you got your hands on and walk away from national obligations entered into while the Southern states were a part. But instead of negotiations, the South issued demands. Instead of a peaceful settlement, the South chose war. War would not have come if the South had not wanted it.
In other words, the South was stuck in a hopeless marriage with a shrew from hell who nullified the Constitution and insisted there was a clause written in invisible ink on the back of the Constitution saying we couldn't leave except under her terms.
That marriage analogy is the lamest of all the lame Southron analogies.
Were the New York, Virgina, and Rhode Island Constitution ratifiers wrong about being able to resume their governance? I trust their words more than I trust your assertions.
Why were they right, and Madison, Jackson, Clay, Webster, Buchanan, Lincoln, et.al. wrong? What divine spark gave them credence and credibility, but not all the statesmen I mentioned? In short, I trust Clay and Webster and Jackson and Lincoln and most of all Madison over the opinions of unnamed people of those three states.
I've always argued on these threads that the Southern leaders made a mistake in firing on Sumter.
Was it a mistake or was in their intent? It isn't like Davis didn't know what he was about to do. Toombs made that clear to him. It isn't that they should have been under any misconceptions on Lincoln's position regarding Sumter. His speeches made that clear. Yet when given the chance between war and status quo, they chose war. More than that, they jumped at the chance for war.
You keep ignoring the offers to negotiate about the property and the national debt. No, you're going to keep the South no matter what -- no matter that they don't want to stay in the Union anymore.
And you keep exaggerating the existence of such offers. Davis' letter to Lincoln introducing his delegation contained a demand. The men were there to obtain recognition of confederate independence and the legitimacy of their actions to date. Period. Nothing less was on the table. If, and only if Lincoln agreed to surrender to this demand then was there a vague offer to discuss matters interesting to both parties. No offer of payment. No discussion of debt. Nothing on traffic on the Mississippi. Not if those matter weren't of interest to the confederacy.
Why weren't they supposed to be there? It was a U.S. fort. It fell under Anderson's command. The workmen there may have been hostile to the Union. Anderson's actions were prudent.
There. Fixed it for you.
Packed it full of errors and deliberate mistakes, you mean.
Well, it was the New York Times writing in April 1861 who said the Union troops were there in Washington or on the way or ready to move. Not that I trust the Times particularly, but as I said above, I've had my share of problems trying to correct someone's modern day regimental history of a WBTS unit that is full of errors.
But the New York Times is spot on? The website sources the OR, Dyer's Compendium, State and Federal records, and other sources for it's information on individual regiments. The New York times sources nothing. Yet we're to believe them and not the website?
Madison, of course, was a party to the Virgina ratification which asserted the right to resume governance. As was Chief Justice Marshall. If they felt otherwise, they certainly got out voted by the people who ratified the Constitution. Madison had at first opposed the idea of the Bill of Rights. Madison later pushed for the Bill of Rights (and actually introduced in Congress his version) that Lincoln would later trash much of. Madison's version of what became the Tenth Amendment was, "The powers not delegated by this constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively."
Madison was not consistent in his statements. You can cite some Madison statements against secession from his old age when the Constitution he helped create was in danger of failing. In turn I can cite his Virginia report of 1799:
Clear as the position must seem, that the federal powers are derived from the Constitution, and from that alone, the committee are not unapprised of a late doctrine, which opens another source of federal powers, not less extensive and important, than it is new and unexpected. The examination of this doctrine will be most conveniently connected with a review of a succeeding resolution. The committee satisfy themselves here with briefly remarking, that in all the cotemporary discussions and comments which the Constitution underwent, it was constantly justified and recommended, on the ground, that the powers not given to the government, were withheld from it; and that, if any doubt could have existed on this subject, under the original text of the Constitution, it is removed, as far as words could remove it, by the 12th amendment [rb: the 12th submitted but in the present day known as the Tenth Amendment], now a part of the Constitution, which expressly declares, "that the powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
Where was the Federal Government given the right to use force to prevent secession? If you'll recall it was voted down in the Constitutional Convention. Here's Madison again:
It appears to your committee to be a plain principle, founded in common sense, illustrated by common practice, and essential to the nature of compacts, that, where resort can be had to no tribunal, superior to the authority of the parties, the parties themselves must be the rightful judges in the last resort, whether the bargain made has been pursued or violated. The Constitution of the United States was formed by the sanction of the states, given by each in its sovereign capacity. It adds to the stability and dignity, as well as to the authority of the Constitution, that it rests on this legitimate and solid foundation. The states, then, being the parties to the constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity, that there can be no tribunal above their authority, to decide in the last resort, whether the compact made by them be violated; and, consequently, that, as the parties to it, they must themselves decide, in the last resort, such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their interposition.
You mentioned Daniel Webster. But he also made this statement:
If the South were to violate any part of the Constitution intentionally and systematically, and persist in so doing, year after year, and no remedy could be had, would the North be any longer bound by the rest of it? And if the North were deliberately, habitually, and of fixed purpose to disregard one part of it, would the South be bound any longer to observe its other obligations? I have not hesitated to say, and I repeat, that if the Northern States refuse, willfully and deliberately, to carry into effect that part of the Constitution which respects the restoration of fugitive slaves, and Congress provide no remedy, the South would no longer be bound to observe the compact. A bargain cannot be broken on one side and still bind the other side.
Then there was Thomas Jefferson, of course, who said the new western states could secede if they wished, or words to that effect. And Chief Justice John Jay and Alexander Hamilton were part of the New York ratification convention that came up with these statements: NY ratifiers
But instead of negotiations, the South issued demands.
A demand? Like this statement to the President? Some demand.
Sir: -- We have the honor to transmit to you a copy of the full powers from the Convention of the people of South Carolina, under which we are "authorized and empowered to treat with the Government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light-houses, and other real estate with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolina, and also for an apportionment for the public debt and for a division of all the property held by the Government of the United States, of which South Carolina was recently a member, and generally to negotiate as to all other measures proper to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between this Commonwealth and the Government at Washington."
And you keep exaggerating the existence of such offers.
See above.
Nothing on traffic on the Mississippi.
I've pointed out to you before the act of the Confederate Congress confirming that ship traffic on the Mississippi was to be free to come and go subject to nominal warfage fees, etc. The Governor and the Legislature of Mississippi essentially stated the same.
In short, I trust Clay and Webster and Jackson and Lincoln and most of all Madison over the opinions of unnamed people of those three states.
What elitism! The ratification delegates of those three states were the people who ratified the Constitution, not Clay, Webster, or Lincoln. Again, if Madison felt different about it at the ratification convention, he was either silent or was outvoted. According to your logic, Virginia could have saved the expense of a convention and turned the whole ratification over to Madison. Which, of course, they didn't do.
The New York times sources nothing. Yet we're to believe them and not the website?
The Times mentions the Seventh Regiment of New York as being in Washington. Here from a regimental history of the Seeventh Regiment New York State Militia, is the following statement [Source]:
April 19, 1861, the regiment, commanded by Col. Marshall Lefferts, left the State, en route to Washington, D. C., where it was mustered in the service of the United States for thirty days, April 26, 1861
The link you provided is not clear about where this regiment was on the date in question. My link is, and it is consistent with the Times article.
The Times mentions the Eighth Regiment Massachusetts being in Washington. According to its regimental history it was [Source]
April 20, 1861, the regiment was ordered to Washington, D. C, and commanded by Col. Geprge [sic] Lyons, left the State on the 23d; it was mustered in the service of the United States April 25, 1861, at Washington, to serve three months
Your link agrees.
The Times mentions the First Regiment Pennsylvania as being in Washington. Your site lists the First Defenders of Pennsylvania as being in Washington, but there were only 475 of them, not 1000. Lincoln shook their hands when they arrived. The First Regiment Pennsylvania (along with the Second Regiment Pennsylvania) retreated from the mess in Baltimore on the way to Washington and returned to Pennsylvania. The Times either confused the First Regiment with the First Defenders or was in error about the First Regiment.
Yes, I can cite quotes from Madison made after he had watched the Constitution in action for decades. And after he had watched people try and twist it. And that's why I believe those comments to be more credible.
Where was the Federal Government given the right to use force to prevent secession?
And I will point out to you that while Lincoln may not have believed in the legality of the Southern acts of secession, he also did not use force to prevent secession. Not until after the South resorted to force to further their aims.
But he also made this statement...
With the caveat "...and Congress provide no remedy..." Congress did provide the remedy through any number of fugitive slave legislation.
A demand? Like this statement to the President? Some demand.
No. Like this letter to President Lincoln (and not President Buchanan) saying the delegation was sent "For the purpose of establishing friendly relations between the Confederate States and the United States..." An end to secession wasn't on the table. The Southern position was the only position open for discussions. And had Lincoln agreed to surrender to this demand, then what? Any earlier suggestions that the South might actually be willing to pay for what they stole had been watered down to "...agree, treat, consult, and negotiate of and concerning all matters and subjects interesting to both nations..." Well, what if having surrendered to the first demand, Lincoln found out that paying for stolen property wasn't a topic interesting to the South? What then?
I've pointed out to you before the act of the Confederate Congress confirming that ship traffic on the Mississippi was to be free to come and go subject to nominal warfage fees, etc. The Governor and the Legislature of Mississippi essentially stated the same.
And in a stroke of a pen, the confederate congress could also state that ship traffic was NOT free to come and go on the Mississippi. What then? Topics as vital as navigation on the Mississippi or payment for property or settlement of debt should have been discussed before the South stole the property, repudiated the debt, and made it clear that they had the power to shut off access to the sea via the Mississippi and weren't shy about using it.
Your link agrees.
But it disagrees on the 69th New York, the 71st New York, 1st Pennsylvania, 3rd New York, 9th New York, and who knows about all those unnamed units in various states. It's accuracy is questionable.
The Times was right. The Times said the 69th was on its way to Washington as of April 28. Which agrees with the following history of the regiment [Source]
On 12th April 1861 the 69th New York State Militia had only 245 men on its regimental roster, but within a few days it had swelled to just over a 1,000 men, composed in almost all its entirety of Irish Americans, who had a 90 day service period.
At the beginning of May 1861, the 69th New York State Militia were billeted on the grounds of Georgetown College in Washington
the 71st New York
The Times said it was on its way to Washington as of April 28. Indeed it was. The Times was right again. [Source]
The regiment left the State (nine companies), under orders, April 21, 1861, en route for Washington, D. C., commanded by Col. A. S. Vosburg; was mustered in the United States service for three months, on the 3d of May; served at and near Washington
1st Pennsylvania
As I said, the Times may confused it with the other Pennsylvania unit already in Washington. But I'll give you that one as your accuracy count needs help.
3rd New York
That's one of the units that existed whose destination had not been decided according to the Times article. The Times was right in that the regiment had been accepted by the state by that point in time, although it wasn't officially mustered in yet.
This regiment was accepted by the State April 25, 1861 [Source]
9th New York
Another unit whose destination was not decided, just as the Times said.
Organized at New York City and mustered into State service April 23, 1861. [Source]
It's accuracy [the Times] is questionable.
I don't disagree. It's the Times after all. For units I have accounted for above and in this post, the Times was right six times (seven if you count the 3rd New York) out of the eight. Apparently the Times is more accurate than you. What a blow that must be to be less accurate than the Times.
Correction. There were seven units whose service I ran to ground, not eight. The Times was correct in six of the seven.
Slothful induction, intent to deceive. Rustbucket patiently quoted you several New York papers written by adults which drew a conclusion diametrically opposed to the one you're peddling. So who am I to conclude is telling it straight? The Northern newspapermen, or you?
Guess.
And I will point out to you that while Lincoln may not have believed in the legality of the Southern acts of secession, he also did not use force to prevent secession.
That is such a howler, I cannot believe you typed it with a straight face:
None of these States had "waged war", or done anything but secede, or deliberate secession, to provoke Lincoln's forcible use of the Army and Wide Awakes.
And if the newspaper editorials said Lincoln barbecued babies for breakfast you would be speculating on the sauce he used. Southern newspapers of the time would be expected to come to the incorrect conclusions they came to in order to promote their war. Democrat Northern papers, like Democrat papers today, would be expeced to do anything before they supported the opposition party president.
So who am I to conclude is telling it straight? The Northern newspapermen, or you?
Based on my experiences with you I would expect you to be gullible enough to believe anything the newspapers said.
But I find your reply totally in keeping with your habits. If you can't misquote someone you don't quote them at all. You left out the second sentence, "Not until after the South resorted to force to further their aims." Every one of those actions came after the South had started the war and when those states were taking steps to join the rebellion. Except for the stuff about conscription and suppressing newspapers. Those came after the South had done the same, though not because of it.
Are we going to argue for all time what the maning of ‘reported’ is or ‘ready for transportation’ is? You win.
Ah, the newspapers of the time all lied (except Horace Greeley's, which never disagreed with Lincoln), but you tell the unvarnished truth. Right.
Well, wrong. They were men of their times, they understood the issues of their times. If you insist that they would "just say anything" and were all tools and mountebanks, you articulate a confession of your own.
Smear, and palpably so. I've quoted The Federalist and other documents repeatedly and in extenso. Trust you to reach for the tar-brush when called on one of your canards.
This is one of them:
Every one of those actions came after the South had started the war and when those states were taking steps to join the rebellion.
"Taking steps to join the rebellion" (there was no "rebellion") does not qualify as an act of violence against the United States.
Your dishonest elision equates calling a secession convention or calling up the Militia with cannonading the Washington Mall.
Your statements also deceptively bind unseceded States with South Carolina's bombardment of Fort Sumter. Jeff Davis and Gen. Beauregard may have been involved as Confederates -- but Virginia and North Carolina, Missouri and Maryland were not.
Only if the truth is a smear.
Taking steps to join the rebellion" (there was no "rebellion") does not qualify as an act of violence against the United States.
In the first place there was a rebellion. And in the second place, regardless of whatever you want to call it the Southern states did start the conflict, every one of those actions took place after the South started the conflict, and every one was in reaction to some action in support of the rebellion.
Your dishonest elision equates calling a secession convention or calling up the Militia with cannonading the Washington Mall.
What exactly am I omitting? The governor and a portion of the legislature tried to take the state out of the Union against the wishes of a convention held to vote on the matter. The blockade of Virginia started after that state had voted to join the rebellion, and the blockade of North Carolina came after it had also gone into rebellion and seized federal facilities. Maryland's legislature voted against secession. I'm not sure what you're talking about in your 'invasion of Tennessee' but aligned themselves militarily with the rebellion on May 7. And again, the South suppressed newspapers and drafted people before Lincoln did. So what did I omit?
Your statements also deceptively bind unseceded States with South Carolina's bombardment of Fort Sumter. Jeff Davis and Gen. Beauregard may have been involved as Confederates -- but Virginia and North Carolina, Missouri and Maryland were not.
All had bound themselves with the rebel government, or had tried to.
Not all lied. But only a fool would take the word of the newspapers alone. Something you do quite often.
They were men of their times, they understood the issues of their times. If you insist that they would "just say anything" and were all tools and mountebanks, you articulate a confession of your own.
With the biases and predjudices and political slants of the time. You and rustbucket quote rebel newspapers and Northern newspapers aligned with the Democrats. Well why not quote some of the Republican newspapers? The you can scratch your butt and say, "Gee, maybe Davis WAS wrong." What with everything in the newspapers being gospel and all.
Did that already and linked to them in post 418 (the New York Times which you took exception to) and in post 400 along with some Union supporting papers [Alexandria (VA) Gazette (Union), the Nashville Patriot (Union), the Nashville Republican Banner (black), the Petersburg (VA) Express (Union), the Albany (NY) Statesman (Radical Republican), the Kennebec (ME) Weekly Journal, the New York Times (Republican), the St. Louis Democrat (Republican), the Rochester (NY) Democrat (Republican), the Detroit Advertiser (Republican)].
If you want more quotes from papers that support your point of view, I suggest you do your own homework.
What I can’t figure out is why you can’t understand the rather simple concept that, during wartime, the North would increase importation of a broad spectrum of goods necessary for a continent-wide war effort. Your problem is that you are trying to compare peacetime importation in 1860 with wartime importation from 1861-1865. Your argument essentially seems to rest on your incredulity that the North would actually import materials useful to the war effort, during a time of war. Of course the North did. You don’t think they manufactured those British Enfield rifles at home, do you? Or that saltpetre that had to be imported from British India (see McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 390)? Fact of the matter is, the North had to import a lot of materials that were necessary to sustain its war effort, both directly and indirectly. This wartime importation skews the import numbers and does not, therefore, allow you to make the direct comparison that you wish to make.
Now, if we wish to make an indirect, yet relevant comparison, we will look at the numbers from Taussig for after the war. The import value for the FY ending 30 June, 1865 (not long after Appomatox, if you will recall), showed that the Northern States imported $209.6 million. But, for the FY ending 30 June 1866, which would include the now restored, though impoverished and largely unreconstructed (both politically and, well, literally) Southern States, the value of imports jumps to $423.5 million. This means that Northern-alone imports ending halfway through 1865 amounted to only 49.5% of the imports for the next FY ending in 1866. By that number alone, the South seems to account for 50.5% of total imports (despite having half the population of the North). Now, we also note that with the end of the war, importation of war materials would drop off, so we can safely suggest that the Northern contribution to the 1866 import number would be lower than the previous year’s figure (which represents only imports to the North). This would make the effective Southern contribution to the 1866 import total even higher, percentage-wise. We ALSO consider that the South in 1866 had been thrashed. Not a whole lot of free capital floating around, the amount of liquidity available to purchase foreign goods would be proportionally less than had been available before the war. This would depress the Southern contribution to the 1866 total for imports, meaning that absent all that infrastructure damage and impoverishment, the South in 1866 would otherwise have spent more than it actually did, which would have pushed that number up even higher.
What this all means is that Adams’ 87% figure is indeed quite plausible.
You keep saying that. Yet duties also rose every year between 1861 and 1864, according to Taussig's table 4. How was that possible if the North only accounted for 13% of duties before the war? Are you suggesting that the North imposed tariffs on the stuff needed for wartime production? Enough to generate 20 times the duty income you claim that they were responsible for in 1860? Is that what you're saying?
First of all, you claim that the North’s share of duty income (in 1864) represents a 20-fold increase over its level (per the 13%) in 1861 is somewhat specious. The customs revenue for FY 1861, ending on 30 June, was $39.6 million. This number, however, excludes the Southern States for the various fractions of that year. The deep South had all left by 1 Feb, 1861, so that for nearly half that FY, those seven States were on unfriendly terms with the remaining union, and not likely to have been importing much through the remaining States in the union (and hence, not being included in compilation of financial numbers for the union). The remaining four secessionist States left later in that FY, and hence their contribution would not be lessened as greatly, but it would still be lessened. If those eleven States had remained in the union instead of disrupting their trade avenues through the union, the customs duties in FY 1861 would likely have been significantly higher, and such an increase as seen by 1864 would be far less than 20 times for the North‘s wartime increase.
That this is indeed QUITE plausible is shown again when we look at the numbers after the war, when the Southern States were brought back into the union, and therefore would be importing through the United States economic bloc, as opposed to their own. In FY 1865, customs duties were $84.9 million. In FY 1866, customs duties brought in $179.0 million, a 110% increase. As seen with the numbers for dollar value of imports above, even with Northern war-related imports for FY 1865 and even with the general impoverishment of the South, the return of the South more than doubled the total amount of duties collected. Without the war and devastation skew, there is no solid reason to think that Adams’ 87% figure would not be entirely likely.
And yes, I certainly am suggesting that the North imposed tariffs on materials necessary to its war effort. Look at Taussig’s Table 2. Even this abbreviated list shows tariffs on a number of items which would be necessary to a war effort. Finished cotton for uniforms, etc. Hemp for rope. Steel, bar iron (including some types of naval stores and tools), iron rails, pig lead, etc. All were tariffed high by the Morrill Tariff, and duties on these and other imports continued to be increased throughout the war. It’s simple, really. When you import increasing amounts of goods, while at the same time imposing higher and higher customs duties on these imports (average rates went from a shade under 20% before the war to just under 50% by the end of the war), you will collect a synergistic amount of customs revenue.
Tell us, why do you think the North didn’t import war materials? What is your source for this assumption on your part?
Let's look at what you said. Your claim was "...a drastic increase such as was seen with the Morrill Tariff, can invite reciprocal protection on the part of other nations - something which in fact was seriously considered by ideologically free-trader Great Britain in response to the Morrill." I'm still waiting for a quote indicating that was true. Palmeston may not have liked the tariff, and I couldn't blame him for that, but the quote you provided shows no evidence that he was contemplating retaliation or a trade war. So what do you have showing your claim is correct?
For starters, the 21 June, 1862 edition of the New York Times contained a report, dated 5 June, from their London correspondent who reported, among other things, that a long term disruption in the cotton supply coming from the South would result in the movement of British cotton manufacture to India - where wages were much cheaper, and which would undercut American manufacturers. The article all but tells “Lowell and Lawrence” (i.e. centres of American cotton goods manufacturing) that once this happens, they’d better be glad they have the Morrill Tariff, because they’re gonna need it. The article claims to represent the common opinion of the British public at this particular point (early in the war), and suggests that moves to undercut American manufacturing may be, ahem, necessary.
This was actually pretty tame compared to some other things said in the British press, and even by members of Parliament. The 24 June, 1861 edition of the NYT reprinted a column penned by an Irish MP named Gregory which originally appeared in the London Times. Mr. Gregory didn’t just grouse about the tariff, he suggested that it might even make war possible between the USA and Great Britain. Now, did he mean trade war, or shooting war (I tend to suspect the latter)? Either way, a definite negative response which goes beyond mere polite distase for the Tariff.
An 8 March, 1861 column in the London Times gives the opinion that the Tariff cuts the United States off from the sympathy of its friends, and would force Britain to side with the Confederacy, both politically and tradewise – trade with the North ceasing, and trade with the South increasing. The British allowed the Bermudas, the British West Indies, and Nassau to be used as bases for Southern blockade runners, and Canada even served as a base for several Confederate attacks into Vermont and New York. Johnson cites these British provocations as a reason for the United States’ cancellation of the reciprocity treaty with Canada in 1866 (R.E. Johnson, History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce in the United States, Vol. II, pp. 61-62). It is highly unlikely the British would have been inclined to aid and abet these activities absent the resentment caused by the Morrill and later tariffs.
Looking back in history, it is fortunate that clearer heads prevailed in both the USA and Great Britain and neither hot war nor trade war resulted, but the rhetoric from some corners in Britain, including at least a few in Parliament, was very bellicose. Means of trade protection - shifting of trade, threats to undercut American manufactures in turn, as well as more underhanded activities - were definitely made in some quarters. BTW, when I remarked about British reciprocation, I was speaking off-the-cuff and colloquially, and was remarking about British ventilation of emotions at the United States in general. I was not suggesting that Parliament was actually passing reciprocal tariffs on US goods, only that there were some in Britain who were suggesting the like, which was normally at odds with the free-trade ethos that permeated the UK at this period in history.
What part of "...shall be vested in one Supreme Court..." is unclear? That is exactly the same wording that the real Constitution uses, and I suggest that there is not a single Constitutional scholar out there who would suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court is optional. The Constitution says that there shall be one. The confederate constitution said the same. One was not established and the failure to do so was deliberate on the part of Jefferson Davis and the confederate congress.
While odd, do you think that if the Founding generation had failed to establish a Supreme Court for five or six years after the ratification of the Constitution, it would have been considered a conspiracy by Washington to subvert the government? Do you think it would have necessarily been considered a constitutional crisis? If so, on what solid evidence would you base such an assumption?
That should be obvious to anyone, even you. What purpose does the three branches of government fill? They provide a system of checks and balances on each other. Take out one of the three legs, especially an independent judiciary, and you remove any controls over the actions of the otehr two.
You’re assuming the word “shall” is meant proscriptively, whereas it can just as easily been seen to be declarative. You’re still stretching to “prove” that Jefferson Davis cooked up a plan with the Confederate Congress to have unimpeded access to subverting and using the Confederate government for their own ends. Especially since Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Congress were at such loggerheads most of the time that the idea of them working together to deliberately eliminate the Supreme Court and have no checks on their powers is laughable outright. Nevertheless, I’ll humour you, so let’s entertain your rather maladroit proposal for a moment. Can you show us what actual evidences, from sources other than people who used to work at Area 51, upon which you base your theory?
And again, a simple reading of the confederate constitution makes it clear that Jefferson Davis was in no position to promise anything like that, unless he was assuming powers his constitution did not give to him. Sorry, but I'm not the one grasping at straws.
I’d say you rather are. You’re essentially asserting an action on the part of Davis for which you have not a single shred of actual evidence. That’s called “grasping at straws”.
Again, read the document. Article 5 says 'congress shall summon'. So how is congress supposed to do that without legislation calling the convention? And how can they do that if they are forbidden from passing any legislation impairing the ownership of slaves? It's a legitimate legal dilemma and one which, on the face of it, would prevent slavery from every being legislated out of existence. It would almost certainly been a question for the supreme court. But there wasn't one, was there?
Sorry, but no. Calling a convention of the States does not qualify as “legislation”. Do you even know what “legislation” is?
The 15th amendment of the Constitution says that no citizen of the United States can be denied their right to vote on account of race, colour, or previous status of servitude. This being said, would you think that a constitutional convention or a constitutional amendment could not be proposed for the purpose of repealing this amendment? While inadvisable, such a purpose most certainly could be pursued (theoretically) by convention or amendment – even though doing so, by your definition, would be considered as violating the existing amendment.
In your world perhaps. The real world knows that you are exaggerating badly.
Really? Are you sure about that? James Randall, in his textbook “Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln”, said,
"Among the unconstitutional and dictatorial acts performed by Lincoln were initiating and conducting a war by decree for months without the consent or advice of Congress; declaring martial law; confiscating private property; suspending habeas corpus; conscripting the railroads and censoring telegraph lines; imprisoning as many as 30,000 Northern citizens without trial; deporting a member of Congress, Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio, after Vallandigham - a fierce opponent of the Morrill tariff -- protested imposition of an income tax at a Democratic Party meeting in Ohio; and shutting down hundreds of Northern newspapers."
Clinton Rossiter (hardly a “lost causer”), wrote these in his work Constitutional Dictatorship,
“The principle and instutitions of constitutional dictatorship played a decisive role in the North's successful effort to maintain the Union by force of arms.” (p. 223), and
“This amazing disregard for the words of the Constitution, though considered by many as unavoidable, was considered by nobody as legal.” (p. 226)
Morison and Commager (Growth of the American Republic, Vol. I, pp. 739-742) note that Lincoln and his subordinates utilized illegal military trials of civilians suspected of disloyalty and suspended newspapers. M&C also note that, while civil liberties violations occurred on the Southern side as well, that “in the field of civil and political liberties, the Confederate record was better than that of the Union. No Southern newspapers were suspended, or even censored, although they were often guilty of divulging important military information to Northern commanders and their attacks on Davis and the government sometimes passed the bounds of decency. Davis suspended the writ of habeas corpus on three occasions, but only with congressional authority and approval.” (p. 742)
McPherson tells us that Lincoln had a number of suspected secessionist-supporting legislators in the Maryland legislature arrested and held until after the election of a new legislature, on the suspicion that a vote for secession might be held in that State (Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 289).
But of course, the whole world knows I’m just exaggerating badly.
Try again. In his book "Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War" Stephen Wise quotes "Hunt's Merchant Magazine and Commercial Review", July-December 1861 issue. The figures reported by Hunts shows that of the 3.13 million bales of cotton exported in the year prior to the rebellion 1.8 million left from New Orleans, 456,000 left from Mobile, 302,000 left from Savannah, etc. Only 248,000 bales left from New York and less that 275,000 left from all Northern ports combined. That's less than 9% of the total, all the rest left from Southern ports. So that still begs the question, if all that stuff was leaving from Southern ports then why wasn't any arriving? Your numbers simply don’t add up. Sorry but regardless of whether we're talking about tariff revenue, imports arriving into specific ports, or exports leaving ports it's apparent that it is your figures that don't add up.
Actually, you are correct in your figures for cotton exportation through Southern ports.
BUT - and here’s the funny part - you are still incorrect in the argument you are trying to make.
My error was in underestimating the high value per ton of cotton. I mistakenly associated high value of cotton exports with high tonnage of exports. Cotton was a high dollar value export commodity (which is why it accounted for around 60% of US export value). Regardless of most US cotton leaving Southern ports, this doesn’t change the fact that most of the total US export tonnage left Northern ports. While comprising the largest share of export value, actual tonnage of cotton was relatively small in comparison to what left Northern ports. The source I linked to earlier, which draws its numbers from E.B. Long’s The Civil War Day by Day, once again, says this,
“In shipping, a total of 11,079 American vessels cleared U.S. ports for the year ending June 30, 1861. Of these 819 were from 8 Southern seaport states. Tonnage totaled 4,889,313, with 286,445 tons of this from the South. Foreign vessels clearing the United states totaled 10,586, with 220 of these from the South. The total number of ships, foreign and U.S., clearing from the country and coming into the country in the ending June 30, 1861, totaled 43,625, with only 1975 of these coming in and out of the South. Total tonnage of all these movements was 14,392,826 tons, of which 737,901 tons moved in and out of Southern ports.”
Again, this means that of the bottoms that moved in and out of US ports, 5.13% of the tonnage and 4.53% of the total number of ships went through Southern ports. In most Southern ports, cotton was just about the only thing that moved outbound, once author cites cotton as comprising 99% of Mobile, Alabama’s export total, for instance. These numbers for Southern ports are miniscule – New York alone dwarfs the whole South combined. 91% of US cotton may have left Southern ports, but that tonnage of cotton was tiny compared to the traffic going through Northern ports. So once again, my claim that Southern ports were underused and insignificant compared to those of the North stands. We saw above that the South really did account for the majority of American imports, as the huge import jumps after the war demonstrated. This point is also substantiated by economic historians as well. For instance E.R. Johnson tells us about the years leading up to the Civil War,
“It does not follow that the Southern states consumed few imports. On the contrary, the business of the South being highly specialized, it was necessary to make heavy purchases from the North, of foreign as well as of domestic commodities. Instead of importing directly from abroad, the South was wont to receive many foreign goods indirectly from northern merchants.” (E.R. Johnson, History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce in the United States, Vol. II, p. 44)
The context for Johnson’s opening statement was his discussion of the vast import imbalance between Northern and Southern ports, where the former greatly outweighed the latter (pp. 43-44). The Northern ports imported more than they exported, at least in dollar value of commodities, while the Southern ports were geared almost exclusively towards the export trade. Johnson includes two examples – Pennsylvania and Alabama, in 1836. Pennsylvania exported less than $4,000,000, while receiving over $15,000,000 in imports (export value only around 27% of import value). Alabama, conversely, had an export trade valued at $11,184,000, but only directly imported foreign goods to the tune of $651,000 (5.8% of its export value). For that year, Alabama imported less than 4.3% of what Pennsylvania did, and the larger numbers provided elsewhere suggest that this trend was repeated across the whole of the North and South. This trend didn’t significantly alter prior to the War. The numbers are clear – the North imported most of the goods, and the South’s trade was almost exclusively exportation. Earlier (#317), you yourself told us that something like 95% of total tariff revenue was generated from Northern ports. The obvious reason for this, as the numbers I’ve provided bear out, is that around 95% of importation went through these ports – which again suggests that the South wasn’t importing very much in terms of volume of goods.
Your question, “So that still begs the question, if all that stuff was leaving from Southern ports then why wasn't any arriving?” is moot. Whether or not you wish to accept it, this is exactly what was happening. The South wasn’t importing much, since its ports were geared to export, and indeed, export of one primary commodity – cotton. Foreign shippers took their goods to New York, Philadelphia, and Boston – not to New Orleans, Savannah, or Mobile. That’s just the way it was.
The North imported most goods coming into the country from abroad. Yet, we can infer that the South purchased the majority (and a strong majority, in antebellum years) of American imports, given that a war-wearied, impoverished South still purchased over 50% of the total US imports in 1866, more than doubling the USA total from 1865 (still inflated with war purchasing as it was until at least April 1865), with the simple return of the Southern States to the fold (and thus, the statistics books). We’ve seen that the South had to buy its goods from Northern importers, and thus logically would have to pay additional transport and middleman costs, as well as the passed-through costs that a tariff would additionally impose. The pre-war Southerners already felt that they were beholden to Northern importers. The addition of a tariff, on goods that they were eventually going to be paying for the majority of, just added to that resentment since that meant they were going to bear the brunt of the cost – the pass-through effect in as many words.
Sorry, the data is all there, and it doesn’t support your apparent arguments. Instead, it supports the view that the South bore a disproportionate share of the costs when a tariff was imposed.
Not at all. You challenged my claim that the tariffs were part of the cause of the South's secession, and therefore the Civil War. I provided several sources which showed just that. You then tried to move the goalposts. You lost the debate, it's that simple. I can claim victory because I already demonstrated the truth of my original claim, which you had (incorrectly) challenged.
I don't really feel obligated to have to jump through additional hoops you might wish to set up before I can "claim victory". However, I will note that of the claims you list, I have already disposed of 2) and 3) above, in my #436 and posts leading up to it. As for claim 1), it looks like rustbucket did a pretty good job of dealing with it in my absence. I would only add that Moore tells us (J.C. Moore, Confederate Military History, Vol. 9, p.24) that even before the inauguration of President Lincoln, Francis Blair had organised several companies of Home Guards in St. Louis, armed in part by the Governour of Illinois, for the purpose of acting as a Union militia. Of course, you'll probably quibble with the source, since it was written by several ex-Confederates, even though it is widely recognised by Civil War historians as a valuable and reliable source of information on the period.
You challenged my claim that the tariffs were part of the cause of the South's secession, and therefore the Civil War.
Well, no. I challenged your claim that the South paid 87% of the tariff. And look at your reply. Your explanation of how tariff revenue could rise by a factor of 20 was that the North taxed the goods it needed to fight the war. You selectively quote from Taussig but in the end cannot provide a single logical explanation for how imports can remain relatively stable, without the South consuming 87% of all imports, and how income from duties can rise. "Well," you say, "the North would increase importation of a broad spectrum of goods necessary for a continent-wide war effort." OK, like what? "War goods," you say. OK, again like what? All those Enfields? The Union imported about 400,000 of them. Tons of saltpetre? Please. The Union imported over $1.2 billion in goods during the rebellion. According to you without the war they should have accounted for about 13% or $160 million. So in your world the Union imported, and apparently taxed, over a billion dollars in arms and war-related goods. So the question remains, what was it that they were importing?
Then there was the Supreme Court. You justify the confederacy's refusal to establish one by wondering if anyone would have questioned Washington's failure to establish one. What you overlook is that, unlike Davis, George Washington respected the Constitution, as did Congress. Among its first acts was the Judiciary Act of 1789 orgainizing the Supreme Court and lower courts. By the late summer Washington had appointed the members and the Senate had confirmed them. By February the court was sitting. All in less than a year. Davis and the confederate congress had 4. And while you will no doubt blame the rebellion on their failure to appoint a court I will point out that the war didn't stop them from keeping Davis's revolving door of a cabinet fully stocked. And none of them were required by the constitution. And as for your complain that I'm assuming the word “shall” is means proscriptively rather than declarative. I'll repeat my challenge. Show me a single constitutional scholar who thinks that the Supreme Court is optional and I'll concede you this point.
I’d say you rather are. You’re essentially asserting an action on the part of Davis for which you have not a single shred of actual evidence. That’s called “grasping at straws”.
The evidence is there. Davis sent Duncan Kenner overseas in 1864. That is irrefutable. Kenner was titled as a "special emissary" to England and France. And his message was that Davis promised an end to slavery in exchange for recognition. That is documented. So Davis was promising something he could not provide and which the confederate congess couldn't pprovide and which, arguably, couldn't be accomplished under any circumstances. There is no grasping at straws in any of that.
You asked me if I knew what 'legislation is. Well, yes I do. And how else would the confederate congress summon the states into convention? Yell out the window, "Yoo hoo, y'all come down heah and we'll have us a convention?" Obviously an act of congress would need to be enacted. And I believe that is what 'legislation' is defined as.
And then you dredge up James Randall. Why not trot out Tommy DiLorenzo and be done with it? Look at the quote you came up with: "Among the unconstitutional and dictatorial acts performed by Lincoln were initiating and conducting a war by decree for months without the consent or advice of Congress; declaring martial law; confiscating private property; suspending habeas corpus; conscripting the railroads and censoring telegraph lines; imprisoning as many as 30,000 Northern citizens without trial; deporting a member of Congress, Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio, after Vallandigham - a fierce opponent of the Morrill tariff -- protested imposition of an income tax at a Democratic Party meeting in Ohio; and shutting down hundreds of Northern newspapers..." Yadda, yadda, yadda. Same old unsubstantiated Southron claims. And once again you accept it at face value without questioning. "Unconstitutional acts?" Which ones were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court? "Shut down hundreds of Northern newspapers?" Can you name the hundreds that were shut down? How about just 100? Maybe 50? 20? The Southron supporters are all masters of the Big Lie.
And finally there is the constant changing of direction you make on Southern imports. I raised the not unreasonable question that if the South imported close to 90% of all goods brought in from overseas then why did the overwhelming majority of them enter in just 3 Northern ports? Wouldn't you expect those goods to be shipped directly to their consumers? This part of our discussion has resulted in the most amusement of all because first you smugly said it was because the South didn't have any ports! As if any idiot could understand that. But then I pointed out that 90% of all cotton leaving the U.S. left from Southern cities, so they had to have some kind of ports, didn' they? And your response is "because their ports were geared for export." Then please explain how all these goods got to the South at all? If not directly from Europe and not by sea from Northern ports and not by railroad, because as your link pointed out there weren't much in the way of railroads between North and South, then how did that 87% of imported goods you claim the South consumed get to them?
On second thought, don't bother. You said you saw no need to jump through hoops and I have no interest in reading more of your unsubstantiated claims and general nonsense. Go ahead and thump your chest and believe you made perfect sense in reply 436 and claim that you've refuted everything. I'll let others read your shit and if they want to agree with you then fine. And if they want to question anything then I'll leave that up to them.
I would only add that Moore tells us (J.C. Moore, Confederate Military History, Vol. 9, p.24) that even before the inauguration of President Lincoln, Francis Blair had organised several companies of Home Guards in St. Louis, armed in part by the Governour of Illinois, for the purpose of acting as a Union militia.
Then add the rest of it. The St. Louis Police Bill passed the state senate on March 2nd but didn't pass the house until the 23rd. Moore says Blair "...foresaw the passage of the St. Louis police bill some time before it passed the house, and adopted measures to counteract its effect." Since Lincoln was inaugurated on the 4th, it's hard to beleive that Blair had 11 companies armed and organized in two days. Likely didn't do anything until after Lincoln's inauguration, and that Colonel Moore's dates are no more accurate than your's. But Moore does admit, through his bias, that a state convention had met and voted against secession. And he also points out that before violence broke out in St. Louis Davis was sending arms to the secessionist elements. So please spare us the 'evil Lincoln raping Missouri' crap. Both sides were mobilizing.
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