Posted on 02/05/2008 9:33:17 AM PST by jdm
Former UN Ambassador John Bolton wants DNI Michael McConnell to redo the National Intelligence Estimate to properly reflect the threat Iran poses to the region and the US. The do-over should emphasize the dual-use nature of its nuclear program, which Bolton claims got glossed over in the original:
Today, Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell testifies before the Senate Intelligence Committee (and Thursday on the House side) to give the intelligence community's annual global threat analysis. These hearings are always significant, but the stakes are especially high now because of the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.
Criticism of the NIE's politicized, policy-oriented "key judgments" has spanned the political spectrum and caused considerable turmoil in Congress. Few seriously doubt that the NIE gravely damaged the Bush administration's diplomatic strategy. With the intelligence community's credibility and impartiality on the line, Mr. McConnell has an excellent opportunity to correct the NIE's manifold flaws, and repair some of the damage done to international efforts to stop Iran from obtaining deliverable nuclear weapons.
Bolton wants McConnell to commit to three actions in order to rebuild confidence in future NIEs. First, explain to Congress how this NIE got distorted and commit to a rewrite that more objectively reflects the current intel and analysis on Iran. Next, Bolton wants a commitment to a more professional process in compiling future NIEs, especially on the unclassified portions. Finally, the DNI has to enforce operational security by stopping the leaks.
It all sounds great, but can McConnell really commit to this and deliver? I think McConnell would want to have already made these commitments to Congress and the nation, but like most government bureaucracies, turning the ship takes a lot of time and more than a little strength. If the intel community has been as politicized as Bolton argues -- and it certainly appears that way -- a housecleaning would be required to make the kinds of changes necessary.
Needless to say, a purge during wartime is not the best set of circumstances. Joseph Stalin found that out the hard way in June 1941. It would get messy, and it would take the focus off of national defense and counterterrorism at a time when we can least afford it.
At the least, though, the DNI needs to revisit the NIE and explain how we could go from a high confidence in one year that Iran had continued its nuclear-weapons program to a high confidence the next year that it had been dormant for four years. The nation's confidence in its intel is not even moderate any more, and thanks to over a decade of bad calls, missing data, and dramatic reversals, it's not likely to improve much without that destructive housecleaning.
The NIE is a State Department brain fart, and as such must be taken with a grain of salt.
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities should receive acclamation for political marketing and condemnation for intelligence value. An intention is a future determination to act in a particular manner. A capability represents possession of sufficient mental and/or physical power to perform an act. Intelligence agencies should contribute information about intentions and capabilities for the policy decision-making tasks of others.
The current NIE becomes a policy determinant by using a data point, belonging to text, and contorting it into the primary judgment. The estimate Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, and had not restarted, states past circumstances representing neither intentions nor capabilities. The NIE does not assume Iranian intention to acquire nuclear weapons, but assertions follow of intentions and capabilities to produce weapons grade uranium, solve associated technical problems, and make subsequent political decisions to proceed with program execution. Potential Iranian policy momentums, and present technical capability estimates continually reflected upon the defining Scope statement. Therefore, political exposition, advocating an accommodative policy toward Iran and its aims, retained primary rhetorical stature. The NIE also baselessly asserted traditional Western diplomatic efforts caused Iran to halt its program. The document avoided accountable assessments of Iran’s intentions.
The report’s political exposition required studied ignorance towards available intelligence data. General Abireza Asgari who defected March 2007 had extensive access to Iran’s nuclear and intelligence secrets. Nowhere does the document qualify statements to recognize traditional security procedures. After his 2005 employment change procedures should limit access to Iran’s nuclear program and intelligence agencies. Defection then required posting bodyguards of deception around continuing operations. An assessment with moderate to high confidence should always require at least two independent sources. Judgments overturning previous assessments should subject data to special scrutiny and skepticism. Obtaining even one trusted source from behind a new security wall within a closed society becomes very unlikely.
Contrary to report assertions, military action offered a key incentive during that period by removing the immediately adjacent Taliban and Hussein regimes. The fact Libya eliminated WMD programs, and the supposition Iran halted their nuclear weapons initiatives should acknowledge intentional or unwitting application of war residing on a continuum of diplomacy. Talks, conferences and economic measures serve as war without bloodshed; war serves as diplomacy with bloodshed. Intelligence and espionage provide a medium invigorating all options.
This latest NIE presents another milepost along the way to complete corrosion of U.S. intelligence. Determined destruction began as the Church and Pike Committees eviscerated the CIA, which can only provide value when operating powerfully within a cunning and ruthless world. Congress under pretense of “reasserting” authority plundered authority given to all presidents since George Washington to conduct clandestine operations. Congressional blindness seeks interminable briefing requests and micro-manages operations. Presidents suffer petulant demands to confirm ever more intelligence officials. Hearings provide the shallow political theater needed for re-election. Without profound catastrophes, there seems little interest to reinvigorate our “short of war” capabilities.
It cannot be done under any Republican president. A rework of the NIE process will certainly be spun as an attempt to cook the books.
Save your breath, John.
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