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The Rising Risk of a Systemic Financial Meltdown: The Twelve Steps to Financial Disaster
Sott.net ^ | 02/05/08 | Nouriel Roubini

Posted on 02/08/2008 9:22:07 PM PST by TigerLikesRooster

The Rising Risk of a Systemic Financial Meltdown: The Twelve Steps to Financial Disaster

Why did the Fed ease the Fed Funds rate by a whopping 125bps in eight days this past January? It is true that most macro indicators are heading south and suggesting a deep and severe recession that has already started. But the flow of bad macro news in mid-January did not justify, by itself, such a radical inter-meeting emergency Fed action followed by another cut at the formal FOMC meeting.

To understand the Fed actions one has to realize that there is now a rising probability of a "catastrophic" financial and economic outcome, i.e. a vicious circle where a deep recession makes the financial losses more severe and where, in turn, large and growing financial losses and a financial meltdown make the recession even more severe. The Fed is seriously worried about this vicious circle and about the risks of a systemic financial meltdown.

That is the reason the Fed had thrown all caution to the wind - after a year in which it was behind the curve and underplaying the economic and financial risks - and has taken a very aggressive approach to risk management; this is a much more aggressive approach than the Greenspan one in spite of the initial views that the Bernanke Fed would be more cautious than Greenspan in reacting to economic and financial vulnerabilities.

To understand the risks that the financial system is facing today I present the "nightmare" or "catastrophic" scenario that the Fed and financial officials around the world are now worried about. Such a scenario - however extreme - has a rising and significant probability of occurring. Thus, it does not describe a very low probability event but rather an outcome that is quite possible.

Start first with the recession that is now enveloping the US economy. Let us assume - as likely - that this recession - that already started in December 2007 - will be worse than the mild ones - that lasted 8 months - that occurred in 1990-91 and 2001. The recession of 2008 will be more severe for several reasons: first, we have the biggest housing bust in US history with home prices likely to eventually fall 20 to 30%; second, because of a credit bubble that went beyond mortgages and because of reckless financial innovation and securitization the ongoing credit bust will lead to a severe credit crunch; third, US households - whose consumption is over 70% of GDP - have spent well beyond their means for years now piling up a massive amount of debt, both mortgage and otherwise; now that home prices are falling and a severe credit crunch is emerging the retrenchment of private consumption will be serious and protracted. So let us suppose that the recession of 2008 will last at least four quarters and, possibly, up to six quarters. What will be the consequences of it?

Here are the twelve steps or stages of a scenario of systemic financial meltdown associated with this severe economic recession...

First, this is the worst housing recession in US history and there is no sign it will bottom out any time soon. At this point it is clear that US home prices will fall between 20% and 30% from their bubbly peak; that would wipe out between $4 trillion and $6 trillion of household wealth. While the subprime meltdown is likely to cause about 2.2 million foreclosures, a 30% fall in home values would imply that over 10 million households would have negative equity in their homes and would have a big incentive to use "jingle mail" (i.e. default, put the home keys in an envelope and send it to their mortgage bank). Moreover, soon enough a few very large home builders will go bankrupt and join the dozens of other small ones that have already gone bankrupt thus leading to another free fall in home builders' stock prices that have irrationally rallied in the last few weeks in spite of a worsening housing recession.

Second, losses for the financial system from the subprime disaster are now estimated to be as high as $250 to $300 billion. But the financial losses will not be only in subprime mortgages and the related RMBS and CDOs. They are now spreading to near prime and prime mortgages as the same reckless lending practices in subprime (no down-payment, no verification of income, jobs and assets (i.e. NINJA or LIAR loans), interest rate only, negative amortization, teaser rates, etc.) were occurring across the entire spectrum of mortgages; about 60% of all mortgage origination since 2005 through 2007 had these reckless and toxic features. So this is a generalized mortgage crisis and meltdown, not just a subprime one. And losses among all sorts of mortgages will sharply increase as home prices fall sharply and the economy spins into a serious recession. Goldman Sachs now estimates total mortgage credit losses of about $400 billion; but the eventual figures could be much larger if home prices fall more than 20%. Also, the RMBS and CDO markets for securitization of mortgages - already dead for subprime and frozen for other mortgages - remain in a severe credit crunch, thus reducing further the ability of banks to originate mortgages. The mortgage credit crunch will become even more severe.

Also add to the woes and losses of the financial institutions the meltdown of hundreds of billions of off balance SIVs and conduits; this meltdown and the roll-off of the ABCP market has forced banks to bring back on balance sheet these toxic off balance sheet vehicles adding to the capital and liquidity crunch of the financial institutions and adding to their on balance sheet losses. And because of securitization the securitized toxic waste has been spread from banks to capital markets and their investors in the US and abroad, thus increasing - rather than reducing systemic risk - and making the credit crunch global.

Third, the recession will lead - as it is already doing - to a sharp increase in defaults on other forms of unsecured consumer debt: credit cards, auto loans, student loans. There are dozens of millions of subprime credit cards and subprime auto loans in the US. And again defaults in these consumer debt categories will not be limited to subprime borrowers. So add these losses to the financial losses of banks and of other financial institutions (as also these debts were securitized in ABS products), thus leading to a more severe credit crunch. As the Fed loan officers survey suggest the credit crunch is spreading throughout the mortgage market and from mortgages to consumer credit, and from large banks to smaller banks.

Fourth, while there is serious uncertainty about the losses that monolines will undertake on their insurance of RMBS, CDO and other toxic ABS products, it is now clear that such losses are much higher than the $10-15 billion rescue package that regulators are trying to patch up. Some monolines are actually borderline insolvent and none of them deserves at this point a AAA rating regardless of how much realistic recapitalization is provided. Any business that required an AAA rating to stay in business is a business that does not deserve such a rating in the first place. The monolines should be downgraded as no private rescue package - short of an unlikely public bailout - is realistic or feasible given the deep losses of the monolines on their insurance of toxic ABS products.

Next, the downgrade of the monolines will lead to another $150 of writedowns on ABS portfolios for financial institutions that have already massive losses. It will also lead to additional losses on their portfolio of muni bonds. The downgrade of the monolines will also lead to large losses - and potential runs - on the money market funds that invested in some of these toxic products. The money market funds that are backed by banks or that bought liquidity protection from banks against the risk of a fall in the NAV may avoid a run but such a rescue will exacerbate the capital and liquidity problems of their underwriters. The monolines' downgrade will then also lead to another sharp drop in US equity markets that are already shaken by the risk of a severe recession and large losses in the financial system.

Fifth, the commercial real estate loan market will soon enter into a meltdown similar to the subprime one. Lending practices in commercial real estate were as reckless as those in residential real estate. The housing crisis will lead - with a short lag - to a bust in non-residential construction as no one will want to build offices, stores, shopping malls/centers in ghost towns. The CMBX index is already pricing a massive increase in credit spreads for non-residential mortgages/loans. And new origination of commercial real estate mortgages is already semi-frozen today; the commercial real estate mortgage market is already seizing up today.

Sixth, it is possible that some large regional or even national bank that is very exposed to mortgages, residential and commercial, will go bankrupt. Thus some big banks may join the 200 plus subprime lenders that have gone bankrupt. This, like in the case of Northern Rock, will lead to depositors' panic and concerns about deposit insurance. The Fed will have to reaffirm the implicit doctrine that some banks are too big to be allowed to fail. But these bank bankruptcies will lead to severe fiscal losses of bank bailout and effective nationalization of the affected institutions. Already Countrywide - an institution that was more likely insolvent than illiquid - has been bailed out with public money via a $55 billion loan from the FHLB system, a semi-public system of funding of mortgage lenders. Banks' bankruptcies will add to an already severe credit crunch.

Seventh, the banks losses on their portfolio of leveraged loans are already large and growing. The ability of financial institutions to syndicate and securitize their leveraged loans - a good chunk of which were issued to finance very risky and reckless LBOs - is now at serious risk. And hundreds of billions of dollars of leveraged loans are now stuck on the balance sheet of financial institutions at values well below par (currently about 90 cents on the dollar but soon much lower). Add to this that many reckless LBOs (as senseless LBOs with debt to earnings ratio of seven or eight had become the norm during the go-go days of the credit bubble) have now been postponed, restructured or cancelled. And add to this problem the fact that some actual large LBOs will end up into bankruptcy as some of these corporations taken private are effectively bankrupt in a recession and given the repricing of risk; convenant-lite and PIK toggles may only postpone - not avoid - such bankruptcies and make them uglier when they do eventually occur. The leveraged loans mess is already leading to a freezing up of the CLO market and to growing losses for financial institutions.

Eighth, once a severe recession is underway a massive wave of corporate defaults will take place. In a typical year US corporate default rates are about 3.8% (average for 1971-2007); in 2006 and 2007 this figure was a puny 0.6%. And in a typical US recession such default rates surge above 10%. Also during such distressed periods the RGD - or recovery given default - rates are much lower, thus adding to the total losses from a default. Default rates were very low in the last two years because of a slosh of liquidity, easy credit conditions and very low spreads (with junk bond yields being only 260bps above Treasuries until mid June 2007). But now the repricing of risk has been massive: junk bond spreads close to 700bps, iTraxx and CDX indices pricing massive corporate default rates and the junk bond yield issuance market is now semi-frozen. While on average the US and European corporations are in better shape - in terms of profitability and debt burden - than in 2001 there is a large fat tail of corporations with very low profitability and that have piled up a mass of junk bond debt that will soon come to refinancing at much higher spreads. Corporate default rates will surge during the 2008 recession and peak well above 10% based on recent studies. And once defaults are higher and credit spreads higher massive losses will occur among the credit default swaps (CDS) that provided protection against corporate defaults. Estimates of the losses on a notional value of $50 trillion CDS against a bond base of $5 trillion are varied (from $20 billion to $250 billion with a number closer to the latter figure more likely). Losses on CDS do not represent only a transfer of wealth from those who sold protection to those who bought it. If losses are large some of the counterparties who sold protection - possibly large institutions such as monolines, some hedge funds or a large broker dealer - may go bankrupt leading to even greater systemic risk as those who bought protection may face counterparties who cannot pay.

Ninth, the "shadow banking system" (as defined by the PIMCO folks) or more precisely the "shadow financial system" (as it is composed by non-bank financial institutions) will soon get into serious trouble. This shadow financial system is composed of financial institutions that - like banks - borrow short and in liquid forms and lend or invest long in more illiquid assets. This system includes: SIVs, conduits, money market funds, monolines, investment banks, hedge funds and other non-bank financial institutions. All these institutions are subject to market risk, credit risk (given their risky investments) and especially liquidity/rollover risk as their short term liquid liabilities can be rolled off easily while their assets are more long term and illiquid. Unlike banks these non-bank financial institutions don't have direct or indirect access to the central bank's lender of last resort support as they are not depository institutions. Thus, in the case of financial distress and/or illiquidity they may go bankrupt because of both insolvency and/or lack of liquidity and inability to roll over or refinance their short term liabilities. Deepening problems in the economy and in the financial markets and poor risk managements will lead some of these institutions to go belly up: a few large hedge funds, a few money market funds, the entire SIV system and, possibly, one or two large and systemically important broker dealers. Dealing with the distress of this shadow financial system will be very problematic as this system - stressed by credit and liquidity problems - cannot be directly rescued by the central banks in the way that banks can.

Tenth, stock markets in the US and abroad will start pricing a severe US recession - rather than a mild recession - and a sharp global economic slowdown. The fall in stock markets - after the late January 2008 rally fizzles out - will resume as investors will soon realize that the economic downturn is more severe, that the monolines will not be rescued, that financial losses will mount, and that earnings will sharply drop in a recession not just among financial firms but also non financial ones. A few long equity hedge funds will go belly up in 2008 after the massive losses of many hedge funds in August, November and, again, January 2008. Large margin calls will be triggered for long equity investors and another round of massive equity shorting will take place. Long covering and margin calls will lead to a cascading fall in equity markets in the US and a transmission to global equity markets. US and global equity markets will enter into a persistent bear market as in a typical US recession the S&P500 falls by about 28%.

Eleventh, the worsening credit crunch that is affecting most credit markets and credit derivative markets will lead to a dry-up of liquidity in a variety of financial markets, including otherwise very liquid derivatives markets. Another round of credit crunch in interbank markets will ensue triggered by counterparty risk, lack of trust, liquidity premia and credit risk. A variety of interbank rates - TED spreads, BOR-OIS spreads, BOT - Tbill spreads, interbank-policy rate spreads, swap spreads, VIX and other gauges of investors' risk aversion - will massively widen again. Even the easing of the liquidity crunch after massive central banks' actions in December and January will reverse as credit concerns keep interbank spread wide in spite of further injections of liquidity by central banks.

Twelfth, a vicious circle of losses, capital reduction, credit contraction, forced liquidation and fire sales of assets at below fundamental prices will ensue leading to a cascading and mounting cycle of losses and further credit contraction. In illiquid market actual market prices are now even lower than the lower fundamental value that they now have given the credit problems in the economy. Market prices include a large illiquidity discount on top of the discount due to the credit and fundamental problems of the underlying assets that are backing the distressed financial assets. Capital losses will lead to margin calls and further reduction of risk taking by a variety of financial institutions that are now forced to mark to market their positions. Such a forced fire sale of assets in illiquid markets will lead to further losses that will further contract credit and trigger further margin calls and disintermediation of credit. The triggering event for the next round of this cascade is the downgrade of the monolines and the ensuing sharp drop in equity markets; both will trigger margin calls and further credit disintermediation.

Based on estimates by Goldman Sachs $200 billion of losses in the financial system lead to a contraction of credit of $2 trillion given that institutions hold about $10 of assets per dollar of capital. The recapitalization of banks sovereign wealth funds - about $80 billion so far - will be unable to stop this credit disintermediation - (the move from off balance sheet to on balance sheet and moves of assets and liabilities from the shadow banking system to the formal banking system) and the ensuing contraction in credit as the mounting losses will dominate by a large margin any bank recapitalization from SWFs. A contagious and cascading spiral of credit disintermediation, credit contraction, sharp fall in asset prices and sharp widening in credit spreads will then be transmitted to most parts of the financial system. This massive credit crunch will make the economic contraction more severe and lead to further financial losses. Total losses in the financial system will add up to more than $1 trillion and the economic recession will become deeper, more protracted and severe.

A near global economic recession will ensue as the financial and credit losses and the credit crunch spread around the world. Panic, fire sales, cascading fall in asset prices will exacerbate the financial and real economic distress as a number of large and systemically important financial institutions go bankrupt. A 1987 style stock market crash could occur leading to further panic and severe financial and economic distress. Monetary and fiscal easing will not be able to prevent a systemic financial meltdown as credit and insolvency problems trump illiquidity problems. The lack of trust in counterparties - driven by the opacity and lack of transparency in financial markets, and uncertainty about the size of the losses and who is holding the toxic waste securities - will add to the impotence of monetary policy and lead to massive hoarding of liquidity that will exacerbates the liquidity and credit crunch.

In this meltdown scenario US and global financial markets will experience their most severe crisis in the last quarter of a century.

Can the Fed and other financial officials avoid this nightmare scenario that keeps them awake at night? The answer to this question - to be detailed in a follow-up article - is twofold: first, it is not easy to manage and control such a contagious financial crisis that is more severe and dangerous than any faced by the US in a quarter of a century; second, the extent and severity of this financial crisis will depend on whether the policy response - monetary, fiscal, regulatory, financial and otherwise - is coherent, timely and credible. I will argue - in my next article - that one should be pessimistic about the ability of policy and financial authorities to manage and contain a crisis of this magnitude; thus, one should be prepared for the worst, i.e. a systemic financial crisis.


TOPICS: Your Opinion/Questions
KEYWORDS: bailout; bernanke; depression; economy; fed; financialmeltdown; keatingfive; mortgage; recession; subprime
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To: TigerLikesRooster

Mike Whitney’s stuff on this is invaluable right now. From an article he wrote yesterday:

“On January 14, 2008 the FDIC web site began posting the rules for reimbursing depositors in the event of a bank failure. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is required to “determine the total insured amount for each depositor….as of the day of the failure” and return their money as quickly as possible. The agency is “modernizing its current business processes and procedures for determining deposit insurance coverage in the event of a failure of one of the largest insured depository institutions.” (http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2008/fil08002.html#body)

The implication is clear, the FDIC has begun the “death watch” on the many banks which are currently drowning in their own red ink. The problem for the FDIC is that it has never supervised a bank failure which exceeded 175,000 accounts. So the impending financial tsunami is likely to be a crash-course in crisis management. Today some of the larger banks have more than 50 million depositors, which will make the FDIC’s job nearly impossible.

-—snip——

Capital is now being destroyed at a faster pace than it is being created. That’s why the Fed is looking for solutions beyond mere rate cuts. Bernanke wants direct government action that will provide immediate stimulus. But that takes political consensus and there’s still debate about the gravity of the upcoming recession. The pace of the economic contraction is breathtaking. This week’s release of the Institute for Supply Management’s Non-Manufacturing Index (ISM) was a shocker. It showed steep declines in all areas of the nation’s service sector—including banks, travel companies, contractors, retail stores etc—The Business Activity Index, the New Orders Index, the Employment Index, and the Supplier Delivery Index have all contracted at a “historic” pace. Everyone took a hit.

“The numbers are so terrible, it’s beyond belief,” said Scott Anderson, senior economist at Wells Fargo & Co.”


21 posted on 02/08/2008 11:11:27 PM PST by skipper18 (You want a winning GOP ticket for '08? Robinson/Taylor, and you can take that to the bank.)
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To: REDWOOD99

Agreed. MPT is no defense for credit default swaps. That’s my nightmare. Other folks will be affected in myriad ways. Sold signs are tangible.


22 posted on 02/08/2008 11:41:42 PM PST by jblair (Air Force Brat)
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To: TigerLikesRooster

We have a serious problem. A quote from a mail from John Maulding sent an hour ago:

“There’s almost no trading being done in the $2 trillion Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) markets. Perfectly good bank loans are trading at discounts of between 10-20% to par, in addition to much higher and wider spreads. There are a lot of opportunities for intrepid investors who can distinguish solid value, as funds, banks, and pensions are having to unload loans without regard to value. It is a buyer’s market.”

and

“The failure of the monoline companies could trigger a very serious crisis, beyond what we have already seen. Of all the things on my worry list, this is at the top. It could trigger a counter-party credit risk in the credit default swap markets that might simply cascade to something hard to imagine. I don’t want to sound too alarmist - but we should be alarmed. This needs to be settled, and soon, so we can go on to the next set of problems. I think if the monoline problem can be resolved, we would be a major step toward the solution of the crisis.”

Cash is king.


23 posted on 02/08/2008 11:47:00 PM PST by AdmSmith
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Sorry, a typo, that should be John Mauldin.


24 posted on 02/08/2008 11:50:08 PM PST by AdmSmith
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To: AdmSmith
We have a serious problem. A quote from a mail from John Maulding sent an hour ago:

I am certain that you have been previously advised...., such postings prove you have not consumed your koolaid and are..., consequently..., subversive!

That said..., post on...

25 posted on 02/08/2008 11:54:20 PM PST by ExSES (the "bottom-line")
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To: AdmSmith
Yes, it is serious.
26 posted on 02/08/2008 11:58:37 PM PST by TigerLikesRooster (kim jong-il, chia head, ppogri, In Grim Reaper we trust)
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To: AdmSmith

“Cash is king.”

Agreed, but what to do about the depreciation? I’ve read some pretty awful projections for the downside reaching .52.


27 posted on 02/09/2008 4:27:29 AM PST by OpusatFR
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To: TigerLikesRooster

Meanwhile, Forbes is doubting the recession.

Me too.... turndown, perhaps

Business is too good around here to be in recession


28 posted on 02/09/2008 4:36:22 AM PST by bert (K.E. N.P. +12 . "You can't be that way"......... Clint)
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To: TigerLikesRooster

VTTTT


29 posted on 02/09/2008 4:38:43 AM PST by dennisw (Never bet on Islam!)
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To: Travis McGee
 
http://www.jsmineset.com/home.asp?RQ=EDL,1&sPID=0&linkid=3806
 
 
Jim’s Formula:
September 1, 2006
  1. First interest rates rise affecting the drivers of the US economy, housing, but before that auto production goes from bull to a bear markets.
  2. This impacts many other industries and the jobs report. An economy is either rising at a rising rate or business activity is falling at an increasing rate. That is economic law 101. There is no such thing in any market as a Plateau of Prosperity or Cinderella - Goldilocks situations.
  3. We have witnessed the Dow rise on economic news indicating deceleration of activity. This continues until major corporations announced poor earnings, making the Dow fall faster than it rose, moving it deeply into the red.
  4. The formula economically is inherent in #2 which is lower economic activity equals lower profits.
  5. Lower profits leads to lower Federal Tax revenues.
  6. Lower Federal tax revenues in the face of increased Federal spending causes geometric, not arithmetic, rises in the US Federal Budget deficit. This is also true for cities & States as it is for the Federal government.
  7. The increased US Federal Budget deficit in the face of a US Trade Deficit increases the US Current Account Deficit.
  8. The US Current Account Balance is the speedometer of the money exiting the US into world markets (deficit).
  9. It is this deficit that must be met by incoming investment in the US in any form. It could be anything from businesses, equities to Treasury instruments. We are already seeing a fall off in the situation of developing nations carrying the spending habits of industrial nations; a contradiction in terms.
  10. If the investment by non US entities fails to meet the exiting dollars by all means, then the US must turn within to finance the shortfall.
  11. Assuming the US turns inside to finance all maturities, interest rates will rise with the long term rates moving fastest regardless of prevailing business conditions.
  12. This will further contract business activity and start a downward spiral of unparalleled dimension because the size of US debt already issued is of unparalleled dimension.
Therefore as you get to #12 you are automatically right back at #1. This is an economic downward spiral.
I heard all this "slow business" as negative to gold talk in the 70s. It was totally wrong then. It will be exactly the same now.

 

30 posted on 02/09/2008 4:43:33 AM PST by dennisw (Never bet on Islam!)
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To: Travis McGee
Very likely scenario

I've been a believer in a catastrophic end for fiat money and fractional reserve banking since I was 18. I'm going to be 58 this year.

Man, have I placed a lot of losing bets!

That having been said, this scenario exposes the fraud of calling what people do with paper (of all kinds) the "economy".

The real economy is, or was, inventing, creating, producing, extracting, exploiting, building, and growing.

Those activities ARE the economy.

House flipping and derivative bundling are not.

A restoration of a real economy is a necessity, and perhaps catastrophe (well, not so much, since we'll still have the land, the resources, and the people) is a necessary step along the way.

31 posted on 02/09/2008 4:50:10 AM PST by Jim Noble (Look out kid, they keep it all hid)
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To: Jim Noble

I’m roughly the same
Looks like this time it is real

Check out the Bush family gold mine — Barrick = ABX

The elites are buying gold and gold mines to hedge against the meltdown they hastened along with stupid trade and monetary policies

Barrick Gold - Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaBarrick Gold Corporation TSX: ABX NYSE: ABX is the largest pure gold mining company in the world, with its headquarters in Toronto, Ontario, Canada; ...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barrick_Gold - 60k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this


32 posted on 02/09/2008 4:59:31 AM PST by dennisw (Never bet on Islam!)
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To: TigerLikesRooster

For later

for later


33 posted on 02/09/2008 5:07:23 AM PST by JDoutrider (No 2nd Amendment... Know Tyranny)
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To: dennisw; skipper18; TigerLikesRooster; Jim Noble; AndyJackson; ex-Texan; Squantos; river rat; ...
Please consider reading the entire linked analysis I excerpted at 15.

The following is also well worth reading. The entire chapter is posted at the link below this paragraph.

Several brokerage houses tumbled; blue-sky investment companies formed during the happy bull-market days went to smash, disclosing miserable tales of rascality; over a thousand banks caved in during 1930, as a result of the marking down both of real estate and of securities; and in December occurred the largest bank failure in American financial history, the fall of the ill-named Bank of the United States in New York.

"Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920s---Aftermath: 1930-31"

by Frederick Lewis Allan

34 posted on 02/09/2008 5:11:13 AM PST by Travis McGee (---www.EnemiesForeignAndDomestic.com---)
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To: bert

The same touts who are saying the risk of recession is low were saying that real estate was rock solid only one year ago, and that the sub-prime problem was “contained.”


35 posted on 02/09/2008 5:12:24 AM PST by Travis McGee (---www.EnemiesForeignAndDomestic.com---)
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To: Travis McGee

Actually, real estate is in good shape in many areas. The plague is not present everywhere.


36 posted on 02/09/2008 5:21:50 AM PST by bert (K.E. N.P. +12 . "You can't be that way"......... Clint)
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To: Travis McGee
One more thing tho.... I was in Florida recently and in a Jacksonville suburb I noticed that there were lots and lots of good residential “Southern Living” type houses with For Sale signs.

There is definitely a problem there but it is not all a lending excess problem.

37 posted on 02/09/2008 5:25:49 AM PST by bert (K.E. N.P. +12 . "You can't be that way"......... Clint)
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To: REDWOOD99
You’ll know this market has bottomed when you see some “SOLD” signs going up on vacant houses.

Huh? A decent percentage of homes on the market in Silicon Valley in the spring of 2005 were vacant. One of many explanations for that is that smart homeowners had done a lot of improvements and had already moved into rentals.

I don't think that's a reliable indicator of a bottom in the housing market.

38 posted on 02/09/2008 6:49:44 AM PST by jiggyboy (Ten per cent of poll respondents are either lying or insane)
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To: TigerLikesRooster

Strangely enough, the dollar has strengthened against major currencies like the Pound and the Euro (1.49 down to 1.4450) as the big boys think the dollar will be a safer bet than the other currencies when the global economy blows.


39 posted on 02/09/2008 7:20:22 AM PST by wildbill
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To: wildbill
That could be true. The problems may originate from U.S. market, but I think financial market dominos will first collapse outside U.S. Europe or Asia. Then it will move toward U.S.

In the mean time, money would bail out of the overseas markets in trouble and head for U.S. market which may not been yet hit in full-force.

It will go down nearly at the end. Then everybody will be pancaked in U.S. market.

40 posted on 02/09/2008 7:27:11 AM PST by TigerLikesRooster (kim jong-il, chia head, ppogri, In Grim Reaper we trust)
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