Free Republic
Browse · Search
News/Activism
Topics · Post Article

Skip to comments.

Hatfill v. US - DOJ and FBI Statement of Facts (filed Friday)
US DOJ and FBI Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment (Statement of Facts) | April 11, 2008 | Department of Justice

Posted on 04/13/2008 8:20:52 AM PDT by ZacandPook

On Friday, the government filed this statement of the facts in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment in a civil rights and Privacy Act lawsuit brought by Dr. Steve Hatfill.

“The anthrax attacks occurred in October 2001. Public officials, prominent members of the media, and ordinary citizens were targeted by this first bio-terrorist attack on American soil. Twenty-two persons were infected with anthrax; five died. At least 17 public buildings were contaminated. The attacks wreaked havoc on the U.S. postal system and disrupted government and commerce, resulting in economic losses estimated to exceed one billion dollars. The attacks spread anxiety throughout the nation – already in a heightened state of alert in the wake of the attacks of September 11 – and left behind a lasting sense of vulnerability to future acts of bioterrorism. Given the unprecedented nature of the attacks, the investigation received intense media attention. Journalists from virtually every news organization pursued the story, sometimes conducting their own worldwide investigation to determine the person or persons responsible for the attacks and the motive behind them.

A. Journalistic Interest In Hatfill That Predates Alleged Disclosures

Testimony has revealed that at least certain members of the media began focusing their attention upon Hatfill in early 2002 because of tips they had received from former colleagues of his who found him to be highly suspicious. Articles about Hatfill thus began to appear in the mainstream press and on internet sites as early as January of 2002, and continued until the first search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, which, in turn, led to even more intense press attention.

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a Professor at the State University of New York, for example, complained in January and February 2002 on the Federation of American Scientists’ (“FAS”) website of the FBI’s apparent lack of progress on the investigation, and described generally the person she believed was the “anthrax perpetrator.” “Analysis of Anthrax Attacks,” Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator (Section IV.6), Defendant’s Appendix , Ex. 1. Rosenberg did not identify Hatfill by name, but described him in sufficient detail: a “Middle-aged American” who “[w]orks for a CIA contractor in Washington, DC area” and [w]orked in USAMRIID laboratory in the past” and “[k]nows Bill Patrick and probably learned a thing or two about weaponization from him informally.” Id. In his amended complaint, Hatfill states that “Professor Rosenberg’s ‘Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator’ . . . described [him].”

In addition to her postings on the FAS website, Professor Rosenberg also presented a lecture on February 18, 2002 at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, entitled “The Anthrax Attacks and the Control of Bioterrorism.” Ex. 2. During the course of her lecture, Rosenberg stated that she had “draw[n] a likely portrait of the perpetrator as a former Fort Detrick scientist who is now working for a contractor in the Washington, D.C, area[.]” Ex. 3. Rosenberg also commented upon Hatfill’s whereabouts on the date of the attacks, stating that “[h]e had reason for travel to Florida, New Jersey and the United Kingdom” – where the attacks had been and from which the letters had been purportedly sent – that “[h]e grew [the anthrax], probably on a solid medium, and weaponised it at a private location where he had accumulated the equipment and the material.” Id. Rosenberg also stated that the investigation had narrowed to a “common suspect[,]” and that “[t]he FBI has questioned that person more than once[.]” Id. Former White House Spokesperson, Ari Fleischer, immediately responded to Rosenberg’s comments, stating that there were several suspects and the FBI had not narrowed that list down to one. Ex. 4. The FBI also issued a press release, stating that it had “interviewed hundreds of persons, in some instances, more than once. It is not accurate, however, that the FBI has identified a prime suspect in this case.” Id. Rosenberg’s comments and writings were subsequently pursued by The New York Times (“The Times”). In a series of Op-Ed articles published from May through July 2002, Nicholas Kristof, a journalist with The Times, accused Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks. Kristof wrote on May 24, 2002 that the FBI was overlooking the anthrax perpetrator, noting that “experts” (Professor Rosenberg) point “to one middle-aged American who has worked for the United States military bio-defense program and had access to the labs at Fort Detrick, Md. His anthrax vaccinations are up to date, he unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax, and he was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the anthrax attack.” Ex. 5.

Hatfill first noticed the Kristof columns in May 2002. Hatfill Dep. Tran. in Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 6, at 13: 3-6. According to Hatfill, “[w]hen Mr. Kristof’s article appeared, it was the first [time] that [he] realized that [his] name [was] in the public domain with connection with an incident of mass murder.” Id. at 16:15-18. Hatfill has charged that The Times began the “entire conflagration and gave every journalist out there reason to drive this thing beyond any sort of sanity. Mr. Kristof lit the fuse to a barn fire and he repeatedly kept stoking the fire.” Id. at 43:19 - 44:1. In July 2004, Hatfill thus filed suit alleging that these articles libeled him by falsely accusing him of being the anthrax mailer. Complaint, Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 7.

Hatfill alleges in that lawsuit that “Kristof wrote his columns in such a way as to impute guilt for the anthrax letters to [him] in the minds of reasonable readers.” Id. ¶ 12. The articles, Hatfill claimed, which described his “background and work in the field of bio-terrorism, state or imply that [he] was the anthrax mailer.” Id. ¶ 14. Hatfill specifically alleged that statements in Kristof’s articles were false and defamatory, including those that stated that he: (1) “‘unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax’”; (2) “had the ‘ability’ to send the anthrax”; (3) “had the ‘access’ required to send the anthrax”; (4) “had a ‘motive’ to send the anthrax”; (5) “was one of a ‘handful’ of individuals who had the ‘ability, access and motive to send the anthrax’”; (6) “had access” to an ‘isolated residence’ in the fall of 2001, when the anthrax letters were sent”; (7) “‘gave CIPRO [an antibiotic famously used in the treatment of anthrax infection] to people who visited [the ‘isolated residence’]”; (8) his “anthrax vaccinations were ‘up to date’ as of May 24, 2002”; (9) he “‘failed 3 successive polygraph examinations’ between January 2002 and August 13, 2002”; (10) he “‘was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the attack’”; (11) he “‘was once caught with a girlfriend in a biohazard ‘hot suite’ at Fort Detrick [where Hatfill had concedely worked] surrounded only by blushing germs.’” Id. ¶ 16 (brackets in original). Hatfill alleges in his lawsuit against The Times that “[t]he publication of [Kristof’s] repeated defamation of [him] . . .gave rise to severe notoriety gravely injurious to [him].” Id. ¶ 29. The injury, Hatfill alleged, “was [made] all the more severe given the status and journalistic clout of The Times.” Id. This harm was compounded, Hatfill alleged, by the fact that these articles were “thereafter repeatedly published by a host of print and on-line publications and on the television and radio news” in the following months. Id., ¶ 30.

The case was initially dismissed by the trial court. Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807, 2004 WL 3023003 (E.D.Va.). That decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005). Upon remand, the trial court granted The Times summary judgment, finding that Hatfill was a public figure and public official and had failed to present evidence of malice. Hatfill v. The New York Times, 488 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D. Va. 2007). In arriving at that conclusion, the court considered Hatfill’s repeated media interviews before the attacks; the fact that he had “drafted a novel, which he registered with [the] United States Copyright office, describing a scenario in which a terrorist sickens government officials with a biological agent”; and had lectured on the medical effects of chemical and biological agents. Id. at 525.

Although not recited by the district court in The New York Times litigation, Hatfill also talked directly to reporters about his suspected involvement in the attacks. Brian Ross of ABC News, and his producer, Victor Walter, for example, talked separately to Hatfill on two to three occasions as early as January and February 2002, Ross Dep. Tran., Ex. 8, at 263:14 - 270:1, and continued talking to Hatfill until May of that year. Id. Ross also spoke to Hatfill’s friend and mentor, William Patrick, about Hatfill. Id. at 287:9 - 295:12. These meetings were prompted by discussions ABC News had in January 2002 with eight to twelve former colleagues of Hatfill at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (“USAMRIID”). Id. at 242:7 - 246:14. Hatfill’s former colleagues found him to be “highly suspicious because of a number of things he had done when he worked at [USAMRIID], and this behavior was strange "and unusual and they felt that he was a likely candidate.” Id. at 242: 7-17. These meetings were also prompted by ABC News’s own investigative reporting into Hatfill’s background; the more ABC News learned “the more interested [they] became” in Hatfill. Id. at 264: 14-15.

Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun also spoke to Hatfill in February 2002. Shane also spoke to USAMRIID employees who had worked with Hatfill. Ex. 9. These employees stated that they had been questioned by the FBI and “asked about a former Fort Detrick scientist” – Hatfill – “who returned a few years ago and took discarded biological safety cabinets, used for work with dangerous pathogens.” Id. at 1. These employees claimed that Hatfill “ha[d] expertise on weaponizing anthrax and ha[d] been vaccinated against it[.]” Id. Shane also called one of Hatfill’s former classmates, who was “plagued” by questions from the Baltimore Sun and others within the media regarding Hatfill’s “alleged involvement with the large anthrax outbreak in Zimbabwe[.]” Ex. 10. According to Hatfill, this classmate was told by Shane that Hatfill was purportedly responsible for “mailing the anthrax letters and also starting the [anthrax] outbreak in Zimbabwe/ Rhodesia twenty years before.” Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014; see also e-mail to Hatfill fr. DF Andrews, dated Mar. 1, 2002, Ex. 10. Hatfill told Shane in February 2002 that he had been “questioned by the FBI” and that “he considered the questioning to be part of a routine effort to eliminate people with the knowledge to mount [the] attack.” Ex. 9. Hatfill also confirmed for Shane that he had taken an FBI polygraph. Ex. 12, at 2. In March 2002, Hatfill left Shane a frantic telephone message reportedly stating how he had “been [in the bioterrorism] field for a number of years, working until 3 o’clock in the morning, trying to counter this type of weapon of mass destruction” and fearing that his “career [was] over at [that] time.” Ex. 13, at 2. According to Hatfill, Shane later Case 1:03-cv-01793-RBW Document 232-2 Filed 04/11/2008 Page 17 of 73

____ Hatfill did not sue either Shane or Rosenberg, even though Hatfill has stated that Rosenberg “caused” the focus on him. Ex. 14, at 10. Because Hatfill believed that the portrait Rosenberg painted at the February 2002 Princeton conference and in her website postings was so identifying and incriminating, however, Hatfill advised Rosenberg through his lawyers that “before [she] get[s] close to describing him in the future, by name or otherwise, [that she] submit [her] comments for legal vetting before publishing them to anyone.” Ex. 15. There is no evidence that the agency defendants bore any responsibility for the media presence. Information about FBI searches is routinely shared with a variety of state and local law enforcement authorities. Roth Dep. Tran., Ex. 16, at 163:5 -165:21; Garrett Dep. Tran. Ex. 17, at 79: 8-18. ______

compounded Hatfill’s problems by calling his then-employer, Science Applications International Corporation (“SAIC”), and accusing Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks, Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014, which, according to Hatfill, cost him his job as a contractor at SAIC. Id. 1

The media frenzy surrounding Hatfill intensified upon the search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, and the search of a refrigerated mini-storage facility in Ocala, Florida on June 26, 2002. Both were witnessed by the media, and the search of his apartment was carried live on national television. In addition to the television coverage, the searches generated a slew of articles about Hatfill throughout the media, one fueling the next. The Associated Press, for example, detailed in an article, dated June 27, 2002, Hatfill’s (1) work as biodefense researcher, including studies he had conducted at SAIC, and the work he had done at the USAMRIID; (2) his educational background; (3) where he had previously lived; and (4) security clearances he had held and the suspension of those clearances. Ex. 18. The Hartford Courant reported these same details, and additional information regarding Hatfill’s purported service in the Rhodesian army. Ex. 19. The next day -- June 28, 2002 -- the Hartford Courant reported details about Hatfill’s background in biological warfare, his vaccinations against anthrax, questioning that purportedly had occurred among Hatfill’s colleagues, his educational background (including the claim that he had attended medical school in Greendale), and lectures that he had given on the process of turning biological agents into easily inhaled powders. Ex. 20. None of this information is attributed to a government source.

B. Hatfill’s Public Relations Offensive

In July 2002, after these reports and after the first search of Hatfill’s apartment on June 25, 2002, Hatfill retained Victor Glasberg as his attorney. Glasberg Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 12: 16-19. Glasberg believed that “any number of people in the media [had] overstepped their bounds. . . . prior to July of 2002 .” Id. at 141:1 - 142:6. To counter this information, Hatfill set out on a “public relations offensive” of his own to “turn [the] tide.” Id. at 138: 20-21, 178: 12-13.

Recognizing that Hatfill “continue[d] [to] get[] killed with bad press, national as well as local[,]” Hatfill drafted a statement and Glasberg forwarded that statement in July 2002 to Hatfill’s then-employer at Louisiana State University (“LSU”). Ex. 11, at 1. The statement detailed Hatfill’s background, including his medical training and employment history, and provided details about Hatfill’s involvement in the anthrax investigation, including how he had been interviewed by the FBI and had taken a polygraph examination. Id. at AGD29SJH00002-13. Hatfill’s statement corroborated the conversations that Hatfill reportedly had with Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun in February 2002, and how that interaction had purportedly cost Hatfill his job at SAIC in March 2002. Id. at AGD29SJH00014.

In his July statement, Hatfill was careful not to blame DOJ or the FBI for his troubles or for any wrongdoing for the information about him that had made its way into the press. He touted the professionalism of the FBI, noting that “[t]he individual FBI agents with whom [he had come] in contact during this entire process are sons and daughters of which America can be justifiably proud. They are fine men and women doing their best to protect this country.” Id. at AGD29SJH00016. Hatfill’s objection lay with the media, whom he labeled as “irresponsible[,]” for trading in “half-truths, innuendo and speculation, making accusations and slanting real world events . . . to gain viewer recognition, sell newspapers, and increase readership and network ratings.” Id.

As the investigation proceeded, however, Glasberg publicly criticized investigators on the date of the second search of Hatfill’s apartment, August 1, 2002, for obtaining a search warrant rather than accepting the offer Glasberg had allegedly made to cooperate. Ex. 22. So angry was Glasberg with investigators that he wrote a letter, dated the same day as the search, to Assistant United States Attorney Kenneth C. Kohl, denouncing the fact that the search had been conducted “pursuant to a search warrant.” Ex. 23. Glasberg forwarded a copy of this letter to Tom Jackman of the Washington Post, and to the Associated Press, the morning of August 1st. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 24, at 265:12 - 266:5; see also Ex. 25 (Glasberg memorandum to file, stating, among other things, that Glasberg showed Jackman Kohl letter on August 1, 2002).

On the day of the search, an FBI spokeswoman at the Bureau’s Washington field office, Debra Weierman, “confirmed that the search was part of the government’s anthrax investigation.” Ex. 25. Weierman added, however, that “she was unable to confirm that [investigators were acting on a search warrant] or to provide any further information about the search.” Id.

The next day – August 2, 2002 – Glasberg faxed the Kohl letter to members of the media. Ex. 26. In the fax transmittal sheet accompanying the Kohl letter, Glasberg also advised the media that: Dr. Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI earlier this year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI. He and his lawyer Tom Carter were told that the results were all favorable and that he was not a suspect in the case. Id. at AGD16SJH03106. Subsequent to the fax transmittal by Glasberg, Weierman confirmed that the search had been conducted pursuant to a search warrant, but only after receiving appropriate authorization from her superiors. Weierman Dep. Tran., Ex. 27, at 93:16 - 94:14.

Hatfill had also accompanied Glasberg for his interview with Jackman the day before to address the “media feeding frenzy.” Ex. 28. Glasberg provided Jackman with the promise of an “[e]xclusive personal statement” from Hatfill and the promise of “[n]o other press contacts pending publication” of the article. Id. Glasberg thus provided Jackman background information about Hatfill, Rosenberg’s statements, and other publications. Ex. 25. Hatfill reportedly complained to the Washington Post in the interview about the media feeding frenzy, and about how his “friends are bombarded” with press inquiries. Ex. 29, at 1. Hatfill also complained about the “[p]hone calls at night. Trespassing. Beating on my door. For the sheer purpose of selling newspapers and television.” Id.

C. Attorney General Ashcroft’s Person of Interest Statements

Following this “media frenzy,” not to mention the two searches of Hatfill’s apartment, former Attorney General John Ashcroft was asked on August 6, 2002 (at an event addressing the subject of missing and exploited children) about Hatfill’s involvement in the investigation. Jane Clayson of CBS News asked General Ashcroft about the searches and whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 30, at 2. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person of interest.” General Ashcroft cautioned, however, that he was “not prepared to say any more at [that] time other than the fact that he is an individual of interest.” Id. At the same media event, Matt Lauer of NBC News also asked General Ashcroft whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 31. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person that – that the FBI’s been interested in.” Id. at 2. General Ashcroft cautioned that he was “not prepared to make a . . . comment about whether a person is officially a . . . suspect or not.” Id.

General Ashcroft made the same comments at a news conference in Newark, New Jersey on August 22, 2002, stating that Hatfill was a “person of interest to the Department of Justice, and we continue the investigation.” Ex. 32, at 1. As in his previous statements, General Ashcroft refused to provide further comment. Id. When asked upon deposition why he referred to Hatfill as a “person of interest” in the anthrax investigation in response to these media inquiries, General Ashcroft testified that he did so in an attempt to correct the record presented by the media that he was a “suspect” in the investigation, which he believed served a necessary law enforcement purpose. Ashcroft Dep. Tran., Ex. 33, at 81: 5-12; 103:18; 108: 9-13; 138: 5-7; 125: 18-21; 134:22 - 136:8. Prior to making these statements, General Ashcroft did not review or otherwise consult any investigative record, id. at 128:14 - 129:12, much less any record pertaining to Hatfill.

General Ashcroft’s initial statements on August 6, 2002 were followed, on August 11, 2002, by the first of Hatfill’s two nationally televised press conferences. Ex. 34. During his press conference, Hatfill lashed out at Rosenberg and other journalists and columnists who he believed wrote a series of “defamatory speculation and innuendo about [him].” Id. at 3. In apparent response to the “person of interest” statements, by contrast, he stated that he did “not object to being considered a ‘subject of interest’ because of [his] knowledge and background in the field of biological warfare.” Id. at 4. This was consistent with Hatfill’s statement to ABC News earlier in 2002 in which he stated that “his background and comments made him a logical subject of the investigation.” Ex. 35. As noted, moreover, Glasberg told the media -- almost a week before the first of General Ashcroft’s statements -- that “Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI [earlier that] year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI.” Ex. 26.

Hatfill’s second press conference was held on August 25, 2002. In the flyer publicizing the conference, Hatfill identified himself to the media -- in bold lettering -- as “the ‘person of interest’ at the center of the federal Government’s [anthrax] investigation.” DA, Exhibit 36.

D. Clawson’s “Sunshine” Policy

Patrick Clawson joined the Hatfill team in early August 2002 as spokesperson and “fielded hundreds of inquiries from members of the press worldwide regarding Dr. Hatfill[.]” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson believed it best to employ a media strategy that would, in his words, “let it all hang out.” Id. at 50:10. Clawson felt that “permitting maximum sunshine into . . . Hatfill’s existence would do both him and the public the best good.” Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 50:16-18.

“The majority of Clawson’s communications with the press regarding this case have been oral and by telephone and he did not keep a press log or any other regular record of such contacts with the press.” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson nonetheless admitted upon deposition that he revealed numerous details about Hatfill’s personal and professional background to members of the press (Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 101:9 - 105:21), including Hatfill’s professional expertise (id. at 103:10 - 105:21), use of Cipro (id. at 123:16 - 130:11, 248: 8-13), whereabouts on the days of the attacks (id. at 148:12 - 158:10, 361:15 - 362:3), expertise in working with anthrax (id. at 194:13 - 195:8), former service in the Rhodesian Army (id. at 210:9 - 211:10), and drunk driving arrest (id. at 795: 7-9, 798: 4-6). Clawson also told reporters what had been purportedly removed from Hatfill’s apartment during the two searches of his apartment on June 25, 2002 and August 1, 2002 (including medical books and a jar of bacillus thuringiensis (“BT”)) (id. at 121: 6-12, 131:2 - 131:12, 14:8 - 147:3, 313: 3-10). Clawson also freely relayed to the press that bloodhounds had been presented to Hatfill during the investigation (id. at 200: 15-19); that Hatfill had been the subject of surveillance (id. at 123:12-15, 428: 19-21); that Hatfill had taken polygraphs (id. at 135:16 - 137:17); and that he had submitted to blood tests (id. at 137:18-138:5, 347: 6-10).

In furtherance of Clawson’s “sunshine” policy, Hatfill, Clawson, and Glasberg, together, provided countless on-the-record, on-background (i.e., for use, but not for attribution), and off-the-record (i.e., not for attribution or use) interviews to counter misinformation. Although Hatfill repeatedly claimed upon deposition not to remember what he said during these interviews, he acknowledged in his responses to the Agency Defendants’ interrogatories having such conversations with, in addition to Mr. Jackman, Judith Miller of The New York Times, Jeremy Cherkis of the City Paper, Guy Gugliotta of the Washington Post, David Kestenbaum of National Public Radio, Rick Schmidt of the LA Times, Rob Buchanan of NBC Dateline, Jim Popkin of NBC News, Dee Ann David and Nick Horrock of UPI, Gary Matsumato of Fox TV, Bill Gertz of the Washington Times, and David Tell of the Weekly Standard. Ex. 12, at 3-4. With respect to the Matsumato interview, Glasberg warned Hatfill before the interview that he “should not be quoted, nor should Matsumato say or imply that he spoke with him.” Ex. 38, at 1. Glasberg warned Hatfill that “Matsumato must be willing to go to jail rather than reveal word one of anything [he] says on ‘deep background.’” Id.

All of these disclosures became too much even for Glasberg, who attempted to put a stop to them. In August, when Jackman aired his exclusive interview with Glasberg and Hatfill, Glasberg heralded the success of his public relations strategy noting that “Rosenberg, Shane and Kristof are, [each] of them, in varying stages of sulking, licking their wounds, reacting defensively and changing their tune.” Ex. 39. Slowly Glasberg advised both Hatfill and Glasberg to observe “the rule of COMPLETE SILENCE regarding anything and everything about the case[.]” Ex. 40 (emphasis in original). Ultimately, in September 2002, Glasberg ordered Clawson to stand down, noting “[w]hat you know, you know, and you have put virtually all of that into the public record. Fine. That is where we are, and for good or ill we can and will deal with it. But we must put a full stop to any further conveyance of substantive data about ANYTHING from Steve to anyone [but his attorneys].” Ex. 41 (emphasis in original). To no avail. On October 5, 2002, Hatfill and Clawson appeared together at an Accuracy in Media Conference. Hatfill was asked about the reaction of bloodhounds, and stated, I’m not supposed to answer things against . . . but let me tell you something. They brought this good-looking dog in. I mean, this was the best-fed dog I have seen in a long time. They brought him in and he walked around the room. By the way, I could have left at anytime but I volunteered while they were raiding my apartment the second time, I volunteered to talk with them. The dog came around and I petted him. And the dog walked out. So animals like me (laughter). Ex. 42, at 2.

Disclosures from the Hatfill camp to the media continued. For example, between late 2002 and May 8, 2003, Hatfill’s current attorney, Tom Connolly, and CBS News reporter James Stewart had multiple telephone conversations and two lunch meetings. Ex. 43. According to Stewart, Connolly told Stewart that the investigation was focusing on Hatfill, and detailed at great length the FBI’s surveillance of Hatfill. In virtually every one of these conversations, Connolly encouraged Stewart to report on these subjects. Id. at 96.

E. Louisiana State University’s Decision To Terminate Hatfill

At the time of the second search of his apartment in August 2002, Hatfill was working as a contract employee at the Louisiana State University (“LSU”) on a program to train first responders in the event of a biological attack. This program was funded by the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (“OJP”) as part of a cooperative agreement. Ex. 44. Under the terms of the cooperative agreement, OJP “maintain[ed] managerial oversight and control” of the program. Id. at 2. Following the second search of Hatfill’s apartment on August 1, 2002, Timothy Beres, Acting Director of OJP’s Office of Domestic Preparedness, directed that LSU “cease and desist from utilizing the subject-matter expert and course instructor duties of Steven J. Hatfill on all Department of Justice funded programs.” Ex. 45. LSU, meanwhile, had independently hired Hatfill to serve as Associate Director of its Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education. Following the second search, LSU placed Hatfill on administrative leave. Ex. 46. LSU then requested a background check of Hatfill. Ex. 47. During the course of that investigation, the University became concerned that Hatfill had forged a diploma for a Ph.D that he claimed to have received from Rhodes University in South Africa. Hatfill explained to Stephen L. Guillott, Jr., who was the Director of the Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education at LSU, that “[h]e assumed the degree had, in fact been awarded since neither his [thesis advisor] nor Rhodes University advised him to the contrary.” Ex. 48. LSU’s Chancellor, Mark A. Emmert, made “an internal decision to terminate [LSU’s] relationship with Dr. Hatfill quite independent of [the DOJ e-mail] communication.” Ex. 51.

Hatfill has now testified that in fact he created a fraudulent diploma with the assistance of someone he met in a bar who boasted that he could make a fraudulent diploma. Hatfill Dep. Tran., Ex. 49 at 19:20 - 20:12. Glasberg, moreover, has stated under oath that Hatfill’s earlier attempted explanation was untrue. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 314:10 - 317:2. In a nationally televised 60 Minutes episode that aired in March 2007, Connolly confirmed that Hatfill forged the diploma for the Ph.D from Rhodes University. Ex. 50, at 3.

F. Hatfill’s Amended Complaint

Hatfill claims lost wages and other emotional damages resulting from General Ashcroft’s “person of interest” statements and other for-attribution statements by DOJ and FBI officials. He also seeks to recover for certain other alleged “leaks” by DOJ and FBI officials. Hatfill additionally asserts that the defendants violated the Act by purportedly failing to (1) maintain an accurate accounting of such disclosures, which he asserts is required by section 552a(c) of the Act; (2) establish appropriate safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of the records that were purportedly disclosed, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(10); (3) correct information that was disseminated about him that was inaccurate or incomplete, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(5); and (4) establish adequate rules of conduct, procedures, and penalties for noncompliance, or to train employees in the requirements of the Act, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(9). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.”


TOPICS: Anthrax Scare; Breaking News; Extended News; War on Terror
KEYWORDS: amerithrax; anthrax; anthraxattacks; bioterrorism; doj; domesticterrorism; fbi; hatfill; islamothrax; trialbymedia; wmd
Navigation: use the links below to view more comments.
first previous 1-20 ... 141-160161-180181-200 ... 981-987 next last
To: piasa
2003 : (BOOKDEALS—— NASS CITED AS CONTRIBUTOR TO BOOK BY ELLEN RAY {See MICHAEL RATNER} & SCHAAP ) Bioterror: Manufacturing Wars the American Way Ellen Ray and William H. Schaap (ed.) Publisher : Ocean Press

Ocean Press churns out a lot of Cuban propaganda, so I'd take anything they publish accordingly.

161 posted on 04/16/2008 11:16:49 AM PDT by Fedora
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 114 | View Replies]

To: ZacandPook

1. The device that USAMRIID thought was used to weaponize the anthrax was the bioreactor when actually it was the DOD-funded Microbial Vac.
2. The Microbial Vac can be used to concentrate and sequentially filter the anthrax. It can be used to weaponize anthrax on a small scale.
3. The silica coating technology that was used was a DARPA/DOD technique.
See silica coating pictures at the URL below.
http://www.nrl.navy.mil/content.php?P=02REVIEW153
Microbial-Vac was going to work with the Navy under the SBIR program but then it did not move forward formally.
4. Ali had a high security clearance in the late 1990s for work with the Navy.
5. A scientist who lived a mile from me was arrested the day Ali’s residence was searched regularly mixed with silica.
6. The USAMRIID scientist who collected Ames went to work with NNMC and actually that is where the Ames file was retrieved.
7. A prototype of the Microbial Vac was at ISU — a professor at the ISU microbiology department had it.
8. The fellow who inherited Al-Timimi’s telephone number is expert in electrospray and electrostatic, electromagnetic control of anthrax particles.
9. And so the main reason for The Hatfill Theory is just that he was the best candidate for POI from that squad. They acted in good faith. Hatfill continued to lie about material things (e..g, re the PhD even after federal investigation) in applying for a federally-funded job in biodefense.
10. But Al-Timimi and his associates were the best candidate(s) for the other squad.
11. Al-Timimi does not have hands-on skill. He’s a “numbers guy.” He is neither the processor nor mailer.
12. Vigorously pursuing alternative hypotheses is what we would want from the investigation. Except for not effectively dealing with leaks in 2002 — and thereby avoiding the continuing leaks by Seikaly in 2003 — the FBI has done very well. It was Seikaly’s senior position and the fact he was in the US Attorney’s Office that prevented the FBI Task Force shutting the leaks down in 2002.
13. The massive press was due in part to Hatfill’s massive solicitation of press such as by the August 2 fax (which the fax transmittal sheet shows was to every major media outlet), press conference etc. . If he had followed Berry’s approach we might not remember Hatfill’s name. The Hatfill civil litigation, including the libel, civil rights and reporters’ issues are just an unfortunate distraction from the solution to the Amerithrax crime.
14. But a Hatfill Theory was fueled and greatly exacerbated by the leak of Mr. Seikaly whose daughter now represents Al-Timimi pro bono. Mr. Seikaly’s leaks likely were just motivated by a personal concern that too often people jump to the conclusion that Arabs are responsible for terrorism. His sister-in-law and brother are active on this issue and spoke and wrote on this issue in 2001/2002. But we all have our biases and political orientation. It’s part of being human. The human mind is an imperfect tool.
15. There is an embarrassment to be sure that there is this connection to DARPA-funded projects. Ali’s defenders have thrown in the fact that Ali worked for 2 months for Andy Card when he was DOT secretary just to confound things and provide material for more conspiracy theories.
16. Ayman Zawahiri thought it was a religious duty to use the weapons of your enemy and that’s what his supporters did.
17. But the embarrassment is no greater than that of the US Army, CIA or FBI in being duped by the Al Qaeda operative Ali Mohammed. We all will trust. We all sometimes will have our trust betrayed.
18. Former CIA analyst Stan Bedlington’s point about Greendale, though, was just mistaken — he perhaps did not know Ayman was using “school” as code for EIJ in May 2001 correspondence. He knew Hatfill and so may have been influenced by Dr. Hatfill’s history of saying things that were not true. Having left the CIA, he may have not have known that Saif Adel used “Green Team” for the EIJ contingent that went to Somalia etc.
19. The press is in the business of news, not analysis. When presented with the Hatfill legal team extensively promoting these issues and Seikaly — whose position made him a great source for any reporter — it is not all surprising that the press evolved the way it did.
20. We only have the great work by USG and foreign forces in capturing KSM, Hambali, Sufaat, Ahmad, Barq, Wahdan and others to thank for the information that then inexorably led to abandonment of The Hatfill Theory.
21. Perps never run when they should. For example, Roger Von Bergendorff should have snuck out of the hospital.


162 posted on 04/17/2008 3:02:24 AM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 159 | View Replies]

To: ZacandPook
3. The silica coating technology that was used was a DARPA/DOD technique.

See silica coating pictures at the URL below. http://www.nrl.navy.mil/content.php?P=02REVIEW153

You seem to be suggesting that if anything can be coated with silica, then spores can be coated with silica. The problem with that reasoning is that most things which are "coated with silica," as in your example, are NOT LIVING CREATURES. Therefore, you don't have to worry about killing them.

When coating spores, assuming someone had a valid reason for doing so, you would have to make certain you did not KILL the spores. You and TrebelRebel keep talking about processes which would KILL EVERY SPORE YOU TRY TO COAT.

In the link you provide, it says:

After spraying, the coated phosphor is heat-treated to remove residual organics and to further densify the coating.

When they "remove residual organics," wouldn't they be removing the spore?

So, you would end up with a coating on nothing.

Ed at www.anthraxinvestigation.com

163 posted on 04/17/2008 11:24:41 AM PDT by EdLake
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 162 | View Replies]

To: EdLake

Note that the DARPA funded work dates back years. For example, here is the same web content from 2003 but the work pre-dates 9/2001.

http://web.archive.org/web/20030303115459/http://www.nrl.navy.mil/content.php?P=02REVIEW153

Rather than two lay people discussing the science, let’s pull up the second 2001 DARPA grant to the GMU Center for Biodefense. The one from July 2001 involved Delta Ames supplied by NIH. What did the first one involve? Ali Al-Timimi — who the FBI, Al-Timimi and the Washington Post suggested the FBI suspected of involvement in the anthrax mailings — was not much more than 15 feet from the leading anthrax scientist Ken Alibek and the former deputy USAMRIID commander Charles Bailey. He was sentenced to life plus 70 years for sedition.

Director Mueller has cautioned that universities must guard against the theft of biochemistry information prior to patenting and classification — universities settings especially pre-911 to be places of free and open exchange (and unlocked offices). Ken tells me that Al-Timimi was a fanatic but not hands-on — he was just a numbers guy. But at issue is not processing, but theft of biochemistry information.

Ken and Charles filed a patent on March 14, 2001 relating to concentration of biological agents (such as anthrax) using silica. The patent application was confidential until after 9/11 — and in any event left key information to those knowledgeable in the field (or practiced in the art).


164 posted on 04/17/2008 11:53:16 AM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 163 | View Replies]

To: EdLake

Here is the patent by Dr. Alibek and Dr. Bailey. One is a leading anthrax scientist. One is the USAMRIID Deputy Commander. Both are above reproach. But the biochemistry information that was in their heads, as reflected by this patent, was just feet away from a man actively working (and taught by) Bin Laden’s sheik.

United States Patent
6,649,408
Bailey ,   et al.
November 18, 2003
Microdroplet cell culture technique

Abstract

The present invention comprises a novel culture method and device in which living cells are cultured in a plurality of individual microdroplets that are immobilized and isolated within a matrix of hydrophobic particles. The hydrophobic particles adhere to inoculated microdroplets of media, isolating the microdroplets in an aseptic microenvironmet. The plurality of individual microdroplets provide and optimal environment for the concentrated growth of cultured cells contained therein.
Inventors:
Bailey; Charles L. (Fayetteville, TN), Alibek; Ken (Alexandria, VA)
Assignee:
George Mason University (Fairfax, VA)
Appl. No.:
09/805,464
Filed: March 14, 2001

***
DESCRIPTION

This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/191,771, filed Mar. 24, 2000.
Claims

Having thus described our invention, what we claim as new and desire to secure by Letters Patent is as follows:

1. A cell culture method comprising the steps of: introducing liquid media inoculated with cells to be cultured into a vessel; converting the inoculated liquid media into individual microdroplets; introducing a sufficient quantity of hydrophobic particles in the form of a dry powder into the vessel to coat the individual microdroplets; and growing the cells within the individual microdroplets.

2. The cell culture method of claim 1 further comprising the step of recovering the cultured cells from the individual microdroplets.

3. The cell culture method of claim 1 wherein the converting step comprises: adding ferromagnetic particles to the vessel; applying an electromagnetic field within the vessel, thereby causing the random circulation of the ferromagnetic particles throughout the vessel.

4. The process of claim 1 wherein the cultured cells are microbial cells.

5. The process of claim 1 where the cultured cells are fungal cells.

6. The process of claim 1 wherein the cells are bacterial cells.

7. The process of claim 1 wherein the cells are eukaryotic cells.

8. The process of claim 1 wherein the cells are insect cells.

9. The process of claim 1 wherein the hydrophobic particles are silicon dioxide particles.

10. The process of claim 1 wherein the ratio of inoculated media to hydrophobic particles comprises a range between 1:2 and 2:1.

11. The process of claim 1 wherein the growing step further comprises the step of providing the microdroplets with exogenous gas.

12. The process of claim 10 wherein the exogenous gas is molecular oxygen.
Description

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

The present invention generally relates to the cultivation and growth of cells on laboratory, pilot plant, or industrial scales and, more particularly, to the cultivation and growth of cells in a plurality of individual microdroplets of liquid media which are interspersed within a matrix of hydrophobic microparticles.

2. Background Description

The culturing of microbial and animal or plant cells are crucial processes that are essential to the production of a wide array of useful chemical and biochemical products. Living cells are employed in such processes because they provide the essential elements necessary to economically synthesize many commercially valuable metabolic products.

Typically, growing cells are cultured either in liquid media (submerged cultivation) or on the surface of a solid nutrient(surface cultivation). Microorganisms such as bacteria and fungi can be cultured in either the surface or submerged method. Eukaryotic cells can be cultured in a submerged or suspended cell culture in rolling flasks or, where cell surface attachment is necessary, cells are grown to confluence in tissue culture flasks with liquid nutrient media placed above the cells. A suitable nutrient medium for microorganisms typically includes a carbon and energy source, an assimilable nitrogen source, oxygen (usually derived from surrounding air), and suitable pH conditions and additional factors which vary for a given microorganism, as one skilled in the art can readily appreciate.

***
With the submerged method, a microorganism is cultured throughout the liquid media. Nutrients are absorbed from contact with the media surrounding the individual microorganisms, oxygen and are provided by various means of aeration that one skilled in the art can readily appreciate, and metabolites seep out and into the media. Usually, the nutrient media is also stirred continually, in order to evenly distribute the microorganisms.

The submerged cultivation process has the beneficial advantages of being less labor and space intensive than the surface method and can be used to produce large batches of cells in a relatively small space. The submerged method is thus the method of choice currently employed in most pilot and industrial scale production of cultured microrganisms and cells.

The submerged cultivation method does, however, require an extensive investment in equipment necessary for the large scale production of cell cultures. In addition, the end products that are the object of large scale submerged cultivation (i.e., the intracellular or extracellular metabolic products of cell and microbe growth) usually require further purification and concentration either from the liquid media or the cells therein. This additional isolation step is necessary because the concentration of product in the media is limited by the metabolites released into the media and the limited solubility of oxygen and/or other gases in the media.

***
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

It is therefore an object of the invention to provide for the growth of a microbe or cell culture with a hybrid method that both combines the beneficial features of submerged and surface cultivation while eliminating some of the negative features inherent in both procedures.

It is another object of the invention to provide an apparatus for the sterile growth of a cell culture in a collection of individual microdroplets. The invention provides for the growth of both prokaryotic and eukaryotic organisms. The invention is particularly suited to the aseptic cultivation of human, animal, plant or microbial cell populations.

***
According to the invention, cells are cultivated in a plurality of individual microdroplets of liquid media. These microdroplets are created by aerosolizing liquid media that has been inoculated with the cells of interest and coating the aerosolized droplets with hydrophobic particles of solid material, such as silicon dioxide, for example. The individual microdroplets are stabilized within the hydrophobic solid particles, thereby providing a large number of small cell culture reactors. The coated microdroplets each provide a sterile environment for the individual microdroplets contained within the culture. Furthermore, the individual microdroplets each provide an optimum microenvironment with a reduced effect of potentially inhibitory metabolites and optimal accessability to aeration, resulting in substantial increases in the concentration of cells per liquid volume.

***
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS OF THE INVENTION

The present invention provides a generalized method and apparatus for aseptically culturing a plurality of microdroplets of media that are inoculated with a given cell type that is to be cultured. Each individual microdroplet provides an individual microenvironment that is isolated from the surrounding microdroplets. In such a manner, each microdroplet is protected from contamination by any adjacent microdroplets. In addition, the apparatus and methods of the present invention provide for concentrated growth of cells in minimal amounts of liquid medium, without the need for extensive further concentration of cells or their metabolic products.

Referring now to the drawings, and more particularly to FIG. 1, there is shown a flow chart of the process that is the object of the present invention. Liquid media is inoculated with a given cell strain, which can be a prokaryotic or eukaryotic cell, either of which may be additionally infected with a virus, transformed with a heterologous DNA expression vector, or otherwise genetically engineered to produce a given substance with techniques that are well known within the art. It is also within the scope of the present invention that cells that produce important chemical and biochemical products without any genetic alterations can be grown with the apparatus and methods of the invention.

In the practice of the present invention, liquid media is inoculated in an aseptic fashion with a cell type that is to be cultured. Referring now to FIG. 2, the inoculated media is then introduced through a first opening into a coating vessel of the present invention, for example, in one embodiment by means of a peristaltic pump, through an entry port. The coating vessel provides an environment in which individual microdroplets of inoculated media can be encased by hydrophobic solid particles. Once the microdroplets are formed and added to the coating vessel, dry hydrophobic powder composed of a plurality of particles of, for example, a hydrophobic ceramic, are introduced into the vessel where the coating process then occurs. The hydrophobic particles intercalate with and adhere to the individual microdroplets, preventing the microdroplets from becoming a confluent liquid, thereby creating a plurality of individual microdroplet cultures, each containing an isolated droplet of growing cells. The resulting product is a slurry-like material that has a semi liquid consistency, due to the fact that the individual microdroplets are prevented from re-aggregating as a confluent liquid. Once the coated hydrophobic particles are formed, they are collected and removed through narrow slotted openings located at the bottom of the coating vessel. The coated microdroplets are then cultured either in a batch or continuous flow process.

It is contemplated in the practice of the present invention that the timing and means of introducing the inoculated media and hydrophobic particles can be varied without departing from the scope of the present invention. For example, the media may be introduced through means other than a peristaltic pump and an entry port, for example, via a spray nozzle. In addition, it is only required that the hydrophobic particles be introduced into the coating vessel at a time such that they are able to homogeneously mix with the microdroplets of liquid media. This time may be varied without departing from the scope of the invention. For example, as discussed further infra, the hydrophobic particles may be introduced into the coating vessel prior to, simultaneous with, or subsequent to formation of the microdroplets of inoculated culture. The only limitation on this aspect of the invention is that the hydrophobic particles must be able to surround and adhere to the microdroplets after they are formed.

In one embodiment of the invention, the inoculated media is converted into microdroplets prior to introduction into the coating vessel. Such a process is enabled by introducing the inoculated media via a spray nozzle that dispenses individual microdroplets into the vessel. It is not essential to the practice of the invention that the microdroplets be created prior to the introduction of the droplets into the coating vessel. Thus, in yet another embodiment, the microdroplets are created after the inoculated liquid media is introduced into the coating vessel. Ferromagnetic particles are sterilized and introduced into a non-magnetic mixing/coating vessel. Electromagnetic inductors are mounted in parallel on either side of the coating vessel. Activation of the electromagnetic inductors causes an electromagnetic field to exist within the vessel. Oscillations of this electromagnetic field are induced by the inductors. The ferromagnetic particles orient along and follow the field lines of the electromagnetic field and follow the oscillations of the field. The rapid motion of the field and particles vigorously mixes the hydrophobic particles and liquid media, inducing the formation of droplets.

The size of the microdroplets will vary, with an optimum size for the cultivation of microorganisms, for example, usually being between 0.5 and 2.0 mm in diameter. Sizes within this range have been found to result in high concentrations of microorganisms per microdroplet. It should readily be understood by one skilled in the art, however, that the optimal size of microdroplet will vary, depending on such factors as the growth rate of the cultured cell type, the amount of optimal aeration for a given cell type, the most effective cell density for production of a given metabolite, and the like.

The size of individual microdroplets can be regulated by adjusting such factors as the size of the nozzle or portal delivering the liquid or aerosolized media, the volume of the vessel, the speed at which the various components are added, the power and frequency of electromagnetic induction (in one embodiment of the invention), and the type of hydrophobic particle utilized, for example.

In one particular embodiment of the invention, the vessel is contained in a refrigerated environment to prevent the rapid random motion of the electromagnetic process from destroying the inoculated microdroplets with excessive heat.

Once the microdroplets of inoculated media have formed, the hydrophobic particles can then intercalate between and around individual microdroplets, creating a semi-liquid slurry comprising a matrix of interspersed microdroplets of inoculated culture and hydrophobic particles. In one embodiment of the invention, the particles are pumped into the coating vessel while the ferromagnetic particles and liquid media are agitated, resulting in the simultaneous agitation and mixing of the hydrophobic particles along with the microdroplets. In another embodiment, the hydrophobic particles are introduced through a second opening positioned such that the particles encounter the aerosolized microdroplets of inoculated media as the droplets enter the vessel.

The hydrophobic particles can be introduced into the vessel by a variety of methods well known within the art, for example, by forced flow with the assistance of an air pump. Introduction of the coating particles can be through the same opening used for the introduction of the inoculated media or through a second opening. The use of two different openings for the media and coating particle introduction may have the advantage of allowing for easier process controls.

In one embodiment of the invention, the hydrophobic particles comprises a powder of silicon dioxide. It can readily be seen by one skilled in the art, however, that the hydrophobic particles can alternatively comprise other hydrophobic ceramic particles (e.g., possibly aluminum oxides and zinc oxides).

In a particularly preferred embodiment, the silicon dioxide particles are Aerosil 300, produced by Brenntag N.V. of Belgium. In another preferred embodiment, the silicon dioxide particles are selected from the group comprising the AEROSIL series of powders manufactured by the Degussa-huls Corporation (i.e., AEROSIL R 104, AEROSIL R 106, AEROSIL R 202, AEROSIL R 805, AEROSIL R 812, AEROSIL R812.S, AEROSIL R 972, AEROSIL R 974, and AEROSIL R.8200). Other silicon dioxide particles are contemplated and within the scope of the invention. The choice of silicon dioxide particles will vary depending on the organism to be cultured and the amount of aeration required. In general, silicon dioxide particles that are useful in the practice of the present invention will be hydrophobic and have a surface area between 50 and 380 meters.sup.2 per gram of weight.

It is contemplated within the practice of the invention that the percent composition of coating particles to inoculated medium will vary, depending on, but not limited to, such factors as the cell type, the size of the individual microdroplets, and the desired final density and phase of growth that is the objective of the particular culture. In one embodiment of the invention that the ratio of individual coating particles to cultured inoculum may be within a range of 99:1 and 1:99. In one preferred embodiment of the invention, the ratio individual coating particles to cell inoculum to will be within a range of 1:2 to 2:1.

Once the microdroplets are formed and coated, they are evacuated from the coating vessel through narrow slotted openings at the bottom of the vessel. In one particular preferred embodiment, the slotted openings will be between 1.5-2.0 mm wide but may vary depending on the size of the microdroplets formed. The microdroplets can be as little as 10 to 20 microns, so long as the initial inoculum is dense enough to ensure each microdroplet contains inoculated medium. The microdroplets can be much larger, with diameters greater than 2.5 mm, so long as the hydrophobic particles are able to maintain the media in individual droplet form. Accordingly, the slots for removal can also be designed to be the same as whatever size the microdroplets are or slightly larger.

In most cases, the space between the coated microdroplets provides adequate aeration of the cell culture. It is a particularly useful and beneficial feature of the present invention that the space which exists between individual coated microdroplets provides an optimum environment for the concentrated growth of cell cultures. The adequate aeration provided with the present invention allows the growing cultures to make optimal use of the liquid media contained within each microdroplet.

It can readily be seen by one skilled in the relevant art, however, that various means can be employed to provide the growing microdroplet culture with supplemental oxygen and/or other gases to optimize the aeration conditions for a given cell culture. For example, a fermentation vessel or zone may be provided with a port opening onto the vessel or zone through which exogenous molecular oxygen may be pumped via conduits and means to transport the gas. Additionally, the fermentation vessel or zone may further be equipped with a second port opening for removal of gases during the fermentation process.

In one embodiment of the invention, the cultured cells will be microorganisms. Fermentation of microorganisms can proceed via a batch process or a continuous fermentation process. In the case of batch fermentation, the microdroplets are collected and grown in a fermentation vessel. In a continuous fermentation process, the coated microdroplets are collected from the slots at the bottom of the coating vessel and are grown in long conduits that constitute a fermenting zone. The particular fermentation method used to culture the microdroplets is not critical to the practice of the present invention.

As can readily be appreciated by one skilled in the art, it will not always be necessary or preferable to separate the hydrophobic particles away from the liquid cell culture following cell growth. For example, since silicon dioxide is frequently utilized in soil treatment, there is no need to remove the silicon dioxide from cell cultures that are grown for the purposes of soil treatment. Furthermore, since the hydrophobic particles limit the potential for the spread of contamination, it may be desirable to maintain cultivated cells within the Individual hydrophobic microdroplets for storage purposes.

It is a particularly beneficial feature of a preferred embodiment of the present invention that the enhanced aeration of cultured cells, combined with the efficient removal of metabolites, allow for microbial cultures to divide to a density that consumes all of the available liquid present in a microdroplet. Thus, in a preferred embodiment of the invention there is no need to (1) concentrate cultures or (2) remove the hydrophobic particles from the microdroplet culture. When all of the liquid media is consumed, the hydrophobic particles disassociate from the cell cultures, allowing the cells to interact directly with the surrounding environment.

Alternatively, once cell growth is complete, the liquid media can be isolated away from the hydrophobic particles through a simple centrifugation step. As can readily be appreciated by one skilled in the art, the time and force of centrifugation will vary depending on the organism and hydrophobic particle employed in the process. The silicon dioxide particles can be sterilized and re-used in another microdroplet cultivation process.


165 posted on 04/17/2008 12:12:28 PM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 163 | View Replies]

To: EdLake

Ed, your astute concern re killing the spores with excessive heat was avoided by Dr. Alibek in his micro-droplet cell culture:

“In one particular embodiment of the invention, the vessel is contained in a refrigerated environment to prevent the rapid random motion of the electromagnetic process from destroying the inoculated microdroplets with excessive heat.”


166 posted on 04/17/2008 12:47:17 PM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 163 | View Replies]

To: ZacandPook
According to the invention, cells are cultivated in a plurality of individual microdroplets of liquid media. These microdroplets are created by aerosolizing liquid media that has been inoculated with the cells of interest and coating the aerosolized droplets with hydrophobic particles of solid material, such as silicon dioxide, for example. The individual microdroplets are stabilized within the hydrophobic solid particles, thereby providing a large number of small cell culture reactors. The coated microdroplets each provide a sterile environment for the individual microdroplets contained within the culture.

I don't know how to break this to you, but this is NOT about coating spores.

They put the living bacteria inside a DROPLET of liquid media and that DROPLET is coated with "hydrophobic particles" so that they don't all merge together into one big pot of liquid media. That way, each bacterium has it's own supply of food and it's own space in which to grow. There's no competition for food, and there's no crowding for space.

Think of it as a fish in a fishbowl. The fish is the bacteria, the water is the liquid media, and the fishbowl is the coating of silica dioxide. The FISH is not coated with the fishbowl!

The size of the microdroplets will vary, with an optimum size for the cultivation of microorganisms, for example, usually being between 0.5 and 2.0 mm in diameter. Sizes within this range have been found to result in high concentrations of microorganisms per microdroplet.

So, we're talking about coating DROPLETS which are 500 to 2,000 times larger than an anthrax bacterium. MANY bacteria will grow inside one droplet.

When all of the liquid media is consumed, the hydrophobic particles disassociate from the cell cultures, allowing the cells to interact directly with the surrounding environment.

In other words, when the bacteria growing within the DROPLET have consumed all the liquid medium, the hydrophobic (silicon dioxide) particles FALL AWAY from the wet bacteria.

Alternatively, once cell growth is complete, the liquid media can be isolated away from the hydrophobic particles through a simple centrifugation step. As can readily be appreciated by one skilled in the art, the time and force of centrifugation will vary depending on the organism and hydrophobic particle employed in the process. The silicon dioxide particles can be sterilized and re-used in another microdroplet cultivation process.

THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH COATING SPORES AND HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ANYTHING RELATED TO THE ANTHRAX ATTACKS. NO SPORES ARE CREATED DURING THIS PROCESS. SO NO SPORES CAN BE COATED DURING THIS PROCESS.

Ed at www.anthraxinvestigation.com

167 posted on 04/17/2008 2:16:04 PM PDT by EdLake
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 165 | View Replies]

To: ZacandPook
“In one particular embodiment of the invention, the vessel is contained in a refrigerated environment to prevent the rapid random motion of the electromagnetic process from destroying the inoculated microdroplets with excessive heat.”

This is about heating up the LIQUID MEDIUM. It has nothing to do with that other article where heat was used to totally destroy all organic material. That process made sure that NO ORGANIC MATERIAL (A.K.A. BACTERIA or SPORES) WAS LEFT when the process was completed.

You seem to be looking for words like silicon and bacteria, and then you put them together in some totally imaginary way that has NOTHING to do with what is really happening.

Ed at www.anthraxinvestigation.com

168 posted on 04/17/2008 2:22:25 PM PDT by EdLake
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 166 | View Replies]

To: EdLake

Ed, Ken is very responsive and straight-forward. You should email him and ask them to clarify any of the scientific matters.

I get my scientific learning from experts. In this case and on this particular patent, I get my scientific advice from military scientists — to include one military scientist whose lab was raided by the FBI. He says this patent relates to encapsulation — and is WOW. Increasing the viability of a wide range of pathogens. So as between Ed Lake, who has no expertise in the field, and a military scientist who makes anthrax simulant for the government, I’ll rely on my consulting scientist rather than you.

But thanks for sharing.

You should also see Dr. Crockett’s PhD thesis on the method of weaponization. Advised by William Patrick and Ken Alibek, she addresses this precise issue of the reason for the silica in the Fall 2001 mailings. See also NSL directed to North Carolina State.


169 posted on 04/17/2008 3:56:28 PM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 168 | View Replies]

To: EdLake

Ed,

You seem not to have read Dr. Crockett’s thesis advised by Ken on the method of weaponization. I’d be glad to send it to you if you like. She also credits Dr. Patrick (and as I recall Dr. Bailey was on the reviewing panel). So when she address silica in connection with the Fall 2001 mailings, it is worth taking note.


170 posted on 04/17/2008 4:01:03 PM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 168 | View Replies]

To: EdLake

Ed,

You seem not to have read Dr. Crockett’s thesis advised by Ken on the method of weaponization. I’d be glad to send it to you if you like. She also credits Dr. Patrick (and as I recall Dr. Bailey was on the reviewing panel). So when she address silica in connection with the Fall 2001 mailings, it is worth taking note.


171 posted on 04/17/2008 4:01:03 PM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 168 | View Replies]

To: EdLake

As of the January 2002 GMU directory, Dr. Crockett (she was one of Ken’s assistants) was a few doors from Ali.


172 posted on 04/17/2008 4:03:23 PM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 168 | View Replies]

To: ZacandPook
He says this patent relates to encapsulation — and is WOW.

It does. It just has NOTHING to do with creating spores.

When you cover a DROPLET with some form of silicon dioxide to keep the DROPLET from merging with other such droplets, that would be termed "encapsulation."

The patent is straightforward in its description. So, if you believe there is something else going on here, the problem is in your beliefs, as usual.

This is not a question about "expertise." It's a question of being able to read English.

If anyone says the patent is about anything other than encapsulating tiny DROPLETS of liquid medium in particles of silicon dioxide so that bacteria can grow in that tiny "capsule" without the problems associated with larger bioreactors or fermentation vats, that person doesn't know what he or she is talking about.

I've seen PhD theses which contain all sorts of idiotic stuff. So, a PhD thesis has little or no value unless it can be supported by something else. I've seen more than one PhD thesis where the author believes what was written in Gary Matsumoto's Science article. To me, that shows a total lack of understanding of the subject.

Ed at www.anthraxinvestigation.com

173 posted on 04/18/2008 7:36:41 AM PDT by EdLake
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 169 | View Replies]

To: ZacandPook
Ken is very responsive and straight-forward. You should email him and ask them to clarify any of the scientific matters

You forget that people on this forum have contacted Ken and threatened to get him involved in a lawsuit if he communicates with me.

So, #1 - I feel it would be irresponsible to contact him about some crazy beliefs some Freeper has about his patent.

And, #2 - I wouldn't want to put him on a spot of being threatened again if he responded to me.

Ed at www.anthraxinvestigation.com

174 posted on 04/18/2008 7:51:30 AM PDT by EdLake
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 169 | View Replies]

To: EdLake

In his interrogatory responses, he “Dr. Hatfill has lost the 25 years he invested in developing a unique career path progression.”

Don’t you love how lawyers can make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear?


175 posted on 04/18/2008 8:13:53 AM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 174 | View Replies]

To: ZacandPook

“William C. Patrick III, once a very close friend and colleague of Dr. Hatfill has broken off communication with him for fear of being associated with Dr. Hatfill and the Anthrax attacks.” (Response to Interrogatory No. 3, p. 8.)


176 posted on 04/18/2008 8:20:17 AM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 175 | View Replies]

To: EdLake

As part of his claimed damages, he suggests in an interrogatory response that if he had gone to Iraq as planned as a UN inspector, he expected to write a book that will bring him $6-12 million given the focus on the issue.


177 posted on 04/18/2008 9:19:49 AM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 174 | View Replies]

To: EdLake

From Kohl, Ken [AUSA]
To: Phillips, Channing
cc. Blier, William
Subject : RE: what I’m hearing from the media

Channing

***
“By the way, WFO has opened a leak investigation in an attempt to find out who spoke to NEWSWEEK magazine over the weekend about the bureau’s use of bloodhounds in the investigation.”

Note that Attorney Seikaly verified the interrogatory response relating to his contact with reporters and omitted his contact with Klaidman about bloodhounds.


178 posted on 04/18/2008 9:41:00 AM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 174 | View Replies]

To: ZacandPook
“By the way, WFO has opened a leak investigation in an attempt to find out who spoke to NEWSWEEK magazine over the weekend about the bureau’s use of bloodhounds in the investigation.”

Are you not reading your own postings? In another thread you posted another memorandum which included this:

The purpose of this memorandum is to notify your office of the closing of the FBI’s criminal investigation of the captioned media leak matter. It is the understanding of the FBI that your continued investigation of this matter will be pursued by your office.

And I replied this way:

It still looks like the FBI planted false information with Seikaly at the DOJ to see if he'd leak it. When he did, the FBI had no way to prosecute someone in the DOJ without help from the DOJ, so they let the people at the DOJ handle it. Seikaly left the DOJ, and he's still sweating out possible prosecution. The FBI got what it wanted: They stopped Seikaly from leaking any more information.

Not every criminal ends up in jail. This looks like a negotiated resulution that caused the least embarrassment to all concerned.

The bloodhound leak matter was evidently turned over to the DOJ's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). The OPR typically punishes people by getting them fired and/or by getting them disbarred. Seikaly left the DOJ. You may argue that he could have left on his own accord, but the facts do not support that belief.

Ed at www.anthraxinvestigation.com

179 posted on 04/18/2008 10:16:42 AM PDT by EdLake
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 178 | View Replies]

To: EdLake

From: Blier, William
Sent: August 11, 2002
To: Howard, Roscoe C, Fredericksen, Scott; Seikaly, Daniel
Subject: Conversation with Glenn Fine

Here is a summary of my conversation with Glenn about the anthrax leak investigation:

The manner in which investigations of leaks are allocated between OIG and OPR is somewhat less clear than you might think. If the universe of persons with knowledge is mixed, attorneys and agents, OPR and OIG will meet and determine who should do it, with OIG essentially deferring unless there appears to be a potential criminal violation. Glenn opined that his office is better equipped, with a staff of investigators, to handle a criminal investigation than is OPR. He was aware of the allegations in this case, but not of the potential leaking of classified material.

Neither OIG nor OPR open investigations based on news accounts. Both await a referral from a complainant (Hatfill) or from within the department (in particular, the DAG’s office). So far, his ofice has not received a referral and he does not believe OPR has either. Glenn said we could either wait to see what Hatfill does, or, if we think it is in the department’s or our Office’s best interest for an investigation to be opened, to talk to the DAG’s office and have the referral made by OGI by the DAG. Because Hatfill said he was going to make his referall to OPR, and because the substance of Hatfill’s complaints are not really criminal, Hatfill’s referall would probably result in OPR handling it (with OIG deferring).

Let me know if you want me to do anything further in this connection. Thanks, Bill.


180 posted on 04/18/2008 10:34:38 AM PDT by ZacandPook
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 179 | View Replies]


Navigation: use the links below to view more comments.
first previous 1-20 ... 141-160161-180181-200 ... 981-987 next last

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.

Free Republic
Browse · Search
News/Activism
Topics · Post Article

FreeRepublic, LLC, PO BOX 9771, FRESNO, CA 93794
FreeRepublic.com is powered by software copyright 2000-2008 John Robinson