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Hatfill v. US - DOJ and FBI Statement of Facts (filed Friday)
US DOJ and FBI Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment (Statement of Facts) | April 11, 2008 | Department of Justice

Posted on 04/13/2008 8:20:52 AM PDT by ZacandPook

On Friday, the government filed this statement of the facts in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment in a civil rights and Privacy Act lawsuit brought by Dr. Steve Hatfill.

“The anthrax attacks occurred in October 2001. Public officials, prominent members of the media, and ordinary citizens were targeted by this first bio-terrorist attack on American soil. Twenty-two persons were infected with anthrax; five died. At least 17 public buildings were contaminated. The attacks wreaked havoc on the U.S. postal system and disrupted government and commerce, resulting in economic losses estimated to exceed one billion dollars. The attacks spread anxiety throughout the nation – already in a heightened state of alert in the wake of the attacks of September 11 – and left behind a lasting sense of vulnerability to future acts of bioterrorism. Given the unprecedented nature of the attacks, the investigation received intense media attention. Journalists from virtually every news organization pursued the story, sometimes conducting their own worldwide investigation to determine the person or persons responsible for the attacks and the motive behind them.

A. Journalistic Interest In Hatfill That Predates Alleged Disclosures

Testimony has revealed that at least certain members of the media began focusing their attention upon Hatfill in early 2002 because of tips they had received from former colleagues of his who found him to be highly suspicious. Articles about Hatfill thus began to appear in the mainstream press and on internet sites as early as January of 2002, and continued until the first search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, which, in turn, led to even more intense press attention.

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a Professor at the State University of New York, for example, complained in January and February 2002 on the Federation of American Scientists’ (“FAS”) website of the FBI’s apparent lack of progress on the investigation, and described generally the person she believed was the “anthrax perpetrator.” “Analysis of Anthrax Attacks,” Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator (Section IV.6), Defendant’s Appendix , Ex. 1. Rosenberg did not identify Hatfill by name, but described him in sufficient detail: a “Middle-aged American” who “[w]orks for a CIA contractor in Washington, DC area” and [w]orked in USAMRIID laboratory in the past” and “[k]nows Bill Patrick and probably learned a thing or two about weaponization from him informally.” Id. In his amended complaint, Hatfill states that “Professor Rosenberg’s ‘Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator’ . . . described [him].”

In addition to her postings on the FAS website, Professor Rosenberg also presented a lecture on February 18, 2002 at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, entitled “The Anthrax Attacks and the Control of Bioterrorism.” Ex. 2. During the course of her lecture, Rosenberg stated that she had “draw[n] a likely portrait of the perpetrator as a former Fort Detrick scientist who is now working for a contractor in the Washington, D.C, area[.]” Ex. 3. Rosenberg also commented upon Hatfill’s whereabouts on the date of the attacks, stating that “[h]e had reason for travel to Florida, New Jersey and the United Kingdom” – where the attacks had been and from which the letters had been purportedly sent – that “[h]e grew [the anthrax], probably on a solid medium, and weaponised it at a private location where he had accumulated the equipment and the material.” Id. Rosenberg also stated that the investigation had narrowed to a “common suspect[,]” and that “[t]he FBI has questioned that person more than once[.]” Id. Former White House Spokesperson, Ari Fleischer, immediately responded to Rosenberg’s comments, stating that there were several suspects and the FBI had not narrowed that list down to one. Ex. 4. The FBI also issued a press release, stating that it had “interviewed hundreds of persons, in some instances, more than once. It is not accurate, however, that the FBI has identified a prime suspect in this case.” Id. Rosenberg’s comments and writings were subsequently pursued by The New York Times (“The Times”). In a series of Op-Ed articles published from May through July 2002, Nicholas Kristof, a journalist with The Times, accused Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks. Kristof wrote on May 24, 2002 that the FBI was overlooking the anthrax perpetrator, noting that “experts” (Professor Rosenberg) point “to one middle-aged American who has worked for the United States military bio-defense program and had access to the labs at Fort Detrick, Md. His anthrax vaccinations are up to date, he unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax, and he was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the anthrax attack.” Ex. 5.

Hatfill first noticed the Kristof columns in May 2002. Hatfill Dep. Tran. in Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 6, at 13: 3-6. According to Hatfill, “[w]hen Mr. Kristof’s article appeared, it was the first [time] that [he] realized that [his] name [was] in the public domain with connection with an incident of mass murder.” Id. at 16:15-18. Hatfill has charged that The Times began the “entire conflagration and gave every journalist out there reason to drive this thing beyond any sort of sanity. Mr. Kristof lit the fuse to a barn fire and he repeatedly kept stoking the fire.” Id. at 43:19 - 44:1. In July 2004, Hatfill thus filed suit alleging that these articles libeled him by falsely accusing him of being the anthrax mailer. Complaint, Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 7.

Hatfill alleges in that lawsuit that “Kristof wrote his columns in such a way as to impute guilt for the anthrax letters to [him] in the minds of reasonable readers.” Id. ¶ 12. The articles, Hatfill claimed, which described his “background and work in the field of bio-terrorism, state or imply that [he] was the anthrax mailer.” Id. ¶ 14. Hatfill specifically alleged that statements in Kristof’s articles were false and defamatory, including those that stated that he: (1) “‘unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax’”; (2) “had the ‘ability’ to send the anthrax”; (3) “had the ‘access’ required to send the anthrax”; (4) “had a ‘motive’ to send the anthrax”; (5) “was one of a ‘handful’ of individuals who had the ‘ability, access and motive to send the anthrax’”; (6) “had access” to an ‘isolated residence’ in the fall of 2001, when the anthrax letters were sent”; (7) “‘gave CIPRO [an antibiotic famously used in the treatment of anthrax infection] to people who visited [the ‘isolated residence’]”; (8) his “anthrax vaccinations were ‘up to date’ as of May 24, 2002”; (9) he “‘failed 3 successive polygraph examinations’ between January 2002 and August 13, 2002”; (10) he “‘was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the attack’”; (11) he “‘was once caught with a girlfriend in a biohazard ‘hot suite’ at Fort Detrick [where Hatfill had concedely worked] surrounded only by blushing germs.’” Id. ¶ 16 (brackets in original). Hatfill alleges in his lawsuit against The Times that “[t]he publication of [Kristof’s] repeated defamation of [him] . . .gave rise to severe notoriety gravely injurious to [him].” Id. ¶ 29. The injury, Hatfill alleged, “was [made] all the more severe given the status and journalistic clout of The Times.” Id. This harm was compounded, Hatfill alleged, by the fact that these articles were “thereafter repeatedly published by a host of print and on-line publications and on the television and radio news” in the following months. Id., ¶ 30.

The case was initially dismissed by the trial court. Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807, 2004 WL 3023003 (E.D.Va.). That decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005). Upon remand, the trial court granted The Times summary judgment, finding that Hatfill was a public figure and public official and had failed to present evidence of malice. Hatfill v. The New York Times, 488 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D. Va. 2007). In arriving at that conclusion, the court considered Hatfill’s repeated media interviews before the attacks; the fact that he had “drafted a novel, which he registered with [the] United States Copyright office, describing a scenario in which a terrorist sickens government officials with a biological agent”; and had lectured on the medical effects of chemical and biological agents. Id. at 525.

Although not recited by the district court in The New York Times litigation, Hatfill also talked directly to reporters about his suspected involvement in the attacks. Brian Ross of ABC News, and his producer, Victor Walter, for example, talked separately to Hatfill on two to three occasions as early as January and February 2002, Ross Dep. Tran., Ex. 8, at 263:14 - 270:1, and continued talking to Hatfill until May of that year. Id. Ross also spoke to Hatfill’s friend and mentor, William Patrick, about Hatfill. Id. at 287:9 - 295:12. These meetings were prompted by discussions ABC News had in January 2002 with eight to twelve former colleagues of Hatfill at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (“USAMRIID”). Id. at 242:7 - 246:14. Hatfill’s former colleagues found him to be “highly suspicious because of a number of things he had done when he worked at [USAMRIID], and this behavior was strange "and unusual and they felt that he was a likely candidate.” Id. at 242: 7-17. These meetings were also prompted by ABC News’s own investigative reporting into Hatfill’s background; the more ABC News learned “the more interested [they] became” in Hatfill. Id. at 264: 14-15.

Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun also spoke to Hatfill in February 2002. Shane also spoke to USAMRIID employees who had worked with Hatfill. Ex. 9. These employees stated that they had been questioned by the FBI and “asked about a former Fort Detrick scientist” – Hatfill – “who returned a few years ago and took discarded biological safety cabinets, used for work with dangerous pathogens.” Id. at 1. These employees claimed that Hatfill “ha[d] expertise on weaponizing anthrax and ha[d] been vaccinated against it[.]” Id. Shane also called one of Hatfill’s former classmates, who was “plagued” by questions from the Baltimore Sun and others within the media regarding Hatfill’s “alleged involvement with the large anthrax outbreak in Zimbabwe[.]” Ex. 10. According to Hatfill, this classmate was told by Shane that Hatfill was purportedly responsible for “mailing the anthrax letters and also starting the [anthrax] outbreak in Zimbabwe/ Rhodesia twenty years before.” Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014; see also e-mail to Hatfill fr. DF Andrews, dated Mar. 1, 2002, Ex. 10. Hatfill told Shane in February 2002 that he had been “questioned by the FBI” and that “he considered the questioning to be part of a routine effort to eliminate people with the knowledge to mount [the] attack.” Ex. 9. Hatfill also confirmed for Shane that he had taken an FBI polygraph. Ex. 12, at 2. In March 2002, Hatfill left Shane a frantic telephone message reportedly stating how he had “been [in the bioterrorism] field for a number of years, working until 3 o’clock in the morning, trying to counter this type of weapon of mass destruction” and fearing that his “career [was] over at [that] time.” Ex. 13, at 2. According to Hatfill, Shane later Case 1:03-cv-01793-RBW Document 232-2 Filed 04/11/2008 Page 17 of 73

____ Hatfill did not sue either Shane or Rosenberg, even though Hatfill has stated that Rosenberg “caused” the focus on him. Ex. 14, at 10. Because Hatfill believed that the portrait Rosenberg painted at the February 2002 Princeton conference and in her website postings was so identifying and incriminating, however, Hatfill advised Rosenberg through his lawyers that “before [she] get[s] close to describing him in the future, by name or otherwise, [that she] submit [her] comments for legal vetting before publishing them to anyone.” Ex. 15. There is no evidence that the agency defendants bore any responsibility for the media presence. Information about FBI searches is routinely shared with a variety of state and local law enforcement authorities. Roth Dep. Tran., Ex. 16, at 163:5 -165:21; Garrett Dep. Tran. Ex. 17, at 79: 8-18. ______

compounded Hatfill’s problems by calling his then-employer, Science Applications International Corporation (“SAIC”), and accusing Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks, Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014, which, according to Hatfill, cost him his job as a contractor at SAIC. Id. 1

The media frenzy surrounding Hatfill intensified upon the search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, and the search of a refrigerated mini-storage facility in Ocala, Florida on June 26, 2002. Both were witnessed by the media, and the search of his apartment was carried live on national television. In addition to the television coverage, the searches generated a slew of articles about Hatfill throughout the media, one fueling the next. The Associated Press, for example, detailed in an article, dated June 27, 2002, Hatfill’s (1) work as biodefense researcher, including studies he had conducted at SAIC, and the work he had done at the USAMRIID; (2) his educational background; (3) where he had previously lived; and (4) security clearances he had held and the suspension of those clearances. Ex. 18. The Hartford Courant reported these same details, and additional information regarding Hatfill’s purported service in the Rhodesian army. Ex. 19. The next day -- June 28, 2002 -- the Hartford Courant reported details about Hatfill’s background in biological warfare, his vaccinations against anthrax, questioning that purportedly had occurred among Hatfill’s colleagues, his educational background (including the claim that he had attended medical school in Greendale), and lectures that he had given on the process of turning biological agents into easily inhaled powders. Ex. 20. None of this information is attributed to a government source.

B. Hatfill’s Public Relations Offensive

In July 2002, after these reports and after the first search of Hatfill’s apartment on June 25, 2002, Hatfill retained Victor Glasberg as his attorney. Glasberg Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 12: 16-19. Glasberg believed that “any number of people in the media [had] overstepped their bounds. . . . prior to July of 2002 .” Id. at 141:1 - 142:6. To counter this information, Hatfill set out on a “public relations offensive” of his own to “turn [the] tide.” Id. at 138: 20-21, 178: 12-13.

Recognizing that Hatfill “continue[d] [to] get[] killed with bad press, national as well as local[,]” Hatfill drafted a statement and Glasberg forwarded that statement in July 2002 to Hatfill’s then-employer at Louisiana State University (“LSU”). Ex. 11, at 1. The statement detailed Hatfill’s background, including his medical training and employment history, and provided details about Hatfill’s involvement in the anthrax investigation, including how he had been interviewed by the FBI and had taken a polygraph examination. Id. at AGD29SJH00002-13. Hatfill’s statement corroborated the conversations that Hatfill reportedly had with Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun in February 2002, and how that interaction had purportedly cost Hatfill his job at SAIC in March 2002. Id. at AGD29SJH00014.

In his July statement, Hatfill was careful not to blame DOJ or the FBI for his troubles or for any wrongdoing for the information about him that had made its way into the press. He touted the professionalism of the FBI, noting that “[t]he individual FBI agents with whom [he had come] in contact during this entire process are sons and daughters of which America can be justifiably proud. They are fine men and women doing their best to protect this country.” Id. at AGD29SJH00016. Hatfill’s objection lay with the media, whom he labeled as “irresponsible[,]” for trading in “half-truths, innuendo and speculation, making accusations and slanting real world events . . . to gain viewer recognition, sell newspapers, and increase readership and network ratings.” Id.

As the investigation proceeded, however, Glasberg publicly criticized investigators on the date of the second search of Hatfill’s apartment, August 1, 2002, for obtaining a search warrant rather than accepting the offer Glasberg had allegedly made to cooperate. Ex. 22. So angry was Glasberg with investigators that he wrote a letter, dated the same day as the search, to Assistant United States Attorney Kenneth C. Kohl, denouncing the fact that the search had been conducted “pursuant to a search warrant.” Ex. 23. Glasberg forwarded a copy of this letter to Tom Jackman of the Washington Post, and to the Associated Press, the morning of August 1st. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 24, at 265:12 - 266:5; see also Ex. 25 (Glasberg memorandum to file, stating, among other things, that Glasberg showed Jackman Kohl letter on August 1, 2002).

On the day of the search, an FBI spokeswoman at the Bureau’s Washington field office, Debra Weierman, “confirmed that the search was part of the government’s anthrax investigation.” Ex. 25. Weierman added, however, that “she was unable to confirm that [investigators were acting on a search warrant] or to provide any further information about the search.” Id.

The next day – August 2, 2002 – Glasberg faxed the Kohl letter to members of the media. Ex. 26. In the fax transmittal sheet accompanying the Kohl letter, Glasberg also advised the media that: Dr. Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI earlier this year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI. He and his lawyer Tom Carter were told that the results were all favorable and that he was not a suspect in the case. Id. at AGD16SJH03106. Subsequent to the fax transmittal by Glasberg, Weierman confirmed that the search had been conducted pursuant to a search warrant, but only after receiving appropriate authorization from her superiors. Weierman Dep. Tran., Ex. 27, at 93:16 - 94:14.

Hatfill had also accompanied Glasberg for his interview with Jackman the day before to address the “media feeding frenzy.” Ex. 28. Glasberg provided Jackman with the promise of an “[e]xclusive personal statement” from Hatfill and the promise of “[n]o other press contacts pending publication” of the article. Id. Glasberg thus provided Jackman background information about Hatfill, Rosenberg’s statements, and other publications. Ex. 25. Hatfill reportedly complained to the Washington Post in the interview about the media feeding frenzy, and about how his “friends are bombarded” with press inquiries. Ex. 29, at 1. Hatfill also complained about the “[p]hone calls at night. Trespassing. Beating on my door. For the sheer purpose of selling newspapers and television.” Id.

C. Attorney General Ashcroft’s Person of Interest Statements

Following this “media frenzy,” not to mention the two searches of Hatfill’s apartment, former Attorney General John Ashcroft was asked on August 6, 2002 (at an event addressing the subject of missing and exploited children) about Hatfill’s involvement in the investigation. Jane Clayson of CBS News asked General Ashcroft about the searches and whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 30, at 2. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person of interest.” General Ashcroft cautioned, however, that he was “not prepared to say any more at [that] time other than the fact that he is an individual of interest.” Id. At the same media event, Matt Lauer of NBC News also asked General Ashcroft whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 31. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person that – that the FBI’s been interested in.” Id. at 2. General Ashcroft cautioned that he was “not prepared to make a . . . comment about whether a person is officially a . . . suspect or not.” Id.

General Ashcroft made the same comments at a news conference in Newark, New Jersey on August 22, 2002, stating that Hatfill was a “person of interest to the Department of Justice, and we continue the investigation.” Ex. 32, at 1. As in his previous statements, General Ashcroft refused to provide further comment. Id. When asked upon deposition why he referred to Hatfill as a “person of interest” in the anthrax investigation in response to these media inquiries, General Ashcroft testified that he did so in an attempt to correct the record presented by the media that he was a “suspect” in the investigation, which he believed served a necessary law enforcement purpose. Ashcroft Dep. Tran., Ex. 33, at 81: 5-12; 103:18; 108: 9-13; 138: 5-7; 125: 18-21; 134:22 - 136:8. Prior to making these statements, General Ashcroft did not review or otherwise consult any investigative record, id. at 128:14 - 129:12, much less any record pertaining to Hatfill.

General Ashcroft’s initial statements on August 6, 2002 were followed, on August 11, 2002, by the first of Hatfill’s two nationally televised press conferences. Ex. 34. During his press conference, Hatfill lashed out at Rosenberg and other journalists and columnists who he believed wrote a series of “defamatory speculation and innuendo about [him].” Id. at 3. In apparent response to the “person of interest” statements, by contrast, he stated that he did “not object to being considered a ‘subject of interest’ because of [his] knowledge and background in the field of biological warfare.” Id. at 4. This was consistent with Hatfill’s statement to ABC News earlier in 2002 in which he stated that “his background and comments made him a logical subject of the investigation.” Ex. 35. As noted, moreover, Glasberg told the media -- almost a week before the first of General Ashcroft’s statements -- that “Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI [earlier that] year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI.” Ex. 26.

Hatfill’s second press conference was held on August 25, 2002. In the flyer publicizing the conference, Hatfill identified himself to the media -- in bold lettering -- as “the ‘person of interest’ at the center of the federal Government’s [anthrax] investigation.” DA, Exhibit 36.

D. Clawson’s “Sunshine” Policy

Patrick Clawson joined the Hatfill team in early August 2002 as spokesperson and “fielded hundreds of inquiries from members of the press worldwide regarding Dr. Hatfill[.]” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson believed it best to employ a media strategy that would, in his words, “let it all hang out.” Id. at 50:10. Clawson felt that “permitting maximum sunshine into . . . Hatfill’s existence would do both him and the public the best good.” Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 50:16-18.

“The majority of Clawson’s communications with the press regarding this case have been oral and by telephone and he did not keep a press log or any other regular record of such contacts with the press.” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson nonetheless admitted upon deposition that he revealed numerous details about Hatfill’s personal and professional background to members of the press (Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 101:9 - 105:21), including Hatfill’s professional expertise (id. at 103:10 - 105:21), use of Cipro (id. at 123:16 - 130:11, 248: 8-13), whereabouts on the days of the attacks (id. at 148:12 - 158:10, 361:15 - 362:3), expertise in working with anthrax (id. at 194:13 - 195:8), former service in the Rhodesian Army (id. at 210:9 - 211:10), and drunk driving arrest (id. at 795: 7-9, 798: 4-6). Clawson also told reporters what had been purportedly removed from Hatfill’s apartment during the two searches of his apartment on June 25, 2002 and August 1, 2002 (including medical books and a jar of bacillus thuringiensis (“BT”)) (id. at 121: 6-12, 131:2 - 131:12, 14:8 - 147:3, 313: 3-10). Clawson also freely relayed to the press that bloodhounds had been presented to Hatfill during the investigation (id. at 200: 15-19); that Hatfill had been the subject of surveillance (id. at 123:12-15, 428: 19-21); that Hatfill had taken polygraphs (id. at 135:16 - 137:17); and that he had submitted to blood tests (id. at 137:18-138:5, 347: 6-10).

In furtherance of Clawson’s “sunshine” policy, Hatfill, Clawson, and Glasberg, together, provided countless on-the-record, on-background (i.e., for use, but not for attribution), and off-the-record (i.e., not for attribution or use) interviews to counter misinformation. Although Hatfill repeatedly claimed upon deposition not to remember what he said during these interviews, he acknowledged in his responses to the Agency Defendants’ interrogatories having such conversations with, in addition to Mr. Jackman, Judith Miller of The New York Times, Jeremy Cherkis of the City Paper, Guy Gugliotta of the Washington Post, David Kestenbaum of National Public Radio, Rick Schmidt of the LA Times, Rob Buchanan of NBC Dateline, Jim Popkin of NBC News, Dee Ann David and Nick Horrock of UPI, Gary Matsumato of Fox TV, Bill Gertz of the Washington Times, and David Tell of the Weekly Standard. Ex. 12, at 3-4. With respect to the Matsumato interview, Glasberg warned Hatfill before the interview that he “should not be quoted, nor should Matsumato say or imply that he spoke with him.” Ex. 38, at 1. Glasberg warned Hatfill that “Matsumato must be willing to go to jail rather than reveal word one of anything [he] says on ‘deep background.’” Id.

All of these disclosures became too much even for Glasberg, who attempted to put a stop to them. In August, when Jackman aired his exclusive interview with Glasberg and Hatfill, Glasberg heralded the success of his public relations strategy noting that “Rosenberg, Shane and Kristof are, [each] of them, in varying stages of sulking, licking their wounds, reacting defensively and changing their tune.” Ex. 39. Slowly Glasberg advised both Hatfill and Glasberg to observe “the rule of COMPLETE SILENCE regarding anything and everything about the case[.]” Ex. 40 (emphasis in original). Ultimately, in September 2002, Glasberg ordered Clawson to stand down, noting “[w]hat you know, you know, and you have put virtually all of that into the public record. Fine. That is where we are, and for good or ill we can and will deal with it. But we must put a full stop to any further conveyance of substantive data about ANYTHING from Steve to anyone [but his attorneys].” Ex. 41 (emphasis in original). To no avail. On October 5, 2002, Hatfill and Clawson appeared together at an Accuracy in Media Conference. Hatfill was asked about the reaction of bloodhounds, and stated, I’m not supposed to answer things against . . . but let me tell you something. They brought this good-looking dog in. I mean, this was the best-fed dog I have seen in a long time. They brought him in and he walked around the room. By the way, I could have left at anytime but I volunteered while they were raiding my apartment the second time, I volunteered to talk with them. The dog came around and I petted him. And the dog walked out. So animals like me (laughter). Ex. 42, at 2.

Disclosures from the Hatfill camp to the media continued. For example, between late 2002 and May 8, 2003, Hatfill’s current attorney, Tom Connolly, and CBS News reporter James Stewart had multiple telephone conversations and two lunch meetings. Ex. 43. According to Stewart, Connolly told Stewart that the investigation was focusing on Hatfill, and detailed at great length the FBI’s surveillance of Hatfill. In virtually every one of these conversations, Connolly encouraged Stewart to report on these subjects. Id. at 96.

E. Louisiana State University’s Decision To Terminate Hatfill

At the time of the second search of his apartment in August 2002, Hatfill was working as a contract employee at the Louisiana State University (“LSU”) on a program to train first responders in the event of a biological attack. This program was funded by the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (“OJP”) as part of a cooperative agreement. Ex. 44. Under the terms of the cooperative agreement, OJP “maintain[ed] managerial oversight and control” of the program. Id. at 2. Following the second search of Hatfill’s apartment on August 1, 2002, Timothy Beres, Acting Director of OJP’s Office of Domestic Preparedness, directed that LSU “cease and desist from utilizing the subject-matter expert and course instructor duties of Steven J. Hatfill on all Department of Justice funded programs.” Ex. 45. LSU, meanwhile, had independently hired Hatfill to serve as Associate Director of its Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education. Following the second search, LSU placed Hatfill on administrative leave. Ex. 46. LSU then requested a background check of Hatfill. Ex. 47. During the course of that investigation, the University became concerned that Hatfill had forged a diploma for a Ph.D that he claimed to have received from Rhodes University in South Africa. Hatfill explained to Stephen L. Guillott, Jr., who was the Director of the Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education at LSU, that “[h]e assumed the degree had, in fact been awarded since neither his [thesis advisor] nor Rhodes University advised him to the contrary.” Ex. 48. LSU’s Chancellor, Mark A. Emmert, made “an internal decision to terminate [LSU’s] relationship with Dr. Hatfill quite independent of [the DOJ e-mail] communication.” Ex. 51.

Hatfill has now testified that in fact he created a fraudulent diploma with the assistance of someone he met in a bar who boasted that he could make a fraudulent diploma. Hatfill Dep. Tran., Ex. 49 at 19:20 - 20:12. Glasberg, moreover, has stated under oath that Hatfill’s earlier attempted explanation was untrue. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 314:10 - 317:2. In a nationally televised 60 Minutes episode that aired in March 2007, Connolly confirmed that Hatfill forged the diploma for the Ph.D from Rhodes University. Ex. 50, at 3.

F. Hatfill’s Amended Complaint

Hatfill claims lost wages and other emotional damages resulting from General Ashcroft’s “person of interest” statements and other for-attribution statements by DOJ and FBI officials. He also seeks to recover for certain other alleged “leaks” by DOJ and FBI officials. Hatfill additionally asserts that the defendants violated the Act by purportedly failing to (1) maintain an accurate accounting of such disclosures, which he asserts is required by section 552a(c) of the Act; (2) establish appropriate safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of the records that were purportedly disclosed, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(10); (3) correct information that was disseminated about him that was inaccurate or incomplete, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(5); and (4) establish adequate rules of conduct, procedures, and penalties for noncompliance, or to train employees in the requirements of the Act, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(9). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.”

TOPICS: Anthrax Scare; Breaking News; Extended News; War on Terror
KEYWORDS: amerithrax; anthrax; anthraxattacks; bioterrorism; doj; domesticterrorism; fbi; hatfill; islamothrax; trialbymedia; wmd
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Because Ed did not bother to learn the history and the players (like the fact that Khalifa funded KSM’s and Hambali Bojinka, then he had lost the ability to analyze evidence relating to half of the factual investigation between done by the Task Force.

“Former Bin Laden friend [Khalifa] denies terror ties,” Christian Science Monitor, January 21, 2003
OBL’s brother-in-law Khalifa years later was killed when a group of men (apparently looters) raided his home in Madagascar where he had gone on gem business and stole his computer.

John O’ Brien and John Mariani, “Witness Freed - Suspect Held, “Iraqi Charity Probe,” Syracuse Post-Standard, March 4, 2003
This Ph.D. in animal genetics and worked as a food researcher at Washington State University before he moved to Syracuse. Although he mixed with silica, there is no indication he used a siliconizing solution.

“U.S. Raids N.Va. Office Of Saudi-Based Charity,” Washington Post, June 2, 2004; Page B01
GMU computer security expert was volunteer here; he was deported the next month.

“Scholar is Given Life Sentence in ‘Virginia Jihad’ Case, New York Times, July 14, 2005
Director Mueller had announced a deadline of October 1, 2004 for an indictment in Amerithrax; Al-Timimi was indicted in late September 2004 for sedition. It was only later his lawyer explained the DOJ viewed him as an anthrax weapons suspect.

“N.Y. man [Mohammed Junaid Babar] admits he aided al Qaeda set up jihad camp,” CNN, August 11, 2004
There is no shortage of candidates for mailer.

“Man Accused of Aiding Terrorists Called ‘Moderate’, Washington Post, August 12, 2004
Indeed, the fellow mirroring Al Qaeda’s website was in North Brunswick, NJ, 6 miles from the mailbox.

John O’Brien “Virus nearly exposed FBI’s Dhafir probe: Internet corruption called Klez.h sent a bureau e-mail to the Manlius doctor,” Syracuse Post-Standard, November 5, 2004
You mean, everyone didn’t get on of those?

“FBI Says N.Y. Man Had Beltway Blueprints,” Associated Press, November 6, 2004; Page A14
Authored on anthrax in JAMA, from where Kathy Nguyen died, had moved from Falls Church, and represented by Lynne Stewart’s partner.

“U.S. Letter Tries To Establish a Doctor’s Links to Terrorists,” New York Times, dated November 6, 2004

“Views of Va. Muslim Leader Differ as Terror Trial Opens,” Washington Post, April 5, 2005

“Scholar ‘rock star’ to young,” Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, April 5, 2005
Blogger and Al-Timimi Umar Lee tells me this description is hyped - Royer was the leader of Virginia Paintball group, not Ali. But surely the young men sought Ali’s religious advice on even the most minor matters and he was highly influential.

“Suspect and A Setback In Al-Qaeda Anthrax Case,” Washington Post, October 31, 2006, A1

“Hardball Tactics in an Era of Threats,” Washington Post, September 3, 2006, A1

The key “POI” of the other squad was 15 feet from Ed’s key expert and he didn’t even know!

“FBI Focusing on ‘About Four’ Suspects in 2001 Anthrax Attacks,” FoxNews, March 28, 2008

But don’t worry. He’s “comfortable” with the FoxNews report. Heck, one of them may bowl after all.

381 posted on 05/02/2008 1:30:08 PM PDT by ZACKandPOOK
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As the evidence grew that Al Qaeda had weaponized anthrax, Ed had to turn to esoteric meaningless debates like the difference between Vander Waals and electrostatic forces. He took to drawing artful cartoons titled “Suzy The Spore” rather than deal with evidence of anthrax spraydrying documents or “extremely virulent” anthrax found.

“Pentagon: al-Qaeda pursuing bio weapons,” USA Today, May 23, 2003

“U.S. Action Halted Al-Qaeda WMD Effort in Afghanistan, Officials Say,” Global Security News, January 27. 2004

“Interrogation: Al Qaeda and Anthrax,” Newsweek, April 12, 2004

“Al-Qaida made surprising advances in ‘Agent X’ “, Associated Press, March 31, 2005

“Qaeda Letters Are Said to Show Pre9/11 Anthrax Plans,” New York Times, May 21, 2005
The article does not take into account that the handwritten letter preceded the typed correspondence.

“Al-Qaeda Gathered Equipment for Biological Weapons Laboratory Before 9/11, Documents Indicate,” Global Security News, May 23, 2005

Getman, “Anthrax Mystery: Evidence Points to al-Qaida,” Newsmax, June 7, 2007

He would disagree with whatever the DARPA contract expert on understanding the distinct signature of the anthrax posted on FreeRepublic.

“Distinct signature found in ’01 anthrax,” Baltimore Sun, July 4, 2004

TrebleRebel took a day explaining the recent Aerosol study before letting me give to Ed so that he could explain the science before it was mangled. What did Ed do without even reading it? He said the authors were NUTS! and the suggestion they had used silica to weaponize anthrax for years at Dugway was BIZARRE!

382 posted on 05/02/2008 1:34:44 PM PDT by ZACKandPOOK
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To: ZacandPook
Well the debate over “principles of coating” and silica is settled by the article published by the Dugway authors. They are the anthrax weaponization experts.

While I was out doing some chores, I remembered reading something that I should have mentioned. It's on the first page of the report by the people from the CDC and Dugway:

Disclaimer. The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.

So, the report is just the conclusions of the authors. Nothing official.

Ed at

383 posted on 05/02/2008 2:08:54 PM PDT by EdLake
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To: EdLake


As a matter of logic, they have actually been doing it.

So they know it is floatable when processed with silica because they used silica and watched it float.

So just as we do not need a governmental statement the earth is not flat, we do not need a government statement that Dugway folks have been using silica to make weaponized anthrax.

The Daschle anthrax did not actually look like what was pictured in the recent study. It is a siliconized solution makes anthrax float like a butterfly and sting like a bee (and results in SEMS that look like that).

So it may be that it is only your suggestion that it makes no sense to use silica that is wrong. The EDX shows the silica spike upon use of siliconized solution. Yet it appears to be individual pure spores in the SEMS.

Google “siliconized solution” and you’ll see the “signature.”

384 posted on 05/02/2008 2:31:49 PM PDT by ZACKandPOOK
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To: EdLake

I meant “siliconizing solution.”

385 posted on 05/02/2008 2:51:08 PM PDT by ZACKandPOOK
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To: TrebleRebel

So, the scientists still agree that silicon plus oxygen still equals silica, huh? That certainly is good to know! :)

386 posted on 05/02/2008 4:24:33 PM PDT by jpl ("Don't tell me words don't matter." - Barack Obama, via Deval Patrick)
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To: TrebleRebel

Operation Golden Frog was a total success.

Although it was on a strictly need to know basis, there was a parallel
Operation Recycled Frog ongoing at the same time.

I made this video to launch and commemorate it:

387 posted on 05/02/2008 4:57:44 PM PDT by ZACKandPOOK
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To: jpl
the scientists still agree that silicon plus oxygen still equals silica, huh?

What about "polymerized glass?"

According to Gary Mastumoto's article in Science, the attack anthrax contained "polymerized glass." Yet AFIP never mentioned any "polymerized glass" being in the Daschle anthrax.

I've been trying to get TrebelRebel to give us his opinion about who screwed up. Was it AFIP or was it Gary Matsumoto?

Ed at

388 posted on 05/03/2008 8:12:06 AM PDT by EdLake
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To: TrebleRebel
Especially since you have already called it “Bizarre”.

You guys seem to be hung up on the word "bizarre." Don't you know what it means?

Bizarre; odd or curious.

Isn't the article even a little bit odd or curious?

1. The entire article is based on the notion that the attack anthrax used a process developed at Dugway over 40 years ago, even though there is an abundance of evidence which says that is total nonsense.

2. The article describes in pretty good detail a process used at Dugway to create "weaponized anthrax" back during the Cold War.

Isn't even a little bit odd or curious?

Since when have government agencies been publishing details about making bioweapons?

Why would a CDC branch in Cincinnati find a need to publish a document that says it is "believed" that some of the material used in the 2001 attacks was in a "fluidized" form, meaning: containing fumed silica?

How come some scientists from Dugway agreed to provide for this paper a description of how they made such anthrax back during the Cold War along with a supply of simulants they made 40 years ago?

How come this information was published in an article about sampling methods and not in an article where KNOWN information (versus believed nonsense) about the powders used in the anthrax attacks of 2001 is also provided?

I appreciate that such information was released, but doesn't anyone else see anything odd or curious in the way it was done?

Ed at

389 posted on 05/03/2008 8:50:18 AM PDT by EdLake
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To: TrebleRebel

You are the scientist. Maybe you can explain this to me.

As to what is odd and curious, I understand all the robotics, automatic production, and even the arc reactor in IRON MAN. But how does Obadiah bring a Ray’s pizza from New York City to Malibu and it’s still hot and fresh?

Did they pay for the product display?

Based on the previews, ANDROMEDA STRAIN and THE HAPPENING both have overtones of an aerosolized anthrax attack on New York City and Washington, D.C. An epidemic of measles (such is feared at summer camp in New York), where the virus remains in the doctor’s room for 2 hours, is scarier than anthrax delivered by mail. Yet the voiceover in film coverage typically uses such a serious tone. When you go back to hear Don Foster, BHR, and Assad’s attorney solemnly intone on the subject — leading to the conclusion it is an insider — you realize how much remains intact of much of BHR’s analysis. Even Dr. Assaad’s analysis. It will take a breakthrough article by the NYT, WP or Hartford Courant to put the Al-Timimi filing (where his lawyer has always suspected him as an anthrax weapons suspect) in the context of the FoxNews report.

390 posted on 05/03/2008 10:33:33 AM PDT by ZACKandPOOK
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To: TrebleRebel; ZacandPook
Here's all 3 pics.

What happened to the two pictures of spores created by the Dugway process?

Were they removed because copyrights were violated?

Were they removed because they used too much bandwidth?

Were they removed because they showed that the Dugway process had nothing to do with the anthrax attack of 2001?

Were they removed because you could no longer use them to persuade people your beliefs are the only correct beliefs?

Or was there some other reason?

Ed at

391 posted on 05/03/2008 11:41:26 AM PDT by EdLake
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To: EdLake

They disappeared because they had been uploaded from my webpage where I had temporarily uploaded them to facilitate their uploading. I don’t understand computers and didn’t realize that when I took the pictures off my webpage it would knock them out here.

392 posted on 05/03/2008 12:24:11 PM PDT by ZACKandPOOK
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didn’t realize that when I took the pictures off my webpage it would knock them out here.

Ah. Okay. Thanks. The code for linking in pictures causes the pictures to come from the place where YOU put (or found) them. They're not on FreeRepublic anywhere. If you want, you can restore the pictures to where they were on your webpage and they will reappear in this thread. The code to do it is still in place.

Ed at

393 posted on 05/03/2008 12:34:26 PM PDT by EdLake
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To: EdLake

Then there is the issue of the inverted plasmid.

Bioforensics Program BAA08-04
Bacterial Population Genetics in a Forensics Context
Published: 03/04/2008
Amended: 4/16/2008

The threat of terrorist or criminal use of pathogenic organisms and their toxins remains of great concern in the United States. There are vulnerabilities and needs to perform microbial forensic analyses for attribution purposes in a rigorous scientific manner. As part of the effort to deter biological terrorism and strengthen the law enforcement response to such an
act, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 10, “Biodefense for the 21st Century” established a dedicated central microbial forensic laboratory known as the National Bioforensics Analysis Center (NBFAC), as part of the Department of Homeland Security to provide bioforensics analysis of evidence associated with the event. The NBFAC operates in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the lead investigative agency in acts of terrorism. This BAA seeks research in the discipline of bacterial population genetics to support the NBFAC’s mission for evidentiary analysis and
interpretation of results to support the FBI’s criminal investigation. The ultimate goal of this joint mission is to provide sound scientific data and analysis supporting attribution analysis leading to the capture, indictment, and prosecution of the perpetrator(s) of the biocrime or terrorist attack.

The NBFAC has instituted a robust molecular biology program to enhance the genomic analysis of the major biological threat agents. The NBFAC continues to expand its operational capabilities for the identification and characterization of the major CDC category A and B agents. The Bioforensics Research and Development Program continues research investments in next generation technologies to support molecular biology and
genotyping techniques capable of characterizing a biothreat agent at the isolate level to better understand the microorganism’s origin and evolutionary history. However, a significant gap exists in the forensics communities understanding of the meaningful interpretation of genotyping/profiling results. Unlike its applications in human DNA analysis, which deals with one species exhibiting diploid sexual reproduction, the bacterial
threat agents pose a more complex problem for the interpretation of genomic data. The bacterial threat agents are haploid organisms propagating asexually and have always been thought to be purely clonal in nature, but population variation does exist even within what have been assumed to be clonal populations, such as a single colony on a Petri-plate. In addition, there are other substantial genetic issues related to interpretation including horizontal gene transfer, recombination, gene duplication and deletion. Hence, there is need for a better understanding of the underlying genomic and population dynamics at both intra and inter-species levels.
Program Objectives
The goal of this research program is to develop algorithms and/or analytical tools that will assist biocrime and bioterror investigations by providing precision and statistical power to inferences concerning the degree of relatedness (based upon matching comparisons) of biothreat agents. The focus of this effort will be on research in the areas of microbial
ecology, population dynamics, genetic stability, host-pathogen interaction, statistical inference, and match criteria for the following select agents: Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Clostridium botulinum, Francisella tularensis, Brucella spp., Escherichia coli O157:H7, Burkholderia mallei, Burkholderia pseudomallei. The objectives include:

¥ Improving our understanding of the population genetics of these pathogens to include research on genome stability, host preferences and interactions, genetic mobility of virulence factors, identification of polymorphic sites and mutational hot spots, geographical distribution, microbial ecology, pathogen lifecycles, natural reservoirs and effects of host – pathogen interaction.
¥ Improving methods for determining rates of mutation and recombination of the pathogen genomes and the identification of adaptive mutations that can have forensic utility
¥ Establishing match criteria for discriminating “difference” or “sameness” in
sample comparisons. Define the parameters for inclusion or exclusion in the
context of a known sample and questioned sample. This must be backed by
statistical parameters for acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis
¥ Developing efficient, economical, and statistically rigorous sampling strategies to acquire spatially referenced genetic information on reservoirs of these pathogens
¥ Developing bioinformatics-based analytical tools for supporting hypotheses
testing regarding pathogen origin that go beyond current phylogeny-based
inferential methods and can meet forensic (legal) admissibility requirements of relevance and reliability.

Background and Motivation
Current forensic analysis of biological threat agents is impeded by lack of knowledge of the underlying population genetics and ecology of the pathogens. In addition, there is a void in the availability of bioinformatics tools necessary to analyze and validate the data that forensics investigators collect from incidence sites. An understanding of pathogen population genetics including ecology, phylogeny, lifecycles, genome stability, mutation rates, recombination rates, epidemiology, host preferences and interactions, geographic distribution and other source information, virulence factors, polymorphic sites and mutation hot spots will be necessary to interpret the results from the application of multiple typing methods (e.g. MLST, VNTR, SNP, InDel, SSRs etc) and use of these techniques to compare “likeness” of isolates associated with a bioforensic investigation. The population genetics will likely be different for each pathogen; hence the typing strategy is also likely to be different. For example, pathogens with stable genomes might be more amenable to source tracking through SNP analysis than pathogens with unstable genomes. Furthermore, as typing data on the pathogens is generated, it will need to be organized, archived and managed in a form that is functional and accessible for forensic analysis. To further complicate the genotyping challenge is the rapid emergence of Next-Generation
whole genome sequencing technologies, e.g., Roche (GS-20 FLX/454 Pyrosequencing), Illumina (Genome Analyzer System), and ABI (SOLiD) which will provide faster and cheaper whole genome sequences. These platforms will potentially displace many of the traditional genotyping techniques in the near future by providing a much richer body of data associated with a whole genome sequence. This will increase by orders of magnitude the sequence data available for microorganisms. Therefore, development of statistically based methodologies to compare whole genome sequences and sort through the maze of data for match comparisons is critical to adequately make use of these powerful new methods.
In addition to an understanding of the population genetics of the pathogens, bioinformatic tools that can bring statistical power and degrees of confidence to the results will need to be developed in order to make an assessment of “match” criteria for comparative forensic purposes. In other words, can reliable inferences be made when a biological threat agent
found at a crime scene is compared to a sample found at a suspect’s home laboratory or place of employment? These tools should have the power to effectively describe the quantitative criteria and provide statistical support as to the likelihood or degree of similarity. These computational tools will need to be developed, standardized and well documented and will be required to produce understandable, explainable and defensible results in a forensic setting.

The program will be separated into two phases. The phase I program goal is to produce a paper study that not only reviews the current level of understanding in terms of population genetics and bioinformatics tools available for each of the eight agents, but also makes recommendations for follow on experiments and research plan that can be performed in
phase II to fill in the knowledge gaps necessary for rigorous forensic data analysis. Phase I awardees have the opportunity to apply for phase II. The phase II program goal is to develop and perform experimental studies that fill in the gaps in current knowledge of the population genetics of the eight select agents as well as to develop new algorithms and
bioinformatics tools to enhance statistical analysis and inference for forensic pathogen analysis. Phase II will consist of two tasks: a computational/bioinformatics task and a laboratory-based experimental task. Proposers may choose to perform one or both tasks or establish a team with other institutions to address both tasks. Teaming is highly encouraged.


For the identification of those responsible for the Fall 2001 mailings, researchers are encouraged to go to “Summons to Conquest.”

“Does it look like I’m negotiating?” — George Clooney, in Michael Clayton

394 posted on 05/04/2008 4:11:13 AM PDT by ZACKandPOOK
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To: All
I just wrote a "comment" about all this for my web site.

The comment concludes with this analogy:

I feel like I've been arguing for years with people who believed that they knew about a super-sophisticated way to travel across America: by horse and buggy. And I've been arguing that it is absolutely ridiculous to believe that anyone would ever travel across America by horse and buggy. And now we've suddenly both been been informed that there was a time, many many years ago, when lots of people actually did travel across America by horse and buggy.

Live and learn.

Ed at

395 posted on 05/04/2008 7:39:43 AM PDT by EdLake
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To: EdLake

Ed, your comment is inconsistent with the fact that the method used to create the Dugway simulant has been used since 1998 in making simulants. For example, it was the method used to make the Dugway simulant used in the Canadian aerosol study done after the threatened use of anthrax in connection with the detention with Vanguards of Conquest #2, Mahmoud Mahjoub.

The study results issued on September 10, 2001. The study found that the simulant leaked from the envelope before opening and that it immediately dispersed to the other side of the room upon opening.

396 posted on 05/04/2008 1:18:46 PM PDT by ZACKandPOOK
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To: EdLake

Here is authority for the proposition that your “horse and buggy” comment makes no sense. The same Dugway simulant was currently being used in aerosol tests re the anthrax threat posed by the islamists. See February 2001 PDB. See also Science article describing mixing at the Wisconsin dairy processor. It leaked from the envelope before opening and immediately dispersed throughout the room.

“Risk Assessment of anthrax threat letters,” Defence R&D Canada, September 2001

397 posted on 05/04/2008 1:28:00 PM PDT by ZACKandPOOK
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For example, it was the method used to make the Dugway simulant used in the Canadian aerosol study

If so, then the results of the study don't really relate to the attack anthrax.

Maybe they used the "horse and buggy" method because it would be against the law to develop NEW methods.

The point is: It's an OLD method, and it has NOTHING to do with the way the attack anthrax was created. The attack anthrax was created the way insecticides are created.

Ed at

398 posted on 05/04/2008 2:39:32 PM PDT by EdLake
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your “horse and buggy” comment makes no sense.

People still use horse and buggies, today. Just visit Amish country in Pennsylvania.

You always try to go off into irrelevant areas just to create arguments. What's important here is:

1. The method used by Dugway to make simulants for these studies has NOTHING to do with the anthrax in the letters mailed in 2001.

2. The CDC report said it was "believed" that the anthrax letters used fumed silica. They believed incorrectly.

3. The coating on the spores created by Dugway is NOT put there to nullify van der Waals forces; it's an unfortunate effect and/or requirement resulting from the static electricity put into the spores by the MILLING process.

4. The attack anthrax was NOT MILLED. OTHER methods were used to avoid static electricity buildup, and those methods did NOT require the used of silica.

So, all these side issues from the horse and buggie days have NOTHING to do with the anthrax attacks of 2001.

Ed at

399 posted on 05/04/2008 2:53:48 PM PDT by EdLake
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To: EdLake


As to the Daschle product, and what best approximates it, I’ve gotten extensive responses from a senior military scientist who makes anthrax simulant for the government concerning his view of the relevance (or not) of that aerosol study. That’s who it makes sense to consult. It doesn’t make sense to consult a webposter who has no science background, experience in aerosol science, has never made anthrax simulant, and didn’t even realize that was how Dugway was making the simulant commonly used in aerosol experiments. So while I encourage you to consider the true crime aspects and welcome the sharing of published unclassified information about the microbial forensics, I recommend it doesn’t make sense to discuss the science. That role is best served by qualified experts. As for the effectiveness of the Dugway simulant used in the Canadian study, its performance is subjective to objective measurement. As I said, it immediately dispersed across the room. That’s not horse and buggy speed. That’s jet speed. It performed comparably in dispersal to the Daschle product. The relatively uniform 1 micron size of the Daschle product was notable to be sure, but for the purpose of causing infection, it was overkill.

400 posted on 05/04/2008 3:17:45 PM PDT by ZACKandPOOK
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