Hatfill v. US - DOJ and FBI Statement of Facts (filed Friday)

On Friday, the government filed this statement of the facts in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment in a civil rights and Privacy Act lawsuit brought by Dr. Steve Hatfill.

“The anthrax attacks occurred in October 2001. Public officials, prominent members of the media, and ordinary citizens were targeted by this first bio-terrorist attack on American soil. Twenty-two persons were infected with anthrax; five died. At least 17 public buildings were contaminated. The attacks wreaked havoc on the U.S. postal system and disrupted government and commerce, resulting in economic losses estimated to exceed one billion dollars. The attacks spread anxiety throughout the nation – already in a heightened state of alert in the wake of the attacks of September 11 – and left behind a lasting sense of vulnerability to future acts of bioterrorism. Given the unprecedented nature of the attacks, the investigation received intense media attention. Journalists from virtually every news organization pursued the story, sometimes conducting their own worldwide investigation to determine the person or persons responsible for the attacks and the motive behind them.

Testimony has revealed that at least certain members of the media began focusing their attention upon Hatfill in early 2002 because of tips they had received from former colleagues of his who found him to be highly suspicious. Articles about Hatfill thus began to appear in the mainstream press and on internet sites as early as January of 2002, and continued until the first search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, which, in turn, led to even more intense press attention.

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a Professor at the State University of New York, for example, complained in January and February 2002 on the Federation of American Scientists’ (“FAS”) website of the FBI’s apparent lack of progress on the investigation, and described generally the person she believed was the “anthrax perpetrator.” “Analysis of Anthrax Attacks,” Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator (Section IV.6), Defendant’s Appendix , Ex. 1. Rosenberg did not identify Hatfill by name, but described him in sufficient detail: a “Middle-aged American” who “[w]orks for a CIA contractor in Washington, DC area” and [w]orked in USAMRIID laboratory in the past” and “[k]nows Bill Patrick and probably learned a thing or two about weaponization from him informally.” Id. In his amended complaint, Hatfill states that “Professor Rosenberg’s ‘Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator’ . . . described [him].”

In addition to her postings on the FAS website, Professor Rosenberg also presented a lecture on February 18, 2002 at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, entitled “The Anthrax Attacks and the Control of Bioterrorism.” Ex. 2. During the course of her lecture, Rosenberg stated that she had “draw[n] a likely portrait of the perpetrator as a former Fort Detrick scientist who is now working for a contractor in the Washington, D.C, area[.]” Ex. 3. Rosenberg also commented upon Hatfill’s whereabouts on the date of the attacks, stating that “[h]e had reason for travel to Florida, New Jersey and the United Kingdom” – where the attacks had been and from which the letters had been purportedly sent – that “[h]e grew [the anthrax], probably on a solid medium, and weaponised it at a private location where he had accumulated the equipment and the material.” Id. Rosenberg also stated that the investigation had narrowed to a “common suspect[,]” and that “[t]he FBI has questioned that person more than once[.]” Id. Former White House Spokesperson, Ari Fleischer, immediately responded to Rosenberg’s comments, stating that there were several suspects and the FBI had not narrowed that list down to one. Ex. 4. The FBI also issued a press release, stating that it had “interviewed hundreds of persons, in some instances, more than once. It is not accurate, however, that the FBI has identified a prime suspect in this case.” Id. Rosenberg’s comments and writings were subsequently pursued by The New York Times (“The Times”). In a series of Op-Ed articles published from May through July 2002, Nicholas Kristof, a journalist with The Times, accused Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks. Kristof wrote on May 24, 2002 that the FBI was overlooking the anthrax perpetrator, noting that “experts” (Professor Rosenberg) point “to one middle-aged American who has worked for the United States military bio-defense program and had access to the labs at Fort Detrick, Md. His anthrax vaccinations are up to date, he unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax, and he was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the anthrax attack.” Ex. 5.

Hatfill first noticed the Kristof columns in May 2002. Hatfill Dep. Tran. in Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 6, at 13: 3-6. According to Hatfill, “[w]hen Mr. Kristof’s article appeared, it was the first [time] that [he] realized that [his] name [was] in the public domain with connection with an incident of mass murder.” Id. at 16:15-18. Hatfill has charged that The Times began the “entire conflagration and gave every journalist out there reason to drive this thing beyond any sort of sanity. Mr. Kristof lit the fuse to a barn fire and he repeatedly kept stoking the fire.” Id. at 43:19 - 44:1. In July 2004, Hatfill thus filed suit alleging that these articles libeled him by falsely accusing him of being the anthrax mailer. Complaint, Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 7.

Hatfill alleges in that lawsuit that “Kristof wrote his columns in such a way as to impute guilt for the anthrax letters to [him] in the minds of reasonable readers.” Id. ¶ 12. The articles, Hatfill claimed, which described his “background and work in the field of bio-terrorism, state or imply that [he] was the anthrax mailer.” Id. ¶ 14. Hatfill specifically alleged that statements in Kristof’s articles were false and defamatory, including those that stated that he: (1) “‘unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax’”; (2) “had the ‘ability’ to send the anthrax”; (3) “had the ‘access’ required to send the anthrax”; (4) “had a ‘motive’ to send the anthrax”; (5) “was one of a ‘handful’ of individuals who had the ‘ability, access and motive to send the anthrax’”; (6) “had access” to an ‘isolated residence’ in the fall of 2001, when the anthrax letters were sent”; (7) “‘gave CIPRO [an antibiotic famously used in the treatment of anthrax infection] to people who visited [the ‘isolated residence’]”; (8) his “anthrax vaccinations were ‘up to date’ as of May 24, 2002”; (9) he “‘failed 3 successive polygraph examinations’ between January 2002 and August 13, 2002”; (10) he “‘was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the attack’”; (11) he “‘was once caught with a girlfriend in a biohazard ‘hot suite’ at Fort Detrick [where Hatfill had concedely worked] surrounded only by blushing germs.’” Id. ¶ 16 (brackets in original). Hatfill alleges in his lawsuit against The Times that “[t]he publication of [Kristof’s] repeated defamation of [him] . . .gave rise to severe notoriety gravely injurious to [him].” Id. ¶ 29. The injury, Hatfill alleged, “was [made] all the more severe given the status and journalistic clout of The Times.” Id. This harm was compounded, Hatfill alleged, by the fact that these articles were “thereafter repeatedly published by a host of print and on-line publications and on the television and radio news” in the following months. Id., ¶ 30.

The case was initially dismissed by the trial court. Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807, 2004 WL 3023003 (E.D.Va.). That decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005). Upon remand, the trial court granted The Times summary judgment, finding that Hatfill was a public figure and public official and had failed to present evidence of malice. Hatfill v. The New York Times, 488 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D. Va. 2007). In arriving at that conclusion, the court considered Hatfill’s repeated media interviews before the attacks; the fact that he had “drafted a novel, which he registered with [the] United States Copyright office, describing a scenario in which a terrorist sickens government officials with a biological agent”; and had lectured on the medical effects of chemical and biological agents. Id. at 525.

Although not recited by the district court in The New York Times litigation, Hatfill also talked directly to reporters about his suspected involvement in the attacks. Brian Ross of ABC News, and his producer, Victor Walter, for example, talked separately to Hatfill on two to three occasions as early as January and February 2002, Ross Dep. Tran., Ex. 8, at 263:14 - 270:1, and continued talking to Hatfill until May of that year. Id. Ross also spoke to Hatfill’s friend and mentor, William Patrick, about Hatfill. Id. at 287:9 - 295:12. These meetings were prompted by discussions ABC News had in January 2002 with eight to twelve former colleagues of Hatfill at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (“USAMRIID”). Id. at 242:7 - 246:14. Hatfill’s former colleagues found him to be “highly suspicious because of a number of things he had done when he worked at [USAMRIID], and this behavior was strange "and unusual and they felt that he was a likely candidate.” Id. at 242: 7-17. These meetings were also prompted by ABC News’s own investigative reporting into Hatfill’s background; the more ABC News learned “the more interested [they] became” in Hatfill. Id. at 264: 14-15.

Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun also spoke to Hatfill in February 2002. Shane also spoke to USAMRIID employees who had worked with Hatfill. Ex. 9. These employees stated that they had been questioned by the FBI and “asked about a former Fort Detrick scientist” – Hatfill – “who returned a few years ago and took discarded biological safety cabinets, used for work with dangerous pathogens.” Id. at 1. These employees claimed that Hatfill “ha[d] expertise on weaponizing anthrax and ha[d] been vaccinated against it[.]” Id. Shane also called one of Hatfill’s former classmates, who was “plagued” by questions from the Baltimore Sun and others within the media regarding Hatfill’s “alleged involvement with the large anthrax outbreak in Zimbabwe[.]” Ex. 10. According to Hatfill, this classmate was told by Shane that Hatfill was purportedly responsible for “mailing the anthrax letters and also starting the [anthrax] outbreak in Zimbabwe/ Rhodesia twenty years before.” Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014; see also e-mail to Hatfill fr. DF Andrews, dated Mar. 1, 2002, Ex. 10. Hatfill told Shane in February 2002 that he had been “questioned by the FBI” and that “he considered the questioning to be part of a routine effort to eliminate people with the knowledge to mount [the] attack.” Ex. 9. Hatfill also confirmed for Shane that he had taken an FBI polygraph. Ex. 12, at 2. In March 2002, Hatfill left Shane a frantic telephone message reportedly stating how he had “been [in the bioterrorism] field for a number of years, working until 3 o’clock in the morning, trying to counter this type of weapon of mass destruction” and fearing that his “career [was] over at [that] time.” Ex. 13, at 2. According to Hatfill, Shane later Case 1:03-cv-01793-RBW Document 232-2 Filed 04/11/2008 Page 17 of 73

____ Hatfill did not sue either Shane or Rosenberg, even though Hatfill has stated that Rosenberg “caused” the focus on him. Ex. 14, at 10. Because Hatfill believed that the portrait Rosenberg painted at the February 2002 Princeton conference and in her website postings was so identifying and incriminating, however, Hatfill advised Rosenberg through his lawyers that “before [she] get[s] close to describing him in the future, by name or otherwise, [that she] submit [her] comments for legal vetting before publishing them to anyone.” Ex. 15. There is no evidence that the agency defendants bore any responsibility for the media presence. Information about FBI searches is routinely shared with a variety of state and local law enforcement authorities. Roth Dep. Tran., Ex. 16, at 163:5 -165:21; Garrett Dep. Tran. Ex. 17, at 79: 8-18. ______

compounded Hatfill’s problems by calling his then-employer, Science Applications International Corporation (“SAIC”), and accusing Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks, Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014, which, according to Hatfill, cost him his job as a contractor at SAIC. Id. 1

The media frenzy surrounding Hatfill intensified upon the search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, and the search of a refrigerated mini-storage facility in Ocala, Florida on June 26, 2002. Both were witnessed by the media, and the search of his apartment was carried live on national television. In addition to the television coverage, the searches generated a slew of articles about Hatfill throughout the media, one fueling the next. The Associated Press, for example, detailed in an article, dated June 27, 2002, Hatfill’s (1) work as biodefense researcher, including studies he had conducted at SAIC, and the work he had done at the USAMRIID; (2) his educational background; (3) where he had previously lived; and (4) security clearances he had held and the suspension of those clearances. Ex. 18. The Hartford Courant reported these same details, and additional information regarding Hatfill’s purported service in the Rhodesian army. Ex. 19. The next day -- June 28, 2002 -- the Hartford Courant reported details about Hatfill’s background in biological warfare, his vaccinations against anthrax, questioning that purportedly had occurred among Hatfill’s colleagues, his educational background (including the claim that he had attended medical school in Greendale), and lectures that he had given on the process of turning biological agents into easily inhaled powders. Ex. 20. None of this information is attributed to a government source.

In July 2002, after these reports and after the first search of Hatfill’s apartment on June 25, 2002, Hatfill retained Victor Glasberg as his attorney. Glasberg Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 12: 16-19. Glasberg believed that “any number of people in the media [had] overstepped their bounds. . . . prior to July of 2002 .” Id. at 141:1 - 142:6. To counter this information, Hatfill set out on a “public relations offensive” of his own to “turn [the] tide.” Id. at 138: 20-21, 178: 12-13.

Recognizing that Hatfill “continue[d] [to] get[] killed with bad press, national as well as local[,]” Hatfill drafted a statement and Glasberg forwarded that statement in July 2002 to Hatfill’s then-employer at Louisiana State University (“LSU”). Ex. 11, at 1. The statement detailed Hatfill’s background, including his medical training and employment history, and provided details about Hatfill’s involvement in the anthrax investigation, including how he had been interviewed by the FBI and had taken a polygraph examination. Id. at AGD29SJH00002-13. Hatfill’s statement corroborated the conversations that Hatfill reportedly had with Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun in February 2002, and how that interaction had purportedly cost Hatfill his job at SAIC in March 2002. Id. at AGD29SJH00014.

In his July statement, Hatfill was careful not to blame DOJ or the FBI for his troubles or for any wrongdoing for the information about him that had made its way into the press. He touted the professionalism of the FBI, noting that “[t]he individual FBI agents with whom [he had come] in contact during this entire process are sons and daughters of which America can be justifiably proud. They are fine men and women doing their best to protect this country.” Id. at AGD29SJH00016. Hatfill’s objection lay with the media, whom he labeled as “irresponsible[,]” for trading in “half-truths, innuendo and speculation, making accusations and slanting real world events . . . to gain viewer recognition, sell newspapers, and increase readership and network ratings.” Id.

As the investigation proceeded, however, Glasberg publicly criticized investigators on the date of the second search of Hatfill’s apartment, August 1, 2002, for obtaining a search warrant rather than accepting the offer Glasberg had allegedly made to cooperate. Ex. 22. So angry was Glasberg with investigators that he wrote a letter, dated the same day as the search, to Assistant United States Attorney Kenneth C. Kohl, denouncing the fact that the search had been conducted “pursuant to a search warrant.” Ex. 23. Glasberg forwarded a copy of this letter to Tom Jackman of the Washington Post, and to the Associated Press, the morning of August 1st. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 24, at 265:12 - 266:5; see also Ex. 25 (Glasberg memorandum to file, stating, among other things, that Glasberg showed Jackman Kohl letter on August 1, 2002).

On the day of the search, an FBI spokeswoman at the Bureau’s Washington field office, Debra Weierman, “confirmed that the search was part of the government’s anthrax investigation.” Ex. 25. Weierman added, however, that “she was unable to confirm that [investigators were acting on a search warrant] or to provide any further information about the search.” Id.

The next day – August 2, 2002 – Glasberg faxed the Kohl letter to members of the media. Ex. 26. In the fax transmittal sheet accompanying the Kohl letter, Glasberg also advised the media that: Dr. Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI earlier this year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI. He and his lawyer Tom Carter were told that the results were all favorable and that he was not a suspect in the case. Id. at AGD16SJH03106. Subsequent to the fax transmittal by Glasberg, Weierman confirmed that the search had been conducted pursuant to a search warrant, but only after receiving appropriate authorization from her superiors. Weierman Dep. Tran., Ex. 27, at 93:16 - 94:14.

Hatfill had also accompanied Glasberg for his interview with Jackman the day before to address the “media feeding frenzy.” Ex. 28. Glasberg provided Jackman with the promise of an “[e]xclusive personal statement” from Hatfill and the promise of “[n]o other press contacts pending publication” of the article. Id. Glasberg thus provided Jackman background information about Hatfill, Rosenberg’s statements, and other publications. Ex. 25. Hatfill reportedly complained to the Washington Post in the interview about the media feeding frenzy, and about how his “friends are bombarded” with press inquiries. Ex. 29, at 1. Hatfill also complained about the “[p]hone calls at night. Trespassing. Beating on my door. For the sheer purpose of selling newspapers and television.” Id.

Following this “media frenzy,” not to mention the two searches of Hatfill’s apartment, former Attorney General John Ashcroft was asked on August 6, 2002 (at an event addressing the subject of missing and exploited children) about Hatfill’s involvement in the investigation. Jane Clayson of CBS News asked General Ashcroft about the searches and whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 30, at 2. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person of interest.” General Ashcroft cautioned, however, that he was “not prepared to say any more at [that] time other than the fact that he is an individual of interest.” Id. At the same media event, Matt Lauer of NBC News also asked General Ashcroft whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 31. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person that – that the FBI’s been interested in.” Id. at 2. General Ashcroft cautioned that he was “not prepared to make a . . . comment about whether a person is officially a . . . suspect or not.” Id.

General Ashcroft made the same comments at a news conference in Newark, New Jersey on August 22, 2002, stating that Hatfill was a “person of interest to the Department of Justice, and we continue the investigation.” Ex. 32, at 1. As in his previous statements, General Ashcroft refused to provide further comment. Id. When asked upon deposition why he referred to Hatfill as a “person of interest” in the anthrax investigation in response to these media inquiries, General Ashcroft testified that he did so in an attempt to correct the record presented by the media that he was a “suspect” in the investigation, which he believed served a necessary law enforcement purpose. Ashcroft Dep. Tran., Ex. 33, at 81: 5-12; 103:18; 108: 9-13; 138: 5-7; 125: 18-21; 134:22 - 136:8. Prior to making these statements, General Ashcroft did not review or otherwise consult any investigative record, id. at 128:14 - 129:12, much less any record pertaining to Hatfill.

General Ashcroft’s initial statements on August 6, 2002 were followed, on August 11, 2002, by the first of Hatfill’s two nationally televised press conferences. Ex. 34. During his press conference, Hatfill lashed out at Rosenberg and other journalists and columnists who he believed wrote a series of “defamatory speculation and innuendo about [him].” Id. at 3. In apparent response to the “person of interest” statements, by contrast, he stated that he did “not object to being considered a ‘subject of interest’ because of [his] knowledge and background in the field of biological warfare.” Id. at 4. This was consistent with Hatfill’s statement to ABC News earlier in 2002 in which he stated that “his background and comments made him a logical subject of the investigation.” Ex. 35. As noted, moreover, Glasberg told the media -- almost a week before the first of General Ashcroft’s statements -- that “Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI [earlier that] year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI.” Ex. 26.

Hatfill’s second press conference was held on August 25, 2002. In the flyer publicizing the conference, Hatfill identified himself to the media -- in bold lettering -- as “the ‘person of interest’ at the center of the federal Government’s [anthrax] investigation.” DA, Exhibit 36.

Patrick Clawson joined the Hatfill team in early August 2002 as spokesperson and “fielded hundreds of inquiries from members of the press worldwide regarding Dr. Hatfill[.]” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson believed it best to employ a media strategy that would, in his words, “let it all hang out.” Id. at 50:10. Clawson felt that “permitting maximum sunshine into . . . Hatfill’s existence would do both him and the public the best good.” Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 50:16-18.

“The majority of Clawson’s communications with the press regarding this case have been oral and by telephone and he did not keep a press log or any other regular record of such contacts with the press.” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson nonetheless admitted upon deposition that he revealed numerous details about Hatfill’s personal and professional background to members of the press (Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 101:9 - 105:21), including Hatfill’s professional expertise (id. at 103:10 - 105:21), use of Cipro (id. at 123:16 - 130:11, 248: 8-13), whereabouts on the days of the attacks (id. at 148:12 - 158:10, 361:15 - 362:3), expertise in working with anthrax (id. at 194:13 - 195:8), former service in the Rhodesian Army (id. at 210:9 - 211:10), and drunk driving arrest (id. at 795: 7-9, 798: 4-6). Clawson also told reporters what had been purportedly removed from Hatfill’s apartment during the two searches of his apartment on June 25, 2002 and August 1, 2002 (including medical books and a jar of bacillus thuringiensis (“BT”)) (id. at 121: 6-12, 131:2 - 131:12, 14:8 - 147:3, 313: 3-10). Clawson also freely relayed to the press that bloodhounds had been presented to Hatfill during the investigation (id. at 200: 15-19); that Hatfill had been the subject of surveillance (id. at 123:12-15, 428: 19-21); that Hatfill had taken polygraphs (id. at 135:16 - 137:17); and that he had submitted to blood tests (id. at 137:18-138:5, 347: 6-10).

In furtherance of Clawson’s “sunshine” policy, Hatfill, Clawson, and Glasberg, together, provided countless on-the-record, on-background (i.e., for use, but not for attribution), and off-the-record (i.e., not for attribution or use) interviews to counter misinformation. Although Hatfill repeatedly claimed upon deposition not to remember what he said during these interviews, he acknowledged in his responses to the Agency Defendants’ interrogatories having such conversations with, in addition to Mr. Jackman, Judith Miller of The New York Times, Jeremy Cherkis of the City Paper, Guy Gugliotta of the Washington Post, David Kestenbaum of National Public Radio, Rick Schmidt of the LA Times, Rob Buchanan of NBC Dateline, Jim Popkin of NBC News, Dee Ann David and Nick Horrock of UPI, Gary Matsumato of Fox TV, Bill Gertz of the Washington Times, and David Tell of the Weekly Standard. Ex. 12, at 3-4. With respect to the Matsumato interview, Glasberg warned Hatfill before the interview that he “should not be quoted, nor should Matsumato say or imply that he spoke with him.” Ex. 38, at 1. Glasberg warned Hatfill that “Matsumato must be willing to go to jail rather than reveal word one of anything [he] says on ‘deep background.’” Id.

All of these disclosures became too much even for Glasberg, who attempted to put a stop to them. In August, when Jackman aired his exclusive interview with Glasberg and Hatfill, Glasberg heralded the success of his public relations strategy noting that “Rosenberg, Shane and Kristof are, [each] of them, in varying stages of sulking, licking their wounds, reacting defensively and changing their tune.” Ex. 39. Slowly Glasberg advised both Hatfill and Glasberg to observe “the rule of COMPLETE SILENCE regarding anything and everything about the case[.]” Ex. 40 (emphasis in original). Ultimately, in September 2002, Glasberg ordered Clawson to stand down, noting “[w]hat you know, you know, and you have put virtually all of that into the public record. Fine. That is where we are, and for good or ill we can and will deal with it. But we must put a full stop to any further conveyance of substantive data about ANYTHING from Steve to anyone [but his attorneys].” Ex. 41 (emphasis in original). To no avail. On October 5, 2002, Hatfill and Clawson appeared together at an Accuracy in Media Conference. Hatfill was asked about the reaction of bloodhounds, and stated, I’m not supposed to answer things against . . . but let me tell you something. They brought this good-looking dog in. I mean, this was the best-fed dog I have seen in a long time. They brought him in and he walked around the room. By the way, I could have left at anytime but I volunteered while they were raiding my apartment the second time, I volunteered to talk with them. The dog came around and I petted him. And the dog walked out. So animals like me (laughter). Ex. 42, at 2.

Disclosures from the Hatfill camp to the media continued. For example, between late 2002 and May 8, 2003, Hatfill’s current attorney, Tom Connolly, and CBS News reporter James Stewart had multiple telephone conversations and two lunch meetings. Ex. 43. According to Stewart, Connolly told Stewart that the investigation was focusing on Hatfill, and detailed at great length the FBI’s surveillance of Hatfill. In virtually every one of these conversations, Connolly encouraged Stewart to report on these subjects. Id. at 96.

At the time of the second search of his apartment in August 2002, Hatfill was working as a contract employee at the Louisiana State University (“LSU”) on a program to train first responders in the event of a biological attack. This program was funded by the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (“OJP”) as part of a cooperative agreement. Ex. 44. Under the terms of the cooperative agreement, OJP “maintain[ed] managerial oversight and control” of the program. Id. at 2. Following the second search of Hatfill’s apartment on August 1, 2002, Timothy Beres, Acting Director of OJP’s Office of Domestic Preparedness, directed that LSU “cease and desist from utilizing the subject-matter expert and course instructor duties of Steven J. Hatfill on all Department of Justice funded programs.” Ex. 45. LSU, meanwhile, had independently hired Hatfill to serve as Associate Director of its Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education. Following the second search, LSU placed Hatfill on administrative leave. Ex. 46. LSU then requested a background check of Hatfill. Ex. 47. During the course of that investigation, the University became concerned that Hatfill had forged a diploma for a Ph.D that he claimed to have received from Rhodes University in South Africa. Hatfill explained to Stephen L. Guillott, Jr., who was the Director of the Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education at LSU, that “[h]e assumed the degree had, in fact been awarded since neither his [thesis advisor] nor Rhodes University advised him to the contrary.” Ex. 48. LSU’s Chancellor, Mark A. Emmert, made “an internal decision to terminate [LSU’s] relationship with Dr. Hatfill quite independent of [the DOJ e-mail] communication.” Ex. 51.

Hatfill has now testified that in fact he created a fraudulent diploma with the assistance of someone he met in a bar who boasted that he could make a fraudulent diploma. Hatfill Dep. Tran., Ex. 49 at 19:20 - 20:12. Glasberg, moreover, has stated under oath that Hatfill’s earlier attempted explanation was untrue. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 314:10 - 317:2. In a nationally televised 60 Minutes episode that aired in March 2007, Connolly confirmed that Hatfill forged the diploma for the Ph.D from Rhodes University. Ex. 50, at 3.

Hatfill claims lost wages and other emotional damages resulting from General Ashcroft’s “person of interest” statements and other for-attribution statements by DOJ and FBI officials. He also seeks to recover for certain other alleged “leaks” by DOJ and FBI officials. Hatfill additionally asserts that the defendants violated the Act by purportedly failing to (1) maintain an accurate accounting of such disclosures, which he asserts is required by section 552a(c) of the Act; (2) establish appropriate safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of the records that were purportedly disclosed, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(10); (3) correct information that was disseminated about him that was inaccurate or incomplete, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(5); and (4) establish adequate rules of conduct, procedures, and penalties for noncompliance, or to train employees in the requirements of the Act, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(9). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.”

Here are excerpts, for example, from a talk Ali gave in London about how in going about establishing Islam in the West, fiqh (the law of islamic jurisprudence) needs to be suitable to the time and place.

“Our Need for a Fiqh Suitable to Our Time and Place
JIMAS (London) 1997 Conference: “Establishing Islam in the West”
http://209.85.215.104/search?q=cache:reB0t6cl01MJ:www.jimas.org/fiqhtime.pdf+London+Al-Timimi+JIMAS&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us

***

“It brings great pleasure to my heart to be once again with my brothers and sisters in the United Kingdom. This being my second participation at a JIMAS conference here in Leicester having been here four years ago.”

With that being said, we do have today’s lecture before us and it has been entitled “Our Need for a Fiqh Suitable to Our Time and Place.” Now as we take a moment to think about the title of this lecture, even though it is a bit lengthy, it is important that we do not forget the conference theme to which this lecture is one part, specifically, “Establishing Islam in the West in the Way of the Pious Predecessors.” The title lecture and the conference theme are such that they are inseparable.
***

“Should the military expedition prepared for Byzantium sent forth?
The Prophet had prepared an army to go forth toward Syria to fight the Byzantine Christians. The army was ready to leave Medina when the Prophet died.

The question the Companions faced was should the army continue forth or should it be diverted to deal with the apostates.”
***
“Yet while all these crises occurred at one time... our pious forefathers... found solutions to them and were able to deal effectively deal with them. Even though with many of these cases there were not direct texts from the Qur’an and the Sunna to show how to deal with these issues.”
****
“So therefore issues regarding jihad, how are the shares to be divided between the mujahidin. The classical books will discuss the share of a person riding a horse versus the share of a person on foot deriving those rulings from the Sunna of the Prophet. But you will find not find them discussing the share of a fighter pilot or a person riding in a tank because these issues, of course, did not exist in time. Modern warfare did not exist during those times when they wrote those classical books of fiqh.”
***
“One illustration is the application of the hudud on the battlefield, like whipping the one who drinks alcohol. We know that the punishment for intoxication is lashing.”

Ali continued: “Yet the scholars have understood that on the battlefield, the hudud are not to be applied.”

“Why? Not because we are negligent with Allah’s sharia; but because the greater benefit [establishing a Worldwide Caliphate] dictates otherwise. If you are on the battlefield and attempt to apply the hudud on your sinful soldiers; they might out of anger (as they are now an object of punishment because of their crime) decide to go to the ranks of enemies.”

[Having been questioned by the FBI and Secret Service a couple years earlier in connection with WTC 1993, Ali can appreciate that anyone questioned might cooperate with the FBI if they get pissed at the powers-that-be.]

A month after his colleague’s residence was searched, I questioned Dr. Alibek about silica trying to understand why authorities had arrested an affiliate as a material witness in a charity investigation. The transcript is below — from a Washington Post online chat. The scientist I was curious about was an animal geneticist / food researcher who mixed silica in making animal feedstuffs whose supervisor consulted (doing statistical work) on a US Army funded device called the Microbial Vac. The Microbial Vac concentrated anthrax by a factor of ten and sequentially filtered it. The PhD was expert at mixing with silica. The inventor of the Microbial Vac says it could be used to weaponize anthrax but only on a small scale. The FBI didn’t question him and the magistrate made them relax the conditions of his home confinement. He lived about a mile from me. Much later I called the PhD and he thanked me for my concern but said too much was going on to talk. So I really know very little about the fellow. But below is the transcript where I interrogate Dr. Alibek on the technical issues.

War in Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction, with Ken Alibek , Author, Professor, George Mason University, Washington Post, March 31, 2003

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/liveonline/03/special/world/sp_iraq_alibek033103.htm

“Syracuse, N.Y.: Dr. Alibek,

With respect to the anthrax mailings, do you agree that the electrostatic charge was not removed? And that small scale production is indicated? And with respect to your letter to the editor to The Washington Post (with Dr. Meselson), could you explain your view for the reason silica was detected in the anthrax? How do you explain the floatability? Under all the circumstances, do you believe the science points away from (or toward) a state sponsored program? Relatedly, do you feel al Qaeda is responsible (with or without help from a state-employed scientist)? Finally, do you feel you have a sufficient basis to form an expert opinion on these particular issues (based on what you have been able to see)?

Ken Alibek: We need to understand that there is no specific technological procedure to remove electric charges. All discussions about to remove or not remove are absolutely senseless. Yes, electric charges could decrease it, but there’s not specific.

These anthrax mailings create electric charge and this went through mail machines and had friction, so to say they didn’t have an electric charge is not right.

To talk about silica, when I’ve looked at micrographs, I haven’t seen any silica in the samples. We shouldn’t forget that silica could be contained in an outer shell of an anthrax spore. Based on this information its hard to see if it is foreign or domestic. What you can see is that there was a lot of incorrect info published in the media. This anthrax wasn’t sophisticated, didn’t have coatings, had electric charge and many other things.

We can form an expert opinion on what kind of anthrax it was, but based on this data, we can’t say what the source was.”

Then a friend of mine from Dallas asked (if he’s Abbott, I’m Costello):

“Dallas, Tex.: A published analysis of the anthrax mailed to government and media in Oct. 2001 shows unambiguously that silicon dioxide was present on the surface of the spores. The work was performed by the AFIP and the results can be seen here.
Does this mean, in your opinion, that the anthrax was made in a state-sponsored bioweapons lab?

Ken Alibek: We paid to much attention to the silicon oxide on the surface of the spores. I haven’t seen any silicon presence on micrographs of this anthrax. We shouldn’t forget that silica would be a natural component. In this case, in my opinion, silica was a natural presence in these spores. There was no special need to add silica to this anthrax.

Ken Alibek: Presence or absence of silica says nothing about whether it was state sponsored. It’s very hard from technical characteristics to make conclusions about possible source. That’s why in my opinion, we should focus on two major directions. We have to do technical examination — equipment, source of the spores. And regular interrogation. Interview people who could be sources of valuable information. One more thing, we need to investigate how — we know when these letters have been sent and locations and we need to check and see what people would be at that location at a certain time. It should be more technical issues, though.”

Then I got really clever and went anonymous, disguising myself as “Somewhere, USA” (It reminds me of the Indy movie where the fellow who betrays Indy says “I lied about being a double agent.”)

“Somewhere, USA: Would silica be detected (in a comparable manner as in the product used in the anthrax mailings in the U.S.) if the instructions for bacillus thuringiensis were followed, such as described in the UN’s description by the Food and Agriculture Organization below? Is bacteriologist Abdul Qadoos Khan, in whose home Khalid Mohammed was reportedly arrested, expert in the production of B.T. from his work for the UN in Sudan and Zambia? What was the field of expertise of that bacteriologist?

Product Harvesting and Formulation of Microbial Insecticide.

Ken Alibek: Again, I said before that silica could be naturally present in spores. In this case, we shouldn’t over focus on silica. There are many other parameters and issues we need to pay attention to.”

On the very next question, I uncloaked again:

“Syracuse, N.Y.: In the Air Force Journal, May 2002, DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency Younger said that essentially the same process to make powderized anthrax is used to make dried milk. Could someone expert in making dried milk make the product used in the Daschle and Leahy letters?

Ken Alibek: Let me answer it this way — yes, actually, it would be the same technique to make a powderized anthrax, but at the same time we shouldn’t overestimate the complexity of making it. My opinion is this — in order to make this powder there is no need to have sophisticated equipment. Such a small amount, keep in mind that the people who did it could have very simple equipment and very simple procedures. There is no need for industrial equipment. It would be enough to have small equipment. But at the same time, when people talk about it being “weaponized” — I can’t say it was that sophisticated. I saw the particles — they were the size of 40 microns. We can’t say anything about the quality of this powder because we saw it after it had gone through mail sorting machines which create very powerful pressure. There was no coating. What I saw on micrograph was no coating. It was natural spores and for some people they mistakenly thought it wasn’t. Some experts said there was more charge because it was fluffy and made a cloud when put on scale. This is another mistake. It did have charge. IT went through the sorting machine and it’s a matter of friction. In this case, it meant that this powder had the same electric charge — this is normal. In this case, I would say it’s a long story, but there have been so many mistakes made in the conclusions, but I hope these mistakes were just in the media, but not the case with the FBI and do know more information.”

Bottom-line: Ken knew about the raid of his colleague whose office was about 15 feet from him. It had been the month before and the subject of national press. He was sensitive on the issue of silica because he and Dr. Bailey had filed a March 2001 patent and the department had know-how relating to microencapsulation. Ed is a lay person. So when he uses his impressive bold, red font — you will ignore it if you have any sense. Ed doesn’t have the relevant training and doesn’t know what he is talking about. My consulting military scientist who makes anthrax simulant for a living says that the patent (there is a related patent also that involves removing the silica) is an encapsulation patent — which is precisely the method that Zawahiri read about in 1999 in the book about Ken. Ken and Charles are not to blame. Hindsight is 20/20. Ayman is a clever guy.

Two of the most notable trials in Guantanamo mililtary commissions possibly bearing on the solution to the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings are KSM and al-Hawsawi.

Fact Sheet: The 16 Prisoners Charged in Guantanamo’s Military Commissions
Posted May 27, 2008 | 07:53 AM (EST)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy-worthington/fact-sheet-the-16-prisone_b_103628.html

Andrew Worthington summarizes:

“8. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). Reportedly the third most important figure in al-Qaeda, after Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, KSM, who was captured in Pakistan in March 2003, and the four men described below are among the 14 “high-value detainees” transferred to Guantánamo in September 2006 after being held for years in secret prisons run by the CIA. KSM confessed in his military tribunal in Guantánamo last year (convened to confirm that he was an “enemy combatant” who could be tried by Military Commission) that he was “responsible for the 9/11 operation, from A to Z.”

US citizen and NYC resident Uzair Paracha, when arrested, said he had met in February 2003 a chemistry professor who was supposed to help Al Qaeda with biological and chemical weapons. It was a big break, therefore, when the son of the imprisoned blind sheik, Abdel Rahman, was captured in Quetta, Pakistan in mid-February 2003 and KSM was captured no later than the beginning of March. Mohammed Abdel-Rahman from Aghanistan had spoken alongside Ali Al-Timimi at IANA conferences in 1993 and 1996. The blind sheik’s son Mohammed Abdel-Rahman had recently had been in contact with Khalid Mohammed, Al Qaeda’s #3, who goes before a military tribunal this year. Two weeks after Abdel-Rahman’s capture, authorities raided microbiologist Ali Al-Timimi’s townhouse in Alexandria, VA, and searched the residence of a couple of PhD level drying experts in Idaho and Upstate NY, along with various others associated with IANA. Mohammed Abdel-Rahman then provided information that led authorities to the home of the bacteriologist that had harbored KSM. Anthrax spray drying documents were found, both on a computer and in hard copy.

In June 2003, a UN report explained that Al-Qaeda has a “WMD Committee,” which according to the report, “is known to have approached a number of Muslim scientists to assist the terrorist network with the creation and procurement of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.” Mohammed Abdel Rahman, a member of the 3-member WMD committee, knew Ali Al-Timimi. Ali Al-Timimi conducted a summer camp at a park in Frederick, Maryland over the years. The FBI searched the park’s ponds more than once claiming that Dr. Hatfill had once suggested that someone could weaponize anthrax and discard the equipment in a pond.

Mohammed Abdel-Rahman is one of the missing prisoners whose absence from Guantanamo leads human rights researchers to believe that the CIA is still operating secret prisons.

The very well-informed Pakistani journalist Zahid Hussain says in his book, Frontline Pakistan that KSM was actually captured in February from a house in Quetta — presumably the same one where Abdel-Rahman was captured. Supposedly he had been tracked for four weeks before that. Zahid Hussain says that they did not make his arrest public because they wanted to capture other al-Qaeda members or sympathizers, such as the Qadoos family. This would be consistent with the strident denials by the bacteriologist’s family that KSM was captured at their home.

The timing of the raid on Al-Timimi’s house two weeks later — and the arrest of animal geneticist and experienced PhD researcher expert at mixing with silica — suggests that it was connected. The FBI had been engaged in surveillance and “trashing” and interception of targets related to the charity for many months. The investigation — including arrests, searches, and some convictions — apparently did not produce any prosecutable evidence of anyone’s involvement in Amerithrax. The timing of the February 26, 2003 raids, however, perhaps related to what Mohammed Abdel-Rahman and KSM told authorities, for example, about various people in the US to include Aafia Siddiqui. Aafia was connected to the blind sheik’s Al Kifah organization. An AUSA has said that Aafia was prepared to participate in an anthrax attack if asked. She opened up a mailbox in Gaithersburg, Maryland as part of operations.

The Washington Post explained that “What the documents and debriefings show, the first official said, is that “KSM was involved in anthrax production, and [knew] quite a bit about it.” Barton Gellman in the Post explained that Al Qaeda had recruited competent scientists, including a Pakistani microbiologist who the officials declined to name. “The documents describe specific timelines for producing biochemical weapons and include a bar graph depicting the parallel processes that must take place between Days 1 and 31 of manufacture. Included are inventories of equipment and indications of readiness to grow seed stocks of pathogen in nutrient baths and then dry the resulting liquid slurry into a form suitable for aerosol dispersal.” The Washington Post story notes that U.S. officials said the evidence does not indicate whether al Qaeda completed manufacture. The documents are undated and unsigned and cryptic about essential details.

Worthington writes:

“10. Mustafa al-Hawsawi. A Saudi, who was captured with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, al-Hawsawi is accused of sourcing funding for the 9/11 attacks from Dubai. In his tribunal at Guantánamo, he admitted providing support for jihadists, including transferring money for some of the 9/11 hijackers, although he denied that he was a member of al-Qaeda. Last week, his lawyer, Army Maj. Jon Jackson, sought fruitlessly to delay his arraignment, in particular because he has only been allowed to meet his client twice, and “has not received any potential evidence against al-Hawsawi supporting charges that ‘allege a complex conspiracy spanning several years,’” as the Associated Press put it.”

Comment on al-Hawsawi’s anthrax connection:

On March 23, 2003, the Washington Post reported on documents allegedly discovered at the Abdul Qadoos Khan residence — on a seized laptop — relating to biochemical weapons. The documents indicated that Al Qaeda leaders may already have manufactured some of them. The documents at the Qadoos home reveal that Al Qaeda had a feasible production plan for anthrax. Confronted with scanned handwritten notes on the computer, Khalid Mohammed reportedly began to talk about Al Qaeda’s anthrax production program. KSM, however, denies that it was his computer — he says it was the computer of Mustafa Hawsawi, who was captured at the home the same day. In 2001, before departing for the UAE, Al-Hawsawi had worked in the Al Qaeda media center (Al Sahab (Clouds) in Kandahar. The letter containing the first anthrax went to the American Media in Florida had blue and pink clouds on it.

Hawsawi worked under KSM who in turn worked for Zawahiri. Al-Hawsawi was a facilitator for the 9/11 attacks and its paymaster, working from the United Arab Emirates, sending thousands to Bin Al-Shibh in the summer of 2001. After 9/11, he returned to Afghanistan where he met separately with Bin Laden, Zawahiri and spokesman Abu Ghaith. KSM worked closely with al-Hawsawi and it would make perfect sense that the computer actually belonged to al-Hawsawi. The fact that the anthrax spray drying documents were on that computer, however, and that he had worked for Al Sahab in Kandahar in 2000, serves to suggest that the undated documents predated 9/11, particularly given that extremely virulent anthrax was later found in Kandahar (according to Ron Suskind in ONE PERCENT SOLUTION). At the same time, it suggests that Al-Hawsawi has personal knowledge relevant to anthrax. Al-Hawawi in turn worked with Aafia Siddiqui’s husband-to-be, KSM’s nephew Al-Baluchi, in the UAE in the summer of 2001 providing logistical support for the hijackers.

Hawsawi worked as a financial manager for Bin Laden when he was in Sudan. He was associated with Egyptian Islamic Jihad shura leader Mahjoub, who was Bin Laden’s farm manager in Sudan. Mahjoub was the subject of the anthrax threat in January 2001 in Canada, upon announcement of his bail hearing. See early February 2001 PDB about this. The day after Mahjoub’s bail was denied on October 5, 2001, the potent stuff was sent to US Senators Daschle and Leahy.

In addition to establishing him as paymaster for the hijackers, Al-Hawsawi’s computer disks reportedly also included lists of contributors worldwide, to include bank account numbers and names of organizations that have helped finance terror attacks. In press accounts, one unnamed government official confirmed that the information has yielded the identities of about a dozen suspected terrorists in the US.

In his substituted testimony in the Moussaoui case, Al-Hawsawi says he became part of Al Qaeda’s media committee in Afghanistan in about July 2000, and KSM joined the committee in February 2001. Hawsawi lived at the media office. For about 4-5 months in 2000, Hawsawi worked as a secretary on al Qaeda’s media committee. Hawsawi’s role “was to copy compact discs and reprint articles for the brothers at the guesthouse in Qandahar. After 2000, Hawsawi worked at the direction of Sheikh Mohammed, transferring funds, and procuring goods.”

The first time that Hawsawi was asked to be come involved in operational activities was about March 2001, when he took his second trip to the UAE. Although Sheikh Mohammed did not use the word “operation,” Sheikh Mohammed told Hawsawi that he would be purchasing items, receiving and possibly sending money, and possibly meeting individuals whom Hawsawi would contact or who would contact him.

Sheik Mohammed told Hawsawi that he would be in contact with individuals called ‘Abd Al-Rahman (Muhammad Atta) and the “Doctor” (Nawaf al-Hazmi). Atta called Hawsawi four times while in the US. Hawsawi says he was never in contact with Hani or Nawaf while in the US. On September 9, Ramzi bin Shibh told him the date of the planned operation and urged that he return to Pakistan. He flew out on 9/11 and after a night in Karachi, flew on to Quetta.

Hawsawi stated repeatedly that he never conducted any activity of any type with or on behalf of Moussaoui and had no knowledge of who made Moussaoui’s travel arrangements. Documents reportedly show that al-Hawsawi worked with the Dublin cell to finance Moussaoui’s international travel. Hamid Aich was an EIJ operative there who once had lived with Ressam, the so-called millennium bomber, in Canada.

The indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui named al-Hawsawi as an unindicted co-conspirator. Moussaou had tried to call KSM and Hawsawi as witnessses. Al-Timimi discussed helping with Moussaoui’s defense with Bin Laden’s sheik al-Hawali by telephone.

One reason not to underestimate al-Hawsawi’s possible role in an anthrax operation is his contact with al-Marri. Al-Marri, who entered the country on September 10, 2001, was researching chemicals in connection with a “second wave.” Al-Marri was also drafting emails to KSM. Although al-Marri denies being in contact with Hawsawi, phone records show otherwise. Email evidence also confirms messages drafted by al-Marri to KSM. An article this year by Susan Schmidt of the Washington Post on al-Marri notes that al-Marri picked up $13,000 in cash from al-Hawsawi. Al-Marri made the mistake of opening the briefcase containing the money in bundles and peeling off a few hundred dollars to pay his bail after being stopped on a traffic charge a couple days after 9/11. After casing targets in NYC, al-Marri had his computer sent to someone in Washington.

http://www.anthraxandalqaeda.com

KSM admitted to being ‘’directly in charge’’ of ‘’managing and following up on the Cell for the Production of Biological Weapons, such as anthrax and others, and following up on Dirty Bomb Operations on American Soil.’’

There was a FrontPage article this week that discussed Adnan El-Shukrijumah and Jdey in the context of a dirty bomb cell.

I don’t know what to make of it. Putting aside the events at the Canadian university (McMasters), it seems that the eyewitness account of both El-Shukrijumah and Jdey at a Denny’s in Avon, Colorado is pretty thin. An eyewitness account, without more, seems very weak, especially given reports that Jdey and his sidekick Boussara entered Turkey in 2002. Touring Colorado’s Rocky Mountain National Park this week, everyone in the van had a different guess as to the identification of the bull deer we were looking at.

http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=E29D7031-7223-48B3-8209-F468FD04ECD5

America in Ashes?
By Christopher S. Carson
FrontPageMagazine.com | Monday, May 26, 2008

“According to the New York Daily News and its sources, the captive KSM told his interrogators that Osama bin Laden was planning a “nuclear hell storm” in America. *** KSM’s recovered laptop had corroborating details.

The agents learned that the chain of command for this new operation went simply: bin Laden, his terrorist doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri, a mysterious scientist named “Dr. X,” and an operational coordinator. The scientist turned out to be Dr. A.Q. Khan, the founder of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, national hero, and nuke material proliferator extraordinaire. The operations ringleader was known as “Jafer the Pilot” (Jaffer al-Tayyar). This ID was corroborated by former al-Qaeda No. 3 Abu Zubaydah when he himself was waterboarded.

Dr. Khan’s input was important: One month before 9/11, according to The Washington Post, bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, met around a blazing campfire with Pakistani scientists from an A.Q. Khan-affiliated group called Umma Tameer-E-Nau, to discuss how al-Qaeda could build a nuclear device themselves and ship it to a target.

The night meeting went well. ‘Jafer the Pilot” is the nom de guerre of U.S. citizen Adnan el-Shukrijumah. Young, intelligent, fluent in multiple languages and a trained jet pilot who had apparently been in flight schools with Mohammed Atta, Shukrijumah had studied and worked with other jihadis at the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at McMaster University in Canada. But one day all the terrorists disappeared from campus forever.

***

One thing is certain: homicidal doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri’s made a decision when KSM was captured: Cancel that planned mass cyanide gas attack in the New York subway system. He told the operational plotters to stand down because “we have something better in mind,” which would presumably suck up all the resources then available to him. What would be “better” than a mass cyanide attack in a confined urban rush-hour space? There is only one thing more murderous.”

Additional comment: I don’t think think a dirty bomb attack is the only thing more murderous than a cyanide attack in a subway.

Bottom-line: The recent report seems to provide corroboration for the suggestion that the Jafar the Pilot letter (among the Harmony Documents) to Midhat Mursi is by El-Shukrijumah and not some other Jafar the Pilot. It makes perfect sense that he would be working with Jdey, whether or not they were together in Avon, Colorado.

It was after the “extremely virulent” anthrax was found in Kandahar that, a few days before Christmas 2003, the country returned to “orange” temporarily and brought in the New Year under high alert. Then, in late February 2004, Zawahiri promised another attack on the homeland was coming. This, perhaps overblown (perhaps not) threat was embodied in the dimunitive Adnan G. El-Shukrijumah aka Jafar the Pilot. Jafar the Pilot’s father was the mentor of Ali Al-Timimi’s mentor, Bilal Philips.

Adnan G. El-Shukrijumah was born on August 4, 1975, in Medina, Saudi Arabia to a 16-year-old mother and a 44-year-old Islamic scholar who had headed a mosque in Brooklyn. El-Shukrijumah’s father once translated for the blind sheik. His father, Gilshair, testified as a character witness at a trial of defendants charged with conspiring to blow up New York City landmarks in 1995. He appeared on behalf of Clement Hampton El, who was convicted of plotting to blow up the Holland tunnel and the United Nations. He was the mentor of Bilal Philips who in turn was the mentor of GWU microbiology grad student of Ali Timimi. Adnan’s father had been sent to the Caribbean country of Trinidad and Tobago by the Saudi government as an Islamic missionary. The family lived there until 1983. When his father was transferred to New York City to lead a Brooklyn mosque, the family returned to Saudi Arabia.

Brooklyn had long been important to the infrastructure in the US for obtaining jihadi recruits. Established in the mid-1980s, the Al-Kifah (or Struggle) Refugee Center in New York originally recruited and raised funds for Mujahedeen headed for Afghanistan. In Peshawar, the organization was headed by Mohammed Islambouli, the brother of Anwar Sadat’s assissin. In 1993, the group announced it was switching its operations to Bosnia. These “mujahideen” recruitment centers spread throughout the USA, to places such as Portland, Oregon, which opened a branch in October 1994 — and to Boston where Aafia Siddiqui attended Brandeis and MIT. In the mid-1990s, KSM and Islambouli were given safe haven in Doha, Qatar by the religious minister there. Mohammed Islambouli and his plan to attack using the aircraft and other means was the subject of a December 4, 1998 Presidential Daily Brief that the CIA provided President Clinton.

In 1995, after Adnan had graduated from high school, his father retired from his missionary job as Imam in Brooklyn and the family to Florida, moving the family to Miramar in 1996. The modest retirement home was next door to a small mosque at which the father would preach. For the next two years, Adnan studied computer engineering at Broward Community College, though he did not get a degree. Imam at the mosque next door to his house, Adnan’s Dad often taught at other mosques. One of the mosques he and Adnan would frequent was in Fort Lauderdale — the one across from Franklin Park. It was there that Adnan met Jose Padilla, the ‘’enemy combatant’’ charged in connection with a plot to explode a radioactive bomb in the United States and arrested en route to meet Adham Hassoun, another worshiper at the mosque.

The former imam of that mosque, Awad, confirms El-Shukrijumah and Padilla knew each other. Adnan’s father counseled Padilla’s wife when he left to go to Egypt and she sought a divorce. (When the Padillas were divorced in 2001 Jose Padilla gave an address in Egypt.)

Adnan was responsible at a young age, with his father absent in Brooklyn. The family acknowledges that Adnan had a quick temper. In 1999, Adnan held garage sales and car washes to raise money for Muslim refugees of the war in Bosnia. The fundraising supported Global Relief Fund, which the government has alleged funded terrorist organizations. In May 2001, he went to Saudi Arabia via Trinidad and Panama to sell Islamic goods and trinkets. He didn’t like the permissiveness of American society — he objected to scantily clad women. He wanted to get married. He allegedly was at one or more meetings in the Summer of 2001 in Pakistan at which KSM and Sufaat were present. After 9/11, the FBI began visiting the family home. His mother told him to stay away and not come home. ‘’I tell him we don’t want to know where he is.’’ She said the last she knew he was teaching English in Morocco and had gotten married.

Adnan El Shukrijumah holds a green card but did not become a U.S. citizen. He is still a citizen of Guyana. Saudi Arabia is quite emphatic that he is not a citizen of Saudi Arabia. Officials say he uses a half-dozen aliases and passports, from such countries as Canada, Trinidad and Saudi Arabia.

Not only is he an alleged associate of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed but of Ramzi Binalshibh, another key 9/11 plotter. George Tenet, former CIA Director, noted that Ramzi Yousef had a CBRN role. Apparently, Adnan Shukrijumah accompanied Mohammed Atta and another hijacker in visiting an INS office in Miami in May 2001. The INS employee is 75% sure it was him, having commented to a colleague at the time at how good looking the fellow was.

The Special Branch Trinidad & Tobago Police said they have records that El Shukrijumah was in Trinidad in 2001 and 2002 into 2003. The Express was told: “We have records on him coming and leaving including the fact that he left on a BWIA flight for London in 2001 but on the last occasion he was here we only have records on him coming to Trinidad but none of him leaving.” El Shukrijumah has been associated with the Darul-Uloom Institute, an Islamic institute in Central Trinidad. Part of the problem is that El Shukrijumah has several passports including a Trinidad and Tobago passport and has in the past used several aliases to escape law enforcement agencies. He is known to have Guyanese links. The US authorities also report that he may have been in Canada in 2002 looking for nuclear material for a “dirty bomb.”

US officials found a letter advising Egyptian El-Maati that he had been granted Canadian citizenship and a patient’s card from Toronto General Hospital. His brother, Ahmad Abu-Elmaati, in a written confession, that he now has recanted, described a plan to drive a truck bomb into the Parliament buildings in Ottawa.

In late May 2004, Jafar allegedly was spotted a Tegucigalpa Internet cafe. According to Honduras security official, he made phone calls to France and the United States. The witness, the owner of the cafe, says he was with two other men, “all badly dressed and bearded,” who spoke English and French. Security Minister Oscar Alvarez claimed Shukrijumah was involved in a plot to disrupt shipping in the Panama Canal.

On September 29, 2001, Dr. Alibek — just a matter of feet from the microbiologist working with Bin Laden’s sheik and known to be a Salafist hardliner — was interviewed on the threat of anthrax. Dr. Osterholm, an expert at the University of Minnesota addressed the threat of aerial spraying. (He and his colleagues were a couple miles from where Zacarias Moussaoui in August was found with cropdusting documents on his laptop.)

Might relatively costless, biosecurity precautions served to avoid the need for $50 billion that then was spent to address the threat?

“Mr. ALIBEK: When we talk and deal with, for example, nuclear weapons, it’s not really difficult to count how much of one or another substance we’ve got in the hands. When you talk about biological agents, in this case it’s absolutely impossible to say whether or not something has been stolen.”

ZWERDLING: Alibek and other researchers say they don’t have evidence that scientists actually did steal deadly germs and sell them to terrorists. But when they look at other countries that have produced bio-warfare agents and look at their possible connections to terrorists, it makes them nervous, such as Iraq, Iran, Egypt and North Korea. And forget secret deals. Terrorists might be able to buy some biological warfare agents on the open market.

Until a few years ago, for instance, researchers could order tiny amounts of anthrax through the mail from at least one commercial lab right here in the United States [from American Type Culture Collection, which by 2001 was located partly in George Mason University’s Discovery Hall along with an adjacent building; ATCC co-sponsored Ali’s bioinformatics program and he had access to the ATCC facilities]. The US government has cracked down on that trade, but bio-weapon specialists say people can still buy anthrax from companies in other countries. So let’s suppose that a group of terrorists could get a sample of virulent anthrax***”

Next question: Could they keep those microbes alive and grow enough of them so they could launch a major biological attack? Alibek says it’s not easy. The terrorists would have to maintain all kinds of precise conditions in a laboratory—oxygen levels, the right nutrients. And that means they’d have to hire renegade scientists who know how to do it, or they’d have to learn themselves.

Mr. ALIBEK: Biological weapons—it’s not rocket science. And people with knowledge, more or less sophisticated, they’re able to develop, manufacture and deploy biological weapons.

***

ZWERDLING: Osterholm studies bio-terrorism and public health at the University of Minnesota. He’s worried about new aerosol products which researchers have developed for factories and hospitals. He says unfortunately those inventions are also perfect for spreading diseases.

Mr. OSTERHOLM: Next time you go through a department store and you come near the perfume section, you know how you can smell that for aisles away. Well, that’s a very simplistic model for what an aerosol particle technology device does. Hardly that little spray bottle is a sophisticated weapon, yet we know that with what kinds of things we’ve developed today, you can have devices that can, in fact, take large buildings and fill them with these kinds of sprays that would have infectious disease agents in them.

ZWERDLING: Osterholm says if terrorists use these sprays to spread anthrax, they could potentially kill thousands of people. Anthrax isn’t contagious, but anybody who’s on the site and breathes the germs could get infected.

— “Possibility of bio-terrorism,” National Public Radio, September 29, 2001

Dr. Alibek testified before the House Armed Services Committee Oversight Panel on Terrorism on May 23, 2000 about the issue of proliferation of biological weapons.

“Biological weapons are relatively inexpensive and easy to produce. Although the most sophisticated and effective versions require considerable equipment and scientific expertise, primitive versions can be produced in a small area with minimal equipment by someone with limited training.
***
By far, the most effective mode for applying biological weapons is an aerosol cloud. Such a cloud is made up of microscopic particles and is therefore invisible. It can be produced in several ways, most of which involve either an explosion (some type of bomb) or spraying (usually involving a special nozzle on a spray tank). The effectiveness of the cloud is determined by numerous factors, such as the amount of agent that survives the explosion or spraying, and the wind and weather conditions outdoors or air flow and ventilation indoors.”

“The interest of terrorist groups in biological weapons is no surprise. Biological weapons have a number of very attractive features for terrorist uses. Their killing power can approach that of nuclear weapons. They are relatively inexpensive to make. A small-scale biological weapons attack using a common disease organism, such as tularemia or plague, can be masked as a natural outbreak. The effects of a biological weapons attack are not apparent for several days, allowing the perpetrator tune to vanish. The raw material—disease- producing strains of microorganisms—fairly easy to obtain. And the techniques and equipment that are used in ordinary biotechnology research and production can be used for biological weapons.”

Comment:
Ayman in a memo to Atef said the group had become interested in biological weapons only because US officials kept telling the world how easy they were to make.

“Terrorists interested in biological weapons are on the level of state- sponsored terrorist organizations such as that of Osama bin Laden; on the level of large, independent organizations such as Aura Shrinikyo; or on the level of individuals acting alone or in concert with small radical organizations.”

Comment:
Given that Ken has told me he knew Ali was a hardliner — more recently he described Ali as a fanatic — it would seem that GMU should have been aware of the threat of such “individuals acting alone or in conert with small radical organizations” (if not Al Qaeda itself).

Dr. A continued:

“Although these groups will produce biological weapons with varying levels of sophistication, they all can potentially cause great damage. *** Furthermore, there is no doubt that we will see future uses of biological weapons by terrorist groups, as there have been several attempts already.”

***
For terrorist groups, the most likely source of such knowledge would be state-sponsored biological weapons programs, which have the financial and scientific wherewithal to perfect production and deployment techniques. Since the Soviet Union and Russia had the most sophisticated and powerful biological weapons program on earth, the former Soviet states present a particular proliferation threat. The tremendous knowledge amassed by former Soviet scientists would be extremely useful to both military and terrorist organizations.”

Comment:
Given he knows the threat is grave, and his program would be a prime target for infiltration, what steps were taken to ensure that someone not allied with the Salafi-Jihadis and preaching on the signs of the coming day of judgment was not sharing his fax, mail drop and water fountain?

Having worked for Andrew Card once (for two months in 1996 when Mr. Card was Secretary of Transportation), did Ali use Mr. Card as a reference?

Dr. Alibek continued:

“When most people think of proliferation, they imagine weapons export. In the case of biological weapons, they picture international smuggling either of ready-made weapons material, or at least of cultures of pathogenic microorganisms. However, this area of proliferation is of the least concern. Even without such assistance, a determined organization could obtain virulent strains of microorganisms from their natural reservoirs (such as soil or animals), from culture libraries that provide such organisms for research purposes, or by stealing cultures from legitimate laboratories.”

Comment:
American Type Culture Collection co-sponsored Ali’s bioinformatics program. I am told by a former ATCC scientist — the scientist says she/he was terminated for an expressed concern for security — that Ali would have had access to the ATCC patent repository (as distinguished from its less interesting online catalog).

Dr. Alibek continued:

“Given the current economic situation in the states of the former Soviet Union, the incentive to sell equipment and knowledge suitable for biological weapons production without regard to their eventual use is great both for the government and for individual scientists and businessmen. The Russian government has long been short of funds, and its biotechnology arena has also been adversely affected. Many of its scientists are unemployed; those that are employed are paid poorly or not at all Some of them have been forced to turn to other lines of work, such as street vending. It is important for the international community to ensure that these scientists have legitimate, decent- paying work to do in their fields.

The proliferation issue is particularly complex for biological weapons. In many cases, the same equipment and knowledge that can be used to produce biological weapons can also be used to produce legitimate biotechnological products ***”

Dr. Alibek concluded:

“To protect ourselves from the threat of biological weapons, we must increase our awareness and understanding of the threat, strengthen current international agreements and increase transparency ***”

Comment:
ATCC refuses to say whether they had virulent Ames in its patent repository. Dr. Bailey refuses to confirm Ali was not more than 15 feet from both Dr. A and Dr. B.

On March 3, 1999, before Ayman wrote his memo to Atef about biological weapons, and just a week before before the blind sheik’s lawyer (and detainees on trial) announced that Ayman was going to use weaponized anthrax against US targets, Dr. A, then Program Manager at Battelle Memorial Institute, testified before the House Intelligence Committee.

“POTENTIAL IMPACT OF TERRORIST USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
While we should not ignore the continuing threat of military use of biological weapons, we are not at present poised for war with any nation known or suspected to possess biological weapons (with the possible exception of Iraq and few other countries). A more likely threat is that posed by the terrorist use of biological weapons. Terrorist use can occur on the level of state-sponsored terrorism; on the level of a large, independent organization like the Aura Shinrikyo cult in Japan; or on the level of an individual acting alone or in concert with a small organization, such as a militia. For these three typerrorist attack, the expected impact will differ considerably.
There is no doubt, however, that the potential impact is great. A report published by the Centers for Disease Control in April, 1997 evaluated the economic impact of a bioterrorist attack for each of three different biological agents: anthrax, brucellosis, and tularemia. Their model showed that the expected economic impact from suck an attack would range from $477.7 million to $26.2 billion per 100,000 persons exposed. A copy of this report is attached.

Furthermore, there is no doubt that we will see future uses of biological weapons by terrorist groups ***”

“However, my analysis of several recently issued handbooks for military use indicated that there were still a considerable number of substantive inaccuracies. Thus, further revisions are necessary for these handbooks.

In my opinion, these inaccuracies largely stem from lack of knowledge. Since the U.S. stopped all offensive biological weapons research in 1969 and significantly curtailed its defensive research until 1994, U.S. knowledge of biological weapons is obsolete in many respects. Only in the last few years has there been a concerted attempt to “catch up.” We must continue our recently renewed efforts to understand biological weapons and to analyze the actual threat they present.”

Comment:
This turned out to be unfortunate. This way when Ken’s DARPA-funded program was infiltrated by a microbiologist working with Al Qaeda supporters, Bin Laden was sure to have access to cutting edge know-how.”

On May 20, 1998, Dr. A, then Program Manager, Battelle Memorial Institute, testified before the Joint Economic Committee on the subject of “Terrorist and Intelligence Operations: Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy.” It was July 1998 that the laptop of the military commander of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (evidencing Ayman’s interest in weaponizing anthrax) was seized after his capture outside a restaurant in Baku, Azerbaijan.

Ali’s testimony in posts above (from 1999 and 2000) derived from the same draft which very likely will have been used also in earlier testimony. And so Ayman had his testimony as a blueprint early on for use in his planning.

But the irony is especially sharp here given that the title of this testimony is “terrorist and intelligence operations.”

Who was in charge of avoiding infiltration of the DARPA-funded Center for Biodefense at George Mason University? Where is the accountability? The FBI’s failure to bring Amerithrax to a successful conclusion has led to conspiracy theories that have undermined the US in world opinion.

What did the DOJ do? They put a man in charge of the prosecution whose family was very active on Palestinian / terrorism issues and whose daughter now represents Al-Timimi pro bono. Where is the accountability?

Dr. Alibek addressed the

“PROLIFERATION OF RUSSIA’S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS EXPERTISE.” He explained:

There are numerous ways in which Russia’s biological weapons expertise can be proliferated to other countries.”

Comment:
Indeed. Sometimes such proliferation is funded by DARPA and then any student who wants to apply to work in the building can submit an application. Salafist preachers seeing signs of the coming day of judgment and end of times upon an inevitable clash of civilizations — and mentored by the sheik who was the subject of bin laden’s declaration of war in 1996 — are invited to apply. A high security clearance for mathematical support work for the Navy will be thrown in as an added bonus.

Dr. A continues:

“Yet another mode of proliferation is one that appears at first completely innocuous: scientific publications. Certainly, neither the authors nor the journals stand to gain financially from this type of technology transfer. However, considerable information that can at best be considered dual-use in nature can be found in such open publications. For example, a recent article detailed a method for cultivating Marburg virus. This method is so simple, and requires so little equipment and training, that it could easily be adopted by a terrorist group. Other, more sophisticated types of information published include such things as genetic engineering methods, antibiotic resistant strains of pathogenic microorganisms, and so on.”

Comment:
Fortunately, Ed’s discussion of the method of weaponization has been so confused for the past half-decade that he has kept America safe from such proliferation. TrebleRebel, OTOH, perhaps should be deported especially if he still has his afternoon tea.

Dr. A asks:

“WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF TERRORIST USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS?

While we should not ignore the continuing threat of military use of biological weapons, we are not at present poised for war with any nation known or suspected to possess biological weapons (with the possible exception of Iraq). A more likely threat is that posed by the terrorist use of biological weapons. Terrorist use can occur on the level of state-sponsored terrorism; on the level of a large, independent organization like the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan; or on the level of an individual acting alone or in concert with a small organization, such as a militia. For these three types of terrorist attack, the expected impact will differ considerably.

There is no doubt, however, that the potential impact is great. A report published by the Centers for Disease Control in April, 1997 evaluated the economic impact of a bioterrorist attack for each of three different biological agents: anthrax, brucellosis, and tularemia. Their model showed that the expected economic impact from such an attack would range from $477.7 million to $26.2 billion per 100,000 persons exposed. A copy of this report is attached.”

“OUR GENERAL PREPAREDNESS FOR MILITARY AND TERRORIST BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS

Fortunately, in the course of the past four or so years, our preparedness for military and terrorist biological attacks has changed considerably for the better. Heightened awareness of the biological threat has lead to a number of positive developments ***”

Comment:
Heightened awareness? I mean, it’s not like Ali was particularly sneaky. He did not shave his beard such as Ayman has advised is useful in covert operations. He did not avoid the mosque as Ayman has advised. While Ali avoided discussing politics or religion at work, his views were widely distributed on the internet. Why was DARPA so eager to spend hundreds of millions on scientific learning and not undertake basic biosecurity precautions at the facilities it funded? Where is the accountability?

Did Ali have some card up his sleeve or behind his back that trumped such considerations? Have you noticed how all the government experts went on to high-paying jobs in similar centers? FBI officials went on to high-paying jobs in the security field? So it is not like they needed to be sure the governmental mission — and the public interest — was accomplished.

When will the public interest be vindicated?

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.