Skip to comments.Hatfill v. US - DOJ and FBI Statement of Facts (filed Friday)
Posted on 04/13/2008 8:20:52 AM PDT by ZacandPook
click here to read article
The Gitmo (September?) trial line-up:
KSM head of the cell planning follow-up anthrax and dirty bomb attacks
Ramzi bin al-Shibh said by Tenet in passing to have had a CBRN role but unclear what role would have been. He used the Jenny code with Atta.
Walid bin Attash at the January 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur at anthrax lab tech’s Yazid Sufaat’s condo. Would be trusted to have a key operational role.
Ali Abd al- Aziz Ali (al-Balucchi), Mohammed’s nephew and alleged deputy - married Aafia who AUSA who said would participate in anthrax attack if asked; successor to KSM upon KSM’s arrest, al-Balucchi was arrested after meeting with chemistry professor
Mustafa Ahmed al- Hawsawi - KSM’s assistant; anthrax spraying documents were on his laptop; docs on laptop included info re Yemeni cell members
The proceedings will be on a 20-second delay in order to prevent any classified information from being disclosed. The arraignment seems to have been quite relaxed, with the defendants chatting between themselves and KSM acting very poised, telling the presiding officer saying he’s been looking forward to getting the death penalty. KSM will act as his own counsel.
A key fact is that of the exosporium, which is a loose-fitting protein envelope surrounding about 7-10 spore coats that overlay the cortex, had traces of silica. Calling on two of the same key cast members in his New York Times best-seller Hot Zone, the scientists who first identified the virus Ebola Reston, Richard Preston in 2002 provided a riveting account of Ft. Detrick’s initial microscopic examination of the mailed anthrax in Demon in the Freezer. The account was excerpted in The Sunday Times.
The exosporium is the spore’s outermost layer. The silica was not dispersed inside of the B. anthracis spore coats and cortex under the exosporium. Ari Fleischer discusses the silica in the anthrax in his book Taking Heat. He reports that he had argued at length with ABC News over its story that the additive was bentonite (which arguably was characteristic of the Iraq program). He explained that from the start he had told ABC that it was silica, not bentonite, that had been detected. The suggestion that AFIP experts did not know the difference between silica and silcon is not well founded, and the scientist who performed the EDX specifically told the journalist that oxygen was also detected in ratios consistent with silicon dioxide. In a broadcast to be aired in October 2008 produced by a producer from New York City, Professor Meselson after making his claim about silicon, is shown the EDX provided by the AFIP for silica. Professor Meselson’s response is his standard perfectly reasonable suggestion that the AFIP should produce all their findings. Their unpublished reports include those relating to the detection of silica in the media sample (as well as the Senate sample).
A PhD student supervised by Matthias Frank, a big star at Livermore in developing the biosensor, addressed these issues in 2004. Lawrence Livermore lab was tasked with combating the Bin Laden anthrax threat in 1998 and is steeped in biodetection, the subject of the PhD thesis. LLNL researchers have developed advanced technologies to rapidly detect the airborne release of biological threat agents. The student cites Gary Matsumoto’s Science article and says:
“In the case of anthrax, it is known that Van der Waals forces cause unprocessed spores to clump together. Large particles are not deposited efficiently in human lungs and also settle rapidly from the air. Both are undesirable properties if maximal lethality is desired. Silica powers and nanoparticles have long been used to prevent agent particles from coming close enough together for Van der Waals forces to become significant.” *** Military scientists have stated that the ‘weaponized’ anthrax letters sent to Senator Daschle’s office contained silica. In the Senate anthrax letter, there is also evidence that the bond between the silica nanoparticles and spores was further enhanced by the use of sol-gel or polymerized glass. Richard Spertzel last year said this information about the polyglass binder came from the FBI. Some believe that the spores may have even been electrostatically charged to aid their dispersal. Dr. Spertzel says that some inside the investigation say that a light charge was added. At any rate, the end result of the processing was a powder far more potent than a simple combination of anthrax spores, cells and residual growth medium.
Former Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and Harvard biologist Matthew Meselson, have opined that there was no special silica coating observable in the Scanning Electron Microscope (”SEM”) images they saw. The presence of any silica, Drs. Meselson and Alibek say, may have come from the environment because of the special tendency of anthrax spore coats to attract silicon. (The lead FBI scientist Dwight Adams relied on the study provided the FBI by Meselson in briefing the Congress in November 2002.) Indeed, the silica may have been in the culture medium and then removed as described by a mid-March 2001 and related patent filed by researchers at Dr. Alibek’s Center for Biodefense at GMU. Dr. Alibek reports that, like Dr. William Patrick, he was also given a polygraph.
A scientist from the FBI Laboratory, Dr. Doug Beecher, in a July 2006 issue of “Applied and Environmental Microbiology” provided me a copy of his article that reports that:
“a widely circulated misconception is that the spores were produced using additives and sophisticated engineering supposedly akin to military weapon production. The issue is usually the basis for implying that the powders were inordinately dangerous compared to spores alone. The persistent credence given to this impression fosters erroneous preconceptions, which may misguide research and preparedness efforts and generally detract from the magnitude of hazards posed by simple spore preparations.”
The generally worded passage mere confirms Dr. Alibek’s point that a sophisticated product can result from a relatively simple method.
Harvard University Matthew Meselson reviewed the language in the FBI scientist’s article before publication. “The statement should have had a reference,” editor-in-chief of the microbiology journal told a trade periodical. “An unsupported sentence being cited as fact is uncomfortable to me. Any statement in a scientific article should be supported by a reference or by documentation.” The two passages, footnoted or not, essentially said what Dr. Alibek had been saying: “’[J]ust because you have a sophisticated product doesn’t mean the technique has to be sophisticated.’ “ Silica in the culture medium would not be a sophisticated “additive” but would permit the agent to be concentrated.
In a Letter to the Editor in Applied and Environmental Microbiology, Aug. 2007, p. 5074, titled Unsupported Conclusions on the Bacillus anthracis Spores, Kay A. Mereish, at the United Nations, reports:
In a meeting I attended in September 2006, a presentation was made by a scientist who had worked on samples of anthrax collected from letters involved in the [anthrax letters] incident in October 2001; that scientist described the anthrax spore as uncoated but said it contained an additive that affected the spores electrical charges. (D. Small, CBRN Counter-Proliferation and Response, Paris, France, 18-20 September 2006; organized by SMi [www.smi-online.co.uk)
Dr. Mereish tells me that her letter to the editor was not intended to agree or disagree with the FBI scientist. She merely notes that his two sentences that related to this issue of additive were not supported by the scientific experiment and data that he published. She relies on Dr. Small who made her statement based on her scientific research finding in connection with her work on the anthrax samples. Dr. Mereish’s letter, however, is another example where the use of “electrical charges” scientists as Dr. Patrick and Dr. Alibek are failing to distinguish between electrostatic charges and Van der Waals forces, thus resulting in some of the confusion in the press reports.
Kathryn Crockett, Ken Alibeks assistant — was just a couple doors down from Ali Al-Timimi — addressed these issues in her 2006 thesis, “A historical analysis of Bacillus anthracis as a biological weapon and its application to the development of nonproliferation and defense strategies.” She expressed her special thanks to Dr. Ken Alibek and Dr. Bill Patrick. Dr. Patrick consulted with the FBI and so the FBI credits his expertise. “I don’t want to appear arrogant. I don’t think anyone knows more about anthrax powder in this country,” William Patrick told an interviewer. Dr. Alibeks access to know-how, regarding anthrax weaponization, similarly, seems beyond reasonable dispute. Dr. Crockett successfully defended the thesis before a panel that included USAMRIID head and Ames strain researcher Charles Bailey, Ali Al-Timimi’s other Department colleague. She says that scientists who analyzed the powder through viewing micrographs or actual contact are divided over the quality of the powder. She cites Gary Matsumotos Science article in summarizing the debate. She says the FBI has vacillated on silica. Regarding the specific issue of weaponization,” Dr. Alibek’s assistant concluded in her PhD thesis, “according to several scientists at USAMRIID who examined the material, the powder created a significant cloud when agitated meaning that the adhesion of the particles had been reduced. Reducing the adhesion of the particles meant that the powder would fly better. She explains that The most common way to reduce electrostatic charge is to add a substance to the mixture, usually a silica based substance.
On the issue of encapsulation, she reports that many experts who examined the powder stated the spores were encapsulated. Encapsulation involves coating bacteria with a polymer which is usually done to protect fragile bacteria from harsh conditions such as extreme heat and pressure that occurs at the time of detonation (if in a bomb), as well as from moisture and ultraviolet light. The process was not originally developed for biological weapons purposes but rather to improve the delivery of various drugs to target organs or systems before they were destroyed by enzymes in the circulatory system” (citing Alibek and Crockett, 2005). “The US and Soviet Union, however, “ she explains, “used this technique in their biological weapons programs for pathogens that were not stable in aerosol form... Since spores have hardy shells that provide the same protection as encapsulation would, there is no need to cover them with a polymer. She explains that one possible explanation is that the spore was in fact encapsulated but not for protective purpose. Encapsulation also reduces the need for milling when producing a dry formulation.” By reducing the need for milling, she means permits greater concentration of the biological agent. If the perpetrator was knowledgeable of the use of encapsulation for this purpose, then he or she may have employed it because sophisticated equipment was not at his disposal.”
One military scientist who has made anthrax simulants described the GMU patents to me as relating to an encapsulation technique which serves to increase the viability of a wide range of pathogens. More broadly, a DIA analyst once commented to me that the internal debate seemed relatively inconsequential given the circumstantial evidence — overlooked by so many people — that US-based supporters of Al Qaeda are responsible for the mailings.
Biological institute head suspected of advising foreign companies
By Yossi Melman, Haaretz Correspondent
Last update - 04:58 07/01/2007
working link (from cache)
“Pathogenesis by aerosol” at page 65-79.
“Bacillus anthracis and the pathogenesis of anthrax” at page 79-99.
“Genomic efforts with biodefense pathogens” at page 417-435.
“Genetic fingerprinting of biodefense pathogens for epidemiology and forensic investigation” at page 453-481.
In the Al-Timimi case, did they delete references to anthrax?
White House Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, Al-Timimi’s old boss at the DOT, met on July 5, 2001 to meet with Dick Clarke and Condi Rice to discuss the threat reported in the July 2, 2001 NLETS. Andy didn’t mention to Condi and Richard “Golly, a microbiologist I know now is working in the building with the famous Russian defector Alibek and former deputy commander of USAMRIID. Given the intel reporting about the anthrax threat, maybe we should drop a wiretap on him.”
Or did he?
We may never know because of redactions. How often is CYA addressed within the beltway under the name “national security”? How long are we going to let the Administration get away with it even 7 years after the fact? If I were the Administration, I would want to address various sensitive issues before the November election so that they can be put in context.
UNCLASSIFIED REVISED ORDER GRANTING THE GOVERNMENTS
MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER PURSUANT TO CIPA
This matter having come before the Court upon an ex parte, in camera motion by the United States for a protective order pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act 18 U.S.C. App. 3, § 4, which was filed under seal, and based upon the pleadings filed in connection therewith, and for good cause shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion by the United States for a Protective Order is GRANTED. In lieu of disclosure to defense counsel of the status report that was filed by the government ex parte and in camera on May 14, 2008, the United States may substitute the attachment to the Governments Motion for a Protective Order, captioned GOVERNMENTS REVISED CLASSIFIED STATUS REPORT REGARDING COMPLETION OF SEARCH FOR DISCOVERABLE MATERIALS, for the Court Security Officer to provide to cleared defense counsel.
The status report that was filed by the government on May 14, 2008 contained no information not contained in the GOVERNMENTS REVISED CLASSIFIED STATUS REPORT REGARDING COMPLETION OF SEARCH FOR DISCOVERABLE MATERIALS that was either relevant and helpful to the defendant, or essential to a fair determination of this case, or that need be disclosed to defense counsel by the United States.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. App. 3, § 4, that the entire text of the motion of the United States for this Order shall remain sealed, shall not be disclosed to the defendant or his counsel, and shall be preserved in the records of the Court under seal to be made available to higher courts in the event of an appeal.
SO ENTERED, this 28th day of May, 2008.
“Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-use
Dilemma in the Biological Sciences”
1 December 2007
What is the Dual-use Dilemma?
The so-called “dual-use dilemma” arises in the context of research in the biological and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research sometimes has the potential to be used for harm as well as for good.
[T]he dilemma arises for the researcher because of the potential
actions of others. Malevolent non-researchers might steal dangerous biological agents produced by the researcher; alternatively, other researchers or at least their governments or leadership might use the results of the original researcher’s work for malevolent purposes. The malevolent purposes in question include bioterrorism, biowarfare and blackmail for financial gain.
Further, there have been a number of acts, or attempted acts, of bioterrorism,
notably by the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan (they attempted to acquire and use anthrax and botulinum toxin), Al-Qaeda (they attempted to acquire and use anthrax) and the so-called Amerithrax attacks (involving the actual use of anthrax).
In the aftermath of the 11th September 2001 attacks in the US, bioterrorism is widely considered to be a real threat, especially to populations in western countries. Moreover, it is seen as a greater threat from non-state terrorist groups than, say, nuclear WMDs, given the availability of the materials and technical knowledge necessary to produce the relevant biological agents and the feasibility of weaponisation. This is not to say that there are not obstacles for would-be bioterrorists, including the dangers to themselves in handling pathogens. But it is to say that there is a non-negligible bioterrorist threat, and it is likely to increase rather than decrease.
Experiments of Concern
Enable the Evasion of Diagnosis and/or Detection by Established Methods
Microencapsulation of pathogen particles would be one way of avoiding
antibody-based detection, although this technique has no analogue in nature. As such, microencapsulation would only be carried out for an offensive BW purpose (such as delivery of a pathogen to the lower intestine) or to investigate the requirements for protection against such a threat.
Project Jefferson. In September 2001 the New York Times revealed the existence of a classified US biodefence project (Project Jefferson) which, in early 2001, involved the production of a vaccine-resistant strain of anthrax bacteria . The purpose was to reproduce results of Russian research published by Vaccine in 1997.
The researchers inserted genes from B cereus into B anthracis and showed that the engineered bacteria were highly lethal against hamsters, even when they had been inoculated with Russia’s standard anthrax vaccine [44, 142]. The US officials involved in Project Jefferson were reportedly mindful of the BWC and the need for protective intent. Accordingly, the project was to produce only small quantities — one gram or less — of the modified anthrax [85, p. 309]. Though the Soviets allegedly had the capacity to produce 4,500 metric tons of anthrax yearly [85, p.
254], strictly speaking even one gram of anthrax is a large quantity, capable of infecting thousands of people if a suitable dried spore preparation is made.
When Project Jefferson produced a vaccine-resistant, genetically modified
biological agent, it was only verifying something that had already turned up in the scientific literature. It is a different matter to produce modified pathogens that no one, potential adversary or otherwise, has ever created.
Enable the Weaponization of a Biological Agent or Toxin
Experiments of this kind test the bounds of permissibility most severely.
Weaponized agents do not exist in nature, and so (absent the threat of biological weapons attack) there is no ongoing public health imperative for protective mechanisms as there is against a naturally occurring infectious disease threat.
The Dual-use Dilemma Understanding weaponization processes may facilitate the development of protections against a potential BW perpetrator (including a nationstate contemplating a terrorist attack on civilians). Our focus here will be on the weaponisation of biological agents by nation-states, as opposed to the processes for delivery of biological agents that might be used by non-state actors contemplating a terrorist attack. (We do not thereby mean to imply that the threat assessment in relation to the latter is not important; clearly it is of enormous importance.)
Weaponization for “threat assessment” purposes is likely to be interpreted by
outsiders as simply the production of BW, thus endangering the norm against their production, driving a biological arms race, and making biological attacks more likely.
Examples Project Clear Vision. In September 2001, the New York Times revealed the existence of a classified US biodefence project (Project Clear Vision) which, from 1997 to 2000, involved building and testing a Soviet-model bomblet for dispersing bacteria . This involved tests of bacteria bomblets, built according to a Soviet design, and conducted by Battelle, a military contractor in Columbus, Ohio. The bomblets were reportedly filled with simulant pathogens and tested for their dissemination characteristics and performance under different atmospheric conditions. Experiments in a wind tunnel revealed how the bomblets, after being released from a warhead, would fall on targets [85, p. 295]. Before the testing took place, some US government legal experts had argued the experiments were not a
breach of the BWC provided they were not intended for offensive purposes. Other officials argued that a weapon was, by definition, meant to inflict harm and therefore crossed the boundary into offensive work: “A bomb was a bomb was a bomb”.2
Aerosolization. Small-scale aerosolization technology may be useful for administering individual doses of inhaled vaccine or antiviral therapy (such as ribavirin) to humans, and larger-scale aerosolization could be used for mass-vaccination of animals —for example, in the poultry industry. It is hard to imagine large-scale aerosolization being therapeutically useful for humans, although such technology would certainly have enormous value for the purpose of delivering BW agents. Such technology might also be developed and tested for protective purposes. One of the principal aims of the NIAID Biodefense Research Agenda, for example, is to ensure adequate numbers of BSL-3 [Biosafety Level Three] facilities with aerosol challenge capacity. [161, p. 8].
NBACC. The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
(NBACC), due to be completed in 2008, is intended to provide the United States with high-containment laboratory space for biological threat characterization and bioforensic research. According to the US Department of Homeland Security, NBACC will form part of the National Interagency Biodefense Campus at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Its programs will investigate the infectious properties of biological agents, the effectiveness of countermeasures, decontamination procedures, and forensic analysis. Part of NBACC is the Biological Threat Characterization Center, which will conduct laboratory experiments aimed at investigating current and future biological threats. The Center will also assess vulnerabilities, conduct risk assessments, and determine potential impacts in order to guide the development of countermeasures such as detectors, vaccines, drugs, and decontamination technologies .
Many of the activities to be undertaken by NBACC could readily be interpreted
by outsiders as the development of BW under the guise of threat assessment. In particular, weaponization projects and the construction of novel (not previously existing) pathogens arguably constitute impermissible research. In a February 2004 presentation, George Korch, Deputy Director of NBACC, revealed that one of its research units intended to pursue a range of topics including “aerosol dynamics”, “novel packaging”, “novel delivery of threat”, “genetic engineering”, and “red teaming.” At one point in his presentation, Korch summarized the threat assessment task areas as: Acquire, Grow, Modify, Store, Stabilize, Package, Disperse [38, 115, 117]. Such language is identical to that which would describe the functions of an offensive BW program.
Ashraf Ali, sender of October 2001 white powder hoax letters to jewish organizations and a media organization in the UK saying All Jews Die, World Trade Centre and Pentagon pleads guilty.
Ashraf Ali was caught six years later when forensic experts matched his DNA to samples found on the letters.
He had included pictures and annotated them.
Each year, for the past decade, there have been many hundreds of hoax letters. In November 2001 (as I recall) there was a letter to Senator Daschle. Proponents of a Hatfill Theory thought a letter from England while Hatfill was at a conference there in November dovetailed nicely with a Hatfill theory. But why, after sending the real thing, would he then send a hoax letter from a country where he had just quite publicly traveled? While the relevance of that November hoax letter would depend on the details (which have not been disclosed), in broad outline it did not fit a Hatfill Theory. He would have had no reason to draw attention to himself in that way.
From The Sunday Times
January 2, 2005
Al-Qaeda seeks toxins for biowarfare attack
Other US officials suspect Bin Laden may be planting his acolytes in university science departments in the same way that he sent the September 11 hijackers to US flying schools.
“This is a guy who thinks long-term,” said one senior Washington source. “We have to learn to think like him.”
Suspicion that Bin Laden is increasingly focusing on WMD was heightened by reports last October that he had sought permission from a well-known Saudi Arabian theologian for an attack that would cause mass American casualties.
Bin Ladens approach is said to have resulted in the publication of a religious decree entitled Rules for the use of WMD against the infidels. It was issued by Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad al-Fahd, who is currently under arrest in Riyadh.
Not all scientists believe a group such as Al-Qaeda will ever master biowarfare technologies. The main fear is that a rogue scientist may be prepared to sell his expertise.
The people that I worry about are the lone operators, the scientist who is disgruntled, deranged or just bought off, said Raymond Zilinskas, a Pentagon biowarfare consultant at the California-based Centre for Non-proliferation Studies.
The probability of you or I dying from a terrorist bioweapon is smaller than our being eaten by a shark, but that is not to say we shouldnt worry about it.
“Al Qaeda Plan Biowarfare Attack on Britain,” Global-intel.com, January 19, 2005
“Britain’s intelligence chiefs have launched urgent checks on all foreign students studying chemistry and biology at our universities after a top Pentagon expert warned Osama bin Laden is recruiting scientists to prepare weapons for biowarfare attack.
‘But our prime focus is that bin Laden is focussing on young scientists in university departments in the same way he sent his September 11 hijackers to US flying schools. We have no doubt that he has planted some of those scientists in British campuses,’ said one of [CIA Director’s] Porter Goss’s senior aides.”
“France Calls For Global Watchdog on Bio-Warfare Risk,” Reuters, March 2, 2005
After the head of Interpol weighed in on this issue of a biological attack, France called for a global watchdog on the bio-warfare risk. This article mentions the possibility of an attack targeting livestock. Such an attack would violate the express prohibition under the hadiths of a nonconventional weapon targeting livestock or crops. Salafi-jihadis would not be in the game if they were not able to argue that they were playing by the book. It is Ed who has a bogeyman view of the Salafi-Jihadis not to appreciate the restrictions posed by the absence of a fatwa in 2001 permitting mass casualties using a poison.
Most of what I’ve read about the threat of biological attack by Al Qaeda seems to have increased the threat, rather than diminish it, by giving Al Qaeda ideas it would not otherwise have had. From today’s news:
“The WMD Notebook: Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B: A lesser known inhalation or ingestion agent,” June 8, 2008
Ayman became determined to weaponize anthrax, he told Atef, because the US folks kept telling him how easy it was. A picture of Cohen holding up the 5 lb. bag of sugar was found in Afghanistan in Fall 2001 at a seminar on how anthrax might be used.
At the same time, short-sighted pork-fueled profit-making priorities have caused governments, industry and academia to proliferate the opportunities to infiltrate or gain access to know-how. Ayman’s supporters clipped an article in which Dr. Alibek sounded the alarm.
Consider “an episode of Get Smart, the late-1960s sitcom about bumbling secret agent Maxwell Smart. The plotline concerned a plague sweeping the nation’s potato crop— potatoes look fine on the outside but .... are empty inside their jackets. Smart discovers that Siegfried, head of the evil enemy agency Kaos, is using a bioengineered bacterium to attack our potatoes [see “Biological Warfare against Crops,” by Paul Rogers, Simon Whitby and Malcolm Dando; Scientific American, June 1999]. Siegfried explains that the bacterium enters the potato, eats the insides, burps and dies, leaving no trace. Now for the really frightening part— Siegfried is spreading the potato-destroying bacteria using crop dusters.”
The Scientific American article might have usefully quoted the religious proscription against attacking crops. There are at least a dozen books on jihad and the islamic jurisprudence on the principles of warfare at many good university libraries — but none of the books discuss the express prohibition on attacking livestock or crops. Future such books or articles should.
Intellectuals should help the young hotheads find the wisdom of the companions of the prophet hidden from them by their anger and hurt. Ayman and his friends from Cairo should follow the lead of Dr. Fadl.
“The Spy Who Loves Us: Pay no mind to the Mossad agent on the line,” The American Conservative, June 11, 2008
Milton, deposed in the Hatfill matter, called me up years ago (out of the blue) and asked if I was Mossad. I told him it was just a hobby. (I need to work on my cover story.) Has anyone checked those paintings sold around government office buildings by Israeli art students for bugs embedded in the frame?
On FreeRepublic, this article was written by a former Israeli intelligence officer.
“Saddam’s regime was the most sophisticated manufacturer of anthrax in the world”
Journal of intelligence and counter-intelligence, March 2007 04 13 2008
If Dany and Stuart have not now changed their view based on the information that has come out about the Salafi-jihadi infiltration of the US biodefense program, they should have their intelligence medals ripped from their chest.
“Militants kill woman ‘U.S. spy’ in Pakistan,” Jun 11, 2008
Although the Salafi-Jihadis kill spies, they respect honesty. Tell them you were the architect of the global rendition policy and that you urged Bush to drop a bomb on Bin Laden’s hunting party when the US had the chance and they respect you. Tell them there is no reason to believe in an old book that they were socialized into believing before they reached the age of reason and they’ll give you a painting for Christmas.
“Top Secret: CIA explains its Wikipedia-like national security project: Intellipedia lets spies post and edit content wiki-style, and includes YouTube and Flickr versions,” Computerworld, June 10, 2008
Yes, but will these CIA and FBI analysts ever be able to both find the infiltrators hidden in plain sight and publicly expose them so as to restore the US reputation on this issue of the anthrax mailings?
There is a 69 minute videotape of Dr. Alibek addressing biological weapons and the threat posed by terrorist organizations that was taped October 16, 2001. Ali had been questioned post-911 by the FBI almost 30 days before (on September 20, as I recall). Ali was questioned about 7 or 8 times before his indictment. Did Ken know at the time of this talk that the FBI suspected Ali of being somehow involved?
Threat of biological weapons
Edward J Markey; Ken Alibek; Christopher H Shays
2001 English Visual Material : Videorecording :
VHS tape 1 videocassette (69 minutes) : sd., col. ; 1/2 in. West
Lafayette, IN : C-SPAN Archives,
Mr. Alibek spoke to reporters about biological
weapons and the threat posed by terrorist organizations. Among the
topics he addressed were former Soviet biological weapons programs,
technologies involved in biological weapons programs, and potential
uses of various biological agents. Following his remarks he answered
questions from the reporters.
Tom Daschle on the lack of transparency in the investigation of the anthrax attacks - 3/26/2008 (LA, CA)
I haven’t included the part about how the first Bush administration (via Ollie’s use of arms supplier Soghanalian) supplied Saddam with TOW-equipped combat configured helicopters for aerial spraying missions because I’m being forward-looking.
the Amerithrax secrets
History Channel on Anthrax Attacks
Special Agent Michelle at Quantico needs some adventure in her life by hunting Ayman’s cell members from the 1970s — not pursuing Ed’s imagined leads at playgrounds.
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