TIME FOR SECESSION

Human Events ^ | 1952 | Frank Chodorov

[Noumenon]

TIME FOR SECESSION
Human Events ^ | 10/15/52 | Frank Chodorov
 

By Frank Chodorov

If I were governor of a state, or even a legislator, I would put my weight behind a secessionist movement; not secession from the Union, but secession from Washington. I would do so exactly because I favor the Union, as originally conceived and my advocacy of secession would be based on the same reasoning that prompted initiation of the Union, namely that divided authority is a good guarantee of freedom.

The Union was—it still exists on paper—a voluntary association of autonomous states, each invested with all the political authority not specifically assigned to the federal government. Outside these limitations, the federal government could not go while state authority was restricted only by the Constitution. This neat political package is being clawed at by the power-mad denizens of the cocktail capital of the country, simply because so long as it remains intact, no matter how damaged, they cannot achieve their ultimate purpose of complete centralization; and the American citizen has some hope of avoiding a regime of absolutism.

The importance of bolstering the Union concept looms large when we consider how far centralization has gone, in the economic field. Through the instrument of taxation, one-third of our economy has already been centralized. Through subsidies and regulation, our industrial plant is virtually operating on the fascist pattern of the private ownership under federal control; outright confiscation waits only upon the excuse of war. Through involvement of our financial institutions in its fiscal schemes, the government has, for all practical purposes, reduced them to mere agencies of the United States Treasury. Through labor legislation presumably intended to favor the worker union leaders are able to ride herd on our basic industries, and the nationalization of labor can be effected by simply drafting these leaders into the government.

Politically, however, the drive toward centralization is handicapped by the residue of power still remaining in the state governments. This fact was recognized by the maniacs of centralization who invaded Washington early in the New Deal era. Promptly, Mr. Roosevelt’s notorious Temporary National Economic Council proposed the division of the country into "administrative" units. With the usual double-talk, the TNEC denied any intention to circumvent the Constitution, but argued the impossibility of carrying out "national programs" under the handicap of divided authority.

The unlikelihood of getting the states to vote themselves out of existence turned the centralizers to other means, such as bribing the state authorities with patronage, alienating the loyalty of the citizenry with federal subsidies, establishing within the states independent administrative bodies for the management of federal works programs. It will be noted that these management bodies are called "authorities"—and that they are, in fact, set up to take care of political matters coincident to their other functions. The current urgency for FEPC, with its promise of using federal troops for the enforcement of the law, is in line with the policy of liquidating the autonomy of the states.

The centralizers know their history. Wherever absolutism got going, the liquidation of home rule prepared the way. A half century before Hitler, Bismarck had cleared the road for him by wiping out the independent German states. Cavour did as much for Mussolini in Italy. The Czars made the advent of Stalin easy. Centralization is the antithesis of home rule, and the dualism written into our Constitution is an assurance, so long as it remains in effect, that Washington will have trouble in achieving Moscow.

The first step I would take, if I were governor of a state, would be to require every school child to become familiar with the history and theory of what we call states’ rights, but which is really the doctrine of home rule. For, it was precisely the fear of centralization, such as we are now faced with, that prompted the Founding Fathers to write that doctrine into our basic law.

It must be remembered that the early American had had his fill of far-off government. Having got rid of it at the cost of war he was dead set against a native version of London rule. He knew he had to have some kind of central government—to deal with foreign governments, to prevent the component commonwealths from setting up trade barriers between themselves, and several other matters that could not be handled by local government—but he wanted it severely restricted in scope. The only kind of Constitution he would accept was one that clearly delimited the power of the government to be set up under it.

In all other matters he was willing to put his trust in local government. Why? Simply because it was not likely to get out of hand; one could keep one’s eyes on it. Besides, being a government of neighbors it was likely to be cognizant of and responsive to the temper of the governed. It is a certainty that the legislator representing Sauk Center, Minnesota, is more fully conversant with the problems of that community than is the Senator from Alabama, and can be trusted not to vote against its interests; on the other hand, the Senator from Alabama has no inhibitions about riding roughshod over the interests of Sauk Center if, in his opinion, these interests run contrary to what he conceives to be to national interest. Then, there is always the possibility of Sauk Center being completely ignored in a tariff deal between the Senators of New York and California.

The extent to which this fear of centralization possessed the early American is illustrated by the story of a point that came up in the term of President Washington. The "father of his country" was expected in Boston, and Governor Hancock cogitated the propriety of his going to meet the distinguished visitor; would he not be compromising the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by so doing? He settled the problem by pleading illness. The sequel to that story is also illustrative. It was suggested to President Washington that he review the Massachusetts militia, but he rejected the idea because such a review might imply federal interference with the military arm of the state; after all the tacit understanding in those days was that the militia might be called upon to face the federal army.

In both cases neither personal idiosyncrasy nor considerations of etiquette were of prime importance. It was the spirit of the times that found expression in these incidents, and the spirit of the times found expression in these incidents, and the spirit of the times was characterized by a keen jealousy of freedom. The early American knew that freedom was nothing more than the absence of external restraint on behavior; the government could not give you freedom, it could only take it away. And he knew from experience, if not from his reading, that when a government is detached from the governed it invariably strives to take it away. Freedom, then, is in better case when the effective government never gets beyond the purview of the town hall meeting.

That is the truth that needs constant reiteration, now that semantics has found a way to fragment freedom and enumerate the parts. The early American could not have been bamboozled by that verbal slight of hand.

There is a facet of political dualism that needs exploration and exploitation. It is the fact that divided authority introduces competition in government, Political science accepts as an axiom the monopolization of coercion by government; it must have that monopoly, so the axiom runs, in order that it may prevent the indiscriminate use of coercion by citizens. There is no arguing with that point. But, when the individual is free to move from one jurisdiction to another, a limit is put on the extent to which the government may use its monopoly power. Government is held in restraint by the fear of losing its taxpaying citizens, just as loss of customers tends to keep other monopolies from getting too arrogant.

For instance, because our federal government has not yet managed a national divorce law, there is competition between states for that kind of business. Some states try to attract capital by advertising their abstention from inheritance and income taxation, and Nevada’s legalization of gambling has to some extent overcome her lack of natural resources and business opportunities. The practice of evading local sales taxes by crossing state borders is a common example of the principle of competition in government.

Before the Sixteenth Amendment got into the constitution, a number of states instituted the income taxes. Though the levies were always small, collection was attended with considerable difficulty; the tax collectors, being neighbors, not "foreigners" from Washington, were inclined toward leniency, and collusion was not uncommon. Nevertheless, the states that did not tax income made that fact known, and the fear of losing industry to them caused a number of states to drop income taxation.

Socialistic experiments did not originate with the New Deal; state governments had their own laboratories, long before 1932. Many years ago I saw an idle state-owned cement plant in South Dakota, and early in the depression a Wisconsin law made it obligatory for restaurants to serve two ounces of Wisconsin made cheese with every meal, whether the diner wanted it or not. The platform of the Farm-Labor party, which sprang up around 1920, and captured several states, was larded with socialism. However, every state experiment in socialism failed simply because of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of movement for both labor and capital across state lines. Federal socialism can be made to operate somehow only because there is no escape from its constabulary.

Then there is the point in dualism that the citizen can apply to the federal government for relief when the state government transgresses his constitutional rights. And a state government may bring suit against the federal government. The effect, then, of divided authority is to keep both the federal and state governments off balance; neither one has that complete monopoly of power necessary to a regime of absolutism.

What with amendments to the Constitution, legalistic interpretations and downright circumvention made possible by well placed subventions, the autonomy of the states has been well watered down. Nevertheless, state lines have not yet been wiped out and there are areas of jurisdiction that are still reserved to the states. These areas can be strengthened and expanded. It is only a matter of intelligent and resolute resistance by the state governments to every scheme, no matter the how seemingly innocuous or politically attractive, that emanates from Washington. If for no other reason, personal pride should prompt every governor and state legislator to take a secessionist attitude; they were not elected to be lackeys of the federal bureaucracy.

Just how far that resistance can go, and remain legal, is a matter for lawyers to determine. But, it is quite obvious that the states can make it difficult for the federal government to expand its spheres of influence by a non-cooperative attitude. Take the federal government’s invasion of electric power business under the guise of flood control and it is still necessary for the centralizers to obtain permission from state governments to carry out such schemes and refusal would go hard with them. Federal tenements, which in practice become enclaves of votes for the party in power, are made possible by exemption from real estate taxes, which is still the prerogative of the local authorities; were exemption regularly refused, the housing bureaucrats would be in a sorry plight. If every grant-in-aid were refused, the federal government would be in the unenviable position of a philanthropist bereft of beggars.

There is no end of trouble the states can give the centralizers by merely refusing to cooperate. Such refusal would meet with popular acclaim if it were supplemented with a campaign of education on the meaning of states’ rights, in terms of human freedom. In fact, the educational part of such a secessionist movement should be given first importance. And those who are plumping for a "third party", because both existing parties are centralist in character, would do well to nail to their masthead this banner: Secession of the 48 states from Washington.

 

© Human Events, 2000
 

[grumpa]

Texas is rolling toward secession:

http://www.texasnationalist.com/

http://www.thetexasrepublic.com/Home_Page.php

http://www.texassecede.com/

http://freetexasconstitution.wordpress.com/

[Travis McGee]

The con-con route is bowling in the nitro factory. My third novel is all about it, and it ain’t pretty.

[supercat]

I would suggest that more people need to be aware of a few simple truths, which aren't really taught in schools but can be derived by simple logic. Among them:

1. The Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Land. Any government act contrary to the Constitution is illegitimate. If an act is unconstitutional, neither the Supreme Court nor any other agency has any authority to declare it otherwise, unless the Constitution is amended via Article V to allow for such action. Any such declaration made without authority is illegitimate and void.
2. Any government action which could not be justified without court precedent is unjustifiable and illegitimate.
3. Juries have a right and duty to regard the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, any judicial declarations notwithstanding. No judge has any legitimate authority to demand they do otherwise.
4. The Supreme Court has no authority over anyone other than the parties to the cases before it. The claim that "precedent" is some sort of uber-law is entirely without legitimate Constitutional basis.
5. The right to a jury trial implies a right of a defendant to demand that a jury make any and all applicable factual determinations. If a judge makes some factual determinations himself, but does so contrary to what a jury would have decided, and if he withholds information from the jury on the basis of such determinations, the verdict attributed to the jury may really be the work of the judge.
6. The reasonableness of searches will often be dependent upon factual issues unique to the cases for which they are used. While it is common for courts to declare that behavior which was "reasonable" in one case is automatically "reasonable" in another, there is no legitimate basis for such declarations. Since unreasonable searches are illegitimate, juries should not construe any evidence from such searches in a manner detrimental to a defendant.
7. The reasonableness of punishments (i.e. fines' being "not excessive", or other punishments' not being "cruel and unusual") is often dependent upon details of of the applicable cases (including, but not limited to, a defendant's state of mind). A punishment which would be if anything too lenient if a particular witness telling the truth, might be grossly excessive if the witness is lying. If a jury's authority to rate the credibility of witnesses is to be upheld, juries must be allowed to limit sentences. Judges routinely block juries from even knowing what sentences would apply to the crimes their judging; I would expect they do that because they know that juries would regard the sentences as excessive and thus illegitimate.
8. A person who performs an action with an objectively reasonable belief the either the action is either de jure or else it is both legal de facto and harmless to others, generally does not have criminal intent; to punish such a person severely would generally be excessive.
9. All free people have a right to keep and bear arms. To disarm someone is to deny that person's liberty. The only people who may be legitimately disarmed are those who may be legitimately regarded as "not free".
10. While there might be some debate regarding the legitimacy of statutes or laws which would, as a side-effect, interfere with people's ability to arm themselves (e.g. requirements that firearms marked for certain calibers be able to withstand certain chamber pressures), any statute whose clear purpose or effect is to make it difficult for some free people to arm themselves effectively is an infringement of such people's right to keep and bear arms, and is thus illegitimate.
11. A government agent who does something without legitimate authority is no less of a crook than would be someone not affiliated with government who does the same thing.
12. A government agent who covers up the crimes of another government agent becomes complicit in the lesser of (1) what he believes those crimes to be, or (2) what they actually are.
13. Denouncing an illegitimate government is not anarchistic. To the contrary, those who oppose anarchy must oppose the anarchists in an illegitimate government.

The Constitution is actually pretty simple. What's hard is trying to twist the Constitution so as to maintain the pretense that the government's behavior is legitimate. Drop the pretense, and the boundaries of legitimate government become much clearer.

[Noumenon]

The con-con route is bowling in the nitro factory.

Yep. Too easily hi-jacked by Alinskyite scum. One of those 'be careful what you ask for' items.

Thinking along the lines of Sun Tzu - our domestic enemies have two gigantic blind spots. The first is their overweening arrogance - their belief that they are entitled to exert their dominion over every aspect of human thought and endeavor. The second is their inability to comprehend the values that inspire our love of country and respect for our Creator. The values that inspire patriots and heroes.

This will lead them to do a lot of breathtakingly stupid, oppressive and dangerous things. We're seeing some of this already.

The upside is that there'll be no lack of material for your next book. If we all survive this.

[Noumenon]

Excellent summary. Should be required reading for a pass-fail citizenship course. If you don’t pass, then no vote, no benefits of citizenship.

[Travis McGee]

And if there’s a functioning currency system, to make writing worth the effort.

[Noumenon]

Well, there’s always barter. How many chickens for that next novel?

[Repeal The 17th]

This is from 1952?
Dang, I was a one-year old.
Who’d a thunk it?

[Travis McGee]

Chickens might get messy and stinky in the mail system. If there is a mail system.

[DuncanWaring]

Makes you a year older than me.

[ForGod'sSake]

Thanks dynachrome. Truly a timeless article noumenon!

Not exactly 10th Amendment but a great article nonetheless; certainly something for us I believe in the vanguard to give some serious thought to. Glenn Beck made a good point on his show a day or two ago: Looking ahead at potential scenarios, consider your options and make your decision beforehand based on the various scenarios. Be prepared. No surprises.

[pissant]

BUMP

[DuncanWaring]

[Blood of Tyrants]

Through two very small blurbs, i.e. the “interstate commerce clause” and the “health and welfare clause”, the federal government has seized massive amounts of power that far exceed the true scope of the Constitution. It is ridiculous that the federal government even THINKS they have the power to seize and redistribute trillions of dollars and to federalize the entire health care industry on mere PIECES of sentences in the Constitution. If we had a judiciary that gave a damned for the Constitution, they would have slapped down the vast majority of legislation as unconstitutional decades ago.

[TheOldLady]

bump

[djf]

In 1776, we were hounded by tyrants 3000 miles away.

Same deal today. They’re just closer.

[Tatze]

Ping and Bump for later read.

[ForGod'sSake]

It is ridiculous that the federal government even THINKS they have the power to seize and redistribute trillions of dollars and to federalize the entire health care industry on mere PIECES of sentences in the Constitution.

Here's the problem - in a nutshell from the HERITAGE FOUNDATION

BTW, based on other articles, these numbers are VERY conservatve. Some have the unfunded liability of Medicare alone at more than, get this, One Hundred Trillion Dollars!

It is nothing more than their unconstitutional efforts to fix an unconstitutionally created problem they initiated in the first place. Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid along with a gaggle of other social "reforms" have yielded what some call the "Medicare Monster". These programs, especially Medicare, are black holes promulgated by unconscionable nonsense from earlier "progressive" movements such that we are now in technical bankruptcy.

If we had a judiciary that gave a damned for the Constitution, they would have slapped down the vast majority of legislation as unconstitutional decades ago.

The SCOTUS? They were apparently co-opted by Potomac Fever decades ago. The States, acting on our behalf may be our last and best hope.

[neverdem]

Thanks, bfl

[Noumenon]

Closer than we might think