Posted on 10/06/2009 8:15:04 AM PDT by GodGunsGuts
ISBN: 9780061894206; ISBN10: 0061894206; Imprint: HarperOne
The distinction between historical and experimental science is one that extends back over the centuries and at its core seems easy to grasp. Whereas historical science has as its focus events that have defined the history both of our planet and larger cosmos, experimental science has its eye on the current operation of nature.
The 19th century philosopher William Whewell coined the term ‘palaetiological sciences’ to describe those fields of science, such as geology and paleontology, that have a historical perspective (1). Whewell’s broad application of the term shone through in his two great works, his History of the Inductive Sciences and his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1). Immanuel Kant used a similar distinction contrasting those sciences that describe “relationships and changes over time” with those that deal with the “empirical study and classification of objects…at present” (2).
As part of their analytical process, scientists routinely assess the validity of competing hypotheses to determine which best explain the data they have at their disposal. The late Cambridge philosopher Peter Lipton formally defined such a process of validation in his book Inference To The Best Explanation (3). Put simply, Lipton considered the best explanation for the occurrence of a natural event as one that obviously best identifies a likely cause. Lipton’s formalization rode on the back of 19th century geologist Thomas Chamberlin’s ‘method of multiple working hypotheses’ (4) and provided an improvement over Charles Peirce’s abductive reasoning- the process through which an established rule is used to explain a tangible observation (5).
Abductive reasoning would have us say that given a rule such as “If it rains the grass is wet”, the occurrence of wet grass must invariably lead to the conclusion that rain had fallen at some moment in the past (5). Nevertheless Peirce was quick to identify an inherent fallacy in such a thread of logic- a fallacy known amongst philosophers as the ‘affirmed consequent’. According to one review:
“Affirming the consequent, sometimes called converse error, is a formal fallacy committed by reasoning in the form: If P, then Q. Q. Therefore, P. Arguments of this form are invalid in that [they] do not always give good reason to establish their conclusions, even if their premises are true.” (5)
In the above illustration, the fallacy is all too evident since rain is quite obviously not the only causal agent that waters our lawns (summertime sprinklers and hose pipes stand out as self-evident alternatives!). The question that naturally follows is, given numerous causally adequate explanations, how might one go about deciding which supplies the greatest explanatory power?
One way is to resort to vera causa (”causes now in operation”) as Darwin did when he used animal migration behaviors to explain common descent. According to Darwin “the simplicity of the view that each species was first produced within a single region captivates the mind. He who rejects it, rejects the vera causa of ordinary generation with subsequent migration, and calls in the agency of a miracle” (6). Darwin of course assumed that the ‘now operational’ variations observed in animal breeding could likewise explain macro-evolutionary changes throughout the history of life.
An alternative approach to the causal adequacy question is to seek out additional lines of evidence that either prop up or debunk competing explanations. Stephen Meyer expounds on this salient point in the seventh chapter of his most recent book Signature In The Cell,
“the process of determining the best explanation often involves generating a list of possible hypotheses, comparing their known (or theoretically plausible) causal powers against the relevant evidence, looking for additional facts if necessary, and then, like a detective, progressively eliminating potential but inadequate explanations until, finally, one causally adequate explanation for the ensemble of relevant evidence remains” (p.166)
Historical scientists are of course not the only group to employ such a procedural chain. Meyer’s impressive list of distinguished professions- including clinical diagnosticians and forensic detectives- that are ’cause-focused’ in their modes of operation, gives us much to ponder over. And his follow-on question is brilliantly relevant- might not intelligent design supply the most causally adequate explanation for the origin of biological information? The answer may surprise some. It turns out that by the same ‘vera causa’ line of reasoning used by Darwin 150 years ago, intelligent causation in biology remains a distinct possibility. After all, a cornerstone claim in the ID offensive is that we routinely observe intelligent agents as ’causes now in operation’ that generate the same type of specified information as we find in DNA.
Meyer goes on to boldly entertain the idea that intelligent design presents us with the only causally adequate explanation for the origin of biological information and spends much of the remainder of his book tying together substantial evidence in support of his position. As for Darwin, one can only imagine how he might have felt coming back to find intelligent design legitimized through his very own criterion. My hunch is that he would have applauded the current state of debate.
Citations Listed
1. For a summary of Whewell’s work, see biologist Robert J O’Hara’s discussion at http://rjohara.net/darwin/palaetiology
2. Phillip R. Sloan (2006), Kant On The History Of Nature: The ambiguous heritage of the critical philosophy for natural history, Stud. Hist. Phil. Biol. & Biomed. Sci. 37 (2006), pp.627â648
3. Peter Lipton: Philosopher of science renowned for his account of inference and explanation, Obituary appeared in The Guardian, Thursday 13th December, 2007, See http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2007/dec/13/guardianobituaries.obituaries1
4. For a detailed account of Thomas Chamberlin’s work, see http://geology.about.com/od/history_of_geology/a/aa_geothinking.htm
5. See Absolute Astronomy, http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Abductive_reasoning
6. Charles Darwin (1859), The Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection Or The Preservation of Favored Races In the Struggle For Survival, Modern Library Paperbacks Edition (1998), New York, p.488
This one is definitely worth a read. How ironic...LOL!
Ping!!!
Hmmm. I've heard this argument from someone around here.
LOL!
We can make measurements today on light that is the result of events that occured billions of years before our planet even existed.
We can essentially make predictions about what light patterns we will see in the future related to events that happened in the distant past.
Maybe there is not such a big distinction between the two kinds of science as the essayist suggests.
==Is astronomy a historical science or an empirical science?
It’s both.
==We can make measurements today on light that is the result of events that occured billions of years before our planet even existed.
You are assuming what must be proved.
==We can essentially make predictions about what light patterns we will see in the future related to events that happened in the distant past.
Could you provide some specific examples?
==Maybe there is not such a big distinction between the two kinds of science as the essayist suggests.
There is a huge distinction, in that operational/experimental science deals with the observable and the repeatable, whereas histrorical science deals with the (mostly) unobservable, unrepeatable past.
Depends on how you define astronomy.
"We can make measurements today on light that is the result of events that occured billions of years before our planet even existed."
No, you can make measurements today on light that is the result of events that you assume occurred billions of years before you assume our planet even existed. This is the fallacy of begging the question.
"Maybe there is not such a big distinction between the two kinds of science as the essayist suggests."
Maybe you don't understand how completely 'historical' science relies on logical fallacy. In this case, your conclusions are totally dependent on your assumption that the speed of light has always been constant.
What astronomers are trying to prove are things like what is dark matter and dark energy? How exactly do stars form? How is it that the universe is "clumpy", i.e. clusters of galaxies rather than an even distribution.
If/when we get answers to those questions it will almost certainly be based on the solid assumptions that the speed of light is a constant, that the speed of light has been constant throughout the history of the universe, and that the stars are close to being the distances away from us that we currently believe they are.
None of this is absolutely certain, because it is all based on inductive knowledge. However, we have good reason to believe that all of these theories will hold true for now and into the forseeable foture.
As far as making predictions about what we'll see in the future based on past events: if we see a supernova exploding, we may be able to predict how the explosion will proceed and what the resulting product will be, even though the explosion occured billions of years ago. Also, we can predict what pictures the Mars rovers will send us even though the pictures were taken ~20 minutes before we get a chance to view them.
There is not a huge distinction between historical and empirical science: both types of science make hypothesis based on information gathered to that point: abduction. Both collect lots of evidence to support or undermine that hypothesis: induction. Both draw logical conclusions from the data they collect: deduction.
If someone measured the speed of light yesterday, am I no longer allowed to use it for empirical research because that measurement is now historical data?
If I am trying to answer the question of whether or not the speed of light has been constant throughout the history of the universe then you are right. However, I believe that most astronomers have gotten past that and are focussing on more interesting questions.
"Maybe you don't understand how completely 'historical' science relies on logical fallacy"
The essayist has not equated 'abduction' with the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent, so why should we? He just makes the point, as others have, that pure abduction without additional research can lead one to that fallacy.
Even empirical scientists use abduction to come up with hypotheses. The only difference between historical scientists and empirical scientists is that empirical scientists can generate new measurements. However, it can often be the case the historical data is much more convincing than newly generated data:
Which is more convincing to you: that a bloody glove of a type seen worn by OJ was at the murder scene, or that an experiment done in court seemed to show that the glove did not fit OJ?
If you are assuming events that occurred 'billions of years before our planet existed', then you are not trying to answer the question, you are assuming it. That is the fallacy.
"The essayist has not equated 'abduction' with the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent, so why should we? He just makes the point, as others have, that pure abduction without additional research can lead one to that fallacy."
Oh he recognized the inherent fallacy in abductive reasoning alright. Whether that 'equates' is a different argument, but the fallacy is there.
"Even empirical scientists use abduction to come up with hypotheses. The only difference between historical scientists and empirical scientists is that empirical scientists can generate new measurements. However, it can often be the case the historical data is much more convincing than newly generated data:"
Yes, I know that you want to ignore the fallacy so that you can believe what the scientists tell you. Anything with a fallacy inherent in the logic is not empirical, however.
"Which is more convincing to you: that a bloody glove of a type seen worn by OJ was at the murder scene, or that an experiment done in court seemed to show that the glove did not fit OJ?"
This would be the fallacy of composition for trying to say that the fact that OJ's glove did not fit means that you can believe in events that occurred 'billions of years before our planet existed'.
Abduction, as defined by Pierce, is a necessary part of the scientific process. It is the process by which we come up with hypotheses. It is a creative process which may be the result of flash of insight or years of data amalgamation. This is something that both historical and empirical scientists do.
My understanding is that before Charles Pierce came up with the concept of abduction, the process of generating a hypothesis was considered part of the inductive process. There are those that disgree with Pierce, but I believe that Pierce is onto something. Induction is a rather mechanical approach that aims at carefully collecting valid data points in support or opposition of a hypothesis which could be the result of a creative insight.
An empirical scientist proposes an experiment to verify a hypothesis. He conducts the experiment and writes down the results. He goes off to dinner to rest up a bit before analyzing the results. Oh no! It is now too late. The data is historical data and anything he gets from it will be subject to 'abductive reasoning'.
We'd better go tell the Nobel Committee. I'm sure they've given away a bunch of awards to undeserving historical scientists.
Yes, a syllogism where certain things are supposed and something different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are presumed so. This results in you committing the fallacy of begging the question for assuming that events occurred 'billions of years before our planet existed' based on that syllogism. This doesn't help your conclusion
"Abduction, as defined by Pierce, is a necessary part of the scientific process. It is the process by which we come up with hypotheses. It is a creative process which may be the result of flash of insight or years of data amalgamation. This is something that both historical and empirical scientists do."
And 'historical' scientists love to equate their work to that of empirical science in an attempt to transfer some of the empirical credibility to their fallacious assumptions. Here's the mistake of invoking the fallacy of equivocation that you were looking for.
"An empirical scientist proposes an experiment to verify a hypothesis. He conducts the experiment and writes down the results. He goes off to dinner to rest up a bit before analyzing the results. Oh no! It is now too late. The data is historical data and anything he gets from it will be subject to 'abductive reasoning'."
Of course, the problem with your position is that the empirical experiment can be repeated by others in the future while the 'historical' scientist can only hope that others accept his fallacious assumptions, turning his 'science' into the fallacy of appeal to popular opinion.
"We'd better go tell the Nobel Committee. I'm sure they've given away a bunch of awards to undeserving historical scientists."
They already know about it.
Thanks for the ping!
Fascinating observation....
If you believe as most scientists do that the speed of light is a constant, and has been so throughout the history of the universe, then you can repeat an experiment to measure the speed of light any time in the future and have a very good idea what your measurement will be.
If, however, you believe that the speed of light has changed, and may still be changing, then you can't be so sure.
Also, if it is possible for something as fundamental to science as the speed of light to change, then why not the gravitational constant? or Planck's constant? or the electric charge?
There are many scientific observations that are quasi-historical in that we have a historical record we can consult, but we can also make predictions about what new "records" will be generated in the future. For example, the study of tree rings, ice cores, and sedimentation.
Tree rings were created in the past and can be studied. As existing trees grow new rings are created. There are theories about how the widths of rings relates to average annual rainfall, temperatures, and soil conditions. We can use those theories to make predictions based on this year's weather patterns about how wide future rings will be. We can use those same theories to make good guesses at what the same trees experienced in the past.
A particular tree ring on a particular tree may be wide because it was the favorite of some ancient tribe who watered it, but a more likely scenario is that that was a particularly good year for tree growth ... especially if surrounding trees also have wide rings for the same year.
Tree rings layed out hundreds of years ago, ice layers layed down thousands of years ago, light from exploding supernovae emitted millions of years ago: there is no essential difference between these scientific records and the entries in a scientist's experimental log book.
There is always some amount of doubt about whether the recordings are accurate, if we are interpreting the data correctly, and if there is sufficient data to support a particular theory.
How would you even know given that measurement-time is now defined in terms that are c-dependent?
"If, however, you believe that the speed of light has changed, and may still be changing, then you can't be so sure."
Again, how would you even know given that the measurement-time is now defined in terms that are c-dependent?
"Also, if it is possible for something as fundamental to science as the speed of light to change, then why not the gravitational constant? or Planck's constant? or the electric charge?"
Indeed. What is constant is hc. h/e (from which h is derived) has been measured as changing throughout the 20th Century.
"Tree rings layed out hundreds of years ago, ice layers layed down thousands of years ago, light from exploding supernovae emitted millions of years ago: there is no essential difference between these scientific records and the entries in a scientist's experimental log book."
Like anything else, tree rings grow worse the further back you attempt to go. Surely you know that they are 'extended' based on wood 'laying around' or in structures not part of the tree being measured. Ice layers? Well, that has it's own set of assumptions because no one really knows whether they represent annual layers or not. It is assumed that they do.
Finally, SN1987A is for those who get confused by the use of the term 'light-year' as a measure of distance and think it is an independent calendar. It too is c-dependent.
In sum, the essential differences between tree rings, ice cores and light-years and entries in an experimental log book are so vast as to render any attempt to equate them a very bad fallacy.
But I know you must make that attempt. All believers in long-ages do it.
The main reason I brought these data sets up, however, is to show that there exist data sets that contain data from the past, the present, and potentially from the future.
Theories can be proved or disproved by a combination of data collected from the past and new measurements proposed in the future. I believe this shows that there is a fatal flaw in any philosophical theory that attempts to draw an artificial line between so-called "historical data" and "empirical data".
With regard to the speed of light. I fail to see how the measurement of the speed of light is c-dependent. Roemer was able to calculate a suprisingly accurate value for the speed of light by measuring variations in the orbit of Io around Jupiter as related to the distance between Jupiter and Earth. Today laser light is bounced off mirrors on the moon, and the time of travel is measured. Neither of those approaches appear to be "c-dependent."
You state that 'hc is constant'. This is part of the theory of Barry Setterfield. I don't know if you are a subscriber to his theories, but no one else seems to be:
From Young Earth Creationists:
ICR on c-decay
From Wikipedia:
Wikipedia on c-decay
From Evolutionists:
TalkOrigins on c-decay
It actually shows exactly the opposite. The fatal flaw in 'science' is the belief that 'historical' data is as empirical as real empiric data. They aren't even close. This is a major philosophical error that 'science' makes.
"With regard to the speed of light. I fail to see how the measurement of the speed of light is c-dependent. Roemer was able to calculate a suprisingly accurate value for the speed of light by measuring variations in the orbit of Io around Jupiter as related to the distance between Jupiter and Earth. Today laser light is bounced off mirrors on the moon, and the time of travel is measured. Neither of those approaches appear to be "c-dependent.""
I don't think you understand what you are saying. Time has been measured using atomic vibration since 1967. Atomic vibration is c-dependent. Measuring c using c-dependent time measures will never show any change.
"You state that 'hc is constant'. This is part of the theory of Barry Setterfield. I don't know if you are a subscriber to his theories, but no one else seems to be:"
This would be the fallacy of appeal to popular opinion.
âIs astronomy a historical science or an empirical science?â [excerpt]If astronomy is the study and observation of incoming electromagnetic radiation, then it is empirical.
âWe can make measurements today on light that is the result of events that occured billions of years before our planet even existed.â [excerpt]That is a statement that I cannot empirically verify.
We measured the speed of light yesterday and found it to be c. There is no absolute certainty that if we measure the speed of light tomorrow that it will still be c.
Even so we have every reason to believe that if we measure the speed of light tomorrow it will be c.
Likewise, given all of the astronomical experiments that have been conducted to date, although we cannot be absolutely certain that some of the light we see today was generated millions of years ago, we have every reason to believe that this is the case.
Absolute certainty appears to be only available to God. We can only come up with rather good approximations.
And my main point is that these rather good approximations are based on a variety of data:
1. Data generated by controlled experiments.
2. "Found data", i.e. particular arrangements of rocks, fossils, etc. that can only be reconciled with the rest of our data if certain assumptions are made.
3. Data collected in the past, present, and future.
4. Data collected in poorly done or well crafted experiments.
5. Data collected by honest and dishonest people. By those with good intentions, those with bad intentions, and those without any particular agenda.
To completely rule out a particular data set because it doesn't meet some set of criteria is not good science.
Data that was created long ago, or by suspect sources should be treated with greater care. Any hypotheses developed from those data sets will be tentative at best.
Still, hypotheses can be proposed and tested by future data that is generated in well crafted experiments or discovered in the world.
“Every empirical statement is ultimately speculative.” [excerpt]Does this relieve scientists of the responsibility to be as objective as possible?
“We measured the speed of light yesterday and found it to be c. There is no absolute certainty that if we measure the speed of light tomorrow that it will still be c.So, how many meters per Earth second are the photons in the Orion nebula traveling?
Even so we have every reason to believe that if we measure the speed of light tomorrow it will be c.” [excerpt]
“Likewise, given all of the astronomical experiments that have been conducted to date, although we cannot be absolutely certain that some of the light we see today was generated millions of years ago, we have every reason to believe that this is the case.” [excerpt]However, it is an untestable belief that we cannot objectively verify, and I personally have no inclination to place any faith in it.
“Absolute certainty appears to be only available to God. We can only come up with rather good approximations.” [excerpt]Generally speaking [in human terms], incorrect.
“And my main point is that these rather good approximations are based on a variety of data:” [excerpt]What is science?
“1. Data generated by controlled experiments.Thats where testability comes in!
2. "Found data", i.e. particular arrangements of rocks, fossils, etc. that can only be reconciled with the rest of our data if certain assumptions are made.
3. Data collected in the past, present, and future.
4. Data collected in poorly done or well crafted experiments.
5. Data collected by honest and dishonest people. By those with good intentions, those with bad intentions, and those without any particular agenda.
To completely rule out a particular data set because it doesn't meet some set of criteria is not good science.” [excerpt]
“Data that was created long ago, or by suspect sources should be treated with greater care. Any hypotheses developed from those data sets will be tentative at best.” [excerpt]A suspect and/or aged source does not mean flawed data, nor does a reputed and/or recent source guarantee accuracy.
“Still, hypotheses can be proposed and tested by future data that is generated in well crafted experiments or discovered in the world.” [excerpt]Proposed yes.
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