Posted on 10/20/2009 11:42:52 PM PDT by The Magical Mischief Tour
The state Supreme Court ruled unanimously Tuesday anonymous tips are sufficient cause for police to stop suspected drunken drivers.
In the case, an anonymous caller to police reported the reckless driving of an 18-wheeler on Interstate 75 in Loudon County. A police officer then found the truck parked on an exit ramp and, after administering field sobriety tests to the driver, arrested him for driving under the influence.
In his argument to the Supreme Court, the driver, Jerry Lee Hanning, contended the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make his 2003 arrest because he didn’t personally see reckless driving. In her opinion, Justice Sharon Lee wrote “the anonymous tip reporting reckless driving indicated a sufficiently high risk of imminent injury or death to members of the public to warrant immediate intervention by law enforcement officials.”
“Had the officer refrained from detaining Mr. Hanning and allowed him to resume driving, either Mr. Hanning or another member of the public may well have been killed or injured.”
The court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals and Criminal Court of Loudon County to deny Hanning’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during his arrest.
I thought this article was about illegal mohels?
Yet another example of “Grass Thy Neighbor”.
This almost invariably leads to corruption as police can “drop their own dimes.”
Hear-say evidence is now admissible...
Yes, I’m not even conflicted about this. Unless drunk driving in a big rig is a felony, the driver can’t be arrested at the point where he was, which any stop/detention is technically an “arrest”. If it’s a misdemeanor, the crime has to be committed in front of the officer. That’s settled law. The cop should have waited until the driver rolled his rig out again and observed his driving. Now, if the cop didn’t see him driving but observed him step down out of the truck and observed staggering, that should satisfy the law. At the very least, the cop should approach the driver to see if he’s ill/having a stroke/head injury from some event/dizzy spell/diabetic event/food poisoning, etc.. At that point he would detect the odor of alcohol and he’s good to go from there with a roadside and further investigation. But to detain him for investigation just on the say-so of an anonymous driver.....I disagree with the decision.
That said, I’m glad this guy was taken off the road. I wonder if he’s part of the influx of fabulous drivers from Mexico.
> This almost invariably leads to corruption as police can “drop their own dimes.”
Yup — it makes a mockery of “probable cause”. Probable Cause becomes whatever the cops want it to mean.
It is also a part of a disturbing trend, where people are expected — nay, encouraged — to grass on their neighbors as a matter of routine. No, I’m not talking about people observing “Omerta” or “Snitches get Stitches and end up in Ditches”, that’s something different again.
I’m talking about the expectation that being a busy-body tattle-tale is being a useful part of Society.
It’s not. It is and always will be wrong to grass on your neighbor. Let law enforcement enforce the laws, give evidence if you can, cooperate with investigations if asked to, and report serious crimes certainly.
But grassing people out is wrong.
Sorry, my niece and nephew were killed by a drunk driver. You drive erratically where I can see it and I am calling 911. How’s that for “grassing you”?
hmmm, SCOTUS and similar case
> How’s that for “grassing you”?
I guess that would make you a grass.
I have no problem with this. I see a big rig all over the road, driving erratically, etc. I'd call. The officer investigated and found cause.
Sorry, I agree with the judge in this case. You have a witness call it in, a rig stopped on an EXIT ramp not a parking lot, and field sobriety tests conducted to confirm.
Guess according to you I shouldn’t report the murder I saw last week either.
> The officer investigated and found cause.
That’s the sticky part ay. It’s kinda bass-ackward: the officer should first have cause AND THEN investigate, not the other way around.
The only “cause” he had was the hearsay evidence of the person who grassed on the truck-driver — who was safely pulled over and not driving at the time the cop caught up with him.
PLEASE NOTE: I am not condoning drink-driving, it is dangerous, illegal and wrong. I am criticizing a) the process that led to the arrest and b) the practise of grassing.
Read my post more carefully. For your convenience, I wrote:
>> Let law enforcement enforce the laws, give evidence if you can, cooperate with investigations if asked to, and report serious crimes certainly.
Murder is a serious crime. Reporting serious crimes isn't grassing. It's a civic duty.
Round here a rig pulled over on an EXIT ramp would get investigated.
The issue that I have with all this is the concept of grassing. It is fundamentally wrong and prejudicial to the fair administration of Justice.
In most judicial systems which have the Magna Carta as their foundations, (that would include the US, UK, and most Commonwealth countries) the accused has a right to know and confront their accuser. There is no such thing as secret witnesses, secret testimony, or secret complainants.
These systems, however, which allow for people to anonymously grass in people that they believe to be breaking the law undermines this fundamental principle. The accuser is not held to account for his accusation — nor indeed for his *suspicion* — because he is hidden from view by the veil on Anonymity.
This is just plain wrong-headed. It ought not be allowed in any Freedom-loving Society.
Dictatorships cannot exist without their grasses and supergrasses — it is axiomatic. Oppression cannot happen without a certain proportion of the populace being willing to Judas out their neighbors. They may be well-meaning, and they may feel that they have right on their side, but what they do is shameful and wrong.
So in this case, the truck-driver (who was probably doing wrong) was grassed out by a well-meaning Judas, who by doing so acted legally tho’ shamefully.
BUT -- I stayed on scene when the cops showed and told them I was the one on the CB. Not exactly an 'anonymous tip'. I was the witness.
And the guy was so drunk he couldn't even stand up.
I’d call, too. That doesn’t change settled law. If the officer had some form of probable cause based on his own observations, I’d buy it. With this ruling, anybody can call the cops on anybody anonymously just to cause them trouble.
It does happen and the difference in these two cases is one officer found the driver impaired.
Akron Mayor claims he was ‘set up’ for traffic stop
http://www.wkyc.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=123790
AKRON — Mayor Don Plusquellic believes he was the target of a couple who purposely misled police to question him about drinking and driving.
Plusquellic attended a surprise 60th birthday party for an Akron police officer Saturday night at the Firehouse Grille and Pub in Tallmadge.
As he was driving home to Akron, a driver called 911 from Memorial Parkway and described the mayor’s car, including his license number, as having nearly driven her off the road.
A few minutes later, police spotted Plusquellic’s car stopped on Portage Path, near Plusquellic’s residence in West Akron’s Highland Square neighborhood.
Based on the 911 call, Lt. Christopher Brewer approached Plusquellic’s car to question him about his driving.
“(The officer) checked for those signs like glassy eyes, slurred speech, and odor of alcohol,” said Lt. Rick Edwards, of the Akron Police. “He didn’t find any of these things that would (indicate) a person to be impaired. At that point, he let the mayor go.”
Radio reports indicate Brewer and his partner spent fewer than 10 minutes talking with Plusquellic before the decision was made to allow him to leave.
At no time was Plusquellic asked to exit the vehicle. Since no action was taken, no report was made, Edwards said.
In the case of a suspected drunk drivers, officers have the latitude to continue testing a driver or to end the test if they’re satisfied that the driver is not impaired, Edwards said.
“It’s their discretion to look to see if (drivers) meet those impairments, and then follow up with field sobriety testing and place a person under arrest,” Edwards said. “All the officers are trained to look for those signs of impairment and, obviously, they didn’t find (Plusquellic) had the signs of impairment that the caller thought there was.”
The caller was identified only as “Melanie” and, while she provided her cell phone number, she did not give a last name. Calls to Melanie’s phone number were not immediately returned.
Plusquellic claims he was targeted. He released a statement Monday afternoon, following a media report that referenced the traffic stop.
His statement claims that Melanie and her boyfriend, an off-duty Akron firefighter, were at the same Tallmadge restaurant during the party.
According to the statement: “...it is clear to me that an Akron firefighter deliberately came to this public restaurant where the birthday party was being held with the intention of setting me up. He and his girlfriend took video pictures from their seat in the restaurant, and when I left, they apparently followed me.”
“Witnesses have since advised me that the firefighter and his girlfriend ... immediately made cell phone calls, apparently to police, before they even had time to observe my driving. They attempted to pass other cars behind me in an effort to get closer to my car as we traveled on Tallmadge Avenue.”
He also wrote that he believes he was targeted for “political purposes.”
“We see how somebody can be victimized by a false accusation when taken to its conclusion, if you’re a public official especially,” said Communications Director Mark Williamson.
“If the media isn’t responsible in analyzing a story to see if it’s truly newsworthy, and somebody puts out a story and it includes a false accusation, the house of cards starts to fall for somebody who did absolutely nothing wrong.”
At the Firehouse Grille & Pub, owner Suzy Baglia told Channel 3’s Mike O’Mara that she heard some customers making comments about the mayor’s behavior during the birthday party.
Baglia said, “I heard people making comments that they were going to follow him out of here. So we did stop him (Plusquellic) at the door and say “hey, are you ok to drive?” And he appeared fine. He’s like, I’m fine. And that’s the reason we asked because people were making comments like that.”
Pub patron Charlie Denny said, “I saw him have a couple (of drinks). I didn’t see him have a lot. And he was under control as far as I could see.”
Debbie Kozlowski said that the mayor was having a great time for several hours at the Pub. “He was dancing, singing, eating just like at a wedding reception,” said Kozlowski.
Plusquellic spent Monday in Columbus attending the funeral of a friend who lost his 12-year-old grandchild, Williamson said.
Interesting story. All politics are local.
Neither case had sufficient probable cause. The chief of police would have caught hell if one of his officers refused to take any action whatsoever, but there would have been other ways to handle it. In the end, the couple who made the call did the mayor a favor by putting him in a sympathetic position. The cop who arrested the truck driver should have either bided his time and waited for the trucker to take off again so he could observe his driving or “found” some other reason to approach the trucker, “Your load looks out of balance” or “One of your tires looks a little low.” He would then detect the odor of alcohol, then give a roadside, then he could have proved that the trucker drove while drunk via the trucker’s log records, manifests, mileage, etc..
The more authority we give the government, the more we allow our own freedoms to be eroded. Probable cause requirements and due process are the only major check and balance that we have to keep the government at bay. The idea that merely a call from an anonymous caller is sufficient to detain someone is frightening.
Well about 5 minutes later it passes me on the right shoulder going all over the road and leaves me sitting. I was doing 65. About 10 minutes or so later I passed the Loudon exit and this same truck was in the median pouring gas in from gas cans. I got on my cell and tried to call THP. I tried. For 20 minutes no answer.
Now how or why do you suppose a wanted Rental Truck could go 85 miles into Tennessee and no one stop it? I know the answer because I saw who was doing the fueling. A likely illegal alien with a likely truck load of same. I doubt the scale house about 8 miles up the road caught the truck either.
I'm not for anonymous tips being probable cause in almost any circumstance. But if a person uses 911 to do so they are not such anyway. 911 Dispatcher has all the information they need. They have to release the phone back to you after you call and before you can call anyone else. I'm pretty sure Loudon County has this technology and the call may have went through Knox County and I know for 100% certain they do.
Good story. So TN WANTS illegals there? The reason I ask is because we’re planning to move to the Smoky mountains/Roan Mountain Elizabethton/Watauga area as soon as we can get out of CA, which is full of illegals and one of the reasons we’re leaving.
You also said: “I’m not for anonymous tips being probable cause in almost any circumstance. But if a person uses 911 to do so they are not such anyway. 911 Dispatcher has all the information they need. They have to release the phone back to you after you call and before you can call anyone else. I’m pretty sure Loudon County has this technology and the call may have went through Knox County and I know for 100% certain they do.”
That’s all well and good, but the ruling didn’t address that because that wasn’t the question before the court. As an aside, the ruling also covers the entire state, so it doesn’t matter if Loudon and Knox Counties have whatever technology. The issue before the court is probable cause and warrantless misdemeanor arrests, which has nothing to do with availability of a witness at a later time during the prosecution of the case. The court’s decision flies in the face of a TON of settled law on probable cause and warrantless misdemeanor arrests not committed in the presence of a peace officer.
The only thing I would point out is that the drive of the rig was parked on an EXIT ramp. Last I checked that was a no parking area.
Not certain about that one ramp but unless signs state otherwise it is legal to park on exit ramps in Tennessee.
Laws for commercial trucks and laws for private vehicles are a bit different and have been so a long time. Not saying a I agree just saying that's the way it's been. BTW you think this is bad? The Tennessee Wildlife Resource Agency has the strongest LEO authority in the state. No probable cause needed period. They want a look see they get it.
As for illegals? Knoxville is flooded as is Oak Ridge and Morrristown. I can't say for certain about the Roan Mountain area I live north of Knoxville myself. In Oak Ridge illegals are shall we say deliberately ignored by LEO’s but yet the city has put all who enter under Traffic Light Camera. Simply meaning we pay but Jose from Juarez with no license and likely a wrong or fictitious address does not. They are beginning to move into more rural areas now. I saw a supposed Apple Orchard in North Knox County house a considerable number. No apples on the trees and trees not kept up.
This is why when I see someone driving erratically, or other strangeness I call it in but I make sure they have my name. Should they decide to to go trial, I should be expected to be able to recall the events that led me to call. The accused have a right to face their accuser.
I usually keep a notepad in the car and note details like the date, time, type of car, license plate number, observed behavior, etc. I also don't tell the 911 dispatcher that I suspect drunk driving. I don't know that and wouldn't be able to determine that from my position. It could be a seizure, or sleepiness, or something other than a DWI.
Thanks for your information. We may have to rethink our plans for TN. I am NOT happy to hear what you’ve said about the illegals. Why are TN LEOs doing nothing about it? I’m sure there’s a political explanation, but what is it? Why aren’t Tennesseans raising hell about it?
What’s this about the TN Wildlife Resource Agency? What do they do? What are they looking for? And why doesn’t the Fourth Amendment apply to them?
As to the trucker and the DUI arrest, I’m aware that LE has enhanced authorities and requirements relating to commercial carriers, but this ruling has nothing to do with it being a big rig involved. The ruling pertains to probable cause and warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not committed in the presence of the officer, and it applies to all drivers in the state, not just big rigs. In fact, I would reiterate the previous point I made that the officer should have “found” another reason to approach the driver. With the enhanced requirements and authorities surrounding big rig, it should have been easy for the officer to do this.
I don’t know about TN, but here in CA it is not illegal to pull out of the roadway and stop on the shoulder of an off ramp.
But Tennessee is basically a good place for businesses and manufactures to locate anyway as we have no state income tax. Many are also more than willing to work for reasonable wages and unions as such aren't strong here except where government contractors are. I'm hoping that our GOP majority in both state houses will address the illegal issue soon.
TWRA is our Game Wardens. They are the most empowered LEO’s on the state level.
Loudon County in the past has had some questionable traffic stops. IIRC one involved a seizure of a mans money a considerable sum and LCSD never could prove the person did any wrong. Loudon County sits on I-75 and I-40. It's reasonable to assume some persons traveling it have legitimate reason to carry large sums of money.
Why are the game wardens so heavily empowered? I mean, more so than your state highway patrol? What powers do they have that other state and local LEAs not have? I don’t get it. Don’t they have to adhere to the Fourth Amendment?
TN is an absolutely beautiful state, and the people we met there or have lived there are our kind of people and all say the same things about TN. We were up in the mountains somewhere and pulled into a little store/gas station at some wide spot in the road on or near the Blue Ridge Parkway. When we saw a sign on the front door that said, “Gentlemen and ladies, please, no firearms inside the store” we knew we were finally in the right state. :) We’re anxious to get there, but if they’re letting illegals in full rein and the cops are running roughshod on the citizenry, we may as well stay here in CA.
Sounds like North Carolina. Reason I say that is they have open carry and unfortunately we don't. BTW they are over ran with illegals also. I'll give you a tip to get into an areas where illegals are few and far between. Get into a community about 20 miles or so from any interstates especially those running north to south. Unfortunately East Tennessee has two such interstates and they attract illegals to locate close to them. I'm about 6 miles from the interstate myself but I'm in a very rural area though.
Well, maybe it was NC and I’m just remembering it wrong.
We’ve looked at a couple of properties outside the Hampton area. What do you think about Hampton? What about illegals there? We made an offer on a real nice place about 1 mile or less from the marina on the southern end of Watauga Lake just outside Hampton, but they didn’t accept it. The land was pretty steep and rugged so we didn’t want to pay any more than our offer. The realtor contacted us again to see if we were still interested but by then we’d decided to keep looking for something with a gentler profile to the lay of the land. They never did sell it - took it off the market, and it just went back on again - with the front yard that used to be a nice lawn now chest-high weeds and the same asking price.
Anyway, we were also thinking about Mountain City, but that elevation gets real cold and a lot of snow, right? How about Valley Forge?
Thanks for your info.
in the same way pi**ed off ex-wives call in an “abuse” complaint on the ex..guilty until proven innocent..
Where I live, though, you have to give the cops your name, address and phone number. In addition to that, they pretty much all have caller ID, so you're not really "anonymous".
I don't have a problem giving the cops my info if I call. Back with my CB & the drunk driver, I followed FCC Regs and gave them my FCC License Number (call sign?) when the Local PD responded back to me as to who was calling them for help.
As to being 'anonymous'; blocking Caller ID I 'think' will do it, or calling on a cell phone. I know it can be done as I listen to Chi PD radio calls (Like I am now) and they get tons of 'anonymous' calls (tips).
Please define probable cause. When you articulate your response, it would be helpful to cite specific authority for your position.
I'm not familiar with the term "grassing," but are you suggesting that drunk driving is not a serious crime?
I'll tell you the problem I have with this... it's the word, "Anonymous"...
If I see an obviously drunk or impaired driver, I would definitely call the cops... but, I'd have no problem giving my name. It's seems to me to be kind of what the Founder's had in mind when they wrote that 4th Amendment... which requires a sworn affidative... ie: A specific accuser.
Of course... the SCOTUS has blown that requirement off too.. When you allow "anonymous" tips... Police can stop anyone they damn well please... That, I think, is a problem.
What do you mean, we don't? If you have a Tennessee HCP you can carry open OR concealed. If you don't have one, you can't carry at all.
On November 15, 2003, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Sergeant Kent Russell of the Loudon
Police Department received a radio dispatch that an anonymous caller had reported a recklessly
driven truck headed north on Interstate 75. The caller identified the vehicle as a black “18-wheeler”2
with “1-800-GoSmith” or “Go Smith Brothers” on the back and stated that the truck had exited at
the Highway 72 exit ramp.
When Sergeant Russell received the dispatch, he was in the parking lot of a McDonald’s
restaurant located about one hundred and fifty yards from the top of the Highway 72 exit ramp. He
immediately drove to the exit ramp where he observed a black truck tractor and trailer with its
parking lights on parked in the emergency lane, facing the top of the ramp. Sergeant Russell
activated his emergency blue lights, drove his patrol car down the ramp against the flow of traffic,
and parked with the front of his vehicle very close to the front of the truck. Sergeant Russell walked
up to the truck’s door, which was emblazoned with an eagle image and the words “Smith” and
“transport,” and requested the truck’s driver, Jerry Lee Hanning, to step out of the truck. After Mr.
Hanning complied with Sergeant Russell’s request, Sergeant Russell asked him if he had been
drinking, administered various field sobriety tests, arrested him for driving under the influence, and
transported him to a hospital for a blood alcohol test.
In October of 2004, the Loudon County grand jury returned an indictment charging Mr.
Hanning with driving under the influence (“DUI”) in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section
55-10-401 and 3 with possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage in violation of
Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-416.4 Mr. Hanning filed a motion to suppress all evidence
obtained as a result of the detention of himself and his vehicle upon the ground that Sergeant Russell lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause and therefore violated the search and seizure
provisions of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
After the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Hanning entered into a conditional plea
agreement with the State. In exchange for a conditional plea of guilty to the DUI charge, the open
container charge was dismissed, and he was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days
incarceration, suspended upon his service of three days in jail and payment of fines and costs. This
plea reserved and certified for appeal the question presented in the motion to suppress of “whether
the warrantless questioning and detention of Mr. Hanning violated the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee.”
This question was certified for appeal pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal
Procedure5 by order of the trial court.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and
found that Sergeant Russell had reasonable suspicion that the truck was the same one that the caller
had identified as being driven recklessly, based upon the facts that when Sergeant Russell received
the dispatch he was in close proximity to the specified exit ramp, he immediately proceeded to the
ramp, and found a black truck tractor and trailer sitting as if it had exited I-75, as stated by the caller.
The Court of Criminal Appeals further found that, based upon Sergeant Russell’s reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Hanning had been driving recklessly, he properly questioned Mr. Hanning and
administered field sobriety tests. Based on the results of these actions, the Court of Criminal
Appeals also found that the officer had probable cause to arrest Mr. Hanning for driving under the
influence. We granted Mr. Hanning’s application for permission to appeal.
Analysis
As noted, the certified question reserved for appeal was “whether the warrantless questioning
and detention of Mr. Hanning violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee.” We determine that under the facts
of this case, the warrantless detention was valid because it was supported by reasonable suspicion
that Mr. Hanning had committed a crime.
Although this case comes to us on appeal as a certified question of law under Tenn. R. Crim.
P. 37(b)(2), we review it under the same standard as an appeal from a judgment denying a motion
to suppress. See State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Tenn. 2006). The “trial court’s findings
of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” State
v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Furthermore, although “[t]he party prevailing in the trial
court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence,” id., the
burden remains on the State to prove that a warrantless search was constitutionally permissible.
Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d at 656-57; State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tenn. 1998). We review
questions of law de novo. State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 900 (Tenn. 2008).
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment as recognized in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961),
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Similarly, Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution provides:
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer
may be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of the fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offences are not
particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought
not to be granted.
Three categories of police-citizen interaction have been judicially designated: (1) full-scale
arrest, which must be supported by probable cause, see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 598 (1975);
State v. Ferrante, 269 S.W.3d 908, 913 (Tenn. 2008); (2) brief investigatory detention, which must
be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968);
State v. Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311, 315 (Tenn. 2006); and (3) brief police-citizen encounter that
requires no objective justification, see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); State v. Daniel,
12 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000). The case before us involves a brief investigatory detention, and
accordingly, we must determine whether at the time Mr. Hanning was detained, Sergeant Russell had
a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hanning had committed a crime.
We have previously noted that a seizure or detention occurs when “‘in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave.’” Williams, 185 S.W.3d at 316 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554 (1980)). Ordinarily, when an officer turns on his blue lights, the officer has initiated a detention.
See State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993). However, in some instances, an officer’s
activation of his or her emergency blue lights will not constitute a detention, such as when the officer
turns on the emergency lights for reasons of safety. See Williams, 185 S.W.3d at 318. While it is
arguable that Sergeant Russell initially activated his blue lights as a safety measure, given that he
was driving down the exit ramp against the flow of traffic, the parties have agreed that Mr. Hanning and his truck were detained when, with its blue lights flashing, Sergeant Russell pulled his patrol car
very close to the front of Mr. Hanning’s truck. A reasonable person in Mr. Hanning’s place would
have believed he was not free to leave when the patrol car was parked in front of the truck, blocking
its exit.
Having established the moment of detention, we must next determine whether the detention
was justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In determining whether an investigatory
detention is based upon reasonable suspicion, we engage in a “fact-intensive and objective analysis,”
reviewing the record for “specific and articulable facts, that the defendant had committed, or was
about to commit, a criminal offense.” See id. at 318-19. Reasonable suspicion must be supported
by something more than the officer’s “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Day,
263 S.W.3d at 902 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). However, “‘reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish
probable cause’” and “can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause.” Id. at 903 (quoting Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 32).
When information is received from an anonymous informant, as occurred in the instant
matter, there is an enhanced concern as to whether the information is reliable or whether it was
fabricated. State v. Wilhoit, 962 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Thus, in order to
ensure reliability, before a motor vehicle can be validly detained based upon information received
from an anonymous informant, there must be a showing of both 1) the basis of the informant’s
knowledge of the conveyed information and 2) the informant’s credibility. Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903
(citing Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 31). The difficulty in utilizing this two-prong test to assess the
reliability of a tip received from an informant whose identity is unknown is readily apparent.
However, any deficiencies in demonstrating reliability based upon this test can be cured by an
investigating officer’s independent corroboration of the anonymously provided information. Wilhoit,
962 S.W.2d at 487.
In the case before us, we first consider whether the basis of the caller’s knowledge and the
caller’s credibility were established in accord with the two-prong test for reliability. While the
record does not show the caller’s basis of knowledge, we have noted that “[w]hen an informant
reports an incident at or near the time of its occurrence, a court can often assume that the report is
first-hand, and hence reliable.” Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 32. We have further held that this
contemporaneity of the caller’s observation and the call, coupled with an officer’s verification of
details of the caller’s observations shortly after receiving the call, can be sufficient to satisfy the basis
of knowledge prong of our inquiry. Wilhoit, 962 S.W.2d at 487-88. In this case, the anonymous
caller reported that a black “18-wheeler” was being driven recklessly on the interstate and had taken
the Highway 72 exit. The call suggested that the caller was reporting the reckless driving as it
occurred. Within mere minutes of receiving the dispatch, Sergeant Russell confirmed that there was
a truck matching the general description given by the caller at the location described by the caller.
The confirmation of this information in close proximity to its receipt was sufficient to demonstrate
the caller’s basis of knowledge. See id. at 488. While the anonymity of the caller precluded direct verification of the caller’s credibility,
Sergeant Russell’s independent corroboration of certain details provided by the caller, specifically
the type of vehicle (truck tractor and trailer), its color (black), its location (Highway 72 exit ramp),
and its direction of travel (northbound), was sufficient to satisfy the credibility prong of the reliability
inquiry. See id. Furthermore, 6 when Sergeant Russell observed the truck, it was parked in the
emergency lane of the exit ramp. While this was not a statutory offense at the time,7 it was a
sufficiently unusual circumstance to arouse Sergeant Russell’s suspicion that the truck was the one
reported by the caller as having been driven recklessly.
Mr. Hanning asserts that Sergeant Russell did not personally observe the truck being driven
recklessly and, citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), argues that Sergeant Russell’s
corroboration of details observable or available to anyone did not establish reasonable suspicion. In
Florida v. J.L., the United States Supreme Court held that an anonymous caller’s report that a suspect
at a specific bus stop was carrying a concealed gun did not create reasonable suspicion sufficient to
justify the suspect being stopped and frisked by law enforcement officers. The Court indicated that
the anonymous caller’s failure to provide predictive information about the subject’s future
movements left the police without any means to confirm that the informant had inside knowledge
about the subject that would have lent credibility to the caller’s charge that the defendant was
engaged in criminal activity. 529 U.S. at 272. We find the circumstances of the instant case to be
distinguishable from the facts in Florida v. J.L. in several ways.
First, a report of readily observable evidence of reckless driving carries a higher degree of
inherent reliability than does a report of a concealed weapon. The basis of the tipster’s knowledge
is apparent when the reported criminal activity is open to observation by the general public, whereas
the basis of the tipster’s knowledge of a concealed crime is unknown, absent proof of inside
information supporting the allegation. See Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1219 (Del. 2004).
Furthermore, when a tipster seeks to report the location of a reckless driver at the time the reckless
driving is observed or shortly thereafter, the tipster has a very brief amount of time to contact the
police, and the likelihood that the allegation is fabricated is proportionately diminished. See id. at 1220. By contrast, a tipster reporting a concealed weapon is not subject to such time restrictions.
And finally, the relatively limited amount of time available to report the location of a moving vehicle
also diminishes the possibility that the tip merely constitutes an attempt by the tipster to employ law
enforcement officials for the purpose of harassment. See id. Logistically, but for the corroboration
requirements imposed by the Court in Florida v. J.L., it would be a simple matter to fabricate a report
of a concealed weapon that would expose an individual to a stop and frisk. However, in order to use
the police for harassment by falsely reporting that an individual is driving recklessly, the tipster
would be required to know not only that the person he seeks to harass is driving a particular vehicle
at a specific time and location, but also that at the time the report is made, an officer will be in close
enough proximity to the subject to promptly execute a stop of the vehicle. Given the intricacies and
improbabilities that would be involved in seeking to harass another by a report of reckless or erratic
driving, it seems highly unlikely that such a report will have been fabricated for that purpose. See
Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1220 (concluding that, because reporting erratic driving “is such an
intricate, improbable, and imprecise method of harassing another,” the risk of a tip being falsified
by an informant is “significantly reduced”).
Second, the level of intrusion presented by the actions of law enforcement officials in the two
cases is different. In Florida v.J.L., the stop and frisk conducted by the officers in the federal case
entailed physical contact between the officers and the suspect, whereas the intervention in this case
initially amounted to a brief detention and did not entail physical contact between Sergeant Russell
and Mr. Hanning. See State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 868 (Vt. 2000) (recognizing that the liberty
interest at stake in a brief motor vehicle stop does not rise to the level that confronted the Court in
Florida v. J.L.); see also United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 737 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that
investigatory stop of motor vehicle is “considerably less invasive, both physically and
psychologically, than the frisk on a public corner that was at issue in [Florida v.] J.L.”).
Finally, and most importantly, the degree of danger and urgency for immediate action that
confronted the officers in Florida v. J.L. was much lower than that confronting Sergeant Russell in
this case. A report that a vehicle is being driven recklessly or erratically suggests that the driver may
be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, see State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 526 (Wis. 2001)
(“Erratic driving is one possible sign of intoxicated use of a motor vehicle.”), fatigued, or in physical
distress and therefore incapable of controlling his or her vehicle. While a concealed weapon does
not of itself present an imminent danger of harm to the public, a truck driven recklessly does present
such a danger. Although the truck was parked at the moment it was located by Sergeant Russell, it
could have been moving and back on the interstate in a matter of seconds, and we do not believe that
Sergeant Russell was obligated to wait until the truck was back on the interstate and moving to
confirm the report of reckless driving. Had he done so, the first indication that the caller’s report of
reckless driving was correct might well have been a collision between the truck and another vehicle,
resulting in injury or death to Mr. Hanning and/or other members of the public. In Florida v. J.L.,
the Court acknowledged that under some circumstances, such as where a person is reported to be
carrying a bomb, the danger alleged by an anonymous caller might be so great that some lesser
indicia of reliability would be sufficient to justify a frisk. 529 U.S. at 273-74. A truck tractor and
trailer being driven recklessly on the interstate is sufficiently analogous to a bomb to warrant prompt intervention and investigation by law enforcement officials. See Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867 (stating that
“a drunk driver is not at all unlike a ‘bomb,’ and a mobile one at that.”); accord Rutzinski, 623
N.W.2d at 526.
Mr. Hanning also relies on State v. Coleman, 791 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989), in
support of his argument that Sergeant Russell lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a detention. In
Coleman, an informant advised law enforcement officials that at a specified time, the subject in a
car of a particular color, model, and make would be transporting marijuana on Highway 431 to a
location on Washington Road in Robertson County. At the time specified by the caller, a deputy
located a car matching the description traveling on Highway 431 toward Robertson County. After
following the vehicle for a brief time, the deputy initiated a stop, searched the vehicle with the
driver’s consent, and discovered several pounds of marijuana. The Court of Criminal Appeals held
that the stop was invalid because the informant’s credibility and basis of knowledge were not
sufficiently established by the deputy’s independent corroboration of the information provided. In
so holding, the Court noted that law enforcement officials failed to make any inquiry as to the
driver’s identity or her reputation with respect to the use or sale of illegal drugs. Coleman, 791
S.W.2d at 506. We find Coleman to be distinguishable from the present case. In Coleman, although
the informant’s identity was apparently known, law enforcement officials failed to make any attempt
to verify the informant’s credibility. Coleman is also distinguishable from the matter now before us
in that the criminal activity reported by the caller in that case (transportation of drugs) did not present
an imminent threat of harm to the public.
In the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. J.L. and consistent
with our above analysis differentiating that case from the present one, one United States Circuit
Court of Appeals and a multitude of state jurisdictions have ruled that an investigatory stop may be
initiated on the basis of an anonymous report of erratic, reckless or drunk driving, even without
corroboration of any criminal activity by law enforcement officials. See Cottrell v. State, 971 So.2d
735, 745-46 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 2006); People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 815-16 (Cal. 2006);
Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1219-20; State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714 (Haw. 2004); State v.
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Iowa 2001); State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 119-20 (Kan. 2003);
State v. Barras, No. 2009 KA 0014, 2009 WL 1717166, at *4-5 (La. App. 1. Cir. June 19, 2009);
State v. Sousa, 855 A.2d 1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004); State v. Contreras, 79 P.3d 1111, 1117-18 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2003); People v. Jeffery, 2 A.D.3d 1271, 1271 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Boyea, 765 A.2d
at 868; Wheat, 278 F.3d at 729. We find guidance in all of these cases in reaching a conclusion in
the present matter. We are also guided in our decision by specific factors recognized by this Court
in State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tenn. 1993).
In Pulley, the police received two anonymous reports indicating that a man driving a yellow
Ford L.T.D. in a specified trailer park was armed with a shotgun and was “supposed to shoot
someone.” 863 S.W.2d at 29. The police found the subject in a vehicle matching the description,
not at the named trailer park, but parked at a nearby gas station. The investigating officer testified
that when he arrived at the gas station, he turned on his blue lights, approached the subject’s car, and
asked him to step out, at which time he saw a shotgun on the car’s floorboard. He arrested the subject on several charges that included possessing various weapons with the intent to go armed and
driving under the influence. Both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that the
weapons and the results of a blood alcohol test should be suppressed, presumably upon grounds that
the investigating officer did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop. We
reversed upon consideration of the following three factors: “‘(i) the public interest served by the
seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objective facts upon which the law
enforcement officer relied in light of his knowledge and experience.’” Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 34
(quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 561). We determined that 1) the stop served the public’s interest
in the prevention of violent crime; 2) the scope of what was intended to be a temporary stop was
minor; 3) the timely nature of the anonymous report indicating that the caller was an eyewitness
verified the caller’s basis of knowledge; and 4) the corroboration of many of the details described
by the caller “provided some basis to believe the informant was credible.” Id. at 34. We concluded
that “given the threat of violence, the police had ‘specific and articulable facts’ to warrant the
investigatory stop,” id., and we recognized “the need for immediate police action in response to
serious threats of harm,” stating that the “reliability of the informant’s tip is not the only determinant
of the reasonableness of the stop. The content of the tip is also a crucial factor and, in particular, the
level of danger that the tip reveals,” id. at 32.
Although Pulley did not involve a report of reckless driving, we believe that a report of a
truck tractor and trailer being driven recklessly on the interstate poses a sufficiently high degree of
threat of imminent hazard to warrant prompt investigation by law enforcement officials. With
specific reference to the three factors designated in Pulley, we conclude that Sergeant Russell’s
detention of Mr. Hanning served the public’s interest in the prevention of reckless driving; the scope
of what was intended to be a temporary stop was minor; and in light of these considerations, the
caller’s basis of knowledge and credibility were sufficiently corroborated by Sergeant Russell to
establish reliability. Taking into account these three factors and bearing in mind the high degree of
danger presented by the anonymous tip, we hold that the warrantless detention of Mr. Hanning and
his truck were justified upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
As we indicated in Pulley, an officer’s action should be evaluated “in light of one’s reaction
had [the officer] failed to act.” Id. at 33. In this case, had Sergeant Russell refrained from detaining
Mr. Hanning and allowed him to resume driving, either Mr. Hanning or another member of the
public may well have been killed or injured. We emphasize the importance of this consideration in
our decision herein. As we have noted above, reckless or erratic driving indicates that the driver may
be impaired as the result of an intoxicant. Recent statistics of the National Highway Transportation
Safety Administration show that in 2007 approximately 13,000 people were killed by drunk drivers
nationally, and 8 the citizens of Tennessee are not exempt from this ongoing tragedy. The imminent
danger presented by drunk driving and the public’s interest in eliminating this problem are obvious
and indisputable.
In holding that detention was justified in the present case, we do not intend to imply that the
extent of corroboration provided by Sergeant Russell will, as a general matter, be sufficient to
establish reliability of anonymously provided information, but only that such degree of corroboration
can be sufficient to establish such reliability when independent corroboration of the reported criminal
activity is not feasible because there is a high risk of imminent injury or death equivalent to the risk
posed by a truck tractor and trailer being recklessly driven on the interstate. Furthermore, we are
compelled to emphasize that the content of the tip is of critical significance. Thus, the degree of
corroboration that was sufficient to establish reliability in this case may not be sufficient where the
nature of the activity reported and any associated imminent danger cannot be reasonably inferred
from the information conveyed by the informant. See State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891 (Tenn. 2008)
(holding that officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop suspect where stop was based solely on
anonymous driver flashing her lights, waving her arms, and pointing at suspect’s vehicle).
Having justifiably detained Mr. Hanning based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, Sergeant Russell approached the door of the truck where he observed the Smith logo and
properly asked Mr. Hanning to step from the truck. See State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Tenn.
2007) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-11 (1977) (holding that once a vehicle has
been lawfully detained, an officer may, as a matter of course, order the driver to step out of the
vehicle)). Thereafter, Sergeant Russell properly administered field sobriety tests, establishing
probable cause to arrest Mr. Hanning for driving under the influence.
In summary, we hold that in this case the anonymous tip reporting reckless driving suggested
a sufficiently high risk of imminent injury or death to members of the public to warrant immediate
intervention by law enforcement officials and justified the brief investigatory stop by Sergeant
Russell because the offense was reported at or near the time of its occurrence, and the report
indicated that the caller was witnessing an ongoing offense; the report provided a detailed description
of Mr. Hanning’s truck, its direction of travel and location; and Sergeant Russell verified these
details within moments of the dispatch reporting the tip.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, on the certified question presented, we hold that Sergeant
Russell’s warrantless detention of Mr. Hanning and his truck was valid because it was supported by
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hanning had committed or was about to commit a crime. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The costs of this appeal are assessed to
Jerry Lee Hanning, and his surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
I particularly “like” the reasoning used in State v. Coleman, 791 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989).
So having well over the threshold of drugs to indicate intent to distribute is not an imminent threat of harm to the public ‘eh?
“Coleman is also distinguishable from the matter now before us in that the criminal activity reported by the caller in that case (transportation of drugs) did not present an imminent threat of harm to the public.”
Just WOW!
Don’t we have a war on drugs that includes pot? Aren’t a lot of people on this site opposed to its use for almost any reason? Say what you will about that, but the reasoning doesn’t track well with past precedent if you ask me...
>> Murder is a serious crime.
> So is drunk driving,
True? If that were so, it would be punishable by a period of incarceration on first offense. It is demonstrably a serious traffic offense, which is how most jurisdictions worldwide tend to treat it.
In NZ, first offense for DWI is punishable by 6 mos. mandatory loss of license. A fine plus court costs are also often applied. Naturally, this increases if there are injuries or losses of life.
In NZ, first offense for murder is punishable by 20 yrs in gaol.
I’d be guessing but I suspect the tariffs would be of a similar scale where you live.
Is this good, right or just? That’s a different question.
> but are you suggesting that drunk driving is not a serious crime?
I haven’t suggested that, but for the avoidance of doubt it is certainly a serious traffic infringement and is treated as such by the Courts.
Is it a serious crime on the scale of Murder or Burglary or Armed Robbery? Most jurisdictions do not treat it that way. Should they? That’s a different debate.
Probable cause is a level of reasonable belief, based on facts that can be articulated, that is required to sue a person in civil court or to arrest and prosecute a person in criminal court. Before a person can be sued or arrested and prosecuted, the civil plaintiff or police and prosecutor must possess enough facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the claim or charge is true.
From this we would probably agree that an anonymous phone call dimed in by persons unknown would not constitute "Probable Cause" sufficient for the police to make an arrest.
If you want to turn someone in, you better face them as the accuser.
That definition is OK. I'd prefer a bit more explanation, specifically articulating that it is less than preponderance of the evidence, but more than reasonable suspicion.
From this we would probably agree that an anonymous phone call dimed in by persons unknown would not constitute "Probable Cause" sufficient for the police to make an arrest.
Sure, an anonymous phone call is not enough to make an arrest by itself, however, the officer doesn't need probable cause to make an investigatory stop. Instead, an officer only needs REASONABLE SUSPICION.
During the investigation, if the officer establishes probable cause, he can then make the arrest.
Read the opinion, the Court never said that an anonymous tip provides probable cause. Nor did the Court say that an anonymous tip was grounds for an arrest. The court merely established that a corroborated anonymous tip could provide enough reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.
An officer does not need to have probable cause to STOP you, they need it to ARREST you. An officer only needs REASONABLE SUSPICION to conduct a traffic stop.
The threshold for reasonable suspicion is much lower than that of probable cause.
Interesting that you raise Reasonable Suspicion. From this same source it is not clear that the officer would even have Reasonable Suspicion based upon an anonymous phone tip.
That said, the truck being parked on the exit ramp would be more sufficient to conduct his Terry stop.
Because Open Carry USUALLY means No Permits Required as long as weapon is in plain sight. Personally I have no permit and I carry concealed. I never intend to ask "Masser State or Federal Government" for such permission to exercise my 2nd Amendment Right either. Waiting for a yell of Citizens Arrest, Citizens Arrest", by someone to tell me I can't.
You can carry & they can't stop you from carrying anymore than those IDIOTS making that insane law can stop a convicted felon from buying a firearm.
Can’t help you too much on places you mentioned. I live north of Knoxville myself toward Kentucky. Valley Forge? Do you mean Pigeon Forge? They are there also. Close to I-40 and I-81 and a tourist town. I can give you the name of one county in private. Close to Knox County but rural and so far has escaped most of the illegal allien invasion because there are not many jobs or businesses and not much government housing for them there.
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