Posted on 05/12/2010 10:43:43 PM PDT by TigerLikesRooster
The Dear Leader’s China Trip: Rift Failed to Cover
Posted by Zhu Feng on May 11, 2010. Filed under China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, United States.
North Korea’s Dear Leader Kim Jong Il visited China May 3-7 in search of aid and economic cooperation. Kim’s visit puts China under fire in the US, Korea and Japan in the light of Cheonan sinking. But it was not a surprise visit, and the rumor of his coming had rippled since last January in 2010. So far, no one knows exactly why his trip was postponed time and again. Maybe his arrival needed to be aligned with the schedules of Chinese leaders and perhaps the visit was delayed by his health conditions. Whatever it was, the visit was a rare showcase opportunity for the Dear Leader, the most mysterious and least accessible figure in the world.
The visit proceeded largely in accordance with the “tradition” between China and DPRK. When Kim was in China, Beijing said “nothing” about his news and even refused to utter any single comment. The official news about his activities was only disclosed after his return. Compared to his previous visit, however, Beijing’s official news releases on his 5-day stay in China seem more transparent than ever before. All state media reported on May 7 on the meeting and talks between Chinese leaders and Kim, as well as on his tours of Dalian’s locomotive manufacturing, Tianjin Harbor’s docks and the Beijing Boao Biotech Co. Ltd. The Chinese state TV station CCTV used an unprecedented 15–minute-long news release at noon on May 7 to describe the meeting of Chinese President Hu Jintao and all his colleagues on the Standing Committee of Political Bureau of the Chinese Community Party with Kim Jong Il. News footage covered all Kim’s stops en route. Such full coverage reporting has not happened before.
Almost simultaneously to the CCTV reports, the Chinese Foreign Ministry briefed South Korean Ambassador Yu Woo-ik about Kim’s visit. South Korea’s Presidential Office, Cheong Wa Dae, quickly followed up by pronouncing that “the Chinese side explained in sincerity the background of Chairman Kim’s visit, what was mainly discussed, and other details.” It seems that Beijing became more aware of the possibly complicated implications to the region of a warm greeting to Kim Jong Il, and decided to more openly disclose China’s intentions to maintain a good relationship with Pyongyang. This is signaling that Beijing’s newly developed “more balanced approach” to deal with N. Korea issue: attempting to manage its own agenda in Korea Peninsula while also giving more attention to the concerns from the region.
This approach is manifested in China’s arrangements upon Kim’s arrival, and their language of dissatisfaction over North Korea’s behavior. The Chinese government provided Kim with the highest honors. Kim met with a long list of other senior Chinese officials, with an emphasis on ties between the countries’ ruling parties, the Chinese Communist Party and the North Korean Workers’ Party. All members of CPC Standing Committee of Political Bureau shook hands with him – a rare occurrence. All Chinese leaders took a positive tone in commenting on the bilateral ties and vowed to push them to a “historic peak.” Nevertheless, official commentaries implicitly indicate Chinese discontent to N. Korea, and euphemistically but firmly ask North Korea to reconsider its relationship with China and the world community. For example, President Hu made the 5-point suggestions to bring both the sides closer, stressing that Kim keeps up high-level official contacts with China, enhancing collaboration to their regional and international policies, and making joint efforts to achieve the goal of the denuclearization of the Peninsula in the spirit of the 19 September Joint Statement. President Hu also softly but pointedly requested that Kim return to the Six-Party Talks “with tangible sincerity.” Furthermore, he emphasized that Sino-North Korean bilateral relations should “process with time” (yu shi ju jin) – a very Chinese analogy to the desirability of a policy evolution that adapts to “the changing world”, and a political appeal to object any obsession over an “old mindset”. If Kim Jong Il acknowledges Chinese terminology, he should understand such Chinese satire to Pyongyang’s longtime rigidity.
Obviously, Beijing has unequivocally implied to the Dear Leader: China will not pull the plug on its traditional relationship with North Korea, but Pyongyang has to do more—internationally and domestically - if it expects substantial Chinese assistance.
I do not know if such remarks have been well heard. Yet, Kim actually has no choice but to follow Chinese instructions if he seeks to obtain economic assistance from Beijing, given the North’s moribund economy. So far, there is no announced package of updated economic aid, and Chinese leaders haven’t shown substantive interest in investing in North Korea. Premier Wen Jiabao, during his meeting with Kim, merely mentioned that Beijing and Pyongyang could put government-to-government negotiations in motion to explore the way to reinforce economic cooperation between both sides.
Contrasting Kim Jong Il’s warm words to welcome Chinese non-governmental investment, Beijing remains uncertain over the extent to which Pyongyang has made up mind to open its domestic market. Actually, no non-government Chinese investment will rush into N. Korea without Beijing’s mandate. Kim Jong Il should be sure of that. Given the rippling effect of “Yang Bin incident,” when in 2000 a Chinese businessman was eventually put in jail by Chinese authorities after being rashly appointed by the North as the “head of the Sinuiju Special Development Zone,” official backing from Beijing is required for any Chinese investment surge in North Korea. Recently, a number of Chinese private investors have inquired about China’s official stance on their expanding business at N. Korea. What they got has been very ambiguous.
Beijing’s leverage to Pyongyang notably remains more than economic aid. Given that the sinking of the Cheonan and the on-going investigation are increasingly assumed to be a DPRK torpedo attack, tension around the peninsula would escalate and Pyongyang has no promise to see the better-off surroundings. For this part, Chinese leaders have a renewed urgency to express what they want and expect from N. Korea in the meeting with Dear Leader. Pyongyang’s growing flexibility would apparently help a lot leaving Beijing a leeway to mitigate the tension.
Dramatically, N. Korea seems less conscious of how awful the screw-up it created is. The message from Dear Leader to Chinese concerns remains quite unclear. Pyongyang just made the reiteration of “the DPRK’s willingness to provide favorable conditions for the resumption of the 6 Parties Talks,” which is code language for its insistence on a peace treaty. N. Korea has argued that the peace treaty allegedly conditions its commitment to the 6 Parties Talks since last October, when Dear Leader made the point to visiting Chinese Premier Wen.
Does Dear Leader want to keep China off balance? Or, does he remain over-confident that Beijing would not act in a decisive manner to change its “even-handed policy” towards the two Koreas? The answer is worth exploring.
At least, both the sides seem quite stymied, and the visit virtually highlights a distinctive rift between Beijing and Pyongyang. Kim is very economically motivated to see if the Chinese open their wallet, while Chinese leaders attempted to use the chance to shake down DPRK’s new flexibility. The reality is that Kim does not want to be obligated to a relationship with China which is more regularized and anticipated. Chinese deference was eventually not at all traded for an expected ensuing return of DPRK to the course of denuclearization. Unfortunately, the standoff will continue.
P!
More accurately, the Chinese Fascist Party and the North Korean hereditary/totalitarian monarchy.
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