Skip to comments.'Baby' Pilot at Controls of Doomed Air France Airbus
Posted on 05/29/2011 12:42:16 PM PDT by lbryce
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That notwithstanding, it does not explain the continual pitch up input. Neither by Second Officer (PF), nor by First Officer (PM) when he assumed control.
Which incidentally, disciplined CRM would require the FO requesting control, the SO annunciating relinquishment of control, and the FO acknowleging they have control.
I was in a situation where the captain would not take control until I informed him he had control. Prior to that he was screaming at me to let go of the controls (which I did). Then he repeatedly asked for control. When I said, "I let go. I don't have control." He stated, "You, must give me control." "you have control." "I have control."
Right, and tell me how 10,000 plus daily flights with millions of miles are not falling out of the sky with the same type of pitot tubes.
Its not a manufacturing problem but a pilot problem.
:-) I understand what you’re saying. My late father was a long-time United captain. He told me all about the good, bad and the ugly.
I’m just saying that they all but characterized the co-pilot as a pre-solo student pilot.
“If the pilot was getting high airspeed readings from the computers,”
I believe there are 3 air data computers on this aircraft and multiple pitot tubes and AOA vanes. If the ADCs don’t agree there would be a CAS message for ADC miscompare. I think there would be an overspeed warning. Did the auto throttle disengage with the over speed?
It is being presented as complete failure of the air data system. I have been in flight test for 30 years and have never heard of catastrophic failure of the air data system. something else is going on here.
In February 2009, at the request of Airbus, Thales carried out a comparative study of the behavior in icing conditions at high altitude of the two standards, C16195AA and C16195BA. This study concluded that the C16195BA standard performed better, without however it being possible to reproduce on the ground all the conditions that could be encountered in reality.
Preliminary results of additional wind tunnel testing conducted with the C16195BA probe during August 2009 are consistent with the qualification data of the probe and have not identified any safety issue regarding the probe behaviour within the icing envelope as defined in Appendix C of EASA Certification Specification (CS) 25.
Science can’t reproduce the problem.
I do not agree. I think the report makes clear that the data was conflicting.
IIRC, there were multiple warnings of miscompare. The triple redundancy is OK if there is only one bad sensor or computer, and the FCS will vote out the bad result (assuming the voter is not the malfunction). However, two bad components and the triple redundancy is insufficient — you need quad redundancy.
The FCS is TMR and designed to deal successfully with a (emphasis on ‘a’) conflict. The fact that the end-result data produced by the air-data/computers was not dealt with successfully proves its failure. There may well have been 2 faults in the ADS, which the TMR used in the Airbus would choke on.
it shows that thee is only something like a 50mph area of stability at 35,000 ft...and the aircraft went up to 38,000 ft....so its into unstable flight conditions where there isn't enough air density to sustain correct lift.
Yeah, that must be it given the AB330’s 41700’ service cieling.
It would seem that its a supernatural problem then.
And either AB or AF developed procedures to address the problems encountered on various flights with respecting unreliable airspeed.
All three of the pilots went through the required certification training in sim post Dec 2008. The most recent sim training was performed by one of the AF447 pilots was Feb 2009. They were ready, willing, able, prepared and alert for all contingencies on that fateful day.