Election officials scoff at security experts’ questions about voting machines

Chicago Southtown Star ^ | Oct 28, 2012 | DAN ROZEK

[KeyLargo]

Election officials scoff at security experts’ questions about voting machines

BY DAN ROZEK Sun-Times Media October 28, 2012 6:32PM

Argonne National Laboratory researchers Roger Johnst(left) JWarner demonstrated how voting machines can be tampered with. Warner removed circuit panel

Argonne National Laboratory researchers Roger Johnston (left) and Jon Warner demonstrated how voting machines can be tampered with. Warner removed a circuit panel, an easy access into the machine. | Rich Hein~Sun-Times

Updated: October 29, 2012 2:39AM

Using a straightened paper clip, Jon Warner needed less than 10 seconds to pop a crucial component out of the touch-screen voting machine.

The simple maneuver exposed a green circuit board — opening the machine to electronic sabotage that could steal or alter votes cast on it, said Warner, a security researcher at Argonne National Laboratory near Lemont.

“You can reach inside and do lots of damage pretty easily,” agreed Warner’s boss, Roger Johnston, after the recent demonstration.

But election officials said the simulated attacks don’t depict real-world conditions or accurately show whether voting machines can be vulnerable to tampering.

The Argonne tests involve different models of touch-screen machines and don’t take into account a host of other security measures used in Chicago, Cook County and other collar counties, election officials said.

“It’s not even apples and oranges; it’s apples and hippos,” said Jim Allen, a spokesman for the Chicago Board of Elections, who described the tests as “a side show.”

And officials say there are political overtones to the research.

[KeyLargo]

Yep. Nothing to see here. Move along.

Election officials scoff at security experts’ questions about voting machines. Change headline to: Chicago, Cook County Democrat officials scoff at security experts..... There - fixed.

[KeyLargo]

Argonne National Laboratory researchers Roger Johnston (left) and Jon Warner demonstrated how voting machines can be tampered with. Warner removed a circuit panel, an easy access into the machine. | Rich Hein~Sun-Times

[KeyLargo]

On a side note. Chicago Democrat election officials are adding more voters to the roles of new Democrat voters....... sarc.

Chicago ties homicide total from last year with fatal home invasion

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-2-wounded-in-west-side-shooting-20121028,0,4971446.story

[Cletus.D.Yokel]

:: And officials say there are political overtones to the research. ::

And those overtones would be, what? Seeing as how ANL is a gummint facility and these 2 experts are gummint employees, and union to boot.

[Bloody Sam Roberts]

These voting machines need to be dumped in the ocean. There is only one reason for creating an electronic voting machine and it is not to be green and save paper. It is to make it easier to cheat. Period.

Paper ballots leave a clear trail for recounts if necessary. Optical scanners that tally the votes from these ballots are nearly infallible. And paper ballots make cheating...or at least...ballot tampering almost impossible.

Elected officials work for US. If they object to We The People when we demand these machines be destroyed, they only do so for one reason. And they ignore our directives at their peril.

[Best and Brightest]

One decimal place change in the code of the tallying machines could make all the difference and who could prove it? Too many cooks in the process, plus a foreign company’s software and hardware.

[zeugma]

plus a foreign company’s software and hardware.

All software for voting machines should be completely open source. There is no reason for any of it to be hidden.

[Best and Brightest]

Ok, are you saying that no one could alter the code and/or the data translation? How can anyone know they’re vote was counted as they wished?

[PraiseTheLord]

I posted recently on the thread about Ohio vote fraud that in North Carolina it has been reported already, on even more than one day, that people voted for Romney, but when done and looking at their entries, say that it then said their vote was for 0bama.

The poll person said oh no problem - he will just *reset* (???) the machines. CLEAR FRAUD INDICATION HERE IMO

Then recall the guy - Republican poll worker ! - caught putting the R ballots in a garbage bag and throwing them away.

So this way, anyway, they will not get an OVER COUNT hmmm

[zeugma]

Ok, are you saying that no one could alter the code and/or the data translation? How can anyone know they’re vote was counted as they wished?

This stuff has been pretty thoroughly discussed in the past. Here's the quick run down on a secure, properly designed electronic voting booth:

1. All source code for the system is completely open to anyone who wants to look at it. Binaries on the systems can be validated as good by printing shasums of the binaries with all compiler options publicly disclosed. That way, you could compile the program yourself, and verify that it matches the published shasums.
2. In addition to the electronic tabulation, the voting machine should also print out a computer generated ballot, (i.e., no stray marks or hanging chads). This is critical, as you have to be able to re-run the election without relying absolutely on the electronics. Without offline auditability, the system is a fail.
   
3. This paper ballot may or may not have a digital checksum of the vote hashed with its own serial number. There are different schools of thought on this. It might provide an opportunity to correlate a particular ballot to a particular voter for unscrupulous poll workers, however simple protocols can be put in place to eliminate much opportunity for this. Once the voter is validated as being legitimate, he/she would pull a ticket (which is used to tell the machine you have a new voter) randomly from a stack of them. Only one vote per ticket is allowed.
4. The paper ballot can be validated by the voter before it is deposited in the box with other ballots.

 

There have been a number of papers published which go over all of this. Google Bruce Schneier and electronic voting.

[Best and Brightest]

“Ok, are you saying that no one could alter the code and/or the data translation? How can anyone know they’re vote was counted as they wished?

This stuff has been pretty thoroughly discussed in the past. Here’s the quick run down on a secure, properly designed electronic voting booth: “

So, when an all electronic big name voting system (no print out of a paper ballot) that had no paper anything was open to tampering? When I was a poll worker a few years ago, that’s what there was. One voter said then that the lack of even a receipt to her showed her the system could be compromised.

[zeugma]

So, when an all electronic big name voting system (no print out of a paper ballot) that had no paper anything was open to tampering? When I was a poll worker a few years ago, that’s what there was. One voter said then that the lack of even a receipt to her showed her the system could be compromised.

Yup. If it doesn't produce a hardcopy that can be verified by the voter and used for auditing/recounts, it was designed to be compromised. However, you can't have the voting system produce a 'receipt' as such, because if the voter takes with him, a receipt that shows who they voted for, that can facilitate fraud.

Suppose Mallory, a malicious democrat wants to pay Alice $5 to vote for Zero. As it stands, with a secret ballot, Alice could go vote, tell Mallory that she voted for Zero, even though she actually voted for CINO Romney. She'd still pocket the cash, and Mallory would be none the wiser. With a receipt that shows your vote, Mallory can validate that the vote was made per her instructions.

Also, anyone who supports internet voting needs to be boiled in oil. The problem isn't that internet voting couldn't be done securely, but the protocols necessary to both guard against fraud, and guarantee the secrecy of an individual's ballot is not simple. I'd be willing to put money that anyone trying to implement internet voting will get one or both sides of that equation wrong.