Kamala Family Dox (FR Debut)

I will explain why it doesn’t destroy anything. “ National jurisdiction” means born into citizenship, ie at least one parent was/is a citizen. This is self-evident in the construction of the statute. Regardless, it hardly matters since the meaning of “natural-born” at the time of the adoption of Constitution is all that really matters.
You are proof that a little knowledge plus lots of hubris is a dangerous thing.

Borh within the jurisdiction jeans born subject to our laws. Neither parent need be a citizen. Also, both parents could be unknown and it would make no difference. Notobly missing from your analysis is any citation to the constitution, law, court opinion, or state department regulation.

Wong Kim Ark 167 U.S. at 659-60

"Allegiance is nothing more than the the or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign under whose protection he is; and allegiance by birth is that which arises from being born within the dominions and under the protection of a particular sovereign. Two things usually concur to create citizenship: First, birth locally within the dominions of the sovereign; and, secondly, birth within the protection and obedience, or, in other words, within the ligeance of the sovereign. That is, the party must be born within a place where the sovereign is at the time in full possession and exercise of his power, and the party must also at his birth derive protection from, and consequently owe obedience or allegiance to, the sovereign, as such, defacto. There are some exceptions which are founded upon peculiar reasons, and which, indeed, illustrate and confirm the general doctrine: Thus, a person who is born on the ocean is a subject of the prince to whom his parents then owe allegiance; for he is still deemed under the protection of his sovereign, and born in a place where he has dominion in common with all other sovereigns& So the children of an ambassador are held .to be subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protection and in the dominions of a foreign prince." 3 Pet. 155. -"The children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens." 3 Pet. 156. "Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country, while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth." 3 Pet. 164

Your birther blather is still just birter blather.

https://statecodesfiles.justia.com/us/2016/title-8/chapter-12/subchapter-iii/part-i/sec.-1401/sec.-1401.pdf?ts=1525233362

Subchapter III - Nationality and Naturalization
Part I - Nationality at Birth and Collective Naturalization
Sec. 1401 - Nationals and citizens of United States at birth
8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2016)
§1401. Nationals and citizens of United States at birth
The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:
(a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof;
(b) a person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe: Provided, That the granting of citizenship under this subsection shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of such person to tribal or other property;
[...]

https://fam.state.gov/FAM/08FAM/08FAM030101.html

8 FAM 300
(U) U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY
8 FAM 301
(U) U.S. CITIZENSHIP
8 FAM 301.1
(U) ACQUISITION BY BIRTH IN THE UNITED STATES
(CT:CITZ-1; 06-27-2018)
(Office of Origin: CA/PPT/S/A)
* FAM 301.1-1 (U) INTRODUCTION
(CT:CITZ-1; 06-27-2018)
. . .

d. “Subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States”: All children born in and subject, at the time of birth, to the jurisdiction of the United States acquire U.S. citizenship at birth even if their parents were in the United States illegally at the time of birth:
(1) The U.S. Supreme Court examined at length the theories and legal precedents on which the U.S. citizenship laws are based in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). In particular, the Court discussed the types of persons who are subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that a child born in the United States to Chinese parents acquired U.S. citizenship even though the parents were, at the time, racially ineligible for naturalization;
(2) The Court also concluded that: “The 14th Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.” Pursuant to this ruling:
(a) Acquisition of U.S. citizenship generally is not affected by the fact that the parents may be in the United States temporarily or illegally; and that; and
(b) A child born in an immigration detention center physically located in the United States is considered to have been born in the United States and be subject to its jurisdiction. This is so even if the child’s parents have not been legally admitted to the United States and, for immigration purposes, may be viewed as not being in the United States.

The child born in a detention center, two two illegla alies awaitihg deportatioh=n, is born a natural born citizen.

Your theory is that the Framers meant for any person born on American land, regardless of parentage, regardless of their actual citizenship, regardless of culture, language, or creed, is eligible to be president.... If that is true WHAT IS THE ACTUAL PURPOSE OF THE NATURAL BORN CLAUSE?
Wong has been explained at nauseum. You are hopeless.

That is NOT my THEORY. That is the United States law.

The birther blather misinterpretation of Wong Kim Ark and other court opinions has been rejected by the courts for well over a century.

When the plain text words of the Constitution or statute law have a clear meaning, that is what controls. The words are adopted, not anybody's intent.

The 14th Amendment is very clear.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.

You do not cite by what authority you have overturned Wong Kim Ark. It leaves nothing to the imagination.

"Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country, while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth." 3 Pet. 164

3 Peters is 28 United States Reports.

Inglis v. Trustees of Snug Harbor, (3 Pet.) 28 U.S. 99, 164 (1830)

In Wong Kim Ark, the Supreme Court quoted the opinion of Justice Story from 1815.

As a matter of law, it matters not whether you or I agree with the opinion of the court. Personally, I have difficulty finding the right to abortion emanating from a penumbra. We may both disagree with Roe v. Wade and it has zero effect upon the reality of the law. The opinion of the court in Roe IS the law.

It matters not if you can quote, misquote, or misinterpret some Founder or Framer. The people never ratified Framer discussions. They ratified the black letter text of the Constitution itself.

The purported intent of the lawgiver is irrelevant if the actual words of the law have a clear meaning. The words prevail even where the lawgiver's words are contrary to his intent. This is even so with legislation where the legislators voted to pass legislation. The words are ratified or passed into law, the intent is not. Neither is your opinion the law when it is contrary to the words of the Constitution and Federal law.

Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 86, 108-09 (1925)

The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted it to the ratification of the Conventions of the thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary. They were familiar with other forms of government, recent and ancient, and indicated in their discussions earnest study and consideration of many of them, but when they came to put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly and easily understood.

"A Matter of Interpretation," Federal Courts and the Law, by Antonin Scalia, 1997. This book contains an essay by Antonin Scalia and responses to that essay by professors Ronald Dworkin, Mary Ann Glendon, Laurence Tribe, and Gordon Wood. There is a final response by Antonin Scalia.

Laurence Tribe, pp. 65-6

Let me begin with my principal area of agreement with Justice Scalia. Like him, I believe that when we ask what a legal text means — what it requires of us, what it permits us to do, and what it forbids — we ought not to be inquiring (except perhaps very peripherally) into the ideas, intentions, or expectations subjectively held by whatever particular persons were, as a historical matter, involved in drafting, promulgating, or ratifying the text in question. To be sure, those matters, when reliably ascertainable, might shed some light on otherwise ambiguous or perplexing words or phrases - by pointing us, as readers, toward the linguistic frame of reference within which the people to whom those words or phrases were addressed would have "translated" and thus understood them. But such thoughts and beliefs can never substitute for what was in fact enacted as law. Like Justice Scalia, I never cease to be amazed by the arguments of judges, lawyers, or others who proceed as though legal texts were little more than interesting documentary evidence of what some lawgiver had in mind. And, like the justice, I find little to commend the proposition that anyone ought, in any circumstances I can imagine, to feel legally bound to obey another's mere wish or thought, or legally bound to act in accord with another's mere hope or fear.

Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845)

In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.

United States v Union Pacific Railroad Company, 91 U.S. 72 (1875)

In construing an act of Congress, we are not at liberty to recur to the views of individual members in debate nor to consider the motives which influenced them to vote for or against its passage. The act itself speaks the will of Congress, and this is to be ascertained from the language used. But courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed, and this is frequently necessary in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it. Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 24; Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115, 120 [argument of counsel -- omitted].

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 254 (1901)

In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.

You do not cite any statute that agrees with your personal opinion of the way things ought to be. You merely presume your opinion takes precedent over the words of the Constitution and the statute Federal law.

You do not cite any Federal law because the Federal law explicitly contradicts your personal opinion.

Subchapter III - Nationality and Naturalization
Part I - Nationality at Birth and Collective Naturalization
Sec. 1401 - Nationals and citizens of United States at birth
8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2018)
§1401. Nationals and citizens of United States at birth
The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:
(a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof;
[...]

Of course, you do not cite State Department policy because they also directly contradict your personal opinion. Hell, a test tube baby born abroad to a U.S. citizen surrogate woman, not the genetic mother, may become a citizen at birth if the surrogate mother is recognized as the child's legal parent at the time of the child's birth.

https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-h-chapter-3

Policy Manual > Volume 12 - Citizenship and Naturalization > Part H - Children of U.S. Citizens > Chapter 3 - United States Citizens at Birth (INA 301 and 309)
State Department
Policy Manual
Chapter 3 - United States Citizens at Birth (INA 301 and 309)
A. General Requirements for Acquisition of Citizenship at Birth
A person born in the United States who is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States is a U.S. citizen at birth, to include a person born to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe. [1]
In general, a person born outside of the United States may acquire citizenship at birth if:

The person has at least one parent who is a U.S. citizen; and

The U.S. citizen parent meets certain residence or physical presence requirements in the United States or an outlying possession prior to the person’s birth in accordance with the pertinent provision. [2]

A person born abroad through Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) to a U.S. citizen gestational mother who is not also the genetic mother acquires U.S. citizenship at birth under INA 301 or INA 309 if:

The person’s gestational mother is recognized by the relevant jurisdiction as the child’s legal parent at the time of the person’s birth; and

The person meets all other applicable requirements under either INA 301 or INA 309. [3]

Until the Act of October 10, 1978, persons who had acquired U.S. citizenship through birth outside of the United States to one U.S. citizen parent had to meet certain physical presence requirements to retain their citizenship. This legislation eliminated retention requirements for persons who were born after October 10, 1952. There may be cases where a person who was born before that date, and therefore subject to the retention requirements, may have failed to retain citizenship. [4]
An officer should determine whether a person acquired citizenship at birth by referring to the applicable statutory provisions and conditions that existed at the time of the person’s birth. These provisions have been modified extensively over the years. [5] The following sections provide the current law.
B. Child Born in Wedlock [6]
1. Child of Two U.S. Citizen Parents [7]
A child born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions acquires citizenship at birth if at the time of birth:

Both of the child’s parents are U.S. citizens; and

At least one parent had resided in the United States or one of its outlying possessions.

2. Child of U.S. Citizen Parent and U.S. National [8]
A child born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions acquires citizenship at birth if at the time of birth:

One parent is a U.S. citizen and the other parent is a U.S. national; and

The U.S. citizen parent was physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of at least one year.

3. Child of U.S. Citizen Parent and Alien Parent [9]
A child born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions acquires citizenship at birth if at the time of birth:

One parent is an alien and the other parent is a U.S. citizen; and

The U.S. citizen parent was physically present in the United States for at least 5 years, including at least 2 years after 14 years of age.

Time abroad counts as physical presence in the United States if the time abroad was:

As a member of the U.S. armed forces in honorable status;?

Under the employment of the U.S. government or other qualifying organizations; or

As a dependent unmarried son or daughter of such persons.

4. Child of a U.S. Citizen Mother and Alien Father [10]
A child born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions acquires citizenship at birth if:

The child was born before noon (Eastern Standard Time) May 24, 1934;

The child’s father is an alien;

The child’s mother was a U.S. citizen at the time of the child’s birth; and

The child’s U.S. citizen mother resided in the United States prior to the child’s birth.

[snip]

See also:

8 FAM 300
(U) U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY
8 FAM 301
(U) U.S. CITIZENSHIP
8 FAM 301.1
(U) ACQUISITION BY BIRTH IN THE UNITED STATES
(CT:CITZ-1; 06-27-2018)
(Office of Origin: CA/PPT/S/A)
* FAM 301.1-1 (U) INTRODUCTION
(CT:CITZ-1; 06-27-2018)
. . .

d. “Subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States”: All children born in and subject, at the time of birth, to the jurisdiction of the United States acquire U.S. citizenship at birth even if their parents were in the United States illegally at the time of birth:
(1) The U.S. Supreme Court examined at length the theories and legal precedents on which the U.S. citizenship laws are based in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). In particular, the Court discussed the types of persons who are subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that a child born in the United States to Chinese parents acquired U.S. citizenship even though the parents were, at the time, racially ineligible for naturalization;
(2) The Court also concluded that: “The 14th Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.” Pursuant to this ruling:
(a) Acquisition of U.S. citizenship generally is not affected by the fact that the parents may be in the United States temporarily or illegally; and that; and
(b) A child born in an immigration detention center physically located in the United States is considered to have been born in the United States and be subject to its jurisdiction. This is so even if the child’s parents have not been legally admitted to the United States and, for immigration purposes, may be viewed as not being in the United States.

Of course, when I state what the law is, I can provide a link, cite, and quote so what I claim can be verified. You merely regurgitate birther nonsense which has been rejected by every court to which it has been presented. It is you who are hopeless.

Here’s where, exactly where, precisely where... you go wrong- “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof....”
This little phrase, AT THE TIME OF THE ADOPTION OF THE AMENDMENT, meant that you had to more than just born in America, you had to “born a citizen.” (At least one parent... AT LEAST ONE PARENT.... a citizen.

You pulled that one straight out of your butt.

Subject to the jurisdiction of the United States means subject to the laws of the United States. If your bullcrap were law, millions could rape and murder and not be subject to United States laws. They would have immunity just as accredited diplomats have immunity.

Subject to the jurisdiction has nothing whatever to do with parentage.

As you exhibit a lack of knowledge of a basic understanding of the word jurisdiction, I here provide it from a law dictionary. It is a 13th century term, and in the 18th century, it meant the same as in the 21st century.

jurisdiction, n. (13c) 1. A government’s general power to exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory; esp., a state’s power to create interests that will be recognized under common-law principles as valid mother states
2. A court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree competent jurisdiction; (in both senses) coram judice; adjudicatory jurisdiction.

"Rules of jurisdiction in a sense speak from a position outside the court system and prescribe the authority of the courts within the system. They are to a large extent constitutional rules. The provisions of the U.S. Constitution specify the outer limits of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and authorize Congress, within those limits, to establish by statute the organization and jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus, Article III of the Constitution defines the judicial power of the United States to include cases arising under federal law and cases between parties of diverse state citizenship as well as other categories. The U.S. Constitution, particularly the Due Process Clause, also establishes limits on the jurisdiction of the state courts. These due process limitations traditionally operate in two areas: jurisdiction of the subject matter and jurisdiction over persons. Within each state, the court system is established by state constitutional provisions or by a combination of such provisions and implementing legislation, which together define the authority of the various courts within the system.” Fleming James Jr., Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. & John Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure § 2.1, at 55 (5th ed. 2001).

3. A geographic area within which political or judicial authority may be exercised
4. A political or judicial subdivision within such an area Cf. VENUE (1), (2). — jurisdictional, adj.
- - - - - - - - - -
Some 16th and 17th century terms follow.
common-law jurisdiction. (17c) 1. A place where the legal system derives fundamentally from the English common-law system 2. A court’s jurisdiction to try such cases as were cognizable under the English common law
- - - - - - - - - -
complete jurisdiction. (17c) A court’s power to decide matters presented to it and to enforce its decisions.
- - - - - - - - - -
general jurisdiction. (16c) 1. A court’s authority to hear a wide range of cases, civil or criminal, that arise within its geographic area. 2. A court’s authority to hear all claims against a defendant, at the place of the defendant’s domicile or the place of service, without any showing that a connection exists between the claims and the forum state. Cf. limited jurisdiction; specific jurisdiction.

Black's Law Dictionary, 11th ed.

At the time of the Founding, all the colonies were under the common law of England, and all used the common law system of jurisprudence. Under the Constitution, each of the original 13 states individually adopted so much of the English common law as was not inconsistent with the Constitution, either in their state constitution or explicitly in their statute law. Notably, Rhode Island had no constitution until 1842. The Federal government uses, and has always used, the common law system of jurisprudence. Of the current 50 states, 49 have adopted the common law system of jurisprudence, with the one exception being Louisiana which was a French colony and retains a code system of law derived from Napoleanic codes.

See American Common Law.

American common law. (1813)
1. The body of English law that was adopted as the law of the American colonies and supplemented with local enactments and judgments.
2. The body of judge-made law that developed during and after the United States’ colonial period, esp. since independence. — Also termed Anglo-American common law.
“Every country has its common law. Ours is composed partly of the common law of England and partly of our own usages. When our ancestors emigrated from England, they took with them such of the English principles as were convenient for the situation in which they were about to place themselves. It required time and experience to ascertain how much of the English law would be suitable to this country. By degrees, as circumstances demanded, we adopted the English usages, or substituted others better suited to our wants, until at length, before the time of the Revolution, we had formed a system of our own, founded in general on the English Constitution, but not without considerable variations.” Guardians of the Poor v. Greene, 5 Binn. 554, 557 (Pa. 1813).

Opinion of TILGHMAN, C.J. in Guardians of the Poor at 5 Binn. 554, 558 (Pa. 1813). The dictionary cites page 557 in error.

[freedomjusticeruleoflaw #177] What matters is what the PERSON WHO AUTHORED the 14th Amendment meant.

This is simply FALSE. Not only is the intent of the author not controling, it is not usable. It is not even a proper subject for judicial comment. The words adopted are the law, and not some purported intent, real or imagined, of the individual author or legislator.

You will find it frequently said in judicial opinions of my court and others that the judge's objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to "the intent of the legislature." This principle, in one form or another, goes back at least as far as Blackstone. Unfortunately, it does not square with some of the (few) generally accepted concrete rules of statutory construction. One is the rule that when the text of a statute is clear, that is the end of the matter. Why should that be so, if what the legislature intended, rather than what it said, is the object of our inquiry? In selecting the words of the statute, the legislature might have misspoken. Why not permit that to be demonstrated from the floor debates? Or indeed, why not accept, as proper material for the court to consider, later explanations by the legislators — a sworn affidavit signed by the majority of each house, for example, as to what they really meant?
Source: Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, p. 16

The evidence suggests that, despite frequent statements to the contrary, we do not really look for subjective legislative intent.

Source: Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, p. 17

A Matter of Interpretation, Federal Courts and the Law, by Antonin Scalia, 1997. This book contains an essay by Antonin Scalia and responses to that essay by professors Ronald Dworkin, Mary Ann Glendon, Laurence Tribe, and Gordon Wood. There is a final response by Antonin Scalia.

Laurence Tribe, pp. 65-6

Let me begin with my principal area of agreement with Justice Scalia. Like him, I believe that when we ask what a legal text means — what it requires of us, what it permits us to do, and what it forbids — we ought not to be inquiring (except perhaps very peripherally) into the ideas, intentions, or expectations subjectively held by whatever particular persons were, as a historical matter, involved in drafting, promulgating, or ratifying the text in question.

At page 30, Scalia quoted from Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845):

In expounding this law, the judgment of the court cannot, in any degree, be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage, nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself; and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.

United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 91 U.S. 72 (1875)

Syllabus

4. In construing an act of Congress, the court may recur to the history of the times when it was passed in order to ascertain the reason for, as well as the meaning of, particular provisions in it, but the views of individual members in debate, or the motives which induced them to vote for or against its passage, cannot be considered.

Opinion of the Court at 79:

In construing an act of Congress, we are not at liberty to recur to the views of individual members in debate nor to consider the motives which influenced them to vote for or against its passage. The act itself speaks the will of Congress, and this is to be ascertained from the language used. But courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed, and this is frequently necessary in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it.

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 254 (1901)

It is unnecessary to enter into the details of this debate. The arguments of individual legislators are no proper subject for judicial comment. They are so often influenced by personal or political considerations, or by the assumed necessities of the situation, that they can hardly be considered even as the deliberate views of the persons who make them, much less as dictating the construction to be put upon the Constitution by the courts. United States v. Union Pac. Railroad. 91 U.S. 72, 79.

For what it is worth, which is legally nothing, Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michigan, the author of the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment, stated:

"This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors, or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons."

Congressional Globe, May 30, 1866, page 2890, on introduction of the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment.

Aliens who belong to the families of ambassadors or fireign ministers addredited to the Government of the United States are born with the foreign nation they represent. All, others are born United States citizens.

[freedomjusticeruleoflaw #178] What you probably fail to grasp is that jurisdiction has nothing to do with geography with regard to the clause in the 14th Amendment. Kamala Harris was born within the geographic jurisdiction of America, but she was within the legal jurisdiction of India/Jamaica because of parentage.

This is simply FALSE. It is completely unsupportable bullshit.

If a person is in the United States, the authorities of foreign nations have ZERO jurisdiction to come into the United States and arrest them. The best they can do is REQUEST extradition. NO foreign country has ANY jurisdiction within the United States.

Ex parte Chin King, Ex parte Chan San Hee, 1888, 35 Fed., 354, at 355-356

At 355:

By the common law, a child born within the allegiance—the jurisdiction—of the United States, is born a subject or citizen thereof, without reference to the political status or condition of its parents. McKay v. Campbell, 2 Sawy. 118; In re Look Tin Sing, 10 Sawy. 353, 21 Fed. Rep. 905; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583. In the latter, case it was held that Julia Lynch, who was born in New York in 1849, of alien parents, during a temporary sojourn by them in that city, and returned with them the same year to their native country, where she resided until her death, was an American citizen.

At 356:

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside."
In Re Look Tin Sing, 10 Sawy. 353, 21 Fed. Rep. 905, it was held that a person born within the United States, of Chinese parents, not engaged in any diplomatic or official capacity under the emperor of China, is a citizen of the United States. The case is similar to that of the petitioners. The party in question was born in California in 1870, of Chinese parents. In 1879 he went, to China, and returned to California in 1884, without the certificate provided for in the restriction act of 1882, or that of 1884, and was therefore denied the right to land.
Mr. Justice FIELD, in delivering the opinion of the court, in which SAWYER, SABIN, and HOFFMAN concurred, says, (p. 359:) "The inability of persons to become citizens under those laws (of naturalization) in no respect impairs the effect of their birth, or of the birth of their children, upon the status of either, as citizens of the United States."
The only point made by the district attorney against the petitioners on the question of their citizenship is that they left this country without, as he claims, any definite or fixed purpose to return.
But I think the evidence does not warrant so strong a statement. For aught that appears they intended to return; and the fact that they have returned gives strength to the inference. The most that can be said is, there was no time fixed for their return. And that is the case with hundreds of minor American citizens, who go abroad yearly, for nurture and education. But it seems that the citizenship of the petitioners would not be affected by the fact, if they had never come back, unless it also appears that they had in some formal and affirmative way renounced the same.
However, in my judgment, a father cannot deprive his minor child of the status of American citizenship, impressed upon it by the circumstances of its birth under the constitution and within the jurisdiction of the United States. This status, once acquired, can only be lost or changed by the act of the party when arrived at majority, and the consent of the government.

In re Yung Sing Hee, 1888, 36 Fed., 437, at 438

The petitioner is this girl. She came from China on the Canadian Pacific steam-ship to Victoria, a short time since, and from there here on the Danube, as stated in the petition.
The testimony on which these facts are found, although given by Chinese persons, is consistent, reasonable, and convincing. It is probably much more entitled to credit than that on which hundreds of Europeans are every day admitted to become citizens of the United States.
The father was directly corroborated in the main by the testimony of two Chinese merchants of this city who lived near him, and knew him and his family, in San Francisco, from about the time of his marriage until the departure of the latter for China and a rigid cross-examination failed to impair in the least the probability of their statements, or to cast a shadow of suspicion on their honesty. On this state of facts, both by the common law and the fourteenth amendment, the petitioner is an American citizen, and is entitled to come and go within the United States as any other such citizen. She was born within or subject to the juridiction of the United States, and is therefore a citizen thereof. See Ex parte Chin King, 35 Fed. Rep. 354, (lately decided in this court,) In re Look Tin Sing, 10 Sawy. 353, 21 Fed. Rep. 905.

In re Wy Shing, In re Wong Gan, 1888, 36 Fed. Rep., 553, at 554

SAWYER, J., (after stating the facts as above.) In Look Tin Sing's Case, 10 Sawy. 853, 21 Fed. Rep. 905, after a full argument by able counsel, and careful consideration by the court, Mr. Justice FIELD, with the concurrence of the circuit and district judges, held that a person born in the United States, of Chinese parents not engaged in the diplomatic service of any foreign government, is born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and is a citizen thereof, under the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the national constitution. As such citizen, it was further held that he was not subject to the Chinese restriction laws, and could not be excluded from this country. I am still satisfied with this ruling; but, if I were in doubt, I should not presume to overrule Mr. Justice FIELD upon a question which he has so maturely considered, and decided. If the point was erroneously decided, then children of Caucasian parentage, born under similar circumstances, are not citizens; and hundreds of thousands have, for years, been, unlawfully, enjoying and exercising all the rights of citizens, civil and political. The decision in that case controls these cases, which are similar to it. The petitioners are citizens, and are not, and they cannot be, excluded from the United States under the provisions of the late act in question. They are, therefore, illegally restrained of their liberty and must be discharged, and it is so ordered.

Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 3 Owen 236, 246 (1844)

The Constitution of the United States,as well as those of all the thirteen old states, presupposed the existence of the common law, and was founded upon its principles, so far as they were applicable to our situation and form of government. And to a limited extent, the principles of the common law prevail in the United States, as a system of national jurisprudence.
The subject of alienage under the national compact, became a national subject, which must be controlled by a principle co-extensive with the United States. And as there is no constitutional or congressional provision declaring citizenship by birth, it must be regulated by some rule of national law; and from the necessity of the case, that rule must have been co-eval with the existence of the Union.
The law on this subject which prevailed in all the states, became the governing principle or common law of the United States, when the union of the states was consummated, and their separate legislation on the point was terminated. It is, therefore, the law of the United States, that children born here, are citizens, without any regard to the political condition or allegiance of their parents.
Children of ambassadors, are, in theory, born within the allegiance of the sovereign power represented and do not fall within the rule.

At 246:

5. It is a necessary consequence, from what I have stated, that the law which had prevailed on this subject, in all the states, became the governing principle or common law of the United States. Those states were the constituent parts of the United States, and when the union was formed, and further state regulation on the point terminated, it follows, in the absence of a declaration to the contrary, that the principle which prevailed and was the law on such point in all the states, became immediately the governing principle and rule of law thereon in the nation formed by such union. If there had been any diversity on the subject in the state laws, it might have been difficult to ascertain which of the conflicting state rules was to become, or did become, the national principle. And if such diversity had existed, it is reasonable to believe that the framers of the constitution would have borne in mind, and enacted a uniform rule, or authorized Congress to establish one. The entire silence of the constitution in regard to it, furnishes a strong confirmation, not only that the existing law of the states was entirely uniform, but that there was no intention to abrogate or change it. The term citizen, was used in the constitution as a word, the meaning of which was already established and well understood. And the constitution itself contains a direct recognition of the subsisting common law principle, in the section which defines the qualification of the President. "No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President," &c. The only standard which then existed, of a natural born citizen, was the rule of the common law, and no different standard has been adopted since. Suppose a person should be elected President who was native born, but of alien parents, could there be any reasonable doubt that he was eligible under the constitution? I think not. The position would be decisive in his favor that by the rule of the common law, in force when the constitution was adopted, he is a citizen.

The vice-chancellor, after an exhaustive examination of the law, declared that every person born within the dominion and allegiance of the United States was a citizen thereof, without reference to the situation of his parents. This, of course, does not include the children born in the United States of parents engaged in the diplomatic service of foreign governments whose residence, in contemplation of public law, is a part of their own country.

The rule of the common law on this subject has been incorporated into the fundamental law of the land.

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