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Serfs: About Your Privilige, Driving

Posted on 09/08/2001 6:54:24 PM PDT by Prism



[Auther UnKnown]

1. The issue is whether this Sovereign is required to obey the provisions in North Carolina General Statutes. It is the contention of this Sovereign that because he is a Free and Natural Person who has given up none of his "RIGHTS." That the North Carolina General Statutes does not apply to him. It is also the contention of this Sovereign that travels upon the streets or highways in North Carolina by this Sovereign is an unalienable "RIGHT." Being this, is not subject to regulation or legislation by the State of North Carolina General Assembly.

2. Let us first consider the contention of this Sovereign that travels upon the streets or highways in North Carolina is a "RIGHT." Various courts have ruled on this issue. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled:

3. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated in 1909:

4. The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois ruled:

5. "Regulated" here means traffic safety enforcement, stop lights, sign, etc., NOT a privilege that requires permission, i.e.; licensing, mandatory insurance, vehicle registration, etc..


7. It could not be stated more conclusively that Sovereigns of the states have a "RIGHT" to travel, without approval or restriction, (license), and that this "RIGHT" is protected under the U.S. Constitution. After all, who do the roadways belong to anyway? The People-At-Large. Here are other court decisions that expound the same facts:

8. The Washington State Supreme Court stated:

9. The Supreme Court of the State of Indiana ruled in 1873:

10. 11 American Jurisprudence 1st, has this to say:

11. The Supreme Court of the State of Georgia ruled:

12. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado discussed the issue in the following way in 1961.

13. The Constitution of the State of Idaho contains the words:

14. The words of the Idaho Constitution are to all intents and purposes identical with those of the North Carolina Constitution. The Constitution of the State of North Carolina, Article I, §1, states as follows:

15. Since courts tend to be consistent in their rulings, it would be expected the Idaho Supreme Court would rule in the same manner as the North Carolina Supreme Court.

16. Other authorities have arrived at similar conclusions:

17. The Constitution of the State of North Carolina, Article I, §36:

18. I demand all of my other rights, including the right to travel upon the public highways and byways in the United States of America.

19. The Constitution of the State of North Carolina, Article I, §2:

20. As member of the Sovereignty of the people, I not only am entitled to use the highways and byways in the United States of America, I have an inalienable right to use the highways and byways.

21. I have emphasized the word "RIGHT" because it is a common point among the authorities listed. The Idaho Code even joins in this common point:

22. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that:

23. Thus, there can be little doubt that, when this Sovereign travels upon the streets or highways in North Carolina, he does so as a matter of "RIGHT" and not privilege. The authority for such travel is described variously as a "RIGHT," a "COMMON RIGHT," an "ABSOLUTE RIGHT," an "UNALIENABLE RIGHT," and a "RIGHT" protected by the Constitution of the United States. Let us then examine the importance of these terms to this Sovereign by defining their meaning.

24. It shows from these definitions that the State has an obligation to acknowledge the "RIGHTS" of this Sovereign to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina. Further, the State has the duty to refrain from interfering with this "RIGHT" and to protect this "RIGHT" and to enforce the claim of this Sovereign to it.

25. Now if this Sovereign has the absolute "RIGHT" to move about on the streets or highways, does that "RIGHT" include the "RIGHT" to travel in a vehicle upon the streets or highways? The Supreme Court of the State of Texas has made comments that are an appropriate response to this question.

26. These words of the Supreme Court of Texas are of particular importance in Idaho because the Idaho Supreme Court quoted the Supreme Court of Texas and used these exact words in rendering its decision in the case of O'Conner v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37. The Supreme Court of Texas went on to say further;


28. The United States Supreme Court states:

29. These authorities point out that the "RIGHT" to own property includes the "RIGHT" to use it. The reasonable use of an automobile is to travel upon the streets or highways on which this Sovereign has an absolute "RIGHT" to use for the purposes of travel. The definitions in Title 49 Chapter 3 of the Idaho Code positively declare the "RIGHT" of this Sovereign to travel in a vehicle upon the streets or highways in Idaho.


31. Now if this Sovereign has the "RIGHT" to use a vehicle on the streets or highways in North Carolina, to what extent can the State of North Carolina regulate or diminish that "RIGHT?" There are some who maintain that specific performance is required of every Sovereign who uses a vehicle upon the streets or highways in North Carolina. Let us examine this contention in detail.


32. Specific performance is a term used to designate an action in equity in which a party to a contract asks the court to order the other party to carry out the contract which he has failed or refused to perform. Thus, if specific performance is expected, a contract must exist. The question then becomes: What are the terms of the contract and when was it executed and by whom? Since specific performance seems expected of every user of a vehicle on the streets or highways in North Carolina, the user of a vehicle seems one of the parties to the supposed contract. And since the State seems the party demanding specific performance, the State is the other party to the contract. So the supposed contract exists between the user of a vehicle and the State of North Carolina. When was this contract executed and what are its' terms? Some contend that when a user of a vehicle avails himself of the "privilege" of driving on public thoroughfares that he enters a contract with the State that requires him to abide with all the laws in the North Carolina General Statutes. Others contend that the contract is executed when a driver's license is obtained. We need now to figure out what is a contract.

33. A contract may be defined as an agreement enforceable in court between two or more parties, for a sufficient consideration to do or not to do some specified thing or things. Thus, a contract has four essential features:

34. Several types of contracts exist, but all must contain the essential features listed. Contracts can be classified under three principal categories:

35. Quasi contracts, while being called contracts are not really contracts, will not be considered in this discussion of contracts but will be considered in a separation section later.

Unilateral & Bilateral Contracts

36. There can also be unilateral and bilateral contracts that is presumed can exist under some or all the above headings. Let us examine each above types of contracts to see if the license obtained by this Sovereign falls under any of the categories of contract.

38. An Iowa Statute that requires that every foreign corporation named in it shall, as a condition for obtaining a permit to transact business in Iowa, stipulate that it will not remove into the federal court certain suits that it would by the laws of the United States have a "RIGHT" to a permit dependant upon the surrender by the foreign corporation of a privilege secured to it by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Bouvier's Law Dictionary quoting Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186:

39. It would be foolish for this Sovereign to exchange a "RIGHT" for a privilege since it would mean giving up valuable property in exchange for something having less value. Is it possible for this Sovereign to do such a thing?

40. Thus, even if this Sovereign wanted to do so, he could not give up his "RIGHT" to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina or exchange it for the privilege of having a driver's license. Thus, in exchange for the supposed obligation of this Sovereign, the State has given nothing. Thus, there is no consideration.

41. It may be contended that the seal on the driver's license is sufficient consideration by the State. It is true that under the common law, the question of consideration could not be raised concerning a contract under seal. The seal provided conclusive presumption of a consideration. Still, North Carolina has abolished by statute the common law presumption of consideration and this statute is binding upon all officers and employees of the State. So, though a seal may be present, it is not evidence of consideration in North Carolina. Of course, the document in question is a contrived and copied document and lacks validity in any case as a contract.

42. As to an obligation, since the license contains no statement of agreement, since there are no parties to any agreement, and since there is no consideration, there can be no obligation. The driver's license thus is not a contract since it fails to contain any of the four essential features of a contract.

43. Can the driver's license be an implied contract? The same elements must exist in an implied contract as exist in an express contract. The only difference is that an implied contract is not written or spoken and the elements of the contract are shown by the acts and conduct of the parties involved. With respect to this Sovereign, there was certainly no meeting of the minds else this brief would not result. It was never the intention of this Sovereign to give up constitutional "RIGHTS" to accept a privilege from the State. Such an action would be ridiculous. This could only be done in a socialistic state. There has been no implied agreement in a free society. It is possible that there were two parties to the supposed contract, the State and this Sovereign. There was no consideration in the implied contract for the same reasons that there was no consideration in the express contract.

44. An obligation is the thing to be done. It may be to pay money, to do work, or to deliver goods; or it may be to refrain from doing something that the person contracting had a "RIGHT" to do. Some may say that the State was obligated to allow this Sovereign to drive on the streets or highways in North Carolina and that this Sovereign was obligated to obey all the Statutes contained in the North Carolina General Statutes. It would be just as easy to say that the State could not be obligated to allow this Sovereign to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina because they did not have the "RIGHT" or the power to prevent him from doing so.

45. If the State cannot prevent this Sovereign from his travels on the streets or highways in North Carolina, they do not have any discretion in the matter and do not have the choice of whether to obligate themselves or not. Thus, the obligation of the State cannot be to grant this Sovereign the privilege of travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina. The obligation of the State cannot be to refrain from prohibiting this Sovereign from his travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina since the State did not have the "RIGHT" to do this at first.

46. It is the contention of this Sovereign that the only obligation that this Sovereign incurs when using a vehicle upon the streets or highways in North Carolina is the Common Law obligation to refrain from any act that causes another person to lose life, liberty, or property. In complying with this obligation, this Sovereign does comply with many Statutes in the North Carolina General Statutes since they are, for the most part, only common sense rules by which this Sovereign avoids doing damage to others.

47. Still, this acquiescence to some Statutes of The North Carolina General Statutes should not be construed as evidence of a contractual obligation by this Sovereign. Neither should it be construed as acquiescence to all the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes or to any of them always. Instead, it is merely evidence of a want of this Sovereign to travel safely and to do harm to no one.

48. Thus, the actions of this Sovereign do not supply unambiguous evidence of a contract with the State. Instead, the actions can, with equal weight, be said to be evidence of the fact that this Sovereign was complying with Common Law requirement that he does harm to no one. The driver's license is not an implied contract because there is no consideration, there may be possibly be two parties, but there is no consideration, and there is not clear evidence of an obligation. Three of the four elements necessary for a contract are missing.

49. The question now becomes whether the driver's license application is a contract. In completing this document, the applicant makes several statements and signs the paper upon which these statements are written under oath. The statements concern the identity, physical description, address, ability and experience in operating a vehicle, and one statement on the physical condition of the applicant. None of the statements are as an agreement.

50. The application form contains the signature of the applicant and the signature of the person taking the oath of the applicant. The reverse side of the Application contains the results of a vision test and rudimentary physical examination with the results of a driving test. These results are signed by the examiner and not by the applicant.

51. Thus the application takes the form of an Affidavit instead of a contract. But let us see if the elements of a contract are present in the application.

52. Since none of the necessary elements of a contract are present, the application does not constitute a contract.

53. The only other document involved in obtaining a driver's license is the document, part of which is copied to make the actual driver's license. It contains, besides the information that is used in making the driver's license, the results of a vision test conducted by the driver's license examiner.

54. The applicant places his signature upon this form that is then copied by some photographic process. Other material is added including a photograph, signature of the Director of the Department of Law Enforcement and the driver's license is made of this composite.

55. Thus the license itself cannot be a contract because it is a contrived document. The form from which the driver's license is made cannot be a contract because, again, none of the elements of a contract are present. So if none of the documents executed by the driver when obtaining a license is a contract, then no contract can exist between the driver and the State as a result of obtaining a driver's license.

56. But the idea that the driver's license is a contract with the State is pervasive. It is a belief that is strongly held even by people in high places. So let us examine the driver's license as if it were a contract and see if it can withstand scrutiny. Not every offer made by one party and accepted by the other creates a valid contract. The outward form of a contract, either oral or written may exist, and yet the circumstances may be such that no contract was in reality created. Some circumstances that will cause an apparently valid contract to be void are:

57. This Sovereign obtained a driver's license upon the representation by the State that one's travel upon the streets or highways of the United States of America was a privilege. This Sovereign accepted this representation as true and did obtain a driver's license.

58. But the General Assembly of the State who passed the Statutes contained in the North Carolina General Statutes are knowledgeable persons, many of whom are lawyers, and they undoubtedly knew at the time the law was passed that an individual's travel was a "RIGHT" and not a privilege. If this were the case, then the mistake would be unilateral. A unilateral mistake known to the other party is sufficient grounds to void a contract.

59. Fraud

60. If the driver's license is a contract, a case can be made for the contention that it was an agreement obtained by the State by fraud.

61. With respect to contracts, the following statements can be made:

62. In view of the many decisions by high courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, that one's travel is a "RIGHT" and not a privilege, it would be hard to defend the proposition that the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina was unaware of these decisions, particularly since many legislators are and were lawyers knowledgeable in such matters. In fact, when one considers the definition of streets or highways in Sections of the North Carolina General Statutes, the Evidence is conclusive that the legislature knew and knows that ones travels is a "RIGHT."

63. Therefore, the statements in the North Carolina General Statutes that a travel is a privilege and that a driver's license is necessary before one can travel constitutes a material misrepresentation of fact to this possessor of a driver's license. And since the legislature is and was aware of the fact that an individual's travels was not a privilege, but a "RIGHT," the statement that one's travels is a privilege, when applied to this Sovereign, constitutes a willful intention to deceive, and therefore, to defraud.

64. This Sovereign did rely upon the representations of the legislature that an individual's travels was a privilege when he obtained his driver's license, else he would not have obtained one.

65. This Sovereign did suffer damage as a result of his acting upon the representation of the legislature at least to the extent of the license fee.

66. In as much as all the necessary elements of fraud are present if the driver's license is considered a contract, the "contract" is void.


67. With respect to duress, Bergh, supra., supplies the following definition:

68. Since it was essential to this Sovereign in pursuing his occupation of common "RIGHT" to use a vehicle upon the streets or highways in North Carolina, and since the State of North Carolina threatens to and does prosecute persons in criminal actions for not possessing a driver's license, regardless of their status, this Sovereign did obtain a driver's license under duress. If then the driver's license is a contract, the contract is unenforceable and invalid because of this duress.

69. With respect to alterations, Bergh, supra., has the following comments:

70. If the driver's license is a contract, it is a written contract, at least to the extent that the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes are written. Each time that the General Assembly amends or modifies or adds to any of the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes, the terms of the contract are changed. Since this Sovereign then has the option of considering the contract as discharged, he then chooses to do so as of the first change in the North Carolina General Statutes following his application for a driver's license.

71. If it is contended that the driver's license is an implied contract, the "Statute of Frauds" comes into play. North Carolina has enacted a "Statute of Frauds."

72. In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum of it, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:

73. Since the term of the driver's license contract is so many years and the contract is not written, the "Statute of Frauds" does apply and the contract is unenforceable.

74. The discussion up to this point has been concerned with bilateral contracts in which each party promises something to the other party. Is it possible that the driver's license is a unilateral contract? A unilateral contract is described as:

75. Since the act expected by the State is obedience to the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes, what promise has the State offered in exchange for this act? The only promise that the State could make this Sovereign is the promise to allow him to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina. Since this Sovereign already can do that as a matter of "RIGHT," the State can promise him nothing. Thus there is no consideration and a unilateral contract cannot exist.

76. Having shown that no contract exists between this Sovereign and the State, let us examine the proposition that a quasi-contract exists between this Sovereign and the State.

77. Quasi-Contract

78. In order to establish the existence of a quasi-contractual obligation it must be shown:

79. Thus, if it is contended that this Sovereign must obey the Statutes in the North Carolina General Statutes because of a quasi-contract, it must be shown that this Sovereign has received a benefit from the State. But one's travels on the streets or highways of the State is not a benefit received from the State. It was a "RIGHT" that attached to this Sovereign at the moment of his birth and cannot be removed by the State. In this respect, no benefit has been received from the State, and thus a quasi-contractual obligation cannot exist with respect to this Sovereign.

80. It may be claimed that the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes are made pursuant to the police powers of the State and that every person in the State is obligated to obey them.

81. The police power is a grant of authority from the people to their governmental agents for the protection of the health, the safety, the comfort and the welfare of the public. In its nature, it is broad and comprehensive. It is a necessary and salutary power, since without it, society would be at the mercy of individual interest and there would exist neither public order or security. While this is true, it is only a power. It is not a "RIGHT?"

82. The powers of government, under our system, are nowhere absolute. They are but grants of authority from the people, and are limited to their true purposes. The fundamental "RIGHTS" of the people are inherent and have not yielded to governmental control. They are not the subjects of governmental authority. They are subjects of individual authority. Constitutional powers can never transcend constitutional "RIGHTS." The police power is subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution upon every power of government; and it will not be suffered to invade or impair the fundamental liberties of the Sovereign, those natural "RIGHTS" that are the chief concern of the Constitution and for whose protection it was ordained by the people.

83. Where inherent, unalienable, absolute "RIGHTS" are concerned, the police powers can have no effect. The "RIGHT" to travel on the streets or highways and the "RIGHT" to own and use property have been described as inherent, unalienable, and absolute. Thus the police power cannot regulate this Sovereign's "RIGHT" to use a vehicle on the streets or highways in North Carolina.

84. If the police power of the State is permitted to regulate the travels of this Sovereign on the streets or highways in North Carolina, and if, through the action of these regulations or Statutes, this Sovereign is denied access to the streets or highways in North Carolina; a fundamental "RIGHT" of this Sovereign has been abrogated.

85. The abrogation of unalienable "RIGHTS" by legislation or rule making is unconstitutional.

86. If further proof is needed to show that this Sovereign need not be licensed to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina, it is provided in the following decisions:

87. Since a fee is charged for a driver's license and since one's travels on the streets or highways in North Carolina is a "RIGHT" guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and by the LAW OF NATURE, it is not constitutional for the State to require this Sovereign to be licensed to travel.

88. Even the application for North Carolina Driver's License Form recognizes the "RIGHT" of some persons to travel without a license. North Carolina General Statutes recognizes categories of persons who are not required to be licensed in this State. Why is it then that the first demand made by the law enforcement personnel when making a traffic stop is:

"Let's see your driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance,"

and not always politely, when the first question should be;

"What is your status and are you required to have a driver's license?"

89. Can it be that there is a conspiracy afoot within the State to reduce all Sovereigns to a status of contract? Why else would a law enforcement person take a Sovereign to jail without even trying to discover if that Sovereign is exempt from the requirement of having a driver's license?

90. The question now becomes whether this Sovereign is required to obey any of the Statutes in the North Carolina General Statutes? It has been shown that this Sovereign has a "RIGHT" to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina. So, any Statute that describes driving on the streets or highways as a privilege cannot apply to this Sovereign. Since the "RIGHT" of this Sovereign to travel cannot be abrogated, any Statute the operation of which would have the effect of denying access to the streets or highways to this Sovereign cannot be applied to this Sovereign.

91. Since violation of any Statue in the North Carolina General Statutes is classified as a "misdemeanor" that is punishable by a fine and six months in jail, and since putting this Sovereign in jail because of his use of the streets or highways that harms nobody would be an abrogation of his "RIGHT" to travel, none of the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes apply to this Sovereign. These contentions are supported by the Supreme Court of United States.

92. This decision is consistent with that in Miranda, supra, in which it was stated that where "RIGHTS" are concerned, there can be no rule making or legislation that would abrogate them. It is also consistent with the discussion in the following case. This case is a tax case, but the discussion on "RIGHTS" that it contains is appropriate.

93. Individual and a Corporation

94. The Emphasized statement is also consistent with North Carolina Statute. In the Statute reads:

95. Since the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes cannot apply to this Sovereign, he becomes subject to the Common Law that maintains that he owes nothing to the public while he does not trespass upon their "RIGHTS."

96. Is it the contention of this Sovereign that because the Statutes contained in the North Carolina General Statutes do not apply to him that the Statutes are unconstitutional? Absolutely not. There is a class of persons in North Carolina to whom these Statutes apply without reservation. Members of this class include corporations and those who do the corporation business on the streets or highways in North Carolina. A corporation is the creation of the State.

97. It is a person in the eyes of the law but it lacks character, no morals, no conscience. It's every activity must be directed and supervised by the State. Under the definition of "Due Process of Law", Bouvier's Law Dictionary states in part:

98. The Statutes in the North Carolina General Statutes are designed to direct the activities of the class of persons of which a corporation is a member. Corporations are absolutely bound by these Statutes. It is imperative that a conscienceless entity not be allowed to roam the streets or highways in North Carolina and jeopardize the Sovereigns. It is for this purpose that the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes were enacted and not for the control of a Free and Natural Sovereign.


99. There is no Court in this Land that could lawfully execute an Order that would or could cause, or work to compel, One to become a servant or slave of any city, county or state without a conviction and with full Due Process of Law, and for any city, county, or state to pretend otherwise is an absurdity.

Losing Cases

Driver's License / Right to Travel

United States ex rel. Verdone v. Circuit Court for Taylor County, 851 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Wisc. 1993)
Argued that the traffic laws infringed on his right to travel and that enforcement of the traffic laws constituted a conspiracy.

City of Spokane v. Port, 716 P.2d 945 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)
Argued that a law requiring that drivers have licenses unconstitutionally restricts one's right to travel.

State v. Gibson, 697 P.2d 1216 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)
Argued that as a "free man" the motor vehicle laws do not apply to him without his consent.

State v. Turk, 643 P.2d 224 (Mont. 1982)
Argued that Montana's compulsory automobile liability insurance statutes are unconstitutional.

TOPICS: Constitution/Conservatism; Miscellaneous
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1 posted on 09/08/2001 6:54:24 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Prism

Driver Licensing vs. the Right to Travel

[Author UnKnown]

The following argument has been used in at least three states (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia) as a legal brief to support a demand for dismissal of charges of "driving without a license." It is the argument that was the reason for the charges to be dropped, or for a "win" in court against the argument that free people can have their right to travel regulated by their servants.

The forgotten legal maxim is that free people have a right to travel on the roads which are provided by their servants for that purpose, using ordinary transportation of the day. Licensing cannot be required of free people, because taking on the restrictions of a license requires the surrender of a right. The driver's license can be required of people who use the highways for trade, commerce, or hire; that is, if they earn their living on the road, and if they use extraordinary machines on the roads. If you are not using the highways for profit, you cannot be required to have a driver's license.


NOW, comes the Accused, appearing specially and not generally or voluntarily, but under threat of arrest if he failed to do so, with this "BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE FOR DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION," stating as follows:


If ever a judge understood the public's right to use the public roads, it was Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Justice Tolman stated:

"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment."

Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133, 147.

The words of Justice Tolman ring most prophetically in the ears of Citizens throughout the country today as the use of the public roads has been monopolized by the very entity which has been empowered to stand guard over our freedoms, i.e., that of state government.


The "most sacred of liberties" of which Justice Tolman spoke was personal liberty. The definition of personal liberty is:

"Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is one of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from, or dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which may not be submitted to a vote and may not depend on the outcome of an election. It is one of the most sacred and valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right to private property ... and is regarded as inalienable."

16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sect.202, p.987

This concept is further amplified by the definition of personal liberty:

"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct."

II Am.Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135

and further ...

"Personal liberty -- consists of the power of locomotion, of changing situations, of removing one's person to whatever place one's inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due process of law."

Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.;
Blackstone's Commentary 134; Hare, Constitution__Pg. 777

Justice Tolman was concerned about the State prohibiting the Citizen from the "most sacred of his liberties," the Right of movement, the Right of moving one's self from place to place without threat of imprisonment, the Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of life.

When the State allows the formation of a corporation it may control its creation by establishing guidelines (statutes) for its operation (charters). Corporations who use the roads in the course of business do not use the roads in the ordinary course of life. There is a difference between a corporation and an individual. The United States Supreme Court has stated:

"...We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for examination on the suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his Constitutional Rights as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no such duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life, liberty, and property. His Rights are such as the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his Rights are the refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under warrant of law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.

"Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that the State, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in exercise of its sovereignty inquire how those franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of corporate books and papers for that purpose."

Hale vs. Hinkel, 201 US 43, 74-75

Corporations engaged in mercantile equity fall under the purview of the State's admiralty jurisdiction, and the public at large must be protected from their activities, as they (the corporations) are engaged in business for profit.

"...Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has the plenary control of the streets and highways in the exercise of its police power (see police power, infra.), may absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a private business for gain. They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the ordinary Right of the Citizen to use the streets in the usual way and the use of the streets as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business for private gain. The former is a common Right, the latter is an extraordinary use. As to the former, the legislative power is confined to regulation, as to the latter, it is plenary and extends even to absolute prohibition. Since the use of the streets by a common carrier in the prosecution of its business as such is not a right but a mere license of privilege."

Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516

It will be necessary to review early cases and legal authority in order to reach a lawfully correct theory dealing with this Right or "privilege." We will attempt to reach a sound conclusion as to what is a "Right to use the road" and what is a "privilege to use the road". Once reaching this determination, we shall then apply those positions to modern case decision.

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."

Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491

and ...

"The claim and exercise of a constitutional Right cannot be converted into a crime."

Miller vs. U.S., 230 F. 486, 489

and ...

"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional Rights."

Snerer vs. Cullen, 481 F. 946

Streets and highways are established and maintained for the purpose of travel and transportation by the public. Such travel may be for business or pleasure.

"The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental Right of which the public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived."

Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22;
Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934;
Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607;
25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163

and ...

"The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by horse drawn carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city can prohibit or permit at will, but a common Right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Thompson vs. Smith, 154 SE 579

So we can see that a Citizen has a Right to travel upon the public highways by automobile and the Citizen cannot be rightfully deprived of his Liberty. So where does the misconception that the use of the public road is always and only a privilege come from?

"... For while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place for private gain. For the latter purpose, no person has a vested right to use the highways of the state, but is a privilege or a license which the legislature may grant or withhold at its discretion."

State vs. Johnson, 243 P. 1073;
Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P. 171;
Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256;
Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516

Here the court held that a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways, but that he did not have the right to conduct business upon the highways. On this point of law all authorities are unanimous.

"Heretofore the court has held, and we think correctly, that while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private gain."

Willis vs. Buck, 263 P. l 982;
Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82

and ...

"The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus."

State vs. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864

What is this Right of the Citizen which differs so "radically and obviously" from one who uses the highway as a place of business? Who better to enlighten us than Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of Washington State? In State vs. City of Spokanesupra, the Court also noted a very "radical and obvious" difference, but went on to explain just what the difference is:

"The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a common right to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary."

and ...

"This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all the authorities."

State vs. City of Spokane, supra.

This position does not hang precariously upon only a few cases, but has been proclaimed by an impressive array of cases ranging from the state courts to the federal courts.

"the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a right common to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary."

Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs. Davis), 85 SE 781

and ...

"The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business."

Thompson vs. Smith, supra.;
Teche Lines vs. Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784

There is no dissent among various authorities as to this position. (See Am. Jur. [1st] Const. Law, 329 and corresponding Am. Jur. [2nd].)

"Personal liberty -- or the right to enjoyment of life and liberty -- is one of the fundamental or natural rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from nor dependent on the U.S. Constitution. ... It is one of the most sacred and valuable rights [remember the words of Justice Tolman, supra.] as sacred as the right to private property ... and is regarded as inalienable."

16 C.J.S. Const. Law, Sect.202, Pg. 987

As we can see, the distinction between a "Right" to use the public roads and a "privilege" to use the public roads is drawn upon the line of "using the road as a place of business" and the various state courts have held so. But what have the U.S. Courts held on this point?

"First, it is well established law that the highways of the state are public property, and their primary and preferred use is for private purposes, and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit."

Stephenson vs. Rinford, 287 US 251;
Pachard vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited;
Frost and F. Trucking Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 271 US 592;
Railroad commission vs. Inter-City Forwarding Co., 57 SW.2d 290;
Parlett Cooperative vs. Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313

So what is a privilege to use the roads? By now it should be apparent even to the "learned" that an attempt to use the road as a place of business is a privilege. The distinction must be drawn between ...

  1. Travelling upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads, which is our Right; and ...
  2. Using the public roads as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business, which is a privilege.

    "[The roads] ... are constructed and maintained at public expense, and no person therefore, can insist that he has, or may acquire, a vested right to their use in carrying on a commercial business."

    Ex Parte Sterling, 53 SW.2d 294;
    Barney vs. Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82;
    Stephenson vs. Binford, supra.

    "When the public highways are made the place of business the state has a right to regulate their use in the interest of safety and convenience of the public as well as the preservation of the highways."

    Thompson vs. Smith, supra.

    "[The state's] right to regulate such use is based upon the nature of the business and the use of the highways in connection therewith."


    "We know of no inherent right in one to use the highways for commercial purposes. The highways are primarily for the use of the public, and in the interest of the public, the state may prohibit or regulate ... the use of the highways for gain."

    Robertson vs. Dept. of Public Works, supra.

There should be considerable authority on a subject as important a this deprivation of the liberty of the individual "using the roads in the ordinary course of life and business." However, it should be noted that extensive research has not turned up one case or authority acknowledging the state's power to convert the individual's right to travel upon the public roads into a "privilege."

Therefore, it is concluded that the Citizen does have a "Right" to travel and transport his property upon the public highways and roads and the exercise of this Right is not a "privilege."


In order to understand the correct application of the statute in question, we must first define the terms used in connection with this point of law. As will be shown, many terms used today do not, in their legal context, mean what we assume they mean, thus resulting in the misapplication of statutes in the instant case.


There is a clear distinction between an automobile and a motor vehicle. An automobile has been defined as:

"The word `automobile' connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on highways."

American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., vs. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH 200

While the distinction is made clear between the two as the courts have stated:

"A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration is received."

International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle, 251 P. 120

The term `motor vehicle' is different and broader than the word `automobile.'"

City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App. 232

The distinction is made very clear in Title 18 USC 31:

"Motor vehicle" means every description or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, or passengers and property.

"Used for commercial purposes" means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other considerations, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.

Clearly, an automobile is private property in use for private purposes, while a motor vehicle is a machine which may be used upon the highways for trade, commerce, or hire.


The term "travel" is a significant term and is defined as:

"The term `travel' and `traveler' are usually construed in their broad and general sense ... so as to include all those who rightfully use the highways viatically (when being reimbursed for expenses) and who have occasion to pass over them for the purpose of business, convenience, or pleasure."

25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect.427, Pg. 717

"Traveler -- One who passes from place to place, whether for pleasure, instruction, business, or health."

Locket vs. State, 47 Ala. 45;
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3309

"Travel -- To journey or to pass through or over; as a country district, road, etc. To go from one place to another, whether on foot, or horseback, or in any conveyance as a train, an automobile, carriage, ship, or aircraft; Make a journey."

Century Dictionary, Pg. 2034

Therefore, the term "travel" or "traveler" refers to one who uses a conveyance to go from one place to another, and included all those who use the highways as a matter of Right.

Notice that in all these definitions, the phrase "for hire" never occurs. This term "travel" or "traveler" implies, by definition, one who uses the road as a means to move from one place to another.

Therefore, one who uses the road in the ordinary course of life and business for the purpose of travel and transportation is a traveler.


The term "driver" in contradistinction to "traveler," is defined as:

"Driver -- One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle ..."

Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 940

Notice that this definition includes one who is "employed" in conducting a vehicle. It should be self-evident that this individual could not be "travelling" on a journey, but is using the road as a place of business.


Today we assume that a "traveler" is a "driver," and a "driver" is an "operator." However, this is not the case.

"It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that a distinction is to be drawn between the terms `operator' and `driver'; the `operator' of the service car being the person who is licensed to have the car on the streets in the business of carrying passengers for hire; while the `driver' is the one who actually drives the car. However, in the actual prosecution of business, it was possible for the same person to be both `operator' and `driver.'"

Newbill vs. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658

To further clarify the definition of an "operator" the court observed that this was a vehicle "for hire" and that it was in the business of carrying passengers.

This definition would seem to describe a person who is using the road as a place of business, or in other words, a person engaged in the "privilege" of using the road for gain.

This definition, then, is a further clarification of the distinction mentioned earlier, and therefore:

  1. Travelling upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads as a matter of Right meets the definition of a traveler.
  2. Using the road as a place of business as a matter of privilege meets the definition of a driver or an operator or both.


Having defined the terms "automobile," "motor vehicle," "traveler," "driver," and "operator," the next term to define is "traffic":

"... Traffic thereon is to some extent destructive, therefore, the prevention of unnecessary duplication of auto transportation service will lengthen the life of the highways or reduce the cost of maintenance, the revenue derived by the state ... will also tend toward the public welfare by producing at the expense of those operating for private gain, some small part of the cost of repairing the wear ..."

Northern Pacific R.R. Co. vs. Schoenfeldt, 213 P. 26

Note: In the above, Justice Tolman expounded upon the key of raising revenue by taxing the "privilege" to use the public roads "at the expense of those operating for gain."

In this case, the word "traffic" is used in conjunction with the unnecessary Auto Transportation Service, or in other words, "vehicles for hire." The word "traffic" is another word which is to be strictly construed to the conducting of business.

"Traffic -- Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, or the like. The passing of goods and commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or money ..."

Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3307

Here again, notice that this definition refers to one "conducting business." No mention is made of one who is travelling in his automobile. This definition is of one who is engaged in the passing of a commodity or goods in exchange for money, i.e .., vehicles for hire.

Furthermore, the word "traffic" and "travel" must have different meanings which the courts recognize. The difference is recognized in Ex Parte Dickey, supra:

" addition to this, cabs, hackney coaches, omnibuses, taxicabs, and hacks, when unnecessarily numerous, interfere with the ordinary traffic and travel and obstruct them."

The court, by using both terms, signified its recognition of a distinction between the two. But, what was the distinction? We have already defined both terms, but to clear up any doubt:

"The word `traffic' is manifestly used here in secondary sense, and has reference to the business of transportation rather than to its primary meaning of interchange of commodities."

Allen vs. City of Bellingham, 163 P. 18

Here the Supreme Court of the State of Washington has defined the word "traffic" (in either its primary or secondary sense) in reference to business, and not to mere travel! So it is clear that the term "traffic" is business related and therefore, it is a "privilege." The net result being that "traffic" is brought under the (police) power of the legislature. The term has no application to one who is not using the roads as a place of business.


It seems only proper to define the word "license," as the definition of this word will be extremely important in understanding the statutes as they are properly applied:

"The permission, by competent authority to do an act which without permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort."

People vs. Henderson, 218 NW.2d 2, 4

"Leave to do a thing which licensor could prevent."

Western Electric Co. vs. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118

In order for these two definitions to apply in this case, the state would have to take up the position that the exercise of a Constitutional Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of life and business is illegal, a trespass, or a tort, which the state could then regulate or prevent.

This position, however, would raise magnitudinous Constitutional questions as this position would be diametrically opposed to fundamental Constitutional Law. (See "Conversion of a Right to a Crime," infra.)

In the instant case, the proper definition of a "license" is:

"a permit, granted by an appropriate governmental body, generally for consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation, to pursue some occupation or to carry on some business which is subject to regulation under the police power."

Rosenblatt vs. California State Board of Pharmacy, 158 P.2d 199, 203

This definition would fall more in line with the "privilege" of carrying on business on the streets.

Most people tend to think that "licensing" is imposed by the state for the purpose of raising revenue, yet there may well be more subtle reasons contemplated; for when one seeks permission from someone to do something he invokes the jurisdiction of the "licensor" which, in this case, is the state. In essence, the licensee may well be seeking to be regulated by the "licensor."

"A license fee is a charge made primarily for regulation, with the fee to cover costs and expenses of supervision or regulation."

State vs. Jackson, 60 Wisc.2d 700; 211 NW.2d 480, 487

The fee is the price; the regulation or control of the licensee is the real aim of the legislation.

Are these licenses really used to fund legitimate government, or are they nothing more than a subtle introduction of police power into every facet of our lives? Have our "enforcement agencies" been diverted from crime prevention, perhaps through no fault of their own, instead now busying themselves as they "check" our papers to see that all are properly endorsed by the state?

How much longer will it be before we are forced to get a license for our lawn mowers, or before our wives will need a license for her "blender" or "mixer?" They all have motors on them and the state can always use the revenue.


The confusion of the police power with the power of taxation usually arises in cases where the police power has affixed a penalty to a certain act, or where it requires licenses to be obtained and a certain sum be paid for certain occupations. The power used in the instant case cannot, however, be the power of taxation since an attempt to levy a tax upon a Right would be open to Constitutional objection. (See "taxing power," infra.)

Each law relating to the use of police power must ask three questions:

"1. Is there threatened danger?

"2. Does a regulation involve a Constitutional Right?

"3. Is this regulation reasonable?

People vs. Smith, 108 Am.St.Rep. 715;
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., under "Police Power"

When applying these three questions to the statute in question, some very important issues emerge.

First, "is there a threatened danger" in the individual using his automobile on the public highways, in the ordinary course of life and business?

The answer is No!  There is nothing inherently dangerous in the use of an automobile when it is carefully managed. Their guidance, speed, and noise are subject to a quick and easy control, under a competent and considerate manager, it is as harmless on the road as a horse and buggy.

It is the manner of managing the automobile, and that alone, which threatens the safety of the public. The ability to stop quickly and to respond quickly to guidance would seem to make the automobile one of the least dangerous conveyances. (See Yale Law Journal, December, 1905.)

"The automobile is not inherently dangerous."

Cohens vs. Meadow, 89 SE 876;
Blair vs. Broadmore, 93 SE 532

To deprive all persons of the Right to use the road in the ordinary course of life and business, because one might, in the future, become dangerous, would be a deprivation not only of the Right to travel, but also the Right to due process. (See "Due Process," infra.)

Next; does the regulation involve a Constitutional Right?

This question has already been addressed and answered in this brief, and need not be reinforced other than to remind this Court that this Citizen does have the Right to travel upon the public highway by automobile in the ordinary course of life and business. It can therefore be concluded that this regulation does involve a Constitutional Right.

The third question is the most important in this case. "Is this regulation reasonable?"

The answer is No!  It will be shown later in "Regulation," infra., that this licensing statute is oppressive and could be effectively administered by less oppressive means.

Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere with the proper exercise of the police power, in accordance with the general principle that the power must be exercised so as not to invade unreasonably the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, it is established beyond question that every state power, including the police power, is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment (and others) and by the inhibitions there imposed.

Moreover, the ultimate test of the propriety of police power regulations must be found in the Fourteenth Amendment, since it operates to limit the field of the police power to the extent of preventing the enforcement of statutes in denial of Rights that the Amendment protects. (See Parks vs. State, 64 NE 682.)

"With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority."

Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540;
Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848;
O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887

"The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution."

Bacahanan vs. Wanley, 245 US 60;
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission, 294 US 613

"It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected from invasion by the police power, include Rights safeguarded both by express and implied prohibitions in the Constitutions."

Tiche vs. Osborne, 131 A. 60

"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the police power are found in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the letter, although they are just as efficient as if expressed in the clearest language."

Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882

As it applies in the instant case, the language of the Fifth Amendment is clear:

"No person shall be ... deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property without due process of law."

As has been shown, the courts at all levels have firmly established an absolute Right to travel.

In the instant case, the state, by applying commercial statutes to all entities, natural and artificial persons alike, has deprived this free and natural person of the Right of Liberty, without cause and without due process of law.


"The essential elements of due process of law are ... Notice and The Opportunity to defend."

Simon vs. Craft, 182 US 427

Yet, not one individual has been given notice of the loss of his/her Right, let alone before signing the license (contract). Nor was the Citizen given any opportunity to defend against the loss of his/her right to travel, by automobile, on the highways, in the ordinary course of life and business. This amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of Liberty.

"There should be no arbitrary deprivation of Life or Liberty ..."

Barbour vs. Connolly, 113 US 27, 31;
Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 US 356

and ...

"The right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a citizen cannot deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. This Right was emerging as early as the Magna Carta."

Kent vs. Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958)

The focal point of this question of police power and due process must balance upon the point of making the public highways a safe place for the public to travel. If a man travels in a manner that creates actual damage, an action would lie (civilly) for recovery of damages. The state could then also proceed against the individual to deprive him of his Right to use the public highways, for cause. This process would fulfill the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment while at the same time insuring that Rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the state constitutions would be protected.

But unless or until harm or damage (a crime) is committed, there is no cause for interference in the private affairs or actions of a Citizen.

One of the most famous and perhaps the most quoted definitions of due process of law, is that of Daniel Webster in his Dartmouth College Case (4 Wheat 518), in which he declared that by due process is meant:

"a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."

See also State vs. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020;
Dennis vs. Moses, 52 P. 333

Somewhat similar is the statement that is a rule as old as the law that:

"no one shall be personally bound (restricted) until he has had his day in court,"

by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and it is oppressive and can never be upheld where it is fairly administered. (12 Am.Jur. [1st] Const. Law, Sect. 573, Pg. 269)

Note:  This sounds like the process used to deprive one of the "privilege" of operating a motor vehicle "for hire." It should be kept in mind, however, that we are discussing the arbitrary deprivation of the Right to use the road that all citizens have "in common."

The futility of the state's position can be most easily observed in the 1959 Washington Attorney General's opinion on a similar issue:

"The distinction between the Right of the Citizen to use the public highways for private, rather than commercial purposes is recognized ..."

and ...

"Under its power to regulate private uses of our highways, our legislature has required that motor vehicle operators be licensed (I.C. 49-307). Undoubtedly, the primary purpose of this requirement is to insure, as far as possible, that all motor vehicle operators will be competent and qualified, thereby reducing the potential hazard or risk of harm, to which other users of the highways might otherwise be subject. But once having complied with this regulatory provision, by obtaining the required license, a motorist enjoys the privilege of travelling freely upon the highways  ..."

Washington A.G.O. 59-60 No. 88, Pg. 11

This alarming opinion appears to be saying that every person using an automobile as a matter of Right, must give up the Right and convert the Right into a privilege. This is accomplished under the guise of regulation. This statement is indicative of the insensitivity, even the ignorance, of the government to the limits placed upon governments by and through the several constitutions.

This legal theory may have been able to stand in 1959; however, as of 1966, in the United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda, even this weak defense of the state's actions must fall.

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."

Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491

Thus the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the Citizen's Right to travel upon the public roads, by passing legislation forcing the citizen to waive his Right and convert that Right into a privilege. Furthermore, we have previously established that this "privilege" has been defined as applying only to those who are "conducting business in the streets" or "operating for-hire vehicles."

The legislature has attempted (by legislative fiat) to deprive the Citizen of his Right to use the roads in the ordinary course of life and business, without affording the Citizen the safeguard of "due process of law." This has been accomplished under supposed powers of regulation.


"In addition to the requirement that regulations governing the use of the highways must not be violative of constitutional guarantees, the prime essentials of such regulation are reasonableness, impartiality, and definiteness or certainty."

25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect. 260

and ...

"Moreover, a distinction must be observed between the regulation of an activity which may be engaged in as a matter of right and one carried on by government sufferance of permission."

Davis vs. Massachusetts, 167 US 43;
Pachard vs. Banton, supra.

One can say for certain that these regulations are impartial since they are being applied to all, even though they are clearly beyond the limits of the legislative powers. However, we must consider whether such regulations are reasonable and non-violative of constitutional guarantees.

First, let us consider the reasonableness of this statute requiring all persons to be licensed (presuming that we are applying this statute to all persons using the public roads). In determining the reasonableness of the statute we need only ask two questions:

1. Does the statute accomplish its stated goal?

The answer is No!

The attempted explanation for this regulation "to insure the safety of the public by insuring, as much as possible, that all are competent and qualified."

However, one can keep his license without retesting, from the time he/she is first licensed until the day he/she dies, without regard to the competency of the person, by merely renewing said license before it expires. It is therefore possible to completely skirt the goal of this attempted regulation, thus proving that this regulation does not accomplish its goal.

Furthermore, by testing and licensing, the state gives the appearance of underwriting the competence of the licensees, and could therefore be held liable for failures, accidents, etc. caused by licensees.

2. Is the statute reasonable?

The answer is No!

This statute cannot be determined to be reasonable since it requires to the Citizen to give up his or her natural Right to travel unrestricted in order to accept the privilege. The purported goal of this statute could be met by much less oppressive regulations, i.e., competency tests and certificates of competency before using an automobile upon the public roads. (This is exactly the situation in the aviation sector.)

But isn't this what we have now?

The answer is No!  The real purpose of this license is much more insidious. When one signs the license, he/she gives up his/her Constitutional Right to travel in order to accept and exercise a privilege. After signing the license, a quasi-contract, the Citizen has to give the state his/her consent to be prosecuted for constructive crimes and quasi-criminal actions where there is no harm done and no damaged property.

These prosecutions take place without affording the Citizen of their Constitutional Rights and guarantees such a the Right to a trial by jury of twelve persons and the Right to counsel, as well as the normal safeguards such as proof of intent and a corpus dilecti and a grand jury indictment. These unconstitutional prosecutions take place because the Citizen is exercising a privilege and has given his/her "implied consent" to legislative enactments designed to control interstate commerce, a regulatable enterprise under the police power of the state.

We must now conclude that the Citizen is forced to give up Constitutional guarantees of "Right" in order to exercise his state "privilege" to travel upon the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business.


A Citizen cannot be forced to give up his/her Rights in the name of regulation.

"... the only limitations found restricting the right of the state to condition the use of the public highways as a means of vehicular transportation for compensation are (1) that the state must not exact of those it permits to use the highways for hauling for gain that they surrender any of their inherent U.S. Constitutional Rights as a condition precedent to obtaining permission for such use ..."

Riley vs. Laeson, 142 So. 619;
Stephenson vs. Binford, supra.

If one cannot be placed in a position of being forced to surrender Rights in order to exercise a privilege, how much more must this maxim of law, then, apply when one is simply exercising (putting into use) a Right?

"To be that statute which would deprive a Citizen of the rights of person or property, without a regular trial, according to the course and usage of the common law, would not be the law of the land."

Hoke vs. Henderson, 15 NC 15

and ...

"We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another."

Simons vs. United States, 390 US 389

Since the state requires that one give up Rights in order to exercise the privilege of driving, the regulation cannot stand under the police power, due process, or regulation, but must be exposed as a statute which is oppressive and one which has been misapplied to deprive the Citizen of Rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the state constitutions.


"Any claim that this statute is a taxing statute would be immediately open to severe Constitutional objections. If it could be said that the state had the power to tax a Right, this would enable the state to destroy Rights guaranteed by the constitution through the use of oppressive taxation. The question herein, is one of the state taxing the Right to travel by the ordinary modes of the day, and whether this is a legislative object of the state taxation.

The views advanced herein are neither novel nor unsupported by authority. The question of taxing power of the states has been repeatedly considered by the Supreme Court. The Right of the state to impede or embarrass the Constitutional operation of the U.S. Government or the Rights which the Citizen holds under it, has been uniformly denied."

McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316

The power to tax is the power to destroy, and if the state is given the power to destroy Rights through taxation, the framers of the Constitution wrote that document in vain.

"... It may be said that a tax of one dollar for passing through the state cannot sensibly affect any function of government or deprive a Citizen of any valuable Right. But if a state can tax ... a passenger of one dollar, it can tax him a thousand dollars."

Crandall vs. Nevada, 6 Wall 35, 46

and ...

"If the Right of passing through a state by a Citizen of the United States is one guaranteed by the Constitution, it must be sacred from state taxation."

Ibid., Pg. 47

Therefore, the Right of travel must be kept sacred from all forms of state taxation and if this argument is used by the state as a defense of the enforcement of this statute, then this argument also must fail.


As previously demonstrated, the Citizen has the Right to travel and to transport his property upon the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business. However, if one exercises this Right to travel (without first giving up the Right and converting that Right into a privilege) the Citizen is by statute, guilty of a crime. This amounts to converting the exercise of a Constitutional Right into a crime.

Recall the Miller vs. U.S. and Snerer vs. Cullen quotes from Pg. 5, and:

"The state cannot diminish Rights of the people."

Hurtado vs. California, 110 US 516

and ...

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."

Miranda, supra.

Indeed, the very purpose for creating the state under the limitations of the constitution was to protect the rights of the people from intrusion, particularly by the forces of government.

So we can see that any attempt by the legislature to make the act of using the public highways as a matter of Right into a crime, is void upon its face.

Any person who claims his Right to travel upon the highways, and so exercises that Right, cannot be tried for a crime of doing so. And yet, this Freeman stands before this court today to answer charges for the "crime" of exercising his Right to Liberty.

As we have already shown, the term "drive" can only apply to those who are employed in the business of transportation for hire. It has been shown that freedom includes the Citnzen's Right to use the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business without license or regulation by the police powers of the state.


It is the duty of the court to recognize the substance of things and not the mere form.

"The courts are not bound by mere form, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty -- indeed they are under a solemn duty -- to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purported to have been enacted to protect ... the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects or is a palpable invasion of Rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution."

Mulger vs. Kansas, 123 US 623, 661

and ...

"It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the Constitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."

Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616

The courts are "duty bound" to recognize and stop the "stealthy encroachments" which have been made upon the Citizen's Right to travel and to use the roads to transport his property in the "ordinary course of life and business." (Hadfield, supra.)

Further, the court must recognize that the Right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a Citizen cannot be deprived without specific cause and without the "due process of law" guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment. (Kent, supra.)

The history of this "invasion" of the Citizen's Right to use the public highways shows clearly that the legislature simply found a heretofore untapped source of revenue, got greedy, and attempted to enforce a statute in an unconstitutional manner upon those free and natural individuals who have a Right to travel upon the highways. This was not attempted in an outright action, but in a slow, meticulous, calculated encroachment upon the Citizen's Right to travel.

This position must be accepted unless the prosecutor can show his authority for the position that the "use of the road in the ordinary course of life and business" is a privilege.

To rule in any other manner, without clear authority for an adverse ruling, will infringe upon fundamental and basic concepts of Constitutional law. This position, that a Right cannot be regulated under any guise, must be accepted without concern for the monetary loss of the state.

"Disobedience or evasion of a Constitutional Mandate cannot be tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least temporarily, promote in some respects the best interests of the public."

Slote vs. Examination, 112 ALR 660

and ...

"Economic necessity cannot justify a disregard of Constitutional guarantee."

Riley vs. Carter, 79 ALR 1018;
16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect. 81

and ...

"Constitutional Rights cannot be denied simply because of hostility to their assertions and exercise; vindication of conceded Constitutional Rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny them than to afford them."

Watson vs. Memphis, 375 US 526

Therefore, the Court's decision in the instant case must be made without the issue of cost to the state being taken into consideration, as that issue is irrelevant. The state cannot lose money that it never had a right to demand from the "Sovereign People."

Finally, we come to the issue of "public policy." It could be argued that the "licensing scheme" of all persons is a matter of "public policy." However, if this argument is used, it too must fail, as:

"No public policy of a state can be allowed to override the positive guarantees of the U.S. Constitution."

16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect. 70

So even "public policy" cannot abrogate this Citizen's Right to travel and to use the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business.

Therefore, it must be concluded that:

"We have repeatedly held that the legislature may regulate the use of the highways for carrying on business for private gain and that such regulation is a valid exercise of the police power."

Northern Pacific R.R. Co., supra.

and ...

"The act in question is a valid regulation, and as such is binding upon all who use the highway for the purpose of private gain."


Any other construction of this statute would render it unconstitutional as applied to this Citizen or any Citizen. The Accused therefore moves this court to dismiss the charge against him, with prejudice.

June 10, 1986.

This ends the legal brief.

In addition:

Since no notice is given to people applying for driver's (or other) licenses that they have a perfect right to use the roads without any permission, and that they surrender valuable rights by taking on the regulation system of licensure, the state has committed a massive construction fraud. This occurs when any person is told that they must have a license in order to use the public roads and highways.

The license, being a legal contract under which the state is empowered with policing powers, is only valid when the licensee takes on the burdens of the contract and bargains away his or her rights knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily.

Few know that the driver's license is a contract without which the police are powerless to regulate the people's actions or activities.

Few (if any) licensees intentionally surrender valuable rights. They are told that they must have the license. As we have seen, this is not the case.

No one in their right mind voluntarily surrenders complete liberty and accepts in its place a set of regulations.

"The people never give up their liberties but under some delusion."

2 posted on 09/08/2001 6:58:49 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Prism
"You're Under Arrest for Resisting Arrest" (cops words - my title)

Constitution/Conservatism Miscellaneous Keywords: POLICE STATE CHECKPOINTS
Posted on 09/08/2001 05:09:17 PDT by Prism

3 posted on 09/08/2001 7:01:11 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Prism

"Licensing Parents"

by Hugh LaFollette

Philosophy and Public Affairs ( Winter 1980) pp. 182-97
[pdf version]

In this essay I shall argue that the state should require all parents to be licensed. My main goal is to demonstrate that the licensing of parents is theoretically desirable, though I shall also argue that a workable and just licensing program actually could be established.


4 posted on 09/08/2001 7:04:45 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Prism
Bump for later
5 posted on 09/08/2001 7:05:27 PM PDT by ThJ1800
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To: Prism
So basicly, you failed your driving test and need to vent your anger, and expess your right to drive on public roads.


6 posted on 09/08/2001 7:06:35 PM PDT by Marine Inspector
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To: Prism
[December 23, 1996 issue of The New American magazine]

In his Society essay, Lykken writes, "I will testify in support of a parental licensure bill to be introduced at the next session of the Minnesota State Legislature. The only sanction proposed in this bill for unlicensed parents who produce a child is periodic visits by child-protection caseworkers who will do an annual audit of each child's physical, social, and educational progress." However, Lykken asserts, "Minnesotans and their legislative representatives will [eventually] recognize the need to take one further step. That step, I suggest, should be to take custody of babies born to unlicensed mothers, before bonding occurs, and to place them for adoption or permanent care by professionally trained and supervised foster parents."

7 posted on 09/08/2001 7:07:31 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Marine Inspector
Haha- Havent had a DL in years, and No I wont get one, and No I do not break the law. (And no, Im not mad about THAT)

What I am mad about is the whole process of deception that goes on in the DL/court fiasco.

8 posted on 09/08/2001 7:10:31 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Prism
Sorry, driving's a privledge which requires a great deal of caution and the will to yield.
9 posted on 09/08/2001 7:11:04 PM PDT by Ken522 (
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To: Prism
You first. I can think of other ways to spend my money that paying traffic fines.
10 posted on 09/08/2001 7:12:29 PM PDT by Catspaw
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To: Prism
If you drive with out a license, you break the law.
11 posted on 09/08/2001 7:13:14 PM PDT by Marine Inspector
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To: Prism
Blah, blah, blah...

I got as far as the part that said that driver's licenses were illegal/unconstitutional. Somehow this writeup reminds me strongly of those tax protestor arguments.

Prism, one question... Do you have a drivers license ? In other words, are you willing to take a bullet for this stuff?

"Trust me, you won't get hurt. Go ahead and jump. I'll jump after you do."

12 posted on 09/08/2001 7:14:00 PM PDT by truth_eagle
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To: Prism

Our society normally regulates a certain range of activities; it is illegal to perform these activities unless one has received prior permission to do so. We require automobile operators to have licenses. We forbid people from practicing medicine, law, pharmacy, or psychiatry unless they have satisfied certain licensing requirements.

Society's decision to regulate just these activities is not ad hoc. The decision to restrict admission to certain vocations and to forbid some people from driving is based on an eminently plausible, though not often explicitly formulated, rationale.(1) We require drivers to be licensed because driving an auto is an activity which is potentially harmful to others, safe performance of the activity requires a certain competence, and we have a moderately reliable procedure for determining that competence. The potential harm is obvious: incompetent drivers can and do maim and kill people. The best way we have of limiting this harm without sacrificing the benefits of automobile travel is to require that all drivers demonstrate at least minimal competence. We likewise license doctors,. lawyers, and psychologists because they perform activities which can harm others. Obviously they must be proficient if they are to perform these activities properly, and we have moderately reliable procedures for determining proficiency Imagine a world in which everyone could legally drive a car, in which everyone could legally perform surgery, prescribe medications, dispense drugs. or offer legal advice. Such a world would hardly be desirable.

Consequently, any activity that is potentially harmful to others and requires certain demonstrated competence for its safe performance, is subject to regulation that is, it is theoretically desirable that we regulate it. If we also have a reliable procedure for determining whether someone has the requisite competence, then the action is not only subject to regulation but ought, all things considered, to be regulated.

1. "When practice of a profession or calling requires special knowledge or skill and intimately affects public health, morals, order or safety, or general welfare, legislature may prescribe reasonable qualifications for persons desiring to pursue such professions or calling and require them to demonstrate possession of such qualifications by examination on subjects with which such profession or calling has to deal as a condition precedent to right to follow that profession or calling." 50 SE 2nd 735 (I949). Also see I99 US 306, 3I8 (I905) and I23 U8 623, 66I (I887).

From Licensing Parents

13 posted on 09/08/2001 7:16:10 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Marine Inspector
It depends...if a law is unlawful then he's not breaking the law. Kind of like that military stuff...if a commander gives you an unlawful order, it's your duty not to obey it. And if you do, you're breaking the law.
14 posted on 09/08/2001 7:19:18 PM PDT by for-q-clinton
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To: truth_eagle
In other words, are you willing to take a bullet for this stuff?

No I do not. But I do not drive. No I will never get one, had one but no more.

Yes, I will take the bullet, again and again when the time comes.

15 posted on 09/08/2001 7:19:54 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Prism
We forbid people from practicing medicine, law, pharmacy, or psychiatry unless they have satisfied certain licensing requirements.

As a self-described "Sovereign" individual, do you believe the States should license any of the above? If so, why?

16 posted on 09/08/2001 7:20:11 PM PDT by truth_eagle
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To: for-q-clinton
17 posted on 09/08/2001 7:21:14 PM PDT by Marine Inspector
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To: Prism
No I do not. But I do not drive

Why don't you drive?

18 posted on 09/08/2001 7:21:24 PM PDT by truth_eagle
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To: Catspaw
You first. I can think of other ways to spend my money that paying traffic fines.

Point taken, thank you for illustrating that the ADMINISTRATIVE LAW you are under by accepting a DL is not concerned with public safety, its concern is to fleece as many people as possible while raising as little objection as possible.

Remove this system, and my violations of your rights through errant driving would be prosecuted LIKE THE CRIMES THEY ARE, with proper burden of proof and harsh penalties.

What happens now? I pay some dough, get a couple points maybe, and Im free to go!

19 posted on 09/08/2001 7:25:40 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Marine Inspector
Marine Inspector member since September 3rd, 2001

Just what FR needs another _FED, cop, JBT

20 posted on 09/08/2001 7:26:27 PM PDT by watcher1
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To: truth_eagle
Why don't you drive?

Haha, you remind me of that broadband commercial-

"How is that POSSIBLE?!!"

It isnt easy, or fun, but I do it.

The cage doesn't dissappear when you stop touching the bars.

21 posted on 09/08/2001 7:29:14 PM PDT by Prism
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To: truth_eagle
As a self-described "Sovereign" individual, do you believe the States should license any of the above? If so, why?

Hard to answer 'in context', but ultimately no. Where does the public get the interest/right in who I conduct business with?

22 posted on 09/08/2001 7:31:47 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Prism
Here's some case law on the subject from "Idiot Legal Arguments." This is why I'm going to keep my driver's license current. I really don't want to pay any fines.

But hey, why don't you drive? You're encouraging others to do so.

relating to traffic laws: state govt can restrict driving on the public roads to drivers with valid current licenses, and restrict drivers to vehicles registered as having passed inspection, notwithstanding argument about a "right to travel". Hendrick v. Maryland (1915) 235 US 610 (a state may restrict the use of its highways to drivers who have complied with the license, insurance and vehicle registration laws of this state or, if the driver is a non-resident, of his home state); Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 US 535 (state statute which denies or suspends drivers license for failure to carry insurance or comparable financial responsibility does not violate constitution); (this authority to prescribe reasonable requisites for the "privilege" of driving on the public highways is inherent in state and local govts) State v. Booher (Tenn.Crim.App 1997) 978 SW2d 953 ("the appellant asserts that the state ... has unduly infringed upon his 'right to travel' by requiring licensing and registarion .... However, contrary to his assertions, at no time did the State of Tennessee place constraints upon the appellant's exercise of this right. His right to travel ... remains unimpeded.... Rather, based upon the context of his argument, the appellant asserts an infringement upon his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state. This notion is wholly separate from the right to travel. The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway is not a fundamental 'right'. Instead, it is a revocable 'privilege' that is granted upon compliance with statutory licensing procedures."); Quackenbush v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 454, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 271 (state can require insurance for drivers licenses); ditto (state has legitimate interest in requiring financial responsibility of drivers) Berberian v. Lussier (1958) 87 RI 226, 139 A2d 869 (this crank, a lawyer who was evidently his own favorite client and eventually got himself disbarred for threatening to bomb the courthouse, Carter v. Berberian (RI 1981) 442 A2d 1263, later got his 13 year old son to sue over the age requirement for learners permits, see below); see generally essay, Validity of Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, 35 ALR2d 1011 & suppl.; Guerrero v. Ryan (1995) 272 IL.App.3d 945, 209 IL.Dec 408, 651 NE2d 586 app.denied 163 IL.2d 556, 657 NE2d 621 cert.den 516 US 1180 (state can suspend license already issued if lack of insurance is discovered, drivers license not a basic constitutional right); similarly State v. Turk (1982) 197 Mont 311, 643 P2d 224; ditto Berberian v. Lussier (1958) 87 RI 226, 139 A2d 869; (cannot evade insurance requirement by religious objections) State v. Cosgrove (So.Dak. 1989) 439 NW2d 119 cert.den 493 US 846; similarly State v. Skurdal (1988) 235 Mont 291, 767 P2d 304 ("This is obviously a growing school of thought which had been misguided.... The notion of right to travel remains wholly separate from the right or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways." The court made a point of discussing many of the crank arguments against requiring drivers licenses; evidently the crank notion is not only are the licensing requirements inapplicable to them but also speed limits); similarly City of Bismarck v. Stuart (No.Dak 1996) 546 NW2d 366 ("No court has ever held that it is an impermissible infringement upon a citizen's constitutional Right to Travel for the legislature to decree that ... every person who operates a motor vehicle on public roads must have a valid operator's license.... The legislature has the constitutional police power to ensure safe drivers and safe roads."); similarly City of Salina v. Wisden (Utah 1987) 737 P2d 981 ("Mr. Wisden's assertion that the right to travel encompasses 'the unrestrained use of the highway' is wrong. The right to travel granted by the state and federal constitutions does not include the ability to ignore laws governing the use of public roadways. The motor vehicle code was promulgated to increase the safety and efficiency of our public roads. It enhances rather than infringes on the right to travel. The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public roadway is not a fundamental right; it is a privilege that is granted upon the compliance with the statutory licensing procedures."); similarly ("The right to operate a motor vehicle is wholly a creation of state law; it certainly is not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, and nothing in that document or in our state constitution has even the slightest appearance or an implicit guarantee of that right. The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel ... is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right.") Berberian v. Petit (RI 1977) 374 A2d 791, 86 ALR3d 468 (this case was a 13-year-old boy challenging the age requirement for learners permits, the court quoted from a 1958 decision involving his father's challenge to the requirement for motorists insurance); similarly Jones v. City of Newport (1989) 29 Ark.App 42, 780 SW2d 338; similarly Azubuko v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles (1st Cir unpub 9/3/96) cert.den 520 US 1157; ditto (state can require drivers license, vehicle registration, display of license plate, etc., notwithstanding argument about "right to travel") State v. Weisman (Minn.App unpub 11/1/88) cert.den 489 US 1080; ditto Maxfield v. Corwin (WD Mich unpub 3/17/87); ditto ("While there exists a fundamental right to travel, neither this court, nor our [state] supreme court, nor the US Supreme Court has ever held that there exists a fundamental right to drive a moter vehicle." State can require display of official registration tag, and that driver present police with valid license and car registration, even against purported religious objections, and can punish for use of homemade license plate) Terpstra v. State (Ind.App 1988) 529 NE2d 839; ditto City of Spokane v. Port (1986) 43 Wash.App 273, 716 P2d 945 revw.den 106 Wash.2d 1010; State v. Patterson (Kan.App unpub 2/14/92) review den (Kan. Supm 1992) 250 Kan 807; ditto US ex rel Verdone v. Circuit Court for Taylor County (7th Cir 1995) 73 F3d 669; similarly Commonwealth v. Levy (1961) 194 Penn.Super 390, 169 A2d 596; see especially essay, Validity of statute making it a criminal offense for operator of motor vehicle not to carry or display his license or registration, 6 ALR3d 506 & suppl.); similarly (right to "property" does not enable perp to drive his car despite its lack of registration, safety inspection, license plate, drivers license, etc., nor to prevent it from being impounded until he complies with the licensing laws) Wisden v. City of Salina (Utah 1985) 709 P2d 371; similarly (perp already had an SSN but refused, supposedly on religious grounds, to provide it to apply for drivers license and thereby refused to renew or carry drivers license on religious grounds; "The appellant advised [the policewoman] that he could not be arrested because her God was not as big as his God. He referred to her as 'an agent of the socialist govt ...", court held the state had sufficient reasons to require SSNs for drivers licenses and that, since driving without a license is a crime, religious fastidiousness could not excuse a criminal act) State v. Loudon (Tenn.Crim.App 1993) 857 SW2d 878; similarly (when cranks already have SSNs but refuse to reveal them for drivers licenses applications, supposedly on religious grounds) Penner v. King (Mo.Supm 1985) 695 SW2d 887; similarly (refused to reveal SSNs for drivers license on privacy grounds, citing various laws on non-disclosure of SSNs, court held that state could require disclosure of SSN on license application) Nowlin v DMV (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1529, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 409; if state law requires the SSN on the license application then the use of the SSN is not optional and an applicant who fails to provide his SSN will thereby be refused a license. Schmidt v. Powell (IL App 1972) 4 IL.App.3d 34, 280 NE2d 236; Ostric v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Policies (Mass 1972) 361 Mass 459, 280 NE2d 692; similarly (crank claimed to have unilaterally revoked his SSN and tried to invoke state law that would permit an individual without an SSN to obtain a drivers license upon submission of a federal govt document attesting to the lack of a Soc.Sec. number or account for that person, at least the individual's own assertion without the federal documentation was insufficient; the court noted that driving on the public roads is a privilege, not a right nor a contract, and the state may impose reasonable conditions upon that privilege and someone too fastidious to meet those conditions would not obtain the privilege) Hershey v. Commonwealth Dept of Transportation (Penn.Commonw.Ct 1995) 669 A2d 517 app.den 544 Penn 664, 676 A2d 1202; ditto Kocher v. Bickley (Penn.Commonw.Ct 1999) 722 A2d 756; similarly (state can insist on SSN to obtain a drivers license and apparently not required to offer alternatives to someone with religious objections to having an SSN) McDonald v. Alabama Dept of Public Safety (Alab.Civ.App unpub 4/9/99); ditto Miller v. Reed (9th Cir 1999) 176 F3d 1202 (and quoting from Bowen v. Roy, 1986, 476 US 693, which upheld an AFDC requirement that welfare payments would not be paid for children whose parents did not provide the child's SSN, notwithstanding the parents' religious objections to SSNs, and without offering an alternative); requirement of SSN to obtain a drivers license did not infringe on religious rights, because the "plaintiffs may preserve their religious scruples intact by foregoing this privilege [of driving on the public roads]. It is for them to balance the resulting inconvenience." Penner v. King (Mo. 1985) 695 SW2d 887; similarly, "The state of Missouri, by making the licensing requirements in question, is not prohibiting Davis from expressing or practicing his religious beliefs or from traveling throughout this land. If he wishes, he may walk, ride a bicycle or horse, or travel as a passenger in an automobile, bus, airplane or helicopter. He cannot, however, operate a moto vehicle on the public highways without ... a valid operator's license." State v. Davis (Mo.App 1988) 745 SW2d 249; (on the other hand, some states have made provision for issuing drivers licenses in special circumstances in which an SSN is unavailable, such as lawfully admitted aliens, with their green cards, who are ineligible for Soc.Sec.) Lauderbach v. Zolin (Cal.App 1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 578, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 434; similarly (accepting the IRS's Taxpayer Identification Number [TIN] as a substitute for the SSN) Devon Inc. v. State Bureau (Ohio App 1986) 31 Ohio App.3d 130, 508 NE2d 984; ditto (state would accept TIN as a substitute for the SSN and not obliged to create any more alternatives) Kocher v. Bickley (Penn.Commonw.Ct 1999) 722 A2d 756; [the state may also give applicants the option of not having their SSNs appear on their drivers license and the public registry but may stil require the SSN on the applications. Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles (Mass.Super unpub 6/8/93) 1 Mass.L.Rptr 156, 21 Media L.Rptr 2041; and if the drivers license does not display the SSN, a policeman stopping the driver may insist on seeing the driver's Soc.Sec. card when the SSN is required on traffic citations. State v. T.N. Hill (Ohio App. unpub 2/6/92)]; neither right to migrate nor right to a job implies a right to unlicensed driving. Maher v. State (Ind.App 1993) 612 NE2d 1063; (ditto, when crank sent the state letters "rescinding his signature" to all drivers license papers assenting to the state's statutory consent to breathalyzer test this had the effect of cancelling his drivers license, and he was charged with unlicensed driving; moreover, the state's refusal to return his car until he presented a valid license and registration was not a taking without due process) Maxfield v. Corwin (WD Mich unpub 3/17/87); {Note: There are reasons, other than dangerous driving, that a court may use to suspend or revoke drivers licenses; e.g. non-payment of taxes; Wells v. Malloy (D Vt 1975) 402 F.Supp 856 aff'd 538 F2d 317; failure to pay court fines; City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore (Wis.App 1994) 185 Wis.2d 499, 517 NW2d 689; failure to pay child support; Richey v. Richey (La.App 1997) 704 So.2d 343; generally essay, Revocation or Suspension of Drivers License for Reason Unrelated to Motor Vehicle, 18 ALR5th 542 & suppl. Another essay deals with putting conditions upon the reinstatement of a suspended license, such as requiring proof of financial responsibility. 2 ALR5th 725.} ("The right to travel on public highways is not absolute. It is subject to reasonable regulation by the state, pursuant to the police power granted by the Constitution. We have previously held that the motor vehicle codes are a valid use of police power. We have also previously held that requiring automobile insurance coverage and the registration of vehicles is a valid use of the police power and does not violate the due process requirements of the US Constitution.") State v. R.E. Wilson (Mont.Supm unpub 12/3/98); {The references to the "right to travel" in this propaganda turn out to refer to court cases that dealt with restrictions on passports, or on restrictions on out-of-state visitors or newcomers to a state obtaining employment or benefits such as food stamps; cf. G.B. Hartch, Wrong Turns: A critique of the Supreme Court's right to travel cases, 21 Wm. Mitchell Law Rev. 457 (1995). The exercise of state and municipal police powers to regulate and restrict traffic on public roads predates the automobile by at least a half-century, when bicycle riding was restricted to avoid frightening horses; cf. R.D. Perry, The Impact of the Sport of Bicycle Riding on Safety Law, 35 Amer. Business Law Jrnl 185 (1998). In France, the registration of automobiles goes back to 1893, before the first US automobile factory, and in the US, registration of cars dates back to 1901 and the licensing of drivers to 1916, and by the mid-1920s there were, in almost every state, age requirements and other limitations on who could be licensed to operate an automobile, even for personal use; for example, see J. Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile accidents, insurance, and the challenge to social order in the inter-war years, 1919 to 1941, 4 Conn. Insur. Law Jrnl 521 (1998). As the US Supreme Court noted in 1915, "The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and serious dangers to the public, and is also abnormally destructive to the [high]ways themselves. ... [A] state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles - those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. ... This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens." Hendrick v. Maryland (1915) 235 US 610; and in 1927, "Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the state may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its highways. ... The state's power to regulate the use of its highways extends to their use by non-residents as well as by residents." Hess v. Pawloski (1927) 274 US 352. There is nothing in the cranks' reliance on a "right to travel" to try to exempt themselves from driver license and traffic laws that limits their theory to wheeled vehicles and they might eventually claim an unregulated right to pilot aircraft over cities! Courts have already held that driving without a license or registration is, by itself, indicative of reckless driving; see essay, 29 ALR2d 963 & suppl.} ; (enforcement of traffic laws is not governed by the UCC; speed limits and their enforcement is not a violation of the "right to travel") Barcroft v. State (Tex.App 1994) 881 SW2d 838; ditto (UCC inapplicable to case involving driving unregistered vehicle) Gipson v. Callahan (WD Tex 1997) 18 F.Supp.2d 662; (state can require that vehicle be maintained with current inspection and registration stickers and tags) State v. Kuball (Minn.App unpub 8/15/89); state can require that drivers carry a drivers license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance. City of Billings v. Skurdal (1986) 224 Mont 84, 730 P2d 371 cert.den 481 US 1020; Nowlin v. Dept of Motor Vehicles (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1529, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 (state can require applicants for new or renewed license to provide their Soc.Sec numbers and refuse licenses until applicant obtains a Soc.Sec number); ditto Miller v. Reed (9th Cir 1999) 176 F3d 1202; ditto McDonald v. Alabama Dept of Public Safety (Alab.Civ.App unpub 4/9/99); ditto Hersshey v. Commonwealth (Commonw.Ct of Penn 1996) 669 A2d 517 app.denied (Penn Supm unpub 6/4/96) 544 Pa 664, 676 A2d 1202; ditto (and also pretending that accepting a benefit from the state, in the form of a license, is against his religion) Terpstra v. State (Ind.App 1988) 529 NE2d 839; ditto State v. Clifford (1990) 57 Wash.App 127, 787 P2d 571 review denied 114 Wash.2d 1025, 792 P2d 535; ditto State v. Booher (Tenn.Crim.App 1997) 978 SW2d 953; ditto (claiming that his religious beliefs were against registering for a drivers lic) Schmidt v. Powell (IL App 1972) 4 IL.App.3d 34, 280 NE2d 236; ditto (and also pretending that violation of license and registration laws is a victimless crime) State v. Yoder (Ohio App unpub 6/7/95); (police request that driver show them his license and registration and proof of insurance is not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, the law requires a driver to keep these documents, and driver cannot insist on search warrant) State v. Reed (1984) 107 Ida 162, 686 P2d 842; (ditto, does not violate Fifth Amendment) Sherman v. Babbitt (9th Cir 1985) 772 F2d 1476; (ditto, does not violate First Amendment religious rights) Terpstra v. State (Ind.App 1988) 529 NE2d 839; (as part of a justifiable traffic stop, the police can instruct the driver to step out of his car) Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 US 106; (thought that posting No Trespassing notices on his truck was a sufficient substitute for having license plates - and was surprised when the police had his truck towed away) Fenili v. Calif. Dept of Motor Vehicles (ND Cal unpub 6/16/98); (homemade license plate, saying "Freeman", not acceptable, and state may impound car until perp presents current and valid license, registration, etc.) Maxfield v. Corwin (WD Mich unpub 3/17/87); (mere use of homemade license plates is indicative that car is not properly registered and is sufficient to justify police stop) Granse v. State (Minn.App unpub 7/1/97); State v. French (1994) 77 Haw 222, 883 P2d 644 (required to comply with license and traffic laws event though perp believes that Hawaii is still an independent kingdom, there is no federal legislation that overrides the state’s authority to regulate driving); driving is a privilege not an inherent right and may be regulated by the state for public safety reasons: Jones v. City of Newport (1989) 29 Ark.App 42, 780 SW2d 338; (driving not synonymous with "right to travel") Azubuko v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles (1st Cir unpub 9/3/96) cert.den 520 US 1157; ditto City of Spokane v. Port (1986) 43 Wash.App 273, 716 P2d 945 revw.den 106 Wash.2d 1010; similarly (including driver license laws and requirement for vehicle registration and insurance) Goode v. Foster (D. Kan unpub 10/21/96); ditto Gordon v. State (1985) 108 Ida 178, 697 P2d 1192; ditto State v. Von Schmidt (1985) 109 Ida 736, 710 P2d 646; ditto Endsley v. State (1987) 184 Ga.App 797, 363 SE2d 1; similarly Lebrun v. State (1986) 255 Ga 406, 339 SE2d 227; ditto Humphreys v. State (Okla. Crim. App 1987) 738 P2d 188; ditto State v. Booher (Tenn.Crim.App 1997) 978 SW2d 953 (privilege of operation a motor vehicle on the public streets is "wholly separate from the right to travel"; perp refused to identify himself to police, tried to present policeman with his own version of "Miranda warning"; claims to be immune to license & registration requirement as an "unenfranchised citizen of Tennessee", etc.; held "No person in the State of Tennessee may exempt himself or herself from any law simply by declaring that he or she does not consent to its applying to them"); ditto State v. D.R. Gibson (1985) 108 Ida. 202, 697 P2d 1216 (perp claimed that as a "free man" who had not "accepted" a drivers license, he is exempt from all traffic laws); similarly Terpstra v. State (Ind.App 1988) 529 NE2d 839; similarly State v. Stuart (No.Dak 1996) 544 NW2d 158; similarly (including argument that his driving is not "commercial" or not connected to govt activity and therefore not susceptible to any state controls) State v. Skurdal (1988) 235 Mont 291, 767 P2d 304 ("That claim is baseless in Montana and we find no law in any other jurisdiction to support it either."); ditto (tried to argue that registration and licensing laws only apply if the vehicle is "for extraordinary use"; "We see no reason why we should place any limitations on the application of the registration statute when the legislature decided not to.") Slye-Nelson v. State (Tex.App 1993) 862 SW2d 628; ditto ("completely frivolous and meritless") J.M. Anderson v. State of Michigan (WD Mich unpub 3/18/93); ditto City of Spokane v. Port (1986) 43 Wash.App 273, 716 P2d 945 revw.den 106 Wash.2d 1010; ditto City of Belton v Horton (Mo.App 1997) 947 SW2d 104; ditto Humphreys v. State (Okla. Crim. App 1987) 738 P2d 188; ditto (claimed "it is a legal impossibility for the state or anyone to collect a civil penalty for non-registration of a private vehicle" and wanted $2.5M in damages; "completely frivolous and meritless") J.M. Anderson v. State of Michigan (WD Mich unpub 3/18/93); ditto (also that this was a "victimless crime") City of South Euclid v. Carroll (Ohio App unpub 10/6/88) app.dism 42 Oh.St.3d 706, 537 NE2d 225; similarly (tried to argue that limiting driving to those able to afford car insurance was discriminatory) Maher v. State (Ind.App 1993) 612 NE2d 1063; ditto State v. J.S. Smith (Minn.App unpub 6/11/96); (tried to argue that he could not be required to pay a fine nor pay for a license nor for registration in the absence of gold and silver coiage) Lowry v. State (Alask.App 1982) 655 P2d 780; (tried to argue that a traffic ticket required the same tedious red tape, such as notarization or accompanying papers, as a formal indictment or a complaint in a lawsuit) State v. Gibson (Ohio App unpub 6/19/95); (seemed to think that by denying US citizenship could immunize himself from drunk driving laws and from traffic court) T.J. Johnson v. State (Ark.App unpub 10/7/92); ditto (as "a ‘free’ man who is no longer a 14th Amendment citizen, he is not required to register his vehicle, wear a seatbelt or maintain liability insurance, ... also asserts that he is not required to abide by any state or federal laws.") State v. Folda (Mont 1994) 267 Mont 523, 51 Mont St.Rep 1149, 885 P2d 426; ditto State v. Skurdal (1988) 235 Mont 291, 767 P2d 304; ditto (argued that his unregistered truck was not a vehicle but a "religious conveyance" and as a "natural citizen" rather than an enfranchised citizen he was exempt from licensing law) Terpstra v. State (Ind.App 1988) 529 NE2d 839; ditto (also tried to argue that his unregistered automobile was not a "motor vehicle" unless and until it was registered) State v. Booher (Tenn.Crim.App 1997) 978 SW2d 953; similarly (altho alone in his truck, tried to deny that he was "driving a motor vehicle" but rather "traveling in a conveyance". "His reasoning for this premise ... is not based on any relevant statute or case precedent, and has no merit. [State law] defines an operator as a person ... 'who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway.' ... Since Davis was in actual physical control of the pickup truck, he was operating a motor vehicle.") State v. Davis (Mo.App 1988) 745 SW2d 249; similarly (argued that traffic laws, even against driving the wrong way down a one-way street, violated the 10th Amendment ... and sent the traffic judge letters on the letterhead of "The Committee to Save the Judges from Hanging Even Though They Deserve It" with the printed marginalia that "oppressed people have never once regained their freedom until they had hung the judges and stoned the tax collectors to death." ) Freeman v. Town of Lusk (Wyo.Supm 1986) 717 P2d 331; similarly (awarded himself, as "a first class judicial citizen", a permanent lifetime "travelers authorization" ... "it also means that never again will he have to wait in line at the Dept of Motor Vehicles for a renewal") Estes-El v. Town of Indian Lake (ND NY unpub 5/11/98); (an international driving permit is not, alone, a sufficient substitute for a drivers license, and requires additionally a drivers license from that person's country or state of residence) Schofield v. Hertz Corp. (1991) 201 Ga.App 830, 412 SE2d 853; Dwyer v. Margono (1997) 128 N.C.App 122, 493 SE2d 763 review den (1998) 347 NC 670, 500 SE2d 85; Eskew v. Young (SD IL 1998) 992 F.Supp 1049; someone whose drivers license had been deliberately suspended or revoked here cannot resume driving by obtaining an international drivers permit. People v. Platts (1995) 274 Ill.App.3d 753, 655 NE2d 300; where an arrestee has an international drivers permit in a false name that is a strong indication of an inclination and ability to flee and adopt false identities for which a high bail may be demanded. US v. Himler (3d Cir 1986) 797 F2d 156; having organized a small mob to resist law enforcement efforts to arrest him, having denied his citizenship and denied being susceptible to the laws or courts, and having threatened the judge, all justify the court refusing to allow him bail or pre-trial release. US v. Kanahele (D Haw 1995) 951 F.Supp 921; {The international driving permit is issued under the authority of the UN Convention on International Road Traffic, and it serves as an authoritative multi-lingual translation and verification of the person's home drivers license, which means that it has no legal weight without that home drivers license (and, also, a driver's international permit has no weight inside the driver's home country). It is good for not more than 12 months (less in some countries) and the driver is still subject to all the traffic laws. In the US, they are available from AAA for $10. Apparently there is a lively Internet scam of selling unauthorized or fake permits and at prices up to $300; cf. USA Today, 5 March 1999; Business Wire, 20 Jan 1999; Toronto Star, 5 Sept 1998}. Bernard J. Sussman, JD, MLS, CP (as of: August, 11, 1999)

23 posted on 09/08/2001 7:33:08 PM PDT by Catspaw
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To: Prism
You didn't answer my question. Why don't you drive?
24 posted on 09/08/2001 7:33:30 PM PDT by truth_eagle
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To: Catspaw
Right to travel, yes, as in walking. Right to operate a motor vehicle, no. That was simple.
25 posted on 09/08/2001 7:36:15 PM PDT by truth_eagle
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To: watcher1
Just what FR needs another _FED, cop, JBT

You know what just occurred to me about that _style?

Programmers use that to indicate variables that are part of the "implementation" as opposed to the USER domain.

Therefore, in some languages, _variables are reserved for the system implementation.

Curious, no?

26 posted on 09/08/2001 7:37:54 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Marine Inspector
If you drive with out a license, you break the law.

Breaking the law? Oh horror of horrors! I've never had a driver's license. Don't feel I need the state's permission to get aroud from place to place. I helped pay for the damn roads anyway, so what do I need permission for?

27 posted on 09/08/2001 7:39:31 PM PDT by southern rock
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To: truth_eagle
Why don't you drive?

Because currently I am not dependent on it, so therefore it is not worth the risk of being ticketed for no DL.

I might do a short drive or two on occassion unlicensed, but thats it.

28 posted on 09/08/2001 7:40:59 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Prism
Outstanding effort, Prism. Tyranny begins right here. It is distressing that FedGov is seeking hegemony over licensing, and may succeed to turn the "license" into a national identity card; central computer systems tie together all databases, and the States are forced to cooperate, we know how much bad these megadatabases do-do.
29 posted on 09/08/2001 7:41:09 PM PDT by telos
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To: Prism
so therefore it is not worth the risk of being ticketed for no DL.

No risk. Just present your sovereign stuff and then go happily on your way :=)

30 posted on 09/08/2001 7:43:01 PM PDT by truth_eagle
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To: truth_eagle
Right to operate a motor vehicle, no

Did you get your state's permission before turning on your computer this evening? Gimme a break!

31 posted on 09/08/2001 7:43:14 PM PDT by southern rock
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To: Catspaw
But hey, why don't you drive? You're encouraging others to do so.

I do, rarely. And my goal here is to get others to think about the issue. If the DL justice system were real criminal justice, I believe the deterrent would be higher and the abuse via fines would be less.

Right now, all we have is a system that is selling your safety. They dont want to raise fines or commit justice because that causes objections and court fights, gumming up thier extortion racket.

32 posted on 09/08/2001 7:48:41 PM PDT by Prism
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To: truth_eagle
Right to travel, yes, as in walking. Right to operate a motor vehicle, no. That was simple.

And ride a bike. But this is what I know will happen if I decide I don't need a driver's license anymore: first I'm pulled over, maybe for speeding, maybe for running a light, maybe for a cracked taillight. Then the cop asks me for my driver's license. I say I don't have one & start telling him why I don't need one. He tells me to get out of the car. I'm told I'm under arrest. I'm read my rights. I'm cuffed. I'm taken to jail. The cop hands me a sheaf of tickets. With luck, I bond out. A while later, I go into court, telling the judge to dismiss these charges because I don't need a license and I hand him a printout of Prism's posts. The judge, trying hard not to stifle a chuckle, asks the prosecutor for his argument. He cites, chapter and verse, the paragraph I just posted. The judge says I'm guilty and assesses the fines. Lots of them. If this is a second and subsequent bust for operating without a license, it's fines and jail time.

Naw, I think I'll let Prism go first on trying this one at home.

33 posted on 09/08/2001 7:48:56 PM PDT by Catspaw
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To: Prism
Therefore, in some languages, _variables are reserved for the system implementation.

I'm not sure I understand you. I'm not a computer programer. I was refering to a Freeper who is known as _FED because his user name starts with a _ and he probably is a cop. I'm alway on the lookout for newbies who say things like "Because it's the law" too much. I just won't trust them anymore.
The sad thing about this country is that if the Founding Fathers were alive today, they wouldn't recognize it any more. I posted an article about the Bill of Rights last week. You might want to read it.
Stay Free...if you can

34 posted on 09/08/2001 7:50:28 PM PDT by watcher1
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To: southern rock
Did you get your state's permission before turning on your computer this evening?

Perhaps we dont have the "right" to surf the net! Hmmmmmmmm???!!!

35 posted on 09/08/2001 7:51:23 PM PDT by Prism
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To: southern rock
We ain't got no Licenses.
We don't need no Licenses.
We don't have to show you any stinkin Licenses!
36 posted on 09/08/2001 7:56:44 PM PDT by watcher1
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To: Prism
Perhaps we dont have the "right" to surf the net! Hmmmmmmmm???!!!

I don't think we do. It's not in the Constitution!!
(Don't laugh, some people actually think that way)

37 posted on 09/08/2001 8:06:24 PM PDT by southern rock
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To: Prism
Hey Prism. You've got a cool web site.
Stay Free
38 posted on 09/08/2001 8:18:20 PM PDT by watcher1
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To: watcher1, _jim
In programming, certain conventions are adopted so there is no conflict (stepping on toes) in the naming of variables.

One of these conventions is the use of _ as first letter in variable name, this is a domain (group) of variables reserved for "system implementation" -- the 'inner workings' of something.


I might make an object called a counter. It has a 'public interface' and the rest of it is its guts, the inner workings. This is done so there is no way to get an object contaminated-- or in a state that shouldn't be possible.

My counter is constructed by a function, whereby I recieve an 'instance' of the counter--

variable c= new Counter(0,10)

the 0 is the starting count, the 10 is the increment.

so now I can say--- c.incr();c.incr(); and c is now equal to 20 (but c is also a counter object).

now you see what I mean by contamination and states that should be impossible (c==9) for instance.

Whew huh. Ok. when you MAKE/design this object, you need an internal number to keep track of the value you are AT, or representing, this is called a private member of the object, and (may) be labeled _count.

It is the IMPLEMENTATION (insides) of the counter object, compared to the INTERFACE (outside/user) part. The user doesnt need to know how a counter works on the inside, they just need to know how it is going to behave on the outside -- functions like c.incr(),c.decr(),c.reset(), etc.

So now maybe you see why I find it interesting that certain posters would choose to underbar thier names, like _Fed, and _Jim.

What do you think?

So _jim, how long you been programming for the government? Or is it just a hobby < Smirk >

39 posted on 09/08/2001 8:20:53 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Prism
The loop-hole that allows all this liscensing came about during FDR's administration.

I don't have it in front of me now, but there existed something called a'Trading with the EnemyAct'.

It originally had to do with restrictions on people who traded with enemies of the United States. Some of the language of this law was changed during FDR's 'War on Poverty'. The language was changed so that all citizens of the United States legally became enemies of the United States and hence became subject to the trading with the enemies act. This marked the start of all the regulations and licensing that has since developed.

FDR's declaration of war on poverty has never been recinded. There have been proposals in the House to end the state of war declared by FDR, but it never passes because it would mean giving up all the regulatory power that the government has enjoyed for more than half a century.

This is why they can demand a license.

40 posted on 09/08/2001 8:26:03 PM PDT by pjd
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To: Catspaw
Naw, I think I'll let Prism go first on trying this one at home.

Not at all what the intention of the post was. I have no serious expectation that anything will work. And when I drive illegally, I accept the risks/consequences of my actions.

I do not, however, accept that the law is right and I am wrong.

Many think this type of post is just such a cry-baby/militia rant.

I reserve the right to be indignant on the intellectual level, and also the right to not be called a hypocrite for avoiding lawful conflicts with beliefs on a practical level.

41 posted on 09/08/2001 8:29:57 PM PDT by Prism
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To: Prism
I enjoy this article by our fellow FReeper, "agitator". (He gave me permission to link to it, as long as I credited him)
42 posted on 09/08/2001 8:36:53 PM PDT by southern rock
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To: Prism
What do you think?

WHOOSH!....Right over my head.
I think I'll just wait for Windows XP and leave the programing to you!
BTW Please don't put my name and the name of any JBT's on the same Bump.
I'm kinda paticular about the company I keep
Stay Free

43 posted on 09/08/2001 8:39:53 PM PDT by watcher1
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To: pjd
This is why they can demand a license.

Because, in essence, the Fed is now an 'occupational government', (and the states are accomplices). Now, seems I recall something along the lines of 'enemies, both foriegn and domestic'.

Amazing how much a flag on the wall can blind people.

44 posted on 09/08/2001 8:41:48 PM PDT by Prism
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To: watcher1
You sound just like the JBT you hate.
45 posted on 09/08/2001 8:53:33 PM PDT by Marine Inspector
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To: Prism
Hi Prism -
OK, I read your post earlier today about the woman who was stopped and arrested for no apparent reason. I was on my way out, so I didn't post a response. It's getting late here on the East coast now, but I felt I needed to share my take on this.

I was upset as well reading about how the police did not have probable cause to pull her over and ask for "her papers". However it occurred to me ( until I read a portion of your post here now) that driving is a privilege, not a right. Here's how I found that out:

About 10 (almost 11) years ago, I was stopped and arrested for DUI (I live in Florida). BTW - that was the last time I ever did that. Anyway - I had to jump through many hoops to get my restricted license during pre-trial so that I could go to work. It was a royal nightmare. I discovered that there really are two entities involved in a situation like this - and I believe this applies in non DUI cases as well.

The first entity is what I call the judicial. This is the actual infraction (crime, if you will) of DUI. The criminal charge to which you are considered innocent until proven guilty. You get a lawyer, go to court and do the best you can with damage control.

The second entity is the administrative. This is the part that deals with trying to have your license re-instated. Here, you are generally percieved to be guilty until proven innocent. Many of the things I had to do to get my license back - classes, counselling, community service - were all facets of an actual sentence. And I did these before even getting to court.

Once I discovered the distinction between the two, I was able to separate them and deal with each as it's own entity - and things went better. However (and here is my point) it occurred to me that once you sign your name to the license, you have signed some of your rights away in exchange for the privelege of operating that vehicle on public roads.

I did't think it was fair at all, but then again driving was not a constitutionally guaranteed right either - at least not directly.

On another note - there are many people who do not have drivers licenses - they are usually residents of big cities where the mass transit system (and the exhorbitant parking rates) are such that it doesn't pay to have a license and vehicle.

Well, thanks for the post. I'm going to bookmark it and refer to it more later. BTW it was that incident 10 years ago that got me back to the Lord. And aside from a glass or beer or wine with meals, I haven't drank since.

46 posted on 09/08/2001 9:14:47 PM PDT by peteram
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To: Marine Inspector
You sound just like the JBT you hate.

Hate? I don't hate anyone. I do dislike and distrust people who are JBT's. Maybe even you. But Hate, NO
All you JBT's better hope President Bush is a one term president ( and I don't think he will be! :) )because your days are numbered. He's cleaning house, and you're part of the dirt that will be swept away. So take off your ninja suit and start pounding a beat. That's where you're needed. Serve and protect....remember?
Stay Free....

PS America will work....I think God want's it to.....He's an American

47 posted on 09/08/2001 9:25:07 PM PDT by watcher1
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