The only serious concern we should have in this operation is Saddam's use of CBW, in three very different contexts:
1. On the battlefield, where it's effectiveness would be very problematic and would involve very nasty -- and very certain -- consequences for the perpetrators. Rumsfeld's message to them is very clear, indeed. When the time comes, I'll be surprised if actual CBW use on the battlefield doesn't turn out to be somewhere between slim-and-none.
2. An attack on Israel, probably employing Scuds or drones. Again, the success of such an attack would be, at best, limited. And it might be completely forestalled by air defense systems and on-the-ground surveillance. Rumsfeld's message is aimed at these low level commanders, too. And, again, I'll be surprised if any real damage is done to Israel.
3. An attack inside the U.S., by "sleeper" agents. If Saddam and his al-Qaeda surrogates have a network inside the U.S. and they have both the CBW and the means and knowledge to deliver them effectively -- all likely circumstances -- it is going to be very difficult to restrain them. They need not necessarily reveal their presence to deploy their weapons. And these are likely to be the most ideologically-driven "troops" in the chain-of-command.
Effective counter-terrorism action, plus counter-CBW measures, are our only defenses in this regard. "Amnesty" isn't going to be an attraction, I don't think. In my view, a citizen of Chicago is more likely to suffer a CBW attack in this war than an American soldier on the outskirts of Tikrit.