The New Arab Way of War [Brian's Military Ping List]

The first great struggles between the Middle East and Europe to be recorded fully were the campaigns of Salamis and Plataea in 480-479 B.C. The Greeks triumphed, and for the next several hundred years Western civilization slowly advanced east. In the 7th century A.D. this was reversed sharply when the Bedouins emerged from Arabia, defeated the Persian and eastern Roman empires, and conquered the Middle East, North Africa, and Spain. The invaders eventually were stopped in the east in 718 at the city walls of Constantinople, and in the west in 732 some 200 miles from Paris. There were to be another thousand years of see-saw wars on sea and land before the last Middle Eastern attack on a major European city, Vienna, was repulsed in 1683. It was not until the attacks by Arabians on New York in 2001 that a major Western city again came under assault from the Middle East.

While this protracted border conflict raged between the West and the Middle East, Western civilization engaged in a long series of civil wars. In 1942, the great democracies started to win and kept winning, thus determining the modern Western technique of war. The horrors of two world wars motivated the strengthening of international laws to prevent attacks on noncombatants and limit war's impact on civilians. Technology was developed that allowed highly accurate attacks that could limit destruction to military targets and minimize the number of people killed. Waging war became the business of elaborate machines operated by highly trained, long-service professionals. Western militaries became seemingly invincible on the battlefield and a tool of humanitarian assistance, not of empire. The last Western war of the 20th century was not of conquest, but waged to defend the human rights of the Muslims of Kosovo.

Middle Eastern societies have taken stock of the Western challenge and devised an innovative, strongly asymmetrical response. Middle Eastern societies demonstrably cannot win symmetrical conflict involving Western militaries. Their "better way" inherently appears barbarous, murderous, and cruel as it is diametrically opposed to the Western approach to armed conflict.

The new Arab approach to conflict is an adaptation of the revolutionary warfare of the second half of the 20th century.1 Assassins using this new way of war now swim among the populations of the world.2 With cheap, unrestricted global air travel provided by Western technology, they can deploy wherever they wish; there are no front lines or safe rear areas. The assassins make effective use of liberal immigration policies that have permitted large numbers of Middle Eastern migrants to settle in the West. Small numbers of fellow travelers and sympathizers are distributed throughout Western nations, able to be activated to provide local support, protection, and knowledge for deploying assassins. Their command-and-control system relies on commercial communications systems and business application cryptography. This makes their control system strong, redundant, secure, and global and the assassins hard to detect, track, and target. They do not rely on their own technology even for weapons, instead using in situ civilian, commercial equipment for attack.

The new Arab way of war is parasitic. Local supporters acquire weapons and explosives, provide safe houses, arrange transportation, and steal or hire vehicles. Assassins fly in, carry out attacks, and fly out quickly, avoiding arrest. Relying completely on local sources, they can strike deep into the Western heartlands, mimicking the strategic air attacks characteristic of the West.

Foot soldiers employed in this way of war usually are male and middle class and often well-educated, with strong religious fervor. A good education is necessary to operate independently and covertly in Western societies. The most dedicated assassins come from countries with a well-established, openly anti-Western education system antagonistic to secular societies, modernism, and human rights. A consuming spiritual passion, with a commitment bordering on fanaticism, is a valuable attribute for members of a small group when deployed into hostile countries. Given these warfare techniques, Muslims seem likely to remain the prime source of recruits.3

Intentionally, there is no obvious state involvement. In his attack, the assassin dies or melts into the crowd, providing no proof of who is responsible. This tactic is meant to confuse and frustrate a legally justifiable response, as the Western paradigm based on the 1648 Peace of Westphalia assumes a state-versus-state conflict. Avoiding giving the West a defined, obvious state opponent is a rational strategy peculiar to the Arab way of war.

The Arab combat style imposes small financial burden on its parent societies, allowing long and protracted wars without inflicting economic hardship. Employing only small numbers of personnel with few needs, wars can be financed privately and seemingly remain independent of overt government support. Such entrepreneurs can be hard to trace and impossible to stop.

A major innovation of the Arab way of war is the deliberate targeting of civilians. The assassins' rhetoric makes no distinction between civilian and military targets. Attacking civilians guarantees global attention as the media, reflecting global values, has a horror of the infliction of cruelty on noncombatants. Attacking civilians is perceived by the assassins as the most direct route to influence global opinion and to affect the national will of the nations struck. Attacks usually are conducted with considerable skill, timing, expertise, and precision but are designed to kill absolutely indiscriminately. Given this, the strategic aim of attacks is hard to discern.4 Violence customarily is conceived as a means to an end, but the essence in this style of war seems to be inflicting terror. Pakistani Brigadier S. K. Malik notes: "Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose on him.

The manner of Arab warfare is intentionally designed contrary to the modern international laws of war. Deliberately attacking civilians, noncombatants, women, and children is against the moral codes of all religions—including Islam. Such actions also violate the ethical codes enshrined in the U.N. human rights charters. The leaders directing such acts are vulnerable to charges of war crimes and international human rights trials. Any country that harbors them inherently appears as an outlaw state operating outside of the civilized world and in defiance of U.N. conventions.

Middle Eastern societies frequently criticize the immoral and lax ethical stance of the secular and materialist West. It is ironic that their chosen way of war makes their assassins appear immoral and unprincipled, which may be why their commanders seek not to identify themselves. Anonymity provides safety from accusations of moral bankruptcy.

Although the tactics of the Arab system rely almost completely on the civilian technology and resources of those nations being attacked, the assassins generally originate from another nation-state. A specific government may not support assassins openly, but to thrive the assassins rely on the acquiescence, sympathy, and often active support of the population from which they came. A society has created them and continues to provide financing, safe harbor, and training. Edmund Burke noted in 1729 that "the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." The silence of the good men of the Middle East implies a terrible consent.

The West now has no choice. For many years the Arab way of war was ignored and its brutal methods overlooked, but this option now is impossible. The societies of the Middle East have forced the West to retaliate with a multifaceted response that is well under way. This response may be complemented by a focus on on denying the support base that keeps the assassins operational.

A dilemma the West faces is whom to hold responsible for the assassins' attacks. The Western warfare paradigm holds the government of the hostile nation-state responsible rather than the people. In the modern Arab conflict style, the people, not the government, often bear responsibility, especially in situations where the central government is weak, fragmented, ineffectual, or corrupt. The West's indignation must be focused on the societies, not just the governments of the nations from which the assassins originate. Members of the societies directly or indirectly supporting attacks must understand they will be held responsible and pay a price for their support.

There is a pressing need to deter the responsible Middle Eastern societies from their chosen path of escalating terrorism. Several Middle Eastern states harbor sizable elements that support the Arab way of war. Those that support this method of conflict have been identified by their actions over several decades. They exist in unfriendly states such as Iran and Syria, but also in friendly nations such as Saudi Arabia, whose children financed, directed, and undertook the 11 September attacks. This population support base is as vulnerable to attack as are the societies of the West. Focusing attention on the support base would be contentious and controversial. However, the West must be innovative and take advantage of inherent weakness in the Arab conflict paradigm to frustrate the steady intensification of violence directed against its citizens.

The West could retaliate with random and indiscriminate attacks on particular Middle Eastern cities, thereby replicating the Arab warfare approach, but this goes against centuries of Western efforts to limit the impact of war and is completely unacceptable.6 Not the whole societies of those Middle Eastern nations involved, but only a small, discernable sliver of these societies should be held accountable and deterred from further support of the Arab way of war. The assassins inevitably are from the middle class, with their commanders among the more wealthy members of the country. The middle and wealthy classes have great power in their own societies at the local level, and more real influence with the masses than their usually despotic governments. If the majority of the middle and wealthy classes determined to no longer directly or indirectly support the Arab style of conflict, this would have a significant impact. Without an active support base, and with the possibility of their activities being compromised at any time, assassins' freedom of action would be curtailed severely.

An intense, relentless psychological campaign could be undertaken targeting the middle and wealthy classes of the Middle Eastern nations involved. Mass-marketing methods may offer insight into how to apply long-term, focused psychological pressure. The aim of such a campaign would be to make each individual perceive being held personally responsible and targeted for his or her support of the Arab way of war. The proud, strongly religious societies of the Middle East may be vulnerable to considerable self-doubt about the moral bankruptcy of their actions and their pronounced ethical decline compared to the remainder of the world. This effort would complement the other measures of defense and containment already being undertaken. Consideration also could be given to applying economic pressure, restrictions, and constraints, such as those used against South Africa during the apartheid years.

Incentives should be offered as well. Easy means should be provided to allow individuals to relay information concerning members of their societies engaging in acts of war. If individuals or groups tire of the difficulties caused by supporting the assassins, an opportunity should be given for them to make a positive contribution to overcoming the problems inflicted. There would be many false reports, but occasionally something of real value would be passed. The possibility of this occurring would create a sense of vulnerability among assassin organizations.

There is a worst-case fear in the West of a Middle Eastern weapon-of-mass-destruction (WMD) attack; this fear has led directly to a preventive war strategy. Possessing, developing, or even considering developing a WMD capability may be considered intent to use in the near future. Although understandable, this is an unwelcome strategy with some inherent flaws. Unnecessary wars may be fought to prevent nations from developing a capability and the possibility of use; a future uncertainty thus becomes the basis for a certain war today. Preventive war may be insufficient by itself to stop all attacks; some may occur. Moreover, chemical and biological weapon laboratories are difficult to detect, making their preemptive destruction hard to guarantee.

Nuclear threats traditionally have been handled using deterrent strategies. In this case, a declaratory policy could be devised based on the threat of retaliation if an attack occurs in the West by nonstate actors using the Arab way of war. In such a circumstance, there could be a strategy of instant, graduated response: nuclear strikes against several of the capital cites of the Middle Eastern nations that long have demonstrated support for this method of war.7 The response's intensity and discrimination would vary based on the severity of the WMD attack. This approach would be a policy of deterrence through the threat of brutal and immediate punishment of particular societies.

The strategy is irrational in the sense that it proposes to punish the innocent—although these "innocents" would have supported assassins that undertook a WMD attack, killing potentially millions. It draws on the successful but frightening Cold War strategy in which the populations of Europe and North America were held hostage for the good behavior of their governments. In this new application, the citizens of several Middle Eastern nations would be held responsible for their own actions, rather than the actions of their governments. The societies' futures would be in their own hands. The sole alternative at present is preventive war; as noted, this strategy may not be sufficient, practical, sensible, or long-term. The WMD threat is so serious that a multifaceted approach is needed to prevent it.

This approach is solely for deterrence, not war fighting, and would be another constant, worrying reminder to the Middle East's middle and wealthy classes that if they allowed the worst to happen to the West, they quickly would pay a heavy price. The strategy articulates what inevitably would happen; a declaratory policy would ensure there were no unfortunate misunderstandings.

There also should be an incentive to motivate Middle Eastern societies to change their ways and be taken off the instant-response list. The Arab way of war starts in the schools and educational facilities of particular nations. Twenty years after a society stops teaching children to hate and kill, and twenty years after the last attempted terrorist attack by the members of that society, their capital should cease to be targeted.

The Arab way of war has been devised to defeat the Western construct by making use of its inherent weaknesses. In so doing, the Arab method has its own intrinsic internal contradictions and weaknesses that can be exploited in response. The vulnerability of the support base in several Middle Eastern nations is one of these. A relentless psychological campaign to dissuade the middle-class and wealthy members of these specific societies from supporting the Arab way of war may complement other current offensive and defensive activities. Deterrence, at least against the WMD threat, also may be worth considering.

Avoiding giving the West a defined, obvious state opponent is a rational strategy peculiar to the Arab way of war.
The West's indignation must be focused on the societies, not just the governments of the nations from which the assassins originate. Members of the societies directly or indirectly supporting attacks must understand they will be held responsible and pay a price for their support

There is a worst-case fear in the West of a Middle Eastern weapon-of-mass-destruction (WMD) attack; this fear has led directly to a preventive war strategy

Excellent article as posted. What's interesting is that the logical progression of this tyle of warfare and response to it will result in the eradication of the Middle East in the end.

If the Middle East ever does manage to release smallpox or detonate nuclear weapons in a Western city. I wouldn't want to be living anywhere NEAR a holy site or city in the ME

In 1993 a state sponsored group of Arab Islamic terrorists attacked the World Trade Center. They failed in that attempt, but in 2001 they succeeded even beyond their dreams. We are only this week about to respond to the state likely behind the attack. My point is, 'the identification of the state in question when a nuke, bio or chem weapon is used in this nation, or if a bio weapon is released in a growing epidemic fashion will make id of the guilty sponsoring state nearly impossible.' Pre-emptive deterrence is the only means we have of fighting such an assemetry at present. We had better do it fast and well, and make every effort to stabilize the governments built in the aftermath. As we see in Turkey, even a generation or two of democratic government in an Islamic country doesn't stop the rise of radical Islamism. Turkey is now corroding the wisdom of Kamal Attaturk, moving toward a theocratic state.

We have shown our willingness to allow other nations the freedom to develop Nuclear Weapons by not imposing our rule over the planet at the end of World War II. However the nations of Lybia, Syria, Iran, Iraq and any other nation that sponsors terrorism and attacks a civilian populace have shown in the last decade not only the lack of moral responsibility necessary to handle such power, but also their willingness to use Nuclear weapons or plague as a weapon of conquest. No-one sets up a proxy army unless one wishs to remain unaccountable for the actions of that army. As responsible nations, it is one thing to allow a sane man the use of a gun to defend himself, quite another to hand a gun to a known killer known for armed robbery.

In this light, we have no choice but to declare war on those who have not only declared war (Jihad) on us, but acted by acts of war to make darn sure we knew they meant it. The war with Iraq is taking the battle home to the sponsor, instead of spinning our wheels in the mire of police actions. We showed restraint by fighting small battles with our intelegence agencys. The Islamics took that for weakness and built more and larger Terrorist groups until they now field whole armys under the terrorist banner in other nations (Iran's Hizbulla Army occupying Lebanon to Attack Israel as a good example.) Army's do not feed themselves or arm themselves, they do not grow crops or manufacture anything.

It is time to stop pretending that Al-Quada, Hamas, the Hizbulla and the Islamic party of god exist in a vacume and time to kill the root that feeds them. The whole world has gone up in war on over 20 fronts now and every single battle including the IRA in Ireland have Islamic ties or training. If you play connect the dots you end up with a circle drawn around the Islamic Empire. (Big suprise)

World War III started a long time ago, we better fight back or we will be destroyed.

"The assassins inevitably are from the middle class, with their commanders among the more wealthy members of the country. The middle and wealthy classes have great power in their own societies at the local level, and more real influence with the masses than their usually despotic governments. If the majority of the middle and wealthy classes determined to no longer directly or indirectly support the Arab style of conflict, this would have a significant impact. Without an active support base, and with the possibility of their activities being compromised at any time, assassins' freedom of action would be curtailed severely.

To ponder the feasability of this, I would ask, "Can we hope to wage a psychological campaign to instill self-doubt in the minds/hearts of Democrats?"

I think that the author makes an important point - that the terrorism springs largely from the middle and upper classes of the Arab world. Unlike Israel, where any adolescent can strap a bomb to him/herself and hike over to the local Israeli marketplace, we have a giant ocean separating us from the Arabs. This ocean is only a barrier to the lower classes, but not the middle and upper classes of the Arabs.

I think that any shred of hope of instilling any "self-doubt" in the minds of middle and upper class Arabs is hopeless. They are educated - they know what they're doing. Save the psychological campaign for the lower classes who can't read or write and thus can't read their own Koran and do not realize that they betray their own religion. The middle and upper class murderers and their associates should be targetted for death, not commercials.

"In the modern Arab conflict style, the people, not the government, often bear responsibility, especially in situations where the central government is weak, fragmented, ineffectual, or corrupt. The West's indignation must be focused on the societies, not just the governments of the nations from which the assassins originate. Members of the societies directly or indirectly supporting attacks must understand they will be held responsible and pay a price for their support."

A government is a body which has or, in the case of a weak government, pursues a monopoly on consolidated lawful power of retribution over a given piece of the planet. If a government does not support terrorists who target America and it is too weak and fragmented to stop them, then it should accept our assistance in rooting out the terrorists within its borders. If the government does not accept our assistance then it seems logical to hold that government responsible, as we would a government that openly sponsers terrorists. The author is correct that we should focus on governments AND societies and he is correct that the terrorists tend to be the middle to upper class. But let's not forget who the middle and upper class people in Arab societies are - the government.

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