Voting Paper Trail Bill

Press release ^ | May 22, 2003 | Rush Holt staff

[csprof]

On Election Day 2004, How Will You Know If Your Vote Is Properly Counted?
Answer: You Won't

Rep. Rush Holt Introduces Legislation to Require All Voting Machines To Produce A Voter-Verified Paper Trail

Washington, DC - Rep. Rush Holt today responded to the growing chorus of concern from election reform specialists and computer security experts about the integrity of future elections by introducing reform legislation, The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003. The measure would require all voting machines to produce an actual paper record by 2004 that voters can view to check the accuracy of their votes and that election officials can use to verify votes in the event of a computer malfunction, hacking, or other irregularity. Experts often refer to this paper record as a "voter-verified paper trail."

"We cannot afford nor can we permit another major assault on the egrity of the American electoral process," said Rep. Rush Holt. "Imagine it"s Election Day 2004. You enter your local polling place and go to cast your vote on a brand new "touch screen" voting machine. The screen says your vote has been counted. As you exit the voting booth, however, you begin to wonder. How do I know if the machine actually recorded my vote? The fact is, you don't."

Last October, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), groundbreaking election reform legislation that is currently helping states throughout the country replace antiquated and unreliable punch card and butterfly ballot voting systems. HAVA, however, is having an unintended consequence. It is fueling a rush by states and localities to purchase computer-voting systems that suffer from a serious flaw; voters and election officials have no way of knowing whether the computers are counting votes properly. Hundreds of nationally renowned computer scientists, including internationally renowned expert David Dill of Stanford University, consider a voter-verified paper trial to be a critical safeguard for the accuracy, integrity and security of computer-assisted elections.

"Voting should not be an act of blind faith. It should be an act of record," said Rep Rush Holt. "But current law does nothing to protect the integrity of our elections against computer malfunction, computer hackers, or any other potential irregularities."

There have already been several examples of computer error in elections. In the 2002 election, brand new computer voting systems used in Florida lost over 100,000 votes due to a software error. Errors and irregularities were also reported in New Jersey, Missouri, Georgia, Texas, and at least 10 other states.

"A recount requires that there be a reliable record to check," said Holt. "Without an actual paper record that each voter can confidentially inspect, faulty or hacked computer systems will simply spit out the same faulty or hacked result. Every vote in every election matters. We can and should do this in time for the 2004 federal election."

Key provisions of The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 include:

1. Requires all voting systems to produce a voter-verified paper record for use in manual audits and recounts. For those using the increasingly popular ATM-like "DRE" (Direct Recording Electronic) machines, this requirement means the DRE would print a receipt that each voter would verify as accurate and deposit into a lockbox for later use in a recount. States would have until November 2003 to request additional funds to meet this requirement.

2. Bans the use of undisclosed software and wireless communications devices in voting systems.

3. Requires all voting systems to meet these requirements in time for the general election in November 2004. Jurisdictions that feel their new computer systems may not be able to meet this deadline may use an existing paper system as an interim measure (at federal expense) in the November 2004 election.

4. Requires that electronic voting system be provided for persons with disabilities by January 1, 2006 -- one year earlier than currently required by HAVA. Like the voting machines for non-disabled voters, those used by disabled voters must also provide a mechanism for voter-verification, though not necessarily a paper trail. Jurisdictions unable to meet this requirement by the deadline must give disabled voters the option to use the interim paper system with the assistance of an aide of their choosing.

5. Requires mandatory surprise recounts in 0.5% of domestic jurisdictions and 0.5% of overseas jurisdictions.

[csprof]

It would be great if we could get some conservative co-sponsors of this legislation, especially on the House Administration Committee.

For more information on electronic voting, see this web site.

[Cicero]

I never heard of Rush Holt, but I see he's a Democrat from New Jersey.

I agree. The Republicans should get behind something like this. The prospects for cheating on computerized voting systems are enormous and basically undetectable. And experience shows that the Democrats will do most of the cheating.

Republicans have been far too casual and accepting of Democrat vote corruption. Nationally, it probably adds up to several million votes, at least, although nobody knows for sure.

[Sonny M]

I could have sworn I saw this posted over at the DUmpster, along with multiple theories on how the 2002 election was rigged.

[supercat]

There exist ways of producing electronic or mechanical voting systems that would be more fraud-resistant than paper ballots. Unfortunately, I know of none that meet two simple criteria:

• If the system is in a state which validly indicates 'n' votes are cast, it must be physically impossible for it to be transformed into any other valid state which does not indicate that more than 'n' votes have been cast.
• It must either be possible either for voters to physically observe the state transition caused by their vote, or both of the following must apply:
  • The machine must be inspectable by interested third-parties, and
  • The machine must be designed so that any alteration would be detectable.

I've posted some ideas elsewhere with ideas for both mechanical and electrical systems. I think my mechanical punch-tape idea is my favorite, though I don't know how much such machines would cost to build.

[Tatze]

Ugh, I agree with a Democrat on this. A system without a voter-verified paper trail is a goldmine for fraud. The computer can show the voter thier votes to confirm, but noone knows for sure what is actually stored in memory. Have the computer print a paper ballot that can be verified and turned in. At the end of the day, compare the paper ballots to the computer total to ensure correct totals.

[supercat]

A system without a voter-verified paper trail is a goldmine for fraud.

Electronic voting systems have another problem I've not seen discussed: given the right collusion between manufacturers and election officials, they could be used to record who voted for whom; even with a paper receipt dropped anonymously into the ballot box there's no guarantee that the machine hasn't kept a not-so-anonymous record.

[gitmo]

There's nothing in here about verifying the identity of the voters. What good is an audit against a DRE style record if the voter has voted 20-30 times already today?

[csprof]

There's nothing in here about verifying the identity of the voters. What good is an audit against a DRE style record if the voter has voted 20-30 times already today?

There are many potential and real forms of voter fraud that this bill does not address. Voter registration problems (which I don't know that much about) seem to be almost completely independent of DRE problems, so it would be possible to address them in separate bills if that were the best strategy for getting laws in place.

[gitmo]

I've worked the polls many times. In many cases, I was the only person in the polling place, and it would have been so simple to check off a few dozen names and vote for my candidate. There are never any audits to see if the people who were supposed to have voted did, in fact, vote.

[Elkiejg]

Not only this problem, but the other day there was a news item that the networks - cbs, abc, nbc, cnn & fox - have signed on with the AP to accept their "exit polls". Did we learn nothing from the 2000 debacle?

[csprof]

This seems like a really bad situation, where it is going to be almost impossible to prevent fraud. A lot of poll workers I talk to report a situation where there are at least three people, including two from different parties at the polls at all times (four are assigned so that people can take breaks).

We have a lot of problems in elections, and the one you raise is clearly very serious. Election integrity depends on a lot of factors. A voter verifiable audit trail is a necessary condition, but nowhere near sufficient. You also need good election administration (and, in your case, it's not happening for some reason).

What state are you in? Is there any chance of doing things better?

[gitmo]

I have worked polls in the two Carolinas and in Georgia.

In many states, the parties are responsible for running the election process. The problem comes down to attracting enough volunteers.

I have donated and raised money to pay for voting machines. And I have helped the Republican Party as a poll watcher. But getting enough workers to cover all the precincts is very difficult.

I recall one Presidential election where I was the sole poll worker in a precinct. I was assigned to a heavily Democrat precint. Probably close to 100% Democrat. There were many periods during the day when I was completely alone and could have really done some mischief.

The biggest challenge is getting party volunteers in these states.

[jojodamofo]

This is outrageous. The party of tree-huggers wants to kill thousands of trees, and produce tons of chemicals necessary to process the dead trees into paper. Does this strike anyone else as OUTRAGEOUS?????

As a compassionate conservative, I mean it when I say I care about the environment. And because I care about the environment, I believe we need to save trees. Thus, we should not record votes on paper when there are environmentally-friendly Diebold machines to fulfill that purpose.