Secret Armies Of The Night

Time Magazine ^ | June 23, 2003 | Michael Duffy,Mark Thompson & Michael Weisskopf

[Ernest_at_the_Beach]

Thanks for posting this .

[Ernest_at_the_Beach]

OFFICIAL BUMP(TOPIC)LIST

[dixiechick2000]

IIRC, there were less than 100 SOF in Afghanistan when Kabul fell.

"Some of the special-forces troops in iraq had seen it all before—12 years ago, to be exact. Long before the war with Iraq began, officials at the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla., combed service records for names of commandos who had seen action in 1991's Operation Provide Comfort, which gave food and shelter to Kurdish refugees after Saddam crushed their rebellion. The goal: to lure these American soldiers out of private life and back into action. "We wanted them for the places they'd been and the people they knew," said a top officer. Army rules prohibit the service from relying on more than 100 retired commandos at any time; by mid-March, a top Army official told TIME, 88 had been tapped to return to the region."

Whether active duty, or retired, these guys are amazing...

Thanks for the post!

[gcruse]

bttt

[MHGinTN]

placemarker ^

[McGavin999]

They really make you proud, don't they?

[Steel Wolf]

SOF ping!

[Sonny M]

Whether active duty, or retired, these guys are amazing...

Depends on who you ask. As the article notes, alot of the top brass doesn't care for them to much and it was General Shwartzkoph (I know its miss-spelled) who mocking kept referring to the special ops as "snake eaters". He didn't mean it as a compliment.

[CGVet58]

yes, excellent article. (not to rain on the positive note in the above article, but...) I hope Rummy doesn't draw down the heavy divisional strength - currently we only have 10 army divisions, 4 of which are in Iraq, and major elements of 3 others disposed against NKor, in the Balkans, etc.

We shouldn't draw down "the regulars"; in fact, we probably need 4 more heavy divisions - because we have potential scenarios where the effectiveness of the SOF could be largely nuetralized (against huge armies like North Korea & China, or in difficult mountainous/jungle terrain such as North Korea, China, South America - or both!).

We also shouldn't draw down because it's alot easier to deconstruct a heavy fighting force than it is to build it back up again. Am not just referring to getting the men ready, we already know that we've plenty of ready Americans for that - specifically, I infer the political obstruction that would have to be overcome locally in order to fund/budget the billions necessary to ensure that any future heavy divisions/corps are properly trained and equipped with the best equipment.

As the Soviets used to say, "at some point in the force-mix equation, Quantity becomes Quality..."; they knew one of our F-15's was better than any one of their MiG's... but the playing field was more even when 30 of our fighters would face 70-80 of theirs.

CGVet58

[fnord]

Certainly the 'regular' portion of each branch has been drawn down too much (notice how many National Guard and Reserve units are deployed now, and for the foreseeable future). It's a balancing act to be sure.

NG units are over-deployed now, and on too many long-term missions. Since we have a large war on our hands, we should have a large standing military to deploy and fight it. It takes time to train troops and build equipment, and in the Navy's case especially, the lead time for increasing equipment stocks is enormous. The budget needs increased now ...

And whazzup with this notion?:
Army rules prohibit the service from relying on more than 100 retired commandos at any time

[BOBTHENAILER]

Great article.

[CGVet58]

re: your #11:

Seeing Rumsfeld's initiatives - and reading what other experts infer from his intentions - I believe Rummy is striving to remake the "boots" portion of our military along the lines of British Imperial forces. The UK policy during their empire was to have a small, highly trained professional army, and a large (large enough to take on the next two closest competitors...) Navy. I partially agree with this premise, with following qualifiers:

In the sense that we are a maritime nation, we should have dominant naval power along similar lines as the UK. Right now we sit at around 300-odd combatants, centered around 12 Carrier Battlegroups. I believe we should have at least 450 major surface combatants, plus a significant number of "small water Navy" vessels. Among the 450, 2 additional CBG's for a total of 14.

The above number is more a broad estimate (not arbitrary)... considering deployment stresses, increased alertness, our current & projected responsibilities, having 14 carriers is actually a bare-bones number. Let's look at our current areas of interest/conflict, along with number of carrier groups in parens projected for each:

Atlantic Ocean (2)
Mediterranean (1)
Indian Ocean* (2)
*=includes Horn of Africa/Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea/Red Sea/East Indies choke points such as Molucca Straits, a HUGE area.

Japan/Korea/Far East (2)
Eastern Pacific (1)

That counts for 8 Carrier groups, out of a total of 12. Though a good rule of thumb for proper maintenance is having 1/3rd of your force inport getting serviced/repaired (and it looks like we have that with above), we are neglecting other trouble spots (Caribbean) or escalating operations in current spheres (recently 3-4 CAG's in Persian Gulf for the war). When we give to Peter - as in the increased forces in the gulf during the war - we take from Paul... the effects being decreased maintenance, increased stress on our crews (which can and does decrease the retention rate for sailors). We're bare-assed tight, and one significant naval setback away from some deep hurt.

And yes, the Caribbean IS - or damned well should be! - an area of concern. Since Jimmy Gimme-my-Nobel-to-show-up-George Carter gave away the Panama Canal, CHICOM interests have effectively taken over control of both ends of that strategic point. Nor it is a coincidence, IMO, that shortly after the Red Chinese pounced on that foolishly undefended morsel, we've seen increased leftist insurgent movements in Columbia & Peru, plus an outright socialist government in Venezuela whose president (Chavez) has possibly sent funds to Al-Qaeda whilst screwing his country.

Ok, what about the Army? So far, my comments have been maritime (which befits my experience - I'm a 25 year recently retired Vet; Navy & Coast Guard) in nature. Well, the Army is impacted by this as well. Without command of the sea, no other service could operate outside CONUS. Coming back to my initial comments (Rummy reorg along lines of British experience...) - we must have an army capable of bearing heavy warfare loads (Hammer & Anvil)... and we must simultaneously expand and hone our SOF capabilities (Point of the Spear). Rummy's got the latter down pretty good; but he's playing a dangerous game, imho, if he thinks future opponents are going to roll over like the Baathists did. Outside of the Middle East (where everything is nice and flat, long sight lines), most other areas where we might be expected to fight in the near future offer significant challenges that won't be so easily overcome by our SOF/Air Force/Tech edges. At some point, we will need to have more conventional, high powered, line formations to win these wars.

Juan
CGVet58

[fnord]

good thoughts ... we need to beef up the Navy to continue this high level of force projection.

I would also add a bulked-up Air Force capable of delivering much higher numbers of the right troops and equipment anywhere in the world within hours. I think we have too long of a lag time delivering and sustaining division- and corps-sized assets to distant theaters.

[Elkiejg]

Panama Canal, CHICOM interests have effectively taken over control of both ends of that strategic point. Nor it is a coincidence, IMO, that shortly after the Red Chinese pounced on that foolishly undefended morsel, we've seen increased leftist insurgent movements in Columbia & Peru, plus an outright socialist government in Venezuela whose president (Chavez) has possibly sent funds to Al-Qaeda whilst screwing his country.

Thanks for your clear and thought provoking comments. I've been very concerned about the Canal give-away. The ChiComs are notorious for waiting years and years to make their move - in the meantime the U.S. sleeps or forgets that the enemy is at our gate.

There are 2 retired SpecOps guys living in my condo bldg. Fascinating to talk to them. One still has contact with some troop members in Iraq and he passes on some interesting info. from the inside. In short - don't believe what you read in the media - but then we already knew that. I love talking to him - he hates the Clintoooons as much as I do!!

BTW - love your tag line - LOL

[Ernest_at_the_Beach]

Thanks for the analysis.

No more Peace Dividend, we need to rebuild our Military and fast!

[dixiechick2000]

"Depends on who you ask."

Yes, it does. It is my opinion...

"...alot of the top brass doesn't care for them to much and it was General Shwartzkoph (I know its miss-spelled) who mocking kept referring to the special ops as "snake eaters". He didn't mean it as a compliment."

While I respect Gen. Schwartzkoph, he was as wrong as any of the "arm-chair" Generals during the Iraq war. To his credit, and IIRC, he is the only one of these former military commentators to admit he was wrong.

I'm in the middle of reading The Hunt for bin Laden. While the author, Robin Moore, certainly has his biases in favor of SOF, as does Gen. Schwartzkoph against SOF, it is a fascinating account of their role in the overthrow of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

[Ben Bolt]

Terrific post . This needs to be read again & again !

[CholeraJoe]

This is the first time in U.S. history that a top commando has been tapped to lead the entire Army

Typical half-a$$ed reporting by Time. General Henry H. Shelton was the Chairman of the JCS prior to General Myers. He was a snakeater.

[Sonny M]

As the Soviets used to say, "at some point in the force-mix equation, Quantity becomes Quality..."; they knew one of our F-15's was better than any one of their MiG's... but the playing field was more even when 30 of our fighters would face 70-80 of theirs.

The Soviets used to have a military policy based on what is called the "drill bit theory". Essentially, imagine you have a wall, and you start drilling, your bit breaks, you get another one, you keep going, breaking bit after bit, untill you finally drill through. Long story short, they saw there personal as cannon fodder. (that must have been good for morale).

I read the report that Rumsfeld gave to congress about his vision, you can find essentially the same thing on the PNAC website. I personally believe that you do need a lighter and quicker, more flexable and efficient and mobile rapid deployment armed forces. That does not mean, you ignore the main forces always for the special forces. The 2 can work extremely well to compliment each other. This Gulf War proved that, and should be the ideal blue print of using conventional and special forces together to achieve a unique goal. The emphasis on speed is essential, but force with great speed can be absolutley brutal. If you go to the site, its on pdf, it's essentialy the exact outline of everything that is the new pentagon formula, with goals, implementation, justification, and detailed analysis. It looks to me like something straight out of Andrew Marshalls head and his ideas.