Skip to comments.Nuke component unearthed in Baghdad back yard
Posted on 06/25/2003 2:20:52 PM PDT by July 4thEdited on 04/29/2004 2:02:44 AM PDT by Jim Robinson. [history]
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Aluminum Tubing Is an Indicator of an Iraqi Gas Centrifuge Program:
September 23, 2002
The September 12, 2002 White House White Paper, A Decade of Deception and Defiance states:
"Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb. In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes which officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium."
The Bush administration has released few details supporting its statement about aluminum tubing. However, there are a growing number of leaks to the media and additional information that collectively shed light on this statement.
U.S. officials have said that a number of secret shipments intended for Iraq have been stopped or intercepted. These officials have refused to name the countries or companies involved. Nonetheless, the Associated Press reported on September 13, 2002 that one of these shipments originated in China and got as far as Jordan before being intercepted.
Upon analysis of the procurement information, technical analysts at the CIA became convinced that the items were for use in an Iraqi gas centrifuge program, a uranium enrichment technology that Iraq had intensively developed between 1987 and early 1991. Because the parts had certain specifications and were ordered in large numbers, the analysts concluded that the parts were intended for the serial production of thousands of centrifuges. Because each centrifuge enriches a relatively small amount of uranium, a few thousand centrifuges must be connected by pipes into "cascades" in order to produce annually enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon.
Other U.S. intelligence and nuclear analysts, however, have challenged the conclusion that the tubes could only be intended for a gas centrifuge program. These analysts have concluded that although the tubes may have been intended for gas centrifuges, they are "dual-use" items that could have been intended for non-nuclear uses. Some experts said that the tubes could be for conventional artillery rockets. Thus, the dispute is whether enough evidence exists to state that the tubes were definitely ordered for the gas centrifuge program.
First Public Revelations
The first public report of the tubing was in The New York Times on September 8, 2002. This report quoted unnamed administration officials stating that the tubes were for centrifuge parts and were intended as "casings for rotors." The link to centrifuges, according to this report, was based on the number, specification, and dimensions of the tubes the Iraqis sought to purchase.
The Washington Times actually first reported this story publicly. But in its July report it erroneously listed the material as stainless steel instead of aluminum. Because stainless steel is not a material critical to gas centrifuges, the story was viewed as inaccurate and did not attract much interest.
The leak to the New York Times appeared to have been timed, or was at least used, by the Bush Administration to help build its case that Iraq was close to getting nuclear weapons. Senior administration officials mentioned the tubes many times as they made their rounds on the Sunday television talk shows the same day the story was published. Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, said on CNN Late Edition on September 8, 2002 that the aluminum tubes "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs." The Vice President reinforced this point on NBC's Meet the Press, stating that Saddam Hussein "now is trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium-specifically aluminum tubes."
Soon afterward, voices of dissent started to be heard. A September 13, 2002 New York Times article stated that although the CIA position appears to be the dominant view, some experts in the Department of Energy and the State Department questioned this conclusion. According to the New York Times report, the administration has shown great sensitivity about suggestions that intelligence experts differ over Iraq's intentions, because Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the centerpiece of the argument for planning a military attack to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime.
An intelligence official told the media that the statement in the White Paper quoted above was toned down. The CIA asked the White House to do so to reflect dissenting opinions and also to give the United States a "little wiggle room." Reflecting this uncertainty, another intelligence official added that the aluminum tubing was "not a smoking gun."
ISIS has learned that U.S. nuclear experts who dissent from the Administration's position are expected to remain silent. The President has said what he has said, end of story, one knowledgeable expert said.
High strength aluminum is a nuclear dual-use item, which means it has both nuclear and non-nuclear uses. Under Security Council resolutions, Iraq is banned from possessing aluminum tubing above a certain strength, unless these items are imported through the UN, used for civilian or non-banned purposes, and subject to monitoring by inspectors.
Iraq has conducted illicit procurement for decades to bolster its conventional armaments and WMD programs. Its efforts before the Persian Gulf were legendary and demonstrated its extraordinary ability to procure items secretly for its conventional military, ballistic missile, and WMD programs. Looking back, the sensitive dual-use items detected by Western authorities before the Gulf War represented only the "tip of the iceberg." After the imposition of the UN embargo in August 1990, Iraq continued to smuggle items.
Given persistent Iraqi attempts to smuggle sensitive items, Western intelligence agencies closely monitor Iraq and its agents to determine what Iraq is attempting to procure and significant efforts are made to stop illicit procurements. If a smuggling effort is detected, government experts evaluate whether the shipment or order may involve items for any proscribed activity.
Aluminum alloy has many military and civilian uses, including aircraft, bike frames, ballistic missiles, and gas centrifuges. However, procurement of high-strength aluminum is considered an indicator of a secret gas centrifuge program. Detection of an indicator normally increases suspicion that a secret activity is being pursued, but it does not prove the existence of a secret centrifuge program without additional evidence to establish a direct link.
Determining an exact use of aluminum tubing is difficult without the cooperation of Iraq or the presence of inspectors in Iraq. Without such capabilities, analysts must evaluate the item itself, looking at its specifications including its type, dimensions, and any modifications made to the tube. The primary goal of analysis in this case is to determine if the part was specifically manufactured for gas centrifuges, the technical specifications of the tubes strongly imply their use in gas centrifuges. The latter case could be bolstered by looking at other items Iraq tried to import and by evaluating the significance of the overall procurement effort.
In addition, insider or intelligence information could be critical. For example, a company official could have been told, deliberately or inadvertently, the true end-use of the part and subsequently informed authorities.
The CIA Case
The administration claims that these intercepted shipments are specific to centrifuges. The public evidence for this case is fragmentary and the government has released little officially. Instead, unnamed officials have released a series of difficult to understand statements to the media, including:
Nothing in these statements provides clear technical evidence that the tubes were intended for centrifuges.
The media has discussed two distinct shipments of aluminum tubing to Iraq-referred to here as an earlier one and a more recent one. Intelligence sources have told the media that multiple shipments were attempted, but no specific number has been revealed. Thus, whether more than two shipments were intercepted is unknown.
Intelligence officials have stated that they are not aware of any aluminum that got through to Iraq. But these officials make clear that they believe other shipments likely exist, and some shipments may have gotten through to Iraq.
Earlier Shipment A shipment was stopped over a year ago and maybe the one that marked the start of the 14-month period the administration mentions. The purpose of this shipment of aluminum tubing was debated extensively in the intelligence community.
A CIA assessment of this shipment linked the tubing to centrifuge components. However, others in the intelligence community concluded that other non-nuclear uses were possible.
Based on available information, this order was for thousands of tubes made from 7000-series aluminum alloy and with a tempering or heat treatment specification of T6. This type of aluminum is alloyed with zinc and is very strong. The heat treatment in this case makes for a hard metal. The tubing was apparently "perfectly fitted" on each end, implying that the tubes were intended to be that length. The diameter of each tube was reportedly about 3-4 inches (about 76-100 millimeters) and they were about one meter long. The wall thickness was a few millimeters.
Outer Casing The diameter of these tubes is significantly less than the outer casing used in Iraq's centrifuges that were being constructed in the late 1980s, and their wall thickness appears too small for an outer casing. Outer casings are rather non-sensitive centrifuge components that are thick-walled tubes designed to contain a failing rotor and preserve the vacuum of the machine.1 The failure of the vacuum in a single centrifuge casing can cause the destruction of the entire cascade.
In the late 1980s, Iraq ordered thousands of 6000-series aluminum tubes for the outer casing of its centrifuges. These tubes had diameters sufficient to hold rotors with a diameter of 145 millimeters.
Iraqi carbon fiber rotors, destroyed by inspectors in the early 1990s.
Iraq's outer casings were welded. Aluminum of the 6000-series is the best for welding, while 7000-series aluminum is not recommended for welding.
Centrifuge Rotor A more likely candidate for a centrifuge component is the rotor, a thin-walled tube that spins at high speeds, causing the uranium to enrich in the isotope uranium 235. A centrifuge rotor is a highly sensitive object that requires specialized high strength material.
There were many old centrifuges that used aluminum rotors, and Iraq pursued at least one of them. When the Iraqi centrifuge program started, it focused on the archaic 1941 "Beams-type" centrifuge design, named after its U.S. originator, Jessie Beams. The Iraqi design used a four-inch diameter duralumin pipe, an old aluminum alloy that is equivalent to 2000-series aluminum. The thickness of the Iraqi rotor is unknown, but the Beams-type rotors built in the United States had a wall thickness of less than one millimeter and the Iraqis copied this design.2 Series 2000 aluminum is not as strong as 7000-series aluminum, but it is stronger than 6000-series aluminum. Iraq could possibly replace the 2000-series aluminum in the Beams-design with 7000-series aluminum. The outer casing of Iraq's Beams-type centrifuge consisted of a steel pipe with welded upper and lower flanges.
Iraq could also use aluminum in a more modern centrifuge design that it was developing in the late 1980s called the "Zippe-type" centrifuge, named after one of its main developers, Gernot Zippe. The first centrifuges of this type were developed in the 1950s and 1960s, and they also used duralumin rotors. However, Iraq had invested heavily in making maraging steel and carbon fiber rotors for its Zippe-type centrifuges. Both materials are more advanced than aluminum and allow the rotor to spin considerably faster. However, Iraq encountered difficulties in building them, despite extensive assistance from German experts.
Iraqi centrifuge components, destroyed by inspectors in the early 1990s. Left are outer casings; right are carbon fiber rotors; rear left, behind first and second casings, are molecular pumps.
Despite the disadvantages, Iraq could have decided to pursue aluminum rotors because it could get the aluminum tubing easier than those other materials. Unlike outer casings, aluminum rotor assemblies do not require welding, therefore the 7000 series aluminum could be used for rotors. Iraq may also feel more confident making aluminum rotors than maraging steel or carbon fiber rotors. Iraq's extensive knowledge of early German and Urenco centrifuge designs enable it to modify its established Zippe-type designs to use aluminum rotors. Iraq's use of this design is more likely than a Beams-type design, given its knowledge and experience.
The dimensions of Zippe-type centrifuges made with aluminum rotors are publicly available. The rotors typically have diameters between 50 and 100 millimeters and a length of about 50 centimeters.3 Their wall thickness was less than one millimeter. Thus, the dimensions of the aluminum tubes Iraq sought are consistent with a centrifuge use, assuming that the tubes would be cut and the walls significantly thinned. Zippe-type centrifuges that used aluminum rotors in the late-1950s and the 1960s used a T6 hardening. As a result, cutting would not present any obstacles. Whether two rotors could be made from each tube is unknown, however. In addition, the special hardening would permit the tubing wall to be shaved down to the required thickness for a centrifuge rotor. A good tool, however, would be required to thin the tube thickness to about 0.5 millimeters.
The aluminum tubes Zippe used were not anodized or did not have any other type of coating. Uncoated aluminum works well in a centrifuge both as a rotor and cascade piping. The coating on the outer surface of the tube would be removed during the shaving operation. An anodized layer on the inside of the tube, however, should work fine in a centrifuge, according to an expert involved in the development of Zippe-type centrifuges in the 1950s and 1960s.
Instead of an pure aluminum rotor, Iraq could also pursue a hybrid design that involves wrapping carbon-fiber or another composite material over an aluminum tube. However, in this case the aluminum tube does not need to be as strong as 7000-series aluminum.
Non-Nuclear Uses Several experts knowledgeable about this attempted procurement, including at least one expert with over a decade of direct experience with gas centrifuges, said that the purpose of the tubes could have been for non-nuclear uses. At least two experts concluded that the most likely intended use of the tubes was non-nuclear. Several assessed that the intended use could have been the outer casing of conventional rockets, such as those for multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS).
UNSCOM inspectors saw and inventoried thousands of similar high strength aluminum tubes in Iraq before they left in 1998, according to one knowledgeable expert. Iraq has a long history of ordering 7000-series aluminum tubes and plates, the expert added. Such aluminum plate was ordered in large quantities in the late 1980s for Iraq's ballistic missile program. The purpose of the tubing Iraq obtained before the inspectors left could not be learned, however.
The CIA rejected any non-nuclear use for the aluminum tubing. The media learned that the use of the tubing was investigated by the U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center. It concluded that the use of this particular high strength aluminum tubing would have been "exquisite," far in advance of what is needed for a MRLS. One knowledgeable expert, however, said that the Ground Intelligence Center did not receive all the information.
This expert said that Iraq imported 7000-series tubing for non-nuclear uses in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, these recent attempted procurements could also have been intended for a non-nuclear use.
The debate over the purpose of the tubing left some dissenters perplexed. "Always the same answer, no matter what the objections were," one said. Inevitably, this situation led to speculation. Did the CIA have information about the tubes it was not sharing to protect important secrets? Or was the CIA arguing a view not really based in the facts? The recent statements emanating from the CIA suggest that it is not as certain about the intended purpose of this shipment, as first stated.
More Recent Shipment The more recent shipment is reported to have happened about three months ago and is the one reported in the New York Times on September 8 as linked to centrifuge outer casings. Administration officials have reportedly stated that they have very specific information linking the tubes to a "rotor casing," interpreted as an outer casing.
Little information is available about the tubes in this shipment or order. If the tubes were intended for centrifuge outer casings, then they are unlikely to be 7000-series aluminum which in general is not good for welding. A wall thickness of a few millimeters, as discussed above, may not be sufficient to contain the shrapnel of a failing rotor.
Even if the CIA can make the case that the intercepted tubes are intended for outer casings, drawing implications about Iraq's gas centrifuge program from that information is difficult. Outer casings are not very critical centrifuge components. They are some of the easiest centrifuge components to fabricate and progress on outer casings says little about progress on procuring items for critical components, such as rotors, end caps, or bearings.
A relatively large diameter tube similar in size to the ones made by Iraq in the late 1980s could imply that the rotors would be made from maraging steel or carbon fiber. These materials are more difficult to obtain than high strength aluminum, and no evidence has been presented that Iraq has acquired either material. Thus, inferring information about the status of the Iraqi centrifuge program from information about the outer casing is a difficult and perhaps misleading exercise.
Construction of Aluminum-Rotor Centrifuges
If Iraq was building a gas centrifuge plant using machines with aluminum rotors, it would need to build a large number of machines, requiring many thousands of tubes. Aluminum rotors will spin slower and thus will have less of an ability to separate uranium than tubes made from maraging steel, carbon fiber, or other composite materials. This weakness must be overcome by building more machines.
Assuming that Iraq would build a Zippe-type aluminum rotor centrifuge of the type he developed in the 1960s, the production of 10 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium per year would require the operation of about 3,500 such centrifuges.4 Each centrifuge would have an enrichment capacity of about 0.5 separative work units (SWUs) per year, assuming that each rotor tube has a diameter of about 75-100 millimeters.
Before an aluminum tube of the type in the earlier shipment could be used in a centrifuge, it would be necessary to modify it by cutting it in half and reducing its wall thickness to less than one millimeter. This task can be accomplished by cutting the tube and shaving aluminum off the wall until the required thickness is obtained. Accomplishing this task is complicated, but within Iraq's capabilities both in terms of available machine tools and expertise.
After cutting the tube to appropriate dimensions, end caps and other items would be attached resulting in a completed rotor assembly. This assembly would then be tested at low speed on an "air stand" to ensure that it performed to specifications. In the case of Iraq, many rotors would likely fail this and other quality assurance tests. Thus, Iraq would need to build far more rotor tubes and other components than it would eventually use in a centrifuge.
To develop an estimate of the time to make a centrifuge plant able to produce 10 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium a year, several assumptions must be made. The first is that about 3,500-7,000 tubes would be modified to produce 3,500 rotor tubes, where the range accounts for whether one or two rotors can be obtained from each tube and the reject rate is taken as 50 percent. This rejection rate is consistent with Iraq's expectation in the late 1980s in designing its centrifuge manufacturing facilities. With the right equipment, skilled technicians can make a rotor in two hours, according to an expert involved in developing both the early Russian and German gas centrifuges that used aluminum rotors. Assuming another two hours to assemble and test the rotor assembly, one machine operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week could make 2,200 rotors a year. Assuming about half are rejects, then annual production is about 1,000 centrifuges of required specifications per year at a clandestine facility.
Thus, in this scenario Iraq is estimated to need about 3.5 years to make a centrifuge facility with enough centrifuges to make 10 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium per year. Given about 15-20 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium per weapon, Iraq could produce enough material for a bomb every 1.5-2 years.
This estimate may be too short because it fails to account for the requirements that Iraq must also produce other centrifuge parts in large number, master the assembly of whole centrifuges and cascades, develop a sufficient stock of uranium hexafluoride, and go through the start-up phase of the centrifuge plant. Accidents and other setbacks may further increase the time to produce the first bomb's worth of weapon-grade uranium. Disrupted procurement efforts can significantly delay progress on building a plant.
If Iraq used a supply of low enriched uranium that it acquired illicitly or diverted from a safeguarded stock in Iraq at the Tuwaitha nuclear site, it would need far fewer centrifuges or it could make a given amount of weapon-grade uranium significantly faster.
Based on the available information, the intercepted aluminum tubing could have been intended for use in a centrifuge. It is far harder to confirm the administration's view that the tubes were specifically intended for use in a centrifuge. The earlier shipment does not appear to be specific to centrifuges, as initially claimed by the Administration. The more recent shipment is hard to assess with the available information, but even the detection of efforts to make an outer casing of a centrifuge provides limited insight into Iraq's gas centrifuge efforts.
By themselves, these attempted procurements are not evidence that Iraq is in possession of or close to possessing nuclear weapons. They also do not provide evidence that Iraq has an operating centrifuge plant or when such a plant could be operational.
These attempted procurements do show that Iraq may have accelerated its efforts to obtain banned items. They also suggest because of the number of tubes involved that, if the tubes are for centrifuges, Iraq is working to build a gas centrifuge plant able to produce significant quantities of highly enriched uranium.
Despite the lack of evidence linking the tubes to centrifuges, these procurements increase suspicions about Iraq's nuclear efforts. As a result, greater scrutiny is needed of all Iraqi procurement efforts. Iraq would need to acquire many items to build a centrifuge plant. A more comprehensive evaluation may shed a clearer light on any Iraqi effort to build gas centrifuges.
Iraq's attempted procurements of aluminum tubing point out the need for intrusive UN Security Council-mandated inspections in Iraq. If inspections would resume in Iraq, they could carefully follow up these attempted procurements. Iraq would have to explain these attempted procurements, either admitting they were intended for centrifuges or provide a compelling case that the end use was non-nuclear.
One hopes that the CIA has special intelligence information supporting its case about the intended use of these tubes. At least, the Administration needs to make more information available. The dimensions, specifications, and any other distinctive characteristics of the tubing should be released. Other information tying these tubes to centrifuges should be provided, while adequately protecting intelligence sources and methods. Otherwise, the Administration should accept that many states and members of the public will question both its conclusions and intentions.
1 Outer casings are also called housings or recipients.
2 The Iraqis used a subcritical Beams design, which would mean that the length of the rotor was about 50 centimeters. The separative capacity of each machine was less than 0.5 SWU/yr.
3 Longer rotors could be built, for so called "supercritical" centrifuges. The rotors would need a specialized flexible joint called a bellows that would be inserted between rotor segments that are about 50 centimeters each.
4 If Iraq instead decided to build a Beams-type centrifuge in large numbers, it would need to build more centrifuges than if it pursued Zippe-type aluminum rotor centrifuges. It would also need to overcome many technical problems, perhaps more problems than if it decided to build a Zippe-type machine.
Bad Preech! BAD Preech!
Experts said the documents and pieces Obeidi gave the United States were the critical information and parts to restart a nuclear weapons program and would have saved Saddam's regime several years and as much as hundreds of millions of dollars for research.
Are you the owner of that bridge in Brooklyn?
"I have very important things at my disposal that I have been ordered to have, to keep, and I've kept them, and I don't want this to proliferate, because of its potential consequences if it falls in the hands of tyrants, in the hands of dictators or of terrorists," said Obeidi, who has been taken out of Iraq with the help of the U.S. government.You might want to wait for the facts to come in rather than specualte why its rational for you to be out on that limb so far when you can hear Bush's chain saw reving up.
Well, I've been using laboratory centrifuges, such as the one whose picture you posted, in research for over 30 years, I've never heard of a 'lab gas centrifuge', and am pretty sure who's looking 'awfully foolish' !
If the regime were planning on using it, they would have stored it in a bunker or some other secure place, not a hole in the ground.
The scientist probably burried it thinking the first war wouldn't last long and he could dig it up in a few weeks, when Iraq lost and was disarmed, there was no reason to bother.
You don't burry sensitive and sophisticated electronics in a dirt hole in the ground as a means of long term storage, the probability of this stuff being servicable is less than zero.
would you bury your washing machine or television in the back yard?
And finding one buried in a rose garden looks innocent? I understand what you are saying about context but that works both ways.
Yep. I find it interesting that Rummy & W just recently said "we'll find WMD stuff" while CNN is sitting on this story. Kinda coinky dink, dontcha think? W also just said recently we'll be getting Saddam & OBL, eventually. Hmmmmm. Meanwhile the Rats have their shovels firmly in hand, digging their holes. I sure like the way this administration works....
There are only two kinds of people who believe anything other than what former President Clinton said: those who work for Saddam and ostriches. This is all a charade. Everybody knows he has chemical and bacteriological weapons. He refused to declare hundreds of tons of VX gas and sarin and thousands of liters of anthrax and botuleum. Once the U.N. inspectors discovered these because of (the former head of the weapons program) Hussain Kamal's defection in 1995, Saddam said, ''Oh, those biological weapons.'' How credulous does someone have to be to believe Saddam now?
We may not have evidence that can be shown until Iraq is liberated and the buried gas centrifuges and bottles of anthrax and canisters of VX are turned up.
5. The detailed analysis of centrifuge components removed from Iraq during the seventh and eighth inspections and new data on foreign procurements by Iraq (acknowledged and added to by Iraqi authorities during the ninth inspection) have resulted in a more consistent picture of the Iraqi centrifuge programme. The new data on foreign procurements were provided by IAEA Member States working with the Action Team and, in two significant instances, by Iraq.
6. The Iraqi centrifuge design conforms substantially to early west European designs. However, no component is identical in design; all showed evidence of intelligent adaptation and development based on sound principles. A number of capable scientists and engineers were involved in the Iraqi centrifuge development effort, but it is unlikely that they were able to make the observed design modifications without outside help. The Iraqi authorities acknowledged "advice from abroad", but they were clearly trying to minimize the extent of foreign involvement. A centrifuge constructed from components found in Iraq, but manufactured to a higher quality standard, would have a separative power greater than that declared by Iraq.
7. Investigations of Iraqi procurements, with the close cooperation of Member State Governments, have become an integral part of the overall inspection effort. Among the data obtained is information from the German Government indicating that large quantities of stock materials intended for the Iraqi centrifuge manufacturing programme had been delivered to Iraq during the period January-May 1990. These stock materials included:
- 300 tonnes of aluminium alloy (AlMgSi 1 F31) tube extrusions for the manufacture of vacuum housings (enough for approximately 2,500 housings). An order for an additional 310 tonnes was stopped by the embargo.
- 84 tonnes of aluminium alloy (AIMgSiPb F28) tube extrusions for the manufacture of molecular pumps (enough for 6,000 pumps);
- 240,000 ferrite magnet spacers (24 per centrifuge stator) and 10,000 soft iron ring band cores (providing material for the manufacture of 10,000 stators for centrifuge motors).
During the ninth inspection, the Iraqi authorities confirmed the receipt of these materials and, in addition, declared the procurement of:
- 100 tonnes of 350-grade maraging steel (material sufficient for approximately 5,000 centrifuges employing maraging steel rotors, end caps and baffles);
- Aluminium forgings sufficient for the manufacture of several thousand top and bottom flanges for the centrifuge vacuum housings.
A schematic showing the various centrifuge components referred to above is presented as Figure 1. The estimate of the numbers of centrifuge components that could have been manufactured from the stated amounts of material implies no difficulty in meeting the required specifications. A reject rate in the range of 50% for some components was estimated by the Iraqi experts. This reasonably can be expected while the manufacturing process is being implemented.
Did you stop to think that perhaps Hussein didn't THINK it would be long term?
'cuse me. Is that a centrifuge or a septic tank buried in your yard?
What if you know something but it is not related to the thread? And if you know something how do you know that you know something?
Iraq was a police state......the scientist was ordered to bury it in his backyard.
Honestly CO, everybody, from Chirac to Blair to Putin to Daschle proclaimed that Iraq had WMDs, the only people saying that Iraq didn't have WMDs in the recent past were Saddam and his boys, and Scott Ritter (redundancy, I know). Shall we add you to that list?
YES! if some freaking despot and his mini-me's were going to kill me and my family.....I would bury it and salute!
-a deep, paranoid hatred for Bush
Stop. My brain is starting to whirl. U-235 is coming out my left ear, and U-238 out my right.
Hey! Why are you jumping all over him? He clearly noted that it was a picture of a lab centrifuge in his caption.
By, David Albright
August 11, 2002
Interview by Will Hodgkinson. David Albright is a former inspector of the Iraqi nuclear programme and president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). www.isis-online.org.
There have been some press reports about Iraq having a gas-centrifuge enrichment programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. People have argued that you could find nuclear facilities quickly as they are big, but Iraq knows how to make them small. A reactor is hard to hide, but a uranium enrichment programme is entirely possible. The clock is ticking.
You would think that if Iraq had a nuclear weapon, it would have done something to show it. But then you can't be certain. Another factor that increases the uncertainty is that Iraq is well aware that Russian controls on nuclear material are terrible, and is excellent at illicit procurement. It works with insiders, it doesn't deal with middlemen, and it has a fighting chance of getting highly enriched uranium and not being discovered. Once it gets the gas-centrifuge programme, you have to assume that it could make [a bomb] in half a year.
A lot of time has been spent trying to find out what Iraqi scientists know. Some are idiots, some are very bright and some learn extremely quickly. The UN created incentives for Iraqi scientists to defect, but very few took it up. Anything we can do to get the scientists out is important as there aren't that many of them, and they're not that into making nuclear weapons because they understand better than anyone what will happen if Iraq really gets them.
A colleague of mine met an Iraqi scientist in Vienna a few years ago. We were stunned that he was travelling, but his family is in Baghdad and they will be killed if he doesn't go back.
The defectors who revealed a lot about the gas-centrifuge programme in 1991 were younger people who were drafted into it. Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, who was the head of the programme, would look at all the Iraqis returning from foreign education and snap them up, and some didn't like it. There was one in particular who packed up, put his family in a car and escaped. He told us a tremendous amount.
People that lloked cross-eyed at Saddam got themselves and their families killed or worse. You believe that this guy put his life and his families life on the line for a sovenir ?
Your position grows more desparate each time you chime in.