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WIRE TAP: Israelis work on the fence Israel is building to separate Israel and the Palestinian territories near the Palestinian city of Qalqilya, Monday July 28, 2003. |
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What's the deal with the fence? Is Israel really so dependent on this single devise? The president of the United States has turned it into an important agenda item. Palestinians are up in arms about it. Is one, albeit very long and heavily reinforced, fence, worth all this fuss? More important, is this fence really about security, or is it all about politics?
The fence has its positive points. Certainly, it will help protect Israelis from suicide bombers. This barrier is not simply a 30-foot high wall or a chain-linked barrier. This fence is a high tech security warning system with all the bells and whistles, literally. There are infrared sensors, motion detectors, mobile command centers. Whole systems can be watched and tweaked with little palm-pilot sized control devises.
Gone are the days when Israel simply dragged the sand. Bedouin trackers sniffing the sent of trespassers and potential terrorists is a rarity these days, too inefficient and too slow. Today, what looks like a virtual reality game is actually a system implemented to better the odds in the real game of terror, of life and of death.
But, like so much that has transpired in the world of Middle East politics and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, all is not as it seems.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon really does not want a fence, this or any other. So why allow it to be built? He is playing a game at which he excels, the game of tactics. Sharon will use this fence as a bargaining chip later on, as a concession.
Here's a little background: The idea of the fence was concocted during the administration of Ehud Barak, the former Israeli prime minister. Barak floated the idea as a panacea in the absence of any serious policy. His administration, in effect, said "throw up a fence." If Palestinians will not take responsibility and clamp down on the terrorists, they postured, then shut them out. The idea caught on even as the Israeli public realized that Barak's fence, without anything behind it, was insufficient, a fa?ade, an inefficient tool. Barak's Labor party paid the price and Labor failed miserably at the polls not once but twice.
And yet, Israelis were intrigued. With no other viable alternatives and with deaths from terrorist attacks mounting they found the idea very attractive. All the cliches came out, especially the one about how good fences make good neighbors. Many reasoned that if they couldn't tell the good guys from the bad, keep them all out -- it might not be fair, but it would, hopefully, save lives.
And so, even the Likud, probably in an effort not to lose the votes of a potentially large voting bloc, jumped on the fence bandwagon. But Sharon has never liked the idea, neither have the settlers nor any of Israel's right wing ideologues.
Why? What's the harm in a fence that will save lives? Opponents fervently believe that this fence will create a de facto border with the Palestinians -- without negotiations without a consensus and without process. America agrees. As a matter of fact, in certain places, the fence is even within the green line, Israel's pre-'67 border.
They believe that the fence throws up a barrier for Israelis and for Palestinians by keeping settlers and their families from freely accessing not only important sites -- religious and military -- but also their homes. They believe that the fence denies Israelis the right to be anywhere within Israel that they consider to be their home.
The first stage, about 80 miles of fence, is complete and the next stage is in progress. There is little doubt that had Sharon believed in the fence, that if he wanted it, he would have acted promptly and finished it years ago. Had America seriously pressured against the fence, he would have scrapped it. Instead, he hemmed, hawed, and delayed until the eve of the last election.
Now Sharon has a wonderful card to play in the game of politics for peace. For Sharon, the fence is a great concession he now has to offer. Once again Israel's prime minister will have the ability to compromise on something that he considers irrelevant, just like he did on the new outposts. He will ceremoniously give away something that, to him, amounts to nearly nothing.
United States President Bush, National Security Adviser Rice and Secretary of State Powell have all expressed worry about the fence. And Ariel Sharon will show flexibility.
Whatever part of the wall is already up and built will mostly remain. It will satisfy those Israelis who still think it will help. Palestinians will be happy when he stops. And America will be satisfied if he dismantles certain small sections of the fence.
Once again, Ariel Sharon has masterfully played his game.