Marines in Beirut, Part I: 32d MAU Goes Ashore

CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. (Sept. 29, 2003) -- When the military arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) began lobbing artillery shells against Jewish settlements in the northern Israeli province of Galilee from positions inside Lebanon, they brought to fruition long-simmering tensions in the region. The ensuing Israeli response was as swift and violent as it was predicable.

On June 6, 1982, seven Israeli Defense Force (IDF) divisions numbering 78,000 men and more than 1,200 tanks crossed the border into Lebanon across a 63-mile front. The intent of Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE was to create a 40-kilometer buffer zone inside Lebanon to thwart future attacks against the Galilee settlements and crush PLO and Syrian forces in the country.

Despite pockets of fierce resistance, the IDF sent the PLO fleeing toward the Lebanese capital of Beirut and severely mauled the 30 thousand-strong Syrian force both on the ground and in the air. After six days of intense combat, a ceasefire was signed between Syria and Israel, and later, the PLO. The Lebanese, who had stood aside as the IDF advanced, watched in horror as 14 thousand PLO fighters poured into Beirut, which prompted the IDF to encircle the city by both land and sea, laying siege to the city.

Meanwhile, the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), based out of Camp Lejeune, N.C. and commanded by Col. James M. Mead, was ordered to Lebanese coastal waters as the situation in Lebanon unfolded. The 32d MAU had left the United States on May 25, 1982 aboard the amphibious ships USS GUAM, NASHVILLE, HERITAGE, SAGINAW, and MANITOWOC, and consisted of its Command Element, Battalion Landing Team 2d Bn., 8th Marines, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 (Reinforced), and MAU Service Support Group 32.

Over the course of the next four months, the 32d MAU remained on station off Lebanon prepared to conduct missions ashore. On June 24, MSSG-32 oversaw the evacuation of 580 noncombatants from the port of Juniyah while HMM-261 (Rein) was kept busy supporting the ongoing efforts of the U.S. State Department to forge a lasting peace. Dubbed the 'Cammie Cab Service,' HMM-261 flew more than 60 missions in support of these diplomatic efforts.

During this prolonged period afloat, the ships were able to break away piecemeal to make port visits in Italy. Doing so required the MAU to constantly shift personnel and equipment to ensure forces remained on hand to support any given mission, but gave the Marines and Sailors a much-needed break from the tedium of cutting 'gator squares.'

In early August, a military liaison team went ashore to support the Special Envoy to Lebanon, Ambassador Phillip C. Habib. Representing the MAU was Lt. Col. Robert B. Johnston, commanding officer of the unit's ground combat element, BLT 2/8.

The focus of the ongoing negotiations was to secure the evacuation of the PLO forces from Beirut as fighting continued to escalate in and around Beirut between the IDF, PLO, Lebanese Christians, and Shi'ite Moslems. Finally, after weeks of intense negotiations, an agreement was

On Aug. 25, a 2,000-man peacekeeping force (composed of 400 Italians, 800 French, and 800 American troops) was ordered to land in Beirut. The 32d MAU provided the American contingent of the force, and was tasked with securing Beirut's port through which the PLO would be evacuated by ship. Via landing craft, utility (LCU), E and F Companies were the first ashore and immediately secured the port. G Company followed, as did elements of the MAU Command Element and MSSG-32.

The next morning, the first ship arrived in port to begin evacuating PLO and Syrian forces. By the end of the day, 1,066 PLO fighters had been allowed to pass through the Marine lines and reach the ship. Elsewhere in Beirut, the Italian and French were also facilitating the departure of the PLO and Syrians.

Over the course of the next 15 days, the evacuation went smoothly as the PLO streamed through the port facilities. The culminating event was the departure of PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat, on Aug. 30. Escorted by French forces, Arafat's arrival at the port caused a huge crowd of well-wishers and media to congregate.

As they approached the port gate, guarded by the grunts of E/2/8, some of Arafat's 25-man bodyguard detachment attempted to push their way past the Marines. The Marines coolly stood their ground and pushed back. The PLO thugs quickly backed down and within the hour, Arafat was aboard the merchant ship ATLANTIS and out of Beirut.

By Sept. 9, the evacuation was complete, calm had more or less descended onto Beirut, and the 32d MAU began reboarding its amphibious shipping. During their 15 days ashore in Beirut, the 32d MAU oversaw the evacuation of 6,436 armed PLO and Syrian fighters, and do so firing a shot.

Mere days after the Marines left, on Sept. 14, Lebanon's Christian president-elect, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated by PLO supporters. Compounded by the massacre of several hundred Palestinian refugees by Christian militia, Beirut again exploded into violence. Lebanon's new president immediately requested a Multi-National Force (MNF) to arrive in Beirut to help restore the peace.

In the midst of well-deserved liberty visits to Italy, the 32d MAU was again ordered to Beirut, and arrived there in late September. During the day of Sept. 29, more than 1,200 Marines came ashore at the port of Beirut and convoyed to their positions at Beirut International Airport. Italian troops occupied the areas to the south of Beirut that teemed with refugee camps and the French operated in Beirut itself. All told, the MNF numbered 3,000 troops.

Sept. 30 brought the first casualties of the American presence in Beirut. As they cleared BIA, an unexploded piece of ordnance unexpectedly detonated, killing Cpl. David Reagan and wounding three other Marines. Reagan would be the first of 266 Americans to die in Beirut.

The 32d MAU quickly went to work fortifying BIA, digging fighting positions, erecting guard posts, laying concertina wire, and clearing fields of fire. The headquarters for the MAU and its elements ashore were established in abandoned buildings throughout the BIA terminal area.

While the MAU Command Element, BLT 2/8, and MSSG-32 had a sizable force presence ashore, all of HMM-261 (Rein) remained aboard ARG shipping except for a single CH-46E which stood ready at BIA in case of medical emergencies.

Throughout October, the Marines conducted limited foot and vehicular patrols in the direct vicinity of BIA, and forged lasting relationships with the French and Italian contingents of the MNF through social functions and sporting events.

At this time, the local populace of Beirut displayed little overt opposition to the MNF presence and the 32d MAU Marines were frequently. The area around BIA was essentially a Muslim enclave and the Marines were well-received as they were seen as a deterrent to further Israeli, Syrian, PLO, and Christian imposition on their neighborhoods.

Despite a few desultory rounds landing on the Marine compound fired by the Lebanese, PLO, Israeli, and numerous militias operating in and around Beirut, the Americans were not an active target. Unfortunately, this would not last.

By late October, the 32d MAU had been deployed longer than anticipated, and the arrival of the advance party from the 24th MAU on Oct. 26 was well-received. Turn-over between the two MAUs continued for four days as the incoming MAU was briefed on the situation in Beirut and disposition of forces ashore. Early on the morning of Oct. 30, elements of the 24th MAU came ashore and conducted a relief-in-place with the 32d. Col. Thomas M. Stokes, Jr., Commanding Officer of the 24th MAU, relieved Col. Mead as the Commander, Task Force 62, and assumed responsibility for American participation in the MNF.

With their forces back aboard ship, the 22d MAU headed west toward an exercise in Morocco, then on to Rota, Spain and eventually the United States. Upon arrival at the port in Morehead City, N.C. the 32d MAU was met by a massive crowd of media representatives, well-wishers and official dignitaries, including the future Marine Corps Commandant, then-Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gray, Jr., who was at that time the Commanding General of the 2d Marine Division.

Meanwhile, back in Beirut, the 24th MAU was settling in for a sustained deployment in Lebanon that would bring the unit, and later, the 22d MAU, its share of heartache, exasperation, and frustration.

This story is the first is a three-part series that details the role Marines played in Beirut from 1982 to 84. A fourth installment details the 22d MAU's participation in Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada. New chapters will be posted to www.usmc.mil and www.22meu.usmc.mil each Monday in October.

......................................

Marines from the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit man a checkpoint at the port in Beirut, Lebanon in late Aug. 1982 during the evacuation of PLO and Syrian fighters from the country. The 32d MAU, later named the 22d MAU, would serve four tours in Beirut in support of multi-national peace-keeping operations there. Photo by: Official USMC Photo

Marines from BLT 2/8, the ground combat element of the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit, stand in formation upon returning home from duty in Beirut, Lebanon as the initial U.S. contingent of a multi-national peacekpeeping force. Photo by: Official USMC Photo

A Navy LST crammed with evacuees leaves Lebanon's port of Juniyah on June 24, 1982 as fighting between Israeli and PLO/Syrian forces escalates in Beirut. The 32d Marine Amphibious Unit helped oversee the evacuation of 580 noncombatants from Juniyah, and within two months would begin an extended multi-national peace-keeping operation in Lebanon. Photo by: Official USMC Photo

banner bids farewell to the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit on Sept. 10, 1982 as the last Marines leave Beirut, Lebanon after overseeing the evacuation of more than six thousand PLO and Syrian fighters from the country. Within three weeks, the MAU would return to Lebanon as part of a multi-national peacekeeping force. Photo by: Official USMC Photo

Marines from the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit prepare 'Green Beach' outside Beirut, Lebanon for the introduction of additional forces on Oct. 1, 1982. The 32d MAU was in Beirut to participate in a multi-national peace-keeping operation. Photo by: Official USMC Photo

Marines from the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit fortify their position at Beirut International Airport during the opening days of a nulti-national peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. Photo by: Official USMC Photo

Col. James Mead, Commanding Officer of the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit, speaks to a Lebanese civlian during the delivery of food supplies from ships laying off shore. Mead commanded the 32d MAU during two tours in Beirut, and a third after the unit was redesignated the 22d MAU. Photo by: Official USMC Photo

Using a metal detector, Marines from the 32 Marine Amphibious Unit scour 'Green Beach' for mines and unexploded ordnance in Oct. 1982 during the first days of a multi-national peace-keeping operation in Beirut, Lebanon. Photo by: Official USMC Photo

An excited Lebanese child gets a return wave from a Marine of the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit as a convoy passes through the Muslim section of Beirut, Lebanon during the early days of a multi-national peace-keeping operation there. Photo by: Official USMC Photo

A Marine from the 32d MAU, far right, talks with a French (in beret) and Lebanese soldier on Oct. 1, 1982, the second day of the deployment of a multi-national peacekeeping force to Beirut, Lebanon. Photo by: Official USMC Photo

Marines from the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit patrol the outskirts of Beirut International Airport in Oct. 1982 during the intial stages of a multi-national peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. Photo by: Official USMC Photo

TEXT

http://www.washington-report.org/back/1995/03/9503079.htm

MIDDLE EAST HISTORY

IT HAPPENED IN MARCH

Israel Charged With Systematic Harassment of
U.S. Marines

By Donald Neff

MARCH 1995, Pages 79-81

It was 12 years ago, on March 14, 1983, that the commandant of the Marine Corps sent a highly unusual letter to the secretary of defense expressing frustration and anger at Israel. General R.H. Barrow charged that Israeli troops were deliberately threatening the lives of Marines serving as peacekeepers in Lebanon. There was, he wrote, a systematic pattern of harassment by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that was resulting in "life-threatening situations, replete with verbal degradation of the officers, their uniform and country."

Barrow's letter added: "It is inconceivable to me why Americans serving in peacekeeping roles must be harassed, endangered by an ally...It is evident to me, and the opinion of the U.S. commanders afloat and ashore, that the incidents between the Marines and the IDF are timed, orchestrated, and executed for obtuse Israeli political purposes."1

Israel's motives were less obtuse than the diplomatic general pretended. It was widely believed then, and now, that Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, one of Israel's most Machiavellian politician-generals, was creating the incidents deliberately in an effort to convince Washington that the two forces had to coordinate their actions in order to avoid such tensions. This, of course, would have been taken by the Arabs as proof that the Marines were not really in Lebanon as neutral peacekeepers but as allies of the Israelis, a perception that would have obvious advantages for Israel.2

Barrow's extraordinary letter was indicative of the frustrations and miseries the Marines suffered during their posting to Lebanon starting on Aug. 25, 1982, as a result of Israel's invasion 11 weeks earlier. Initially a U.S. unit of 800 men was sent to Beirut harbor as part of a multinational force to monitor the evacuation of PLO guerrillas from Beirut. The Marines, President Reagan announced, "in no case... would stay longer than 30 days."3 This turned out to be only partly true. They did withdraw on Sept. 10, but a reinforced unit of 1,200 was rushed back 15 days later after the massacres at the Palestinian refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila that accompanied the Israeli seizure of West Beirut. The U.S. forces remained until Feb. 26, 1984.4

During their-year-and-a-half posting in Lebanon, the Marines suffered 268 killed.5 The casualties started within a week of the return of the Marines in September 1982. On the 30th, a U.S.-made cluster bomb left behind by the Israelis exploded, killing Corporal David Reagan and wounding three other Marines.6

Corporal Reagan's death represented the dangers of the new mission of the Marines in Lebanon. While their first brief stay had been to separate Israeli forces from Palestinian fighters evacuating West Beirut, their new mission was as part of a multinational force sent to prevent Israeli troops from attacking the Palestinian civilians left defenseless there after the withdrawal of PLO forces. As President Reagan said: "For this multinational force to succeed, it is essential that Israel withdraw from Beirut."7

"Incidents are timed, orchestrated, and
executed for Israeli
political purposes."

Israel's siege of Beirut during the summer of 1982 had been brutal and bloody, reaching a peak of horror on Aug. 12, quickly known as Black Thursday. On that day, Sharon's forces launched at dawn a massive artillery barrage that lasted for 11 straight hours and was accompanied by saturation air bombardment.8 As many as 500 persons, mainly Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, were killed.9

On top of the bombardment came the massacres the next month at Sabra and Shatila, where Sharon's troops allowed Lebanese Maronite killers to enter the camps filled with defenseless civilians. The massacres sickened the international community and pressure from Western capitals finally forced Israel to withdraw from Beirut in late September. Troops from Britain, France, Italy and the United States were interposed between the Israeli army and Beirut, with U.S. Marines deployed in the most sensitive area south of Beirut at the International Airport, directly between Israeli troops and West Beirut.

It was at the airport that the Marines would suffer their Calvary over the next year. Starting in January 1983, small Israeli units began probing the Marine lines. At first the effort appeared aimed at discovering the extent of Marine determination to resist penetration. The lines proved solid and the Marines' determination strong. Israeli troops were politely but firmly turned away. Soon the incidents escalated, with both sides pointing loaded weapons at each other but no firing taking place. Tensions were high enough by late January that a special meeting between U.S. and Israeli officers was held in Beirut to try to agree on precise boundaries beyond which the IDF would not penetrate.10

No Stranger to the Marines

However, on Feb. 2 a unit of three Israeli tanks, led by Israeli Lt. Col. Rafi Landsberg, tried to pass through Marine/Lebanese Army lines at Rayan University Library in south Lebanon. By this time, Landsberg was no stranger to the Marines. Since the beginning of January he had been leading small Israeli units in probes against the Marine lines, although such units would normally have a commander no higher than a sergeant or lieutenant. The suspicion grew that Sharon's troops were deliberately provoking the Marines and Landsberg was there to see that things did not get out of hand. The Israeli tactics were aimed more at forcing a joint U.S.-Israeli strategy than merely probing lines.

In the Feb. 2 incident, the checkpoint was commanded by Marine Capt. Charles Johnson, who firmly refused permission for Landsberg to advance. When two of the Israeli tanks ignored his warning to halt, Johnson leaped on Landsberg's tank with pistol drawn and demanded Landsberg and his tanks withdraw. They did.11

Landsberg and the Israeli embassy in Washington tried to laugh off the incident, implying that Johnson was a trigger-happy John Wayne type and that the media were exaggerating a routine event. Landsberg even went so far as to claim that he smelled alcohol on Johnson's breath and that drunkenness must have clouded his reason. Marines were infuriated because Johnson was well known as a teetotaler. Americans flocked to Johnson's side. He received hundreds of letters from school children, former Marines and from Commandant Barrow.12 It was a losing battle for the Israelis and Landsberg soon dropped from sight.

But the incidents did not stop. These now included "helicopter harassment," by which U.S.-made helicopters with glaring spotlights were flown by the Israelis over Marine positions at night, illuminating Marine outposts and exposing them to potential attack. As reports of these incidents piled up, Gen. Barrow received a letter on March 12 from a U.S. Army major stationed in Lebanon with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO). The letter described a systematic pattern of Israeli attacks and provocations against UNTSO troops, including instances in which U.S. officers were singled out for "near-miss" shootings, abuse and detention.13 That same day two Marine patrols were challenged and cursed by Israeli soldiers.14

Two days later Barrow wrote his letter to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, who endorsed it and sent it along to the State Department. High-level meetings were arranged and the incidents abated, perhaps largely because by this time Ariel Sharon had been fired as defense minister. He had been found by an Israeli commission to have had "personal responsibility" for the Sabra and Shatila massacres.15

Despite the bad taste left from the clashes with the Israelis, in fact no Marines had been killed in the incidents and their lines had been secure up to the end of winter in 1983. Then Islamic guerrillas, backed by Iran, became active. On the night of April 17, 1983, an unknown sniper fired a shot that went through the trousers of a Marine sentry but did not harm him. For the first time, the Marines returned fire.16

The next day, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was blown up by a massive bomb, with the loss of 63 lives. Among the 17 Americans killed were CIA Mideast specialists, including Robert C. Ames, the agency's top Middle East expert.17 Disaffected former Israeli Mossad case officer Victor Ostrovsky later claimed that Israel had advance information about the bombing plan but had decided not to inform the United States, a claim denied by Israel.18 The Iranian-backed Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. Veteran correspondent John Cooley con-
sidered the attack "the day [Iranian leader Ayatollah] Khomeini's offensive against America in Lebanon began in earnest."19

Still, it was not until four months later, on Aug. 28, that Marines came under direct fire by rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons at International Airport. They returned fire with M-16 rifles and M-60 machine guns. The firefight resumed the next day with Marines firing 155mm artillery, 81mm mortars and rockets from Cobra helicopter gunships against Shi'i Muslim positions. Two Marines were killed and 14 wounded in the exchange, the first casualties in actual combat since the Marines had landed the previous year.20

From this time on, the combat involvement of the Marines grew. Their actions were generally seen as siding with Israel against Muslims, slowly changing the status of the Marines as neutral peacekeepers to opponents of the Muslims.21 Israel could hardly have wished for more. The polarization meant that increasingly the conflict was being perceived in terms of the U.S., Israel and Lebanon's Christians against Iran, Islam and Lebanon's Shi'i Muslims.

Accelerating the Conflict

Israel accelerated the building conflict on Sept. 3, 1993 by unilaterally withdrawing its troops southward, leaving the Marines exposed behind their thin lines at the airport. The United States had asked the Israeli government to delay its withdrawal until the Marines could be replaced by units of the Lebanese army, but Israel refused.22 The result was as feared. Heavy fighting immediately broke out between the Christian Lebanese Forces and the pro-Syrian Druze units, both seeking to occupy positions evacuated by Israel, while the Marines were left in the crossfire.23 On Sept. 5, two Marines were killed and three wounded as fighting escalated between Christian and Muslim militias.24

In an ill-considered effort to subdue the combat, the Sixth Fleet frigate Bowen fired several five-inch naval guns, hitting Druze artillery positions in the Chouf Mountains that were firing into the Marine compound at Beirut airport.25 It was the first time U.S. ships had fired into Lebanon, dramatically raising the level of combat. But the Marines' exposed location on the flat terrain of the airport left them in an impossible position. On Sept. 12, three more Marines were wounded.26

On Sept. 13, President Reagan authorized what was called aggressive self-defense for the Marines, including air and naval strikes.27 Five days later the United States essentially joined the war against the Muslims when four U.S. warships unleashed the heaviest naval bombardment since Vietnam into Syrian and Druze positions in eastern Lebanon in support of the Lebanese Christians.28 The bombardment lasted for three days and was personally ordered by National Security Council director Robert McFarlane, a Marine Corps officer detailed to the White House who was in Lebanon at the time and was also a strong supporter of Israel and its Lebanese Maronite Christian allies. McFarlane issued the order despite the fact that the Marine commander at the airport, Colonel Timothy Geraghty, strenuously argued against it because, in the words of correspondent Thomas L. Friedman, "he knew that it would make his soldiers party to what was now clearly an intra-Lebanese fight, and that the Lebanese Muslims would not retaliate against the Navy's ships at sea but against the Marines on shore."29

By now, the Marines were under daily attack and Muslims were charging they were no longer neutral.30 At the same time the battleship USS New Jersey, with 16-inch guns, arrived off Lebanon, increasing the number of U.S. warships offshore to 14. Similarly, the Marine contingent at Beirut airport was increased from 1,200 to 1,600.31

A Tragic Climax

The fight now was truly joined between the Shi'i Muslims and the Marines, who were essentially pinned down in their airport bunkers and under orders not to take offensive actions. The tragic climax of their predicament came on Oct. 23, when a Muslim guerrilla drove a truck past guards at the Marine airport compound and detonated an explosive with the force of 12,000 pounds of dynamite under a building housing Marines and other U.S. personnel. Almost simultaneously, a car-bomb exploded at the French compound in Beirut. Casualties were 241 Americans and 58 French troops killed. The bombings were the work of Hezbollah, made up of Shi'i Muslim guerrillas supported by Iran.32

America's agony increased on Dec. 3, when two carrier planes were downed by Syrian missiles during heavy U.S. air raids on eastern Lebanon.33 On the same day, eight Marines were killed in fighting with Muslim militiamen around the Beirut airport.34

By the start of 1984, an all-out Shi'i Muslim campaign to rid Lebanon of all Americans was underway. The highly respected president of the American University of Beirut, Dr. Malcolm Kerr, a distinguished scholar of the Arab world, was gunned down on Jan. 18 outside his office by Islamic militants aligned with Iran.35 On Feb. 5, Reagan made one of his stand-tall speeches by saying that "the situation in Lebanon is difficult, frustrating and dangerous. But this is no reason to turn our backs on friends and to cut and run."36

The next day Professor Frank Regier, a U.S. citizen teaching at AUB, was kidnapped by Muslim radicals.37 Regier's kidnapping was the beginning of a series of kidnappings of Americans in Beirut that would hound the Reagan and later the Bush administrations for years and lead to the eventual expulsion of nearly all Americans from Lebanon where they had prospered for more than a century. Even today Americans still are prohibited from traveling to Lebanon.

The day after Regier's kidnapping, on Feb. 7, 1984, Reagan suddenly reversed himself and announced that all U.S. Marines would shortly be "redeployed." The next day the battleship USS New Jersey fired 290 rounds of one-ton shells from its 16-inch guns into Lebanon as a final act of U.S. frustration.38 Reagan's "redeployment" was completed by Feb. 26, when the last of the Marines retreated from Lebanon.

The mission of the Marines had been a humiliating failure--not because they failed in their duty but because the political backbone in Washington was lacking. The Marines had arrived in 1982 with all sides welcoming them. They left in 1984 despised by many and the object of attacks by Muslims. Even relations with Israel were strained, if not in Washington where a sympathetic Congress granted increased aid to the Jewish state to compensate it for the costs of its bungled invasion, then between the Marines and Israeli troops who had confronted each other in a realpolitik battlefield that was beyond their competence or understanding. The Marine experience in Lebanon did not contribute toward a favorable impression of Israel among many Americans, especially since the Marines would not have been in Lebanon except for Israel's unprovoked invasion.

This negative result is perhaps one reason a number of Israelis and their supporters today oppose sending U.S. peacekeepers to the Golan Heights as part of a possible Israeli-Syrian peace treaty. A repeat of the 1982-84 experience would certainly not be in Israel's interests at a time when its supporters are seeking to have a budget-conscious Congress continue unprecedented amounts of aid to Israel.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Ball, George, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, Washington, DC, Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984.

*Cockburn, Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story of the U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship, New York, Harper Collins, 1991.

Cooley, John K., Payback: America's Long War in the Middle East, New York, Brassey's U.S., Inc., 1991.

*Findley, Paul, Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts About the U.S.-Israeli Relationship, Brooklyn, NY, Lawrence Hill Books, 1993.

Fisk, Robert, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon, New York, Atheneum, 1990.

Frank, Benis M., U.S. Marines in Lebanon: 1982-1984, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1987.

*Friedman, Thomas L., From Beirut to Jerusalem, New York, Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1989.

*Green, Stephen, Living by the Sword, Amana, 1988.

*Jansen, Michael, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon, London, Zed Press, 1982.

MacBride, Sean, Israel in Lebanon: The Report of the International Commission to enquire into reported violations of international law by Israel during its invasion of Lebanon, London, Ithaca Press, 1983.

Ostrovsky, Victor and Claire Hoy, By Way of Deception, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990.

Peck, Juliana S., The Reagan Administration and the Palestinian Question: The First Thousand Days, Washington, DC, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984.

*Randal, Jonathan, Going all the Way, New York, The Viking Press, 1983.

Schechla, Joseph, The Iron Fist: Israel's Occupation of South Lebanon, 1982-1985, Washington, D.C.: ADC Research Institute, Issue Paper No. 17, 1985.

*Schiff, Ze'ev and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984.

Timerman, Jacobo, The Longest War: Israel in Lebanon, New York, Vantage Books, 1982.

Woodward, Bob, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987.

* Available through the AET Book Club.

NOTES:

1 New York Times, 3/18/83. For a detailed review of these clashes, see Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 177-92, and Clyde Mark, "The Multinational Force in Lebanon," Congressional Research Service, 5/19/83.

2 See "NBC Nightly News," 6:30 PM EST, 3/17/86; also, George C. Wilson, Washington Post, 2/5/83.

3 Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, p. 51; Cooley, Payback, pp. 69-71.

4 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982-1984, p. 137.

5 Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon: 1982-1984, Appendix F.

6 New York Times, 10/1/82. Also see Cooley, Payback, p. 71; Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 175-77

7 The text is in New York Times, 9/30/82. Also see Peck, The Reagan Administration and the Palestinian Question, p. 76.

8 Schiff & Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, p. 225.

9 "Chronology of the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer/Fall 1982,
p. 189.

10 Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 178-80.

11 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982-1984, pp. 45-46.

12 Ibid.

13 Green, Living by the Sword, p. 182.

14 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982-1984, p. 56.

15 New York Times, 2/9/83; "Final Report of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry," Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1983, pp. 89-116.

16 Frank, U.S Marines in Lebanon: 1982-1984, p. 56.

17 New York Times, 4/22/83 and 4/26/83. For more detail on CIA victims, see Charles R Babcock, Washington Post, 8/5/86, and Woodward, Veil, pp. 244-45.

18 Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception, p. 321.

19 Cooley, Payback, p. 76.

20 New York Times, 8/30/83.

21 Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, pp. 75-77.

22 New York Times, 9/5/83.

23 Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp. 489-91; Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, p. 179.

24 New York Times, 9/6/83.

25 Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 505.

26 New York Times, 9/14/83.

27 New York Times, 9/13/83.

28 Philip Taubman and Joel Brinkley, New York Times, 12/11/83. Also see Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison, p. 335; Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 505; Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, p. 210.

29 Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, pp. 200-01. Also see Green, Living by the Sword, pp. 190-92.

30 New York Times, 9/29/83.

31 New York Times, 9/25/83; David Koff, "Chronology of the War in Lebanon, Sept.-November, 1983," Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1984, pp. 133-35.

32 Philip Taubman and Joel Brinkley, New York Times, 12/11/83. Also see Cooley, Payback, pp. 80-91; Fisk, Pity the Nation, pp. 511-22; Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, pp. 201-4; Woodward, Veil, pp. 285-87.

33 New York Times, 1/4/84; Cooley, Payback, pp. 95-97.

34 New York Times, 12/4/83.

35 New York Times, 1/19/84. Also see New York Times, 1/29/84, and Cooley, Payback, p. 75. For a chronology of attacks against Americans in this period, see the Atlanta Journal, 1/31/85.

36 Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 533.

37 New York Times, 4/16/84. Also see Cooley, Payback, p. 111; Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 565.

38 Cooley, Payback, p. 102; Fisk, Pity the Nation, p. 533; Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, p. 220.

Donald Neff is author of the Warriors trilogy on U.S.-Middle East relations and of the unpublished Middle East Handbook, a chronological data bank of significant events affecting U.S policy and the Middle East upon which this article is based. His books are available through the AET Book Club.
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