In Memory of a Fallen Comrade

Personal experience ^ | May 28, 2017 | Donald J. Taylor

[cibco]

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[Chainmail]

Hi DJ -

I have a couple of questions about that action and the subsequent events -

1. Was there a dedicated reaction force to support your teams as they were employed? I was in the Marines and we had specific units -company through battalion - that were assigned the mission of rescuing recon or CAP units when the enemy overwhelmed them. They had detailed plans for movement and essentially stood by for immediate movement if they were called. You mentioned that the Division CG didn't come to the rescue. Did they have units that were supposed to do that?

2. Did you or anyone else elevate the request for award for Hunt or any of the others through the army chain to bypass whatever roadblock you ran into? Any correspondence with Congress? Is it still possible? Even though many witnesses have passed on, any written testimony would be strong evidence.

3. I found it crazy that the only artillery support you could bring into action was that 155mm SP battery - and that they did that unbelievable night road march through enemy controlled areas! Why weren't arty units already in direct support of your teams? 155s were GS weapons back then and decidedly not rapid fire weapons. What happened to the DS 105s?

It just seems to me that your units were left hanging out in the breeze with the assumption from Day One that you were expendable.

[little jeremiah]

May I share this with link and attribution?

[DJ Taylor]

"May I share this with link and attribution?"

Yes, you may share my memory of Bill Hunt as often as you please.

[little jeremiah]

Thank you.

[DJ Taylor]

I will attempt to answer your questions, but first you need to understand that attempting to compare U.S. Army Special Forces units with U.S. Marine units in Vietnam just isn’t possible for a number of reasons.

1. 5th Special Forces Group Headquarters, commanded by a Colonel, was in Nha Trang with its four Companies, A, B, C, and D, assigned to the four Corps areas, I Corps, II Corps, III Corps, and IV Corps. Each Special Forces Company was a C-Team, commanded by a LTC, with four B-Teams, commanded by Majors, under it. These four B-Teams were assigned to Province Capitols throughout the Corps area, and each B-Team had four twelve man A-Teams, commanded by Captains, serving under it. These four A-Teams were assigned four areas of responsibility throughout the Province where they constructed A-Camps, recruited and trained Montagnard Tribesmen, and led them in combat operations.

2. Special Forces units in Vietnam had no assigned or attached Aviation units or Artillery units to support us, but, instead, we “depended upon the kindness of strangers.” The only fire support we could depend on was our own 60MM, 81MM, and 4-2 in. mortars.

3. At each C-team in each Corps Area, Special Forces kept a Mike Force Battalion consisting of three Mike Force Companies of Chinese Nungs or Montagnards led by Special Forces NCOs as a reaction force for A-Camps when they came under attack. A Mike Force Battalion of Chinese Nung Mercenaries led by Special Forces NCOs was based at 5th Special Forces Group HQs in Nha Trang as a country wide reaction force to assist any Special Forces unit under attack.

4. The three Nung Mike Force Companies borrowed by the 1st Infantry Division in the November 5, 1966 operation in Tay Ninh Province was the reaction force for all Special Forces units conducting operations in III Corps. The loss of these three Nung Companies curtailed Special Forces combat operations throughout III Corps until three Mike Force Companies of Cambodians could be recruited and trained. Lessons learned: I don’t think Special Forces ever again loaned out any of our Mike Force Companies.

I hope this answered your questions.

We haven’t given up yet, and as long as even one of us remains alive we will continue through channels with the MOH recommendation for MSG William B. Hunt and his recovery.

And, yes, we were expendable.

DJ Taylor

[Chainmail]

Thank you for the detailed explanation -

The only Special Forces folks that I dealt with while I was in Vietnam were the gents we helped evacuate from the A Shau in March '66.

You are correct about the differences in organization between us and the SF. Our philosophy was that if we had something less than a battalion of us out there in Indian Country, we'd ensure that we had reinforcements right around the corner and lots of artillery and on-call fixed wing on a short leash. p>The enemy was very good at massing in a hurry, so we always had plans in place and were task organized to ramp up fast when needed.

It just seems hard to imagine that you had the mission of finding COSVN - an aggressive recon mission, with a nearly certain contact with major forces - and nobody attached to you for rapid reinforcement or fire support. I wouldn't think that you could expect the whole division to come - just too many helo lifts/too few usable LZs - but a grunt battalion with an artillery battery or two with on-call targets would have been a godsend.

I hope you can beat the system and get that award for that heroic soldier.

[DJ Taylor]

You mention the A Shau Valley. Now that brings back a few memories.

I took two reconnaissance patrols into the A Shau in April 1969 and those memories can be found here, if you’re interested:

http://www.projectdelta.net/the_ashau.htm

http://www.projectdelta.net/wrong_valley.htm

[Chainmail]

Excellent, very gripping stories! Thanks for the links..

Welcome Home.

[Rusty0604]

God bless you and God bless William Hunt.

[alfa6]

BKMRK for later

Regards

alfa6 ;>}

[Armscor38]

Just read your post for the 1st time and words fail me.